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Chapter 1
Social Innovation: A Sympathetic and Critical 
Interpretation
Taco Brandsen, Adalbert Evers, Sandro Cattacin and Annette Zimmer
1.1  The Promise and Challenge of Social Innovations
The effort to strengthen social cohesion and lower social inequalities is among Europe’s 
main policy challenges. At the urban level, these great challenges become visible and 
tangible, which in many senses makes cities a microcosm of society. It means that local 
welfare systems are at the forefront of the struggle to address this challenge—and they 
are far from winning. While the statistics show some positive signs, the overall picture 
still shows sharp and sometimes rising inequalities, a loss of social cohesion and failing 
policies of integration and inclusion. When we focus on specific groups in society (e.g. 
migrants), the situation is even more dire. It is clear that new ideas and approaches to 
tackle these very wicked problems are needed.
Contrary to what is sometimes thought, a lack of bottom-up innovation is not 
the issue in itself. European cities are teeming with new ideas, initiated by citizens, 
professionals and policymakers. There are by now many examples of innovation, 
paraded by think tanks and policymakers as tomorrow’s answers. This is certainly 
promising. Yet this altogether too rosy picture obscures some of the drawbacks, 
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which are both practical and academic in nature. In public policy, there has often 
been the suggestion that such innovations will substitute for, rather than comple-
ment, present welfare arrangements. This has made the concept rather suspicious, 
in the eyes of many. It is not our wish to enter into a political debate here, but it 
must be observed that we as yet know little about the broader effects of innova-
tions and how these compare to the effects of established programmes. Also, it is 
often implicitly suggested that social innovation is necessarily good, which is again 
unproven. As we will show in this book, while it is fine to regard social innovation 
with sympathetic eyes, it is misleading to ignore the contested and dark sides of the 
phenomenon.
Academically, there are also various reasons to be careful with the term. To begin 
with, the concept of social innovation is poorly defined and demarcated. Further-
more, innovations are too often presented as “pearls without an oyster”: They are 
pretty to look at, but we do not know where they come from. How do such inno-
vations originate in a specific local context of social relations, regulations, space 
and politics? What exactly did they contribute to local welfare systems? And how 
can we ensure a positive interaction between these forms of social innovation and 
public policies for reform? The European Union (EU)-funded international research 
project “Welfare Innovations at the Local Level in Favour of Cohesion” (WILCO) 
was set up to find out specifically how social innovations can help to deal with the 
challenge of social inclusion, in the context of established local welfare systems.
This entails a special perspective on the phenomenon of social innovation and 
the various promoters, agents of change and social entrepreneurs that are involved 
with them. The new approaches and instruments developed, which are part of so-
cial innovations, should, self-evidently, work “in the here and now”, in the place 
they are operating; but they also contain messages concerning values, hopes and 
assumptions. Other actors, such as the political-administrative system can then en-
gage with and react to innovations in various ways. They can borrow successful 
instruments, adapting them to their own administrative and policy frameworks. But 
equally, these other actors may also feel challenged by the nature of these new in-
struments or by the innovators themselves. There is, then, a significant difference, 
as well as significant room for variation, between making use of innovations, their 
methods and instruments and actually learning from them. From that point of view, 
our analysis of innovation aims to facilitate a broader concept of policy learning that 
goes beyond making (greater) use of social innovations. It tries to understand them 
as socially embedded phenomena, with all the strings attached.
1.2  Social Innovation: A Contested Issue and the Concept 
Proposed by WILCO
The definition of social innovations is a bone of contention. In their overview writ-
ten for the European Commission and the WILCO project, Jenson and Harrison 
have referred to social innovation as a “quasi-concept”, a “hybrid, making use of 
empirical analysis and thereby benefitting from the legitimising aura of the scientif-
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ic method, but simultaneously characterised by an indeterminate quality that makes 
it adaptable to a variety of situations and flexible enough to follow the twists and 
turns of policy, that everyday politics sometimes make necessary” (European Com-
mission 2013, p. 16). Indeed, it has achieved the status of a buzzword in national 
and European policy circles. US President Obama established no less than two of-
fices for social innovation. The EU has used the term to fund several initiatives, 
including the research project upon which this book is based. It is then little wonder 
that the meaning has diluted, sometimes referring to anything that is considered new 
and that is not technical.
Although as an academic concept, it is less wide-ranging, there still remains a 
broad range of interpretations. Some posit simply that it must constitute a new ap-
proach to a particular kind of problem. The Stanford Centre for Social Innovation, 
for example, describes it as “the process of inventing, securing support for, and im-
plementing novel solutions to social needs and problems” (Phillis et al. 2008, p. 34). 
This is a conveniently flexible interpretation, yet one could argue that, according 
to this definition, there is little that does not qualify as a social innovation. Other 
scholars are more specific in circumscribing the nature of innovation. For example, 
the SOCIAL POLIS project defined it as “the satisfaction of alienated human needs 
through the transformation of social relations: transformations which ‘improve’ the 
governance systems that guide and regulate the allocation of goods and services 
meant to satisfy those needs, and which establish new governance structures and 
organizations (discussion forums, political decision-making systems, etc.)” (Mou-
laert 2010, 2013). This implies not only that an innovation must be radical (trans-
formative), but also that it changes the power structure within the system where it 
is introduced. The problem with this kind of definition is less with its normative 
character, but with its essentialist nature. It is true that innovations are about new 
ideas and purposes deriving from established paths and patterns getting practical; 
however, it must be likewise considered that they are about processes and ways of 
development under conditions and in contexts where interaction is not determined 
and foreseeable ex ante. Innovatory effects of a new product, strategy or service can 
be path breaking to different degrees. Thinking this way it becomes clear that what 
is needed is a concept of social innovation as a complex societal process, rather than 
a mere classificatory definition of an action or product.
For the purposes of the WILCO project, we defined social innovation as both 
products and processes; ideas translated into practical approaches; new in the con-
text where they appear. It was important for us to use such a definition, rather than a 
more specific one, because one cannot clearly predict what comes out of even a very 
promising innovation in the course of its development. The problem with defining 
social innovation resides less in “innovation” and much more in the meaning one at-
tributes to “social”. Studying the current literature on conceptualising and defining 
social innovations, one finds that “social” is mainly equated with “improvement” 
(Phillis 2008), finding better answers to basic needs and more satisfying social rela-
tions (Moulaert 2010), and a range of other “good things”.
One way of challenging such an interpretation of “social” has been proposed by 
Johnson in his essay asking “Where good ideas come from” (2010). He argues that 
there are four different environments that create new ideas, processes and things: 
6 T. Brandsen et al.
(a) the ideas of individual inventors working as or with businessmen, (b) ideas of 
individuals in society that may be taken up at different places, (c) market-networked 
innovations, generated by (clusters of) enterprises and their R&D departments and 
finally (d), what he calls “the fourth quadrant” (2010, p. 213), non-market/net-
worked movements inventions and actions making them practical innovations. It is 
then not the more or less technical nature of an innovation, nor the degree to which 
its final (by)effects are beneficial, but the offspring from the realms of society and 
social interactions that might make a difference between innovations at large and 
social innovations. He also tries to show that in the last centuries, there has been a 
swing from individual and business based to what he calls “non-market/networked” 
based (social) innovations. It would be tempting to discuss then in which ways there 
is a link between more social innovation and more civil society as a fertile ground 
for processes that generate and give room to such innovations.
The view proposed by Johnson may allow a more subtle understanding of the 
prevailing broad consensus on the positive definition of the “social” aspect of social 
innovation (see BEPA 2010; Mulgan 2006). They may not always be seen unani-
mously as good, but possibly as more promising or attractive than previous ar-
rangements, or in comparison to the lifestyles created by the innovative products, 
services or regulations of big business and big government. While this allows us 
to feel sympathetic towards social innovations, we must still remain critical about 
statements and definitions that declare them as inherently good.
Interpretations of the added value and success of social innovations, which re-
flect what is seen as good and better for society, will often be widely contested. By 
definition, innovations differ from prevailing routines, forms of thinking and acting. 
It is possible that they may become a mainstream practice, but this is never the case 
at the outset. They can be linked with a diverse range of goals and come to take on 
different meanings over time. Just as important as the initial goals of social innova-
tion are wider political concepts and institutional systems in which they become 
embedded (see e.g. Osborne and Brown 2011), reactions of the social and economic 
environments, and the hopes for better coping strategies and solutions that they 
attract. The enormous impact of social environments for the shape and directions 
innovations take is a well known topic from the older and more established research 
and debates on technological innovations (see e.g. Chesbrough 2003). Basically all 
innovations, technological and social innovations, are, as convincingly argued by 
Nowotny (1997), marked by a high degree of risk and uncertainty in the course of 
their development.
Altogether, this shows that defining innovation—and more specifically social in-
novation—is an issue in an evolving area of study undergoing a great deal of change 
and often linked with normative assumptions.
Against this background, our definition avoids objectifying what is a matter of 
processes involving not only proponents and activists and their initial goals but 
also the ways contexts react and shape the ways and directions social innovations 
develop. We employed the simple criterion that social innovations are those that, 
created mainly by networks and joint action in social realms beyond business and 
government routines, at any given moment, raise the hope and expectations of prog-
ress towards something “better” (a more socially sustainable/democratic/effective 
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society). Whether or not these hopes and expectations come to fruition is harder to 
ascertain, as they depend both on the values and strategies of change agents and 
on the impact of context on these social innovations, which can often only be veri-
fied in retrospect. Thereby we have tried, first, to avoid working with a normative 
concept that is imposed on social processes from a purely academic perspective and 
second, to take account of the fact that innovations are processes with future direc-
tions and meanings that depend on many factors.
Furthermore, we have avoided assuming an inherent link between social innova-
tion and specific organisational forms such as “social enterprises” or an individual 
character or attitude represented by the “social entrepreneur” (for an overview on 
this perspective, see the contributions in Nicholls 2006). The link between social 
innovations and organisational forms should be an empirical question, not a presup-
position.
1.3  Aims and Methodology
The findings described in this collection derive from the research project WILCO 
(“Welfare Innovations at the Local Level in Favour of Cohesion”, 2010–2014). The 
project was funded by the EU under the 7th Framework Programme and included 
universities from ten countries (Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and UK), coordinated by Radboud University 
Nijmegen. Its objectives were twofold:
a. To chart patterns of social inequality and exclusion in European cities.
b. To identify (socially) innovative practices in European cities, specifically related 
to local welfare. It is on the second objective that this book focuses.
With respect to both points, it must be emphasised that our project was not about 
comparing countries and their welfare regimes or systems of governance. Instead, 
we studied urban patterns of inequality and exclusion, and the social innovations 
related to them, within a wider framework of reference than the national level only. 
Today’s social innovations, the patterns and instruments that make them different 
to what exists, are not primarily about regime differences, but about dealing with 
the insufficiencies of traditions and trends shared across European countries. In-
novations generally have to cope with (a) typical patterns of traditional post-war 
welfarism and (b) more recent modernisation strategies building on neo-liberal and 
managerial concepts. As the respective chapters on social innovations in this book 
will show, it is with regard to this international heritage in welfare and governance 
that social innovations make a difference and show commonalities.
Taking an international perspective and looking at commonalities does not, how-
ever, deny the importance of context. Our work has been guided by a perspective 
that underlines the impact of local contexts, of the peculiarities of cities and urban 
areas. These local contexts are not merely local representations of national regimes. 
Cities and their governing elites have room, sometimes wide room, to manoeuvre, 
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as our city chapters in part II of the book show, and these different local contexts 
determine the conditions for the emergence and development of local social innova-
tions, for example, the space given to them, the opportunities for sustainability and 
the scope for policy learning.
In accordance with our understanding of social innovation, focus on the axis 
between specific contexts of local and urban settings on the one hand and innova-
tions taking shape there on the other has been central to our research and constitutes 
the basis of this book. Part II looks at it from the perspective of urban contexts and 
regimes, whereas part III is focussing on typical examples of such local innovations 
and the various ways in which they interact with their local context. To what degree 
and in which ways the interaction of local contexts and innovations is mediated by 
national traditions and trends is a challenge for further research. It was not central 
to this project.
The first period of our research work was devoted to mapping the context of 
social innovations at the local level. We described the historical-institutional back-
grounds on the basis of two dimensions: the structure of the overall welfare state 
and the degree of centralisation and the position of “the local” in shaping welfare. 
For this purpose, we made an inventory of variables that must be regarded as for-
mal preconditions for local welfare policies and initiatives, including key regula-
tions, financial provisions, contractual arrangements and entitlements. Because at 
this concrete level there were many changes in key variables (e.g. in financial and 
regulatory conditions), we set a time frame covering the last 10 years. The variables 
were specified for three policy fields central to the project: childcare, employment 
and housing.
We started with a literature review and conducted six interviews per country 
(two in each of the three policy fields, with public officials and professionals), 60 
overall, to make sure our information was up-to-date. After mapping the national 
backgrounds to social innovation, we moved to the local level. We chose 20 Euro-
pean cities (two per country) on which we focused our further research. The cho-
sen cities were: Münster and Berlin Friedrichshain—Kreuzberg (DE), Zagreb and 
Varazdin (HR), Amsterdam and Nijmegen (NL), Barcelona and Pamplona (ES), 
Milan and Brescia (IT), Stockholm and Malmö (SE), Birmingham and Medway 
area (UK), Warsaw and Plock (PL), Lille and Nantes (FR), and Bern and Genève 
(CH). For the 20 chosen cities, we gathered data about social inequality and exclu-
sion in the local labour market, housing market and childcare facilities, as well as 
more general data on patterns of social cohesion. Specifically, we identified the 
relative position of age, gender and migrant groups with respect to general patterns 
of social inequality and exclusion. Data collection consisted of two parts. The first 
was an analysis of the Eurostat Database Urban Audit that includes data for more 
than 200 European cities; it constituted the background for our comparative analy-
sis. The second part consisted of 360 intensive interviews, 36 in each country (six 
interviews for each group mentioned above in each city). The analysis was aimed 
at describing the living conditions of people experiencing difficult situations and at 
identifying the strategies they adopt in order to deal with them. This first stage of 
the project has been the subject of a separate book (Ranci et al. 2014).
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Having identified the contexts of social innovation in local welfare in the first 
period of the research, the project then turned to the innovations themselves. In 
order to do so, a distinction was made between the core ideas behind local welfare 
and the concrete approaches and instruments through which local welfare is imple-
mented.
The first part of this second stage of our research focused on discourses on so-
cial inequality, social cohesion and their links with overarching concepts for local 
economic growth and urban development. We examined the ways these shaped the 
three policy fields mentioned above, revealing the locally prevailing practices, core 
ideas and discourses that drive local welfare systems and their governance.
In the second part of our analysis, interviews were conducted with experts, poli-
cymakers, administrators and key persons in the three policy fields, which included 
questions about what they considered new and promising in their local context in 
terms of activities, concepts and organisations. This matched with our concept of 
looking at social innovations as risky and basically open processes, leaving it to 
central stakeholders what to qualify as new, innovative and promising. Our final 
choice of local social innovations to be studied (three to five per city) was thereby 
guided and informed by local knowledge.
We described instruments and approaches used to fight against social inequality 
and stimulate social cohesion. By virtue of the knowledge accumulated in previous 
phases of the research, we could assess how instruments and approaches were inno-
vative in their contexts. It allowed us to generate a more concrete knowledge about 
what kind of shared patterns make up for social innovations. What instruments and 
approaches do they use when they try to act different and better? We were interested 
in styles of services rendered, forms of organisation and working patterns and in is-
sues of governance. The development of such local innovations was understood as a 
co-product of their own strategies and of the impact of local discursive contexts. In 
total, we gathered information about 77 social innovations. This was done primarily 
through an additional 180 interviews (Table 1.1).
The key methods used were:
• An analysis of documentation, including policy documents produced by the 
stakeholders in the chosen policy fields, parliamentary protocols produced at the 
local level discussing choices taken in the policy fields and newspaper articles 
produced in the local press concerning the policy fields.
• Qualitative semi-structured interviews with stakeholders both within the anal-
ysed fields and at the level of general policy with policymakers, civil servants, 
representatives of civil society organisations and representatives of our three 
chosen groups. In total, we carried out about 12 interviews per policy field per 
country and 360 interviews overall.
• To involve stakeholders in the progress of the research, focus groups were organ-
ised in each city to invite policymakers, civil servants, representatives of civil 
society organisations and representatives of the three groups of interest.
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1.4  Contributions to the Book
Part II of the book summarises the overall findings, addressing the topics of how 
local development and its innovative elements are framed and shaped by urban 
regimes and local governance arrangements. Contributions illustrate how local con-
text and urban welfare politics with their respective governance arrangements func-
tion as a framework that defines room and limits for social innovations. As such, 
the contributions of this chapter exemplify the general findings of the research as 
regards specific governance arrangements with a detailed analysis of a city. Each 
city corresponds to a specific arrangement and thoroughly highlights the identified 
dimensions.
The introductory chapter on urban governance and social innovations by Sandro 
Cattacin and Annette Zimmer highlights the urban governance arrangements identi-
fied by WILCO. These arrangements provide very different opportunity structures 
for social innovations. They are characterised by following dimensions:
• The governance of cooperation is characterised by a general orientation on in-
novation in politics and economics; the search of synergies between economics 
and social policies to foster the urban character of the city operates as the main 
orientation.
• The governance of growth prioritises economics and economic interest groups. 
Social problems are individualised and innovation in the social field is relegated 
to the self-organisation of groups.
Table 1.1  Overview of methods
Stage of the project Focus Data collection
Stage one Collecting data about social inequality 
and exclusion in the local labour 
market, housing market and childcare 
facilities, as well as more general data 
on patterns of social cohesion
Analysis of the Eurostat database 
urban audit
Interviews with migrants, young 
unemployed, single mothers (360 
overall)
Stage two—
preparatory phase
Update on the state of the art Literature review
Six interviews per country
Stage two—analysis 
of cities
Cities (Münster and Berlin Fried-
richshain—Kreuzberg (DE), Zagreb 
and Varazdin (HR), Amsterdam 
and Nijmegen (NL), Barcelona and 
Pamplona (ES), Milan and Brescia 
(IT), Stockholm and Malmö (SE), 
Birmingham and Medway area (UK), 
Warsaw and Plock (PL), Lille and 
Nantes (FR), Bern and Genève (CH)
Analysis of policy documents, 
parliamentary protocols and 
newspaper articles
Qualitative semi-structured 
interviews (12 per policy field per 
country, 360 overall)
Stakeholder meetings (20 overall)
Stage two—analysis 
of innovations
Social innovations (3–5 per city, 
77 overall; full list available on 
www.wilcoproject.eu)
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• The governance of social challenges develops social policies through state-ori-
ented initiatives that are coordinated with private non-profits.
• The conflicting governance of social and economic challenges describes policy 
developments based on a competition for public investment in economic or so-
cial initiatives. No clear priorities are stated and decisions depend on the mobili-
sation of interest groups.
The next chapter in this part, by Christina Rentzsch, concerns the German city of 
Münster. This city’s governance regime is influenced both by traditions and struc-
tural changes. In line with this political context, economics and local welfare policy 
appear to be geared towards innovation—which is characteristic for such a regime. 
Furthermore, non-profit organisations are heavily integrated in local welfare provi-
sion. The underlying idea is the attainment of broad-based involvement of various 
actors from different sectors of society. Nevertheless, this orientation towards col-
laborative governance of innovation has started to change, that is, increasing com-
petition between municipalities led to stakeholders focusing intently on strength-
ening the attractiveness of Münster as such. Therefore, over the last few years, 
Münster has gradually shifted away from being the poster-child of such an ideal 
regime towards a more economically oriented regime. This regime transition could, 
moreover, pose a threat—in the long run—to the tradition of third sector involve-
ment and citizens’ influence at the local level, to the benefit of investors’ interests.
The chapter on Malmö by Ola Segnestam Larsson, Marie Nordfeldt and Anna 
Carrigan serves as an illustration of how urban governance arrangements provide 
structures for social innovations and where the city of Malmö could be categorised 
as an example of the governance of social challenges. The chapter contributes to 
the debate on social innovations by arguing that attention must be paid also to the 
relationship between inertia, clearings in local contexts and innovations in order to 
understand the underpinnings of social innovations in local welfare regimes. Spe-
cifically, in addition to describing the local welfare regime and a set of social in-
novations in the city of Malmö, the chapter analyses the different types of clearings 
that proved fertile for the development of the social innovations under study. Rather 
than arguing that social innovations come to the fore as a result of the quality of 
certain individuals or being locally and socially embedded, the authors put forth that 
innovations also may emerge in clearings as a consequence of inertia, in the case 
of Malmö in the shape and form of an unwillingness to change due to political and 
ideological factors.
The next chapter, by Nadia Brookes, Jeremy Kendall and Lavinia Mitton, focuses 
on Birmingham, the UK’s second largest city with a growing number of residents, 
the youngest population of any major European city and significant diversity in 
terms of ethnic composition. There is general agreement across the city that a local 
welfare system should support vulnerable people and promote equality and inclu-
sion, both socially and economically. In the UK, however, social policy tends to be 
centrally driven and funded, although there is often scope as to how this is imple-
mented at a local level. There is consensus in Birmingham on the nature of social 
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problems and the local political decision-making process allows for policy solu-
tions to be developed. Another reason for consensus is economic growth, important 
for all cities and enhancing the quality of life of residents, usually linked to social 
inclusion. Although social policy coordination in Birmingham is characterised by 
partnerships, decisions are not usually implemented without the involvement of lo-
cal government.
The chapter about Geneva by Patricia Naegeli shows that Geneva’s governance 
arrangements are built on a strong local and cantonal state that uses the support of 
subsidised non-profit organisations in order to implement local welfare decisions. 
In the Swiss context, which is based on the principle of subsidiarity, this is quite an 
exception. It can be explained by a strong public administration that influences all 
local welfare decisions in a conservative way and the presence of a relative consen-
sus among political forces to have “generous” social policies. Yet since the 2000s, 
newcomer parties have challenged political stability and long-lasting conflicting 
debates within the city council and the cantonal parliament. Both the influence of 
neighbouring France, where social policies are centralised and state-oriented and 
the strong economy of Geneva that can finance “generous” social measures are part 
of the explanation. However, in the governance of social challenges, social inno-
vation tends to be incremental, and seems to happen within the public sector or at 
least, under the guidance of the local or cantonal state.
Milan, the focus of the chapter by Giuliana Costa, Roberta Cucca and Rossana 
Torri, can be described as a city lost in transition. For more than two decades, Milan 
has been ruled by a strongly market-oriented system of governance, following the 
rhetoric that creating a “good business climate” is not only an effective way to foster 
growth and innovation, but also to eradicate poverty and to deliver higher standards 
of living. This approach has led to (a) a disinvestment in welfare services directly 
provided by the municipality, in favour of a more residual welfare system based on 
non-profit and private involvement and (b) a huge investment in neo-liberal tools of 
government for the economic development of the city, such as the promotion of in-
ternational events (Expo2015) and large real estate investments through public–pri-
vate partnerships. After some scandals as well as a huge increase of social inequali-
ties, municipal elections rewarded a new coalition following a style of governance 
oriented to a social innovation approach. However, the difficult financial situation 
of the municipality has reduced ambitions of the current government.
The chapter by Benjamin Ewert on Berlin shows that for a long time the city ben-
efitted immensely from the myth to be “poor but sexy”. The popular slogan, refer-
ring to the coexistence of impoverishment and creativity in the city, expressed very 
well the Berlin Zeitgeist promising “a good life for little money”. Hence the city 
has been a home for creative workers, artists, cosmopolitans and young people from 
all over the world, literally speaking “change agents” that sustainably co-designed 
Berlin as a place for unconventional life styles and innovative solutions for every-
day challenges. This chapter argues, however, that Berlin’s sources for innovative 
capital may dry up in the near future due to the re-emergence of social challenges 
that tend to eclipse the improvements emanating from social innovations. There are 
very different ways of giving innovatory practices and organisations a preliminary 
place in the architecture of public policies and forms of governance. A new system 
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for establishing a back and forth between the political administrative system and 
social innovations has still to be developed.
Part III of the book focuses on distinctive types of innovations, describing two 
basic aspects. The first concerns their internal characteristics, approaches and in-
struments used. The major goals of innovators and innovations will be sketched, as 
well as the internal governance and organisation of innovations. The second aspect 
concerns the context of the innovation and the ways the innovators deal with it. The 
creation of innovations is to a large degree contingent and their dynamic risky. The 
focus is on their interplay with the urban and city context of the innovation, the 
climate(s) of a city and the locally prevailing political strategy and its role in the 
policy field where the innovation is located. Contributions in this part represent a 
choice of more detailed and elaborated case studies carried out as part of WILCO, 
published in an e-book in 2014 (see: Evers et al. 2014).
The introductory chapter to this part on the nature and relevance of local social 
innovations by Adalbert Evers and Taco Brandsen deals with two issues. First of all 
it identifies and analyses recurring approaches and instruments in local social inno-
vations that differ from those dominating in the past and prevailing presently. These 
include the search for new ways of addressing users and citizens; the emphasis on 
new risks and related approaches to the issues of rights and responsibilities, ways 
of organising and working; and finally the concern with issues of governance. The 
features of these local innovations may have significance for welfare systems at 
large, going beyond the introduction of special new items in special fields. Second-
ly, the chapter discusses the kinds of typical relationships of innovations with their 
environments, as they are embedded in local contexts, reaching from tolerance to 
policies of mainstreaming. This helps to determine the local conditions and support 
innovations required for innovations to unfold, blossom and become part of chang-
ing local welfare systems in various ways. For the discussion of policies on social 
innovation, that is, approaches and instruments, and of politics of social innovation, 
shaping the processes of their development over time, a common metaphor is used: 
understanding social innovations as messages with a content that may be read and 
understood differently by the addressees in the (local) contexts, assuming such mes-
sages find their ways, are read and interpreted with some degree of interest.
The next chapter in this third part is on the MaMa Foundation, Warsaw, 
described by Renata Siemieńska, Anna Domaradzka and Ilona Matysiak. It is 
a non-profit organisation established in June 2006 by young, highly educated 
mothers. Its activities are based on the idea that mothers and fathers with young 
children should be able to increase their participation in local public and so-
cial life through the elimination of cultural and architectural barriers. MaMa 
Foundation’s modes of working include social campaigns, such as “O Mamma 
Mia! I cannot drive my pram in here!”—a campaign for adapting public spaces 
to prams and wheelchairs; campaigns for employees’ rights, such as “Horror 
Stories”, which lists examples of dismissing mothers from their jobs; legal and 
psychological advice; and workshops for female refugees. MaMa Foundation 
starts many cultural and artistic initiatives as well as educational projects. It 
also supports local moms’ clubs organising workshops for mothers and local 
leaders and promotes the economic value of women’s housework.
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“RODA” (“Parents in Action”) in Zagreb, described by Gojko Bežovan, Jelena 
Matančević and Danijel Baturina, is a civil society organisation founded in 2001 
by a group of mothers as direct answer to the reductions of maternity leave ben-
efits. Over time, the organisation evolved into a group of concerned and engaged 
citizens interested in promoting and protecting the rights to a dignified pregnancy, 
parenthood and childhood in Croatia. Being fully engaged in meeting the needs of 
their members, and equipped with an entrepreneur spirit, the organisation launched 
the production of cotton diapers, organised in sheltered workshops. It was the first 
organisation of its kind that emerged in the broader field of family policy. It is ac-
tively involved in advocacy for changing regulations in family and health policies 
at national and local levels.
Francesca Broersma, Taco Brandsen and Joost Fledderus discuss the Neigh-
bourhood Stores for Education, Research, and Talent Development (Buurtwinkel 
voor Onderwijs, Onderzoek en Talentontwikkeling, BOOTs) in Amsterdam, an ini-
tiative of the Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences. In BOOTs, the students 
of the Hogeschool van Amsterdam (HvA)—under supervision of teachers and pro-
fessionals—provide certain (welfare) services for residents in so-called problem 
areas. In this manner, the students develop practical skills while also assisting the 
residents of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, either directly by offering services to 
residents themselves or indirectly by offering services to partner organisations. The 
services offered by BOOTs include financial, legal, and social consultation hours, 
homework support for 6–10-year-olds and an atelier for urban renewal. In addition, 
depending on the needs of a specific neighbourhood, BOOTs may also engage in 
other activities.
The chapter on Ilot Stephenson, the co-production of housing in a major urban 
renewal district in Lille, written by Laurent Fraisse, analyses how an historical local 
dispute in a renewal operation has led to an emblematic housing innovation called 
Ilot Stephenson at the periphery of one of the biggest urban renewal projects in the 
Roubaix-Tourcoing-Wattrelot district. A protest by inhabitants against the demoli-
tion of popular housing led to co-production between architects, local authorities 
and inhabitants. Access to homes at reduced cost has been achieved thanks to an 
innovative mode of architectural intervention that encourages inhabitants’ partici-
pation in the self-rehabilitation of their neighbourhood. The building phase is no 
longer considered as a parenthesis in inhabitants’ lives, but as an important oppor-
tunity for public expression and civic participation.
The Neighbourhood Children Services in Pamplona, analysed by Manuel Agui-
lar Hendrickson and Marta Llobet Estany, are social activities aimed at the pre-
vention of social problems amongst children in Pamplona. They are the result of a 
movement of community associations that developed leisure activities for children 
and their integration into the local government structure of social services while 
retaining a specific way of working. They show a blurring of limits between practi-
tioners, volunteers and service users, who in fact become co-producers of services. 
It shows as well some of the ambivalence that may be found in social innovation 
projects. Born out of an initiative of grassroots associations, it was integrated into 
the municipal structure due to its effectiveness and efficiency by local authorities 
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that did not have much initial sympathy for such organisations. It has been criticised 
by advocates both of traditional public responsibility on the Left and of a more 
corporate approach to service management on the Right, but it has been able to find 
support on both sides of the political spectrum for different, sometimes opposite 
reasons.
Benjamin Ewert and Adalbert Evers argue that the innovation of “Kreuzberg 
Acts—entrepreneurship in the district” in Berlin results in the intertwining of two 
issues that are usually separated: On the one hand, individual consultancy for (fu-
ture) entrepreneurs and, on the other hand, a concern with community development 
and urban planning addressing different local groups. “Kreuzberg Acts” bridges 
economic and social concerns. For instance, those interested in founding a start-up 
are coached by local mentors how to apply for public subsidies and how to launch 
an effective marketing campaign. Yet, the project is also striving for street cred-
ibility by building bridges to the local economy. Project leaders and participants 
develop strategies how local people may benefit from the district’s booming eco-
nomic sectors such as health care or tourism. Respective inventions are designed in 
a neighbourhood-friendly way, for example, by devising small-scale business ideas 
that fit the local social ecology.
The Fondazione Welfare Ambrosiano in Milan, discussed by Giuliana Costa 
and Stefania Sabatinelli, was created by a heterogeneous group of actors to sup-
port individuals and families dealing with short-term risks and reducing economic 
precariousness. It promotes access to micro-credits by persons who lack financial 
guarantees and/or have a past record of “bad payers”. Two types of micro-credits 
are available: “social credit”, reserved to persons who can hardly afford crucial 
expenses (such as the payment of university fees for their children or unexpected 
health expenditures) and credit for self-employment, to overcome unemployment 
or under-employment. The basic guidelines for actual and future programmes are an 
active approach to hardships following the idea of “we help you to help yourself” 
and the rotation of existing funds in order to be sustainable long-term.
Children to single (lone) mothers, analysed by Marie Nordfeldt, Ola Segnestam 
Larsson and Anna Carrigan, is a project carried out by Fryshuset, a well-known 
and entrepreneurial third-sector organisation with a wide range of activities within 
the field of youth policy. This project started with the aim to support and strengthen 
children living with a single mother in economically vulnerable circumstances. 
From a health perspective, the focus is on the everyday situation of children and 
mothers. This represents an example of an innovation initiated within civil society, 
in line with the traditional role of third-sector organisations to be pioneers and to fo-
cus attention on new needs and new groups with needs that are not covered in other 
ways. There are elements of advocacy in this innovation with the aim to raise at-
tention to the issue of child poverty and the situation of unemployed or low-income 
single mothers. Fryshuset implements this by developing cooperation with different 
stakeholders and spreads awareness on this subject through these channels.
Joost Fledderus, Taco Brandsen and Francesca Broersma discuss “work corpo-
rations” in Nijmegen, social enterprises that aim at reemploying social assistance 
recipients with a considerable distance to the labour market by offering them a place 
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where they can combine work and education. Participants are supposed to become 
more job-ready by actively taking part in courses or educational programmes and 
by getting used to a work rhythm. Furthermore, they sell products or offer services 
together with other participants in order to raise money that is invested in the pro-
gramme itself. This means that a highly active role of participants is expected. For 
the municipality of Nijmegen, the new policy of work corporations represents a 
radical shift: from providing subsidised jobs towards co-produced activation. This 
chapter investigates the origins of this shift and the current organisation and func-
tioning of work corporations.
YEER (Youth Enterprise and Employment Rehearsal) in Birmingham, which Na-
dia Brookes, Jeremy Kendall and Lavinia Mitton have analysed, was set up by The 
Future Melting Pot, a community interest company, to provide business support to 
black and minority ethnic young people who were not in employment, education or 
training. The main aim was to enable participants to set up their own enterprises. 
The project included training, support and access to accredited advisors. The ap-
proach was innovative in that it offered young people an alternative to the con-
ventional focus on getting a job by providing the opportunity to explore the option 
of self-employment in an environment that was needs-led. The approach could be 
described as intensive, personalised support to stimulate entrepreneurialism and an 
example of integrating economic and social domains.
Nadia Brookes, Jeremy Kendall and Lavinia Mitton also discuss the locality ap-
proach to worklessness in Birmingham, an approach to tackling worklessness de-
veloped by the city. It was locality driven and focused on areas where worklessness 
was high. Detailed consultation took place to agree on neighbourhood employment 
and skills plans and services commissioned on that basis. It also had a strong client 
focus adopting an Integrated Employment and Skills model. The aim of the model 
was to offer a continuous service, incorporating the provision of targeted action 
and support that each individual required no matter which provider they accessed. 
It enabled an in-depth understanding of issues for local residents where workless-
ness was high, provided the opportunity for provider organisations to work together 
for the first time and the development of small-scale innovative projects. Key was 
agreement of the major players in the local welfare system and their signing up to 
the model.
Andrea Walter and Danielle Gluns discuss innovations in childcare in Mün-
ster. The general orientation in Münster is collaborative. As such, local elites 
utilise networks and resources in order to put their ideas into practice. The 
chapter outlines the implementation of prevention visits as an example for the 
use of expertise, political connections and negotiating skills. The head of the 
Youth Office—who initiated the visits—is very well connected in the city and 
used these networks in order to improve local child protection. The chapter 
shows how structures and individual agents act in synchronism with regards to 
childcare policy as to obtain the observed outcomes.
The “Citizen’s Agreement for an Inclusive Barcelona” is described by Teresa 
Montagut, Gemma Vilà and Sebastià Riutort. The program “Citizen’s Agreement 
for an Inclusive Barcelona” is an innovative policy in the field of social welfare 
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of the city. It represents a different model of governance based on a new decision-
making process where local government and civil society organisations act together 
with a common strategy. They join efforts and resources with the aim to improve 
social cohesion in Barcelona. One of the powerful outputs of this program is the cre-
ation of several action networks to carry out concrete welfare policies. The chapter 
will analyse the social processes that allowed the emergence and development of 
the program, its effects and expectations of future.
The integration guidelines in Bern are the subject of a chapter by Maxime Felder. 
In the second half of the nineties, due to growing heterogeneity and fragmentation 
of the social and urban structure, and the arrival of new lifestyles (of nationals as 
well as of migrants), Swiss cities started taking charge of the challenges of migrant 
integration. In order to overcome an ageing foreigners law and diverse understand-
ing of concepts and procedures, the city of Bern decided to elaborate a concept of 
guidelines and recommendations regarding integration of migrant populations. A 
large consultation resulted in a widely publicised document compiling recommen-
dations addressing everyone, and particularly institutional actors. The document 
was meant to inform the population about the position and aims of the city council 
regarding integration. This way of discussing, negotiating and writing down guide-
lines supports participation and acceptance through involvement of stakeholders 
and acknowledges the limits of traditional welfare governance operating by en-
forceable rules in a field like integration.
The fourth and final part of the book (Part IV) is devoted to crosscutting and 
conclusive issues.
A chapter on the dark side of social innovation by Ola Larsson and Taco Brand-
sen critically appraises the concept and practice of social innovation. Normative 
assumptions behind research on social innovation tend to obscure the dark sides of 
the phenomenon, such as failure, political conflict and oppression. One of the aims 
of the WILCO project was to identify lessons for social policies and ultimately im-
prove social cohesion. Such an optimistic approach should not, however, prevent us 
from discussing the more disturbing elements that the researchers identified.
The final conclusive chapter of the book by Taco Brandsen, Sandro Cattacin, 
Adalbert Evers and Annette Zimmer, gives an overview of the Good, the Bad 
and the Ugly in social innovation. It discusses the implications of the findings, 
for policymakers and professionals as well as the academic research agenda. 
“Good” signifies what innovations can contribute to a society’s ability to cope 
with change and, more precisely, to do it in a way that change can is perceived 
as progress in civility. “Bad” signifies the shortcomings of social innovations—
especially their limited impact in an overall averse social and policy context. 
“Ugly” stands for discourses that deal with social innovations as if they were 
something else—usually, treating them like market-based products and technol-
ogies. On the basis of the overall evidence on the potential and limits of social 
innovation discourse, the chapter will give a balanced assessment of the state of 
the art of social innovation and of social innovation research.
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Part II
Urban Contexts for Local Innovations
How do social innovations come to the fore? Are they exclusively based on the 
entrepreneurial spirit of change makers? And what makes social innovations work? 
Can a solid business plan make innovations sustainable? In other words, does sur-
vival of the fittest also hold true for social innovations? From this Darwinist per-
spective, social innovations are perceived as new products geared towards address-
ing new societal needs in competitive markets.
We question whether this perspective, based on microeconomics, really helps us 
understand how social innovations emerge, are further developed and finally inte-
grated into the repertoire of welfare politics at the local level. Instead, we argue that, 
particularly at the local level, the emergence, development and firm establishment 
of social innovations constitute a political process whose outcome is highly depen-
dent on both a decisive set of environmental factors, including coalition building, 
and specific constellations of actors. From our point of view, social innovations are 
highly embedded in their environment.
And indeed, environments differ significantly. Research has demonstrated that 
some environmental factors, like freedom, diversity and density of contacts, are 
correlated with innovation (Evers et al. 2014). That is why cities have always been 
places of innovation (Cattacin 2011). But the innovative capacity of cites differs, 
and we think that these differences are related not only to the factors mentioned but 
also to strategies and dynamics linked to government decisions and lobbies in the 
economic and social spheres. In particular, analyses of social innovation have to 
take into account these decisions and these actors. European cities, which are at the 
centre of our analysis, stand out for their diversity in terms of government set-up, 
social-policy traditions and local political cultures.
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Hence, we argue that social innovations have to be analysed against the back-
ground of their specific contexts or, to put it differently, that social innovations at 
the local level are the outcome of a political process and as such a reflection of city-
specific (welfare) cultures—the institutional perspective—and local governance ar-
rangements—the political perspective. These city-specific settings create both op-
portunity structures and constraints for new ideas and concepts that are put forward 
by agents in alliance with like-minded persons and brokers and which develop into 
locally embedded social innovations.
Although European cities are renowned for their specificity, their local tradi-
tions and their particular flair, the rich empirical material we have collected within 
the framework of the European project Welfare Innovations at the Local Level in 
Favour of Cohesion (WILCO)1 allows us to identify groups of similar urban-gov-
ernance arrangements.
This chapter provides portraits of these arrangements, which constitute the 
bedrock on which social innovations are built, based on a comparative analysis of 
governance and social innovations in the 20 cities included in the project. Doubt-
lessly, characterising specific constellations and hence developing a typology of 
governance arrangements that might enable, foster or discourage processes of social 
innovation constitute a courageous undertaking. We are aware that the governance 
arrangements we identify do not do justice to the complexity and variety of gover-
nance constellations to be found in European cities. But the typology of constella-
tions we lay out here may be helpful for researchers of urban governance as well 
as policymakers trying to give meaning to the puzzling world of new ideas and ap-
proaches grouped together under the umbrella term social innovation. The typology 
may also help us better understand why some social innovations face a tough time 
being accepted and integrated into local welfare politics.
Of course, we have not developed the typology out of the blue. The four specific 
governance arrangements we identified are the outcome of in-depth analysis of the 
rich empirical material that researchers from ten different countries collected from 
Amsterdam to Warsaw.2 From a methodological point of view, we took advantage 
of various distinct streams of research and theory building. In particular, we have 
drawn on the results and the repertoire of theoretical approaches put forward by 
urban sociology, and especially comparative urban governance, policy analysis and 
welfare research. We specifically tried to link together recent approaches in urban 
sociology and local governance.
The first section of this chapter outlines the theoretical approaches we refer to 
in order to develop a typology of different urban governance arrangements in core 
1 For details on the project see www.wilcoproject.eu and the first publications of this EU-financed 
comparative project in Ranci et al. 2014. The project involves 20 European cities from ten different 
countries, namely Stockholm, Malmö, Birmingham, Dover, Milan, Brescia, Barcelona, Pamplona, 
Warsaw, Płock, Zagreb, Varaždin, Berlin, Münster, Lille, Nantes, Amsterdam, Nijmegen, Geneva 
and Bern.
2 Data were collected from various administrative and political documents linked to debates in lo-
cal parliaments, local newspaper articles, interviews with stakeholders and focus groups organised 
with the intent of clarifying stakeholders’ diverging or shared positions.
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welfare domains. The second section describes how we analysed and systematised 
the empirical data in order to develop our typology of four urban welfare gov-
ernance arrangements, and it offers an analysis of the common trends throughout 
Europe that trigger the need for social innovations in urban settings because estab-
lished social-policy routines and welfare services no longer meet the demands and 
needs of major parts of the urban population. The key third section describes the 
four ideal types of urban governance arrangements. The conclusion summarises our 
findings and discusses the nexus between the identified urban governance arrange-
ments and the emergence and development of social innovations in European cities.
2.1  State of the Art: The Governance Approach
In recent years, the social sciences have moved away from simplistic one-size-fits-
all analyses and increasingly turned towards more complex and multi-layered meth-
odological approaches. A textbook example of this trend is the shift from the study 
of government to the study of governance. Indeed, the concept of governance, first 
used by scholars of international relations, has become ubiquitous in the social sci-
ences (Levi-Faur 2012). From an analytical point of view, governance stands for 
horizontality in the sense of non-hierarchical modes of co-ordination, steering and 
decision-making, in which, in contrast to classical top-down government, new con-
stellations of actors are involved, among them, besides government officials, stake-
holders such as representatives from civil-society organisations and the business 
community. As such, governance is used as synonymous with regulation through 
networks of agents, which constitutes a third mode of coordination besides market 
and hierarchy (Powell 1990).
But governance is not restricted to describing how decisions are made; the con-
cept also involves a structural component, the limited set of options that are embed-
ded in a distinctive local culture. A governance arrangement, therefore, encom-
passes the constellation of actors in a given setting as well as path dependency, 
or the prevailing and hence limited set of choices that are inherent to a particular 
urban context. Simply speaking, urban governance constitutes the set of rules by 
which a city operates. However, urban governance arrangements are not simply a 
set of rules imposed by local politicians and government officials; instead, they are 
the outcome of complex coalition-building processes through which core values 
are framed, and in which multiple stakeholders are involved. Urban governance 
arrangements are highly influenced by local traditions and cultures, and they are 
embedded in and hence affected by multi-layered institutional settings, including 
supranational frameworks, specific national administrative structures (federal or 
unitary state, self-government) and particular local and national welfare regimes 
(Ferrera 2005).
The ubiquitous use of the concept of governance has created a situation in which 
urban sociologists unanimously declare that it is very difficult and perhaps unreal-
istic to comprehend most recent developments in urban settings and cities through 
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any single orientation or theoretical framework (Blanco 2013). This is particularly 
the case in the field of comparative urban studies. Although the so-called classical 
schools of urban sociology (Lin and Mele 2012), with their focus on the analysis of 
urban structures, processes, changes and problems, are still acknowledged as an im-
portant point of departure, they are no longer exclusive points of reference. Instead, 
recent scholarship in urban sociology favours multifaceted approaches that build 
on various traditions and models that previously enjoyed a stand-alone position and 
were treated as distinct paradigms (Mossberger and Stoker 2001).
2.1.1  The European-City Approach
For analyses of how cities cope with current challenges and try to reconcile social 
and economic policies, urban sociologists nowadays turn to what is called an in-
tegrated approach to urban governance (DiGaetano and Strom 2003) that builds 
on different theoretical perspectives and combines distinctive methodological ap-
proaches (DiGaetano and Strom 2003; Kazepov 2005). In their seminal and widely 
cited article “The European City”, Häussermann and Haila identify four theoretical 
traditions of urban sociology, each of which provides useful insights into urbanism. 
In particular, they refer to the work of Georg Simmel, the Chicago School, political 
economy and the “global city” perspective. However, they advise against trying to 
ground empirical urban studies in a single “abstract urban model” (Häussermann 
and Haila 2005, p. 43) such as those developed by the Chicago or the Regulation 
Schools. Instead, in accordance with the work of Bagnasco and Le Galès (2000), 
they underline the specificity of the European city.
In the tradition of Max Weber, Häusermann and Haila argue convincingly that 
we must acknowledge the special features of European cities that make them dis-
tinct from cities in other parts of the world. The most important feature of the Eu-
ropean city is its multi-faceted character. In the words of Bagnasco and Le Galès, 
European cities are simultaneously “political and social actors and […] local soci-
eties” (Bagnasco and Le Galès 2000, p. 3). Hence, in contrast to cities in other re-
gions, European cities traditionally constitute stand-alone arenas for policymaking, 
although there are significant differences with respect to the degree of autonomy 
European cities enjoy from their respective national governments.
In particular, since the heyday of industrialisation and urbanisation in the nine-
teenth century, the so-called social question has always been a central topic for 
European cities (Isin 2008, p. 273). In Europe, the welfare state began locally within 
internal city borders. Since then, the guaranteed provision of public services by city 
governments has emerged as a further key feature of the distinctiveness of Euro-
pean cities (Kazepov 2005, p. 13). Finally, citizens’ involvement in urban affairs, 
either through local self-governance or via civil society and its broad spectrum of 
organisations and initiatives, adds an additional facet to the specific character of 
the European city. But despite these distinguishing characteristics, European cities 
also display an impressive variety. Here regional differences and hence cultural 
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aspects come into the picture. As Häussermann and Haila have correctly remarked, 
in Europe there are “remarkable differences between cities with different welfare 
regimes and different political-institutional and cultural contexts” (2005, p. 50).
2.1.2  Analysing Urban Governance
In our WILCO research, we have focused on conceptualising the European city 
while simultaneously acknowledging the empirical variance among European cit-
ies and in particular among cities within any given country. Drawing on the re-
sults of studies of policy analysis and urban governance, a key point of departure 
is the recognition of the embeddedness or nestedness of governance arrangements 
(Granovetter 1985) within complex environments. In accordance with DiGaetano 
and Strom (2003), and in line with comparative policy-analysis studies (Kazepov 
2008), we differentiate between the following (Fig. 2.1):
3ROLWLFDO$FWRUV,QVWLWXWLRQDO0LOLHX3ROLWLFDO&XOWXUH6WUXFWXUDO&RQWH[W &XOWXUDO,QWHUPHGLDWLRQRIVWUXFWXUDOFRQWH[WDQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOPLOLHX,QVWLWXWLRQDOLQWHUPHGLDWLRQRIFXOWXUHDQGSROLWLFDODFWRUV,QVWLWXWLRQDOLQWHUPHGLDWLRQRIVWUXFWXUDOFRQWH[WDQGSROLWLFDODFWRUV
Fig. 2.1  An integrated approach to urban governance. (Source: DiGaetano and Strom 2003, 
p. 373)
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• The institutional context of administrative structures and state organisation
• The welfare-regime context in which the local welfare regime is embedded
• The local political culture as an expression or outcome of specific norms and 
values
These environmental parameters serve as the background or—to put it differently—
set of coalition-building opportunities for actors who aim to develop and stabilise 
social innovations as remedies for current social problems. At the same time, how-
ever, these institutional structures or parameters might also significantly hinder so-
cial innovation. In particular, metropolitan cities, thanks to their cultural and ethnic 
diversity hubs for innovativeness and productivity (Florida 2005), are not necessar-
ily prone to making social innovations sustainable by integrating new concepts and 
ideas into the repertoire of local welfare politics.
2.1.3  Urban Welfare Governance Arrangements
In order to understand the multiple challenges faced by cities, we developed an 
analytical scheme that makes it possible to reconstruct why specific decisions were 
or were not made. We tried to identify the agents that contest social policies and 
propose a new way to handle them—through policy brokers that mediate between 
different coalitions’ values and orientations—but also to comprehend the values, 
politics, technical constraints and especially expert discourses that have been de-
veloped by local epistemic communities (Majone 1997). The latter define the core 
ideas of what good local welfare practices are, i.e. what successful or innovative 
efforts to combat social inequality or encourage social cohesion look like. Epis-
temic communities are not only responsible for the coherence of local discourses 
regarding how policies should be implemented or problems should be interpreted 
but also related to other networks of specialists and stakeholders, which creates 
convergences between cities and policies at all levels of regulation (Ferrera 1996).
There are at least two approaches to analysing core values. The first is that of 
Sabatier, who assumes that there exist coalitions of values (or belief systems3) and 
power relationships between these coalitions in specific policy areas or constella-
tions of actors (Sabatier 1998, 1999). A coalition is a discursively coherent group 
that produces intersubjectively shared realities or truths, which are then reflected in 
the group’s discourses and in documents.
3 According to Sabatier, building on the philosophy of science by Lakatos (1970), a belief system 
is made up of three strata: the deep core, a set of normative axioms (what is fair, values such as 
freedom, defence of equality rather than preservation of status differences, etc.); the near core, 
which is about policy-oriented approaches and consists of general choices regarding the relevant 
patterns of intervention; and secondary aspects, which consist of instrumental decisions and the 
search for relevant information to implement specific public programs.
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The second is the approach of Jobert and Muller, who analyse public administra-
tion’s global and sectorial value orientations, which they call referential4 (Jobert 
and Muller 1987). Value orientations can be found easily in official public admin-
istration documents and debates in the local parliament that also reflect coalitions. 
We have tried to combine these two approaches by not only describing general and 
sectorial orientations, or configurations of coalitions of differences, but also focus-
ing on the coherences and contrasts between majorities and minorities, and between 
the public administration’s general and sectorial orientations.
2.1.4  Social Policies at the City Level
Cities are changing from a hierarchical model of governance to a heterarchical 
(Willke 1992) one, with many centres of decision. This change can lead to the hori-
zontal integration of actors in the city, synergies between the producers of services 
and even solidarity in the city if the different actors are recognised as producers and 
if their resources can be combined.5 But this combination can take different forms, 
as indicated by studies on the alternative orientations of the local welfare state in the 
areas of social and health services (Blanke et al. 1986). For a given orientation to 
be successful, the actors involved have to recognise each other’s relevant role in the 
creation of a workable urban society. But in relation to disadvantaged neighbour-
hoods or vulnerable individuals, it is clear that only capability-building policies lead 
to the creation of new (and autonomous) resources.
As Donzelot and Estèbe argued in their significant work on the état animateur 
(or enabling state) in French suburbs, the shift from a paternalistic to a capabil-
ity-building policy helped improve living conditions in these neighbourhoods 
(Donzelot and Estèbe 1994). Urban development policies for these areas provided a 
kind of self-governance that empowered the powerless—although one may wonder 
whether this outcome was the product of a planned strategy on the part of the en-
abling state or just an accidental side effect.
In any case, this policy was discontinued in the 1990s—as a result of financial 
cutbacks, and not because the policy had failed. As a consequence, and as many 
authors have pointed out, living conditions once again deteriorated (Kokoreff and 
Lapeyronnie 2013). In other words, incorporating the resources of the poorest 
people requires that they have the opportunity to develop their own resources—an 
4 We aim to understand the referential of the local welfare system, that is, the set of beliefs, values 
and technologies shaping how participants deal with social inequalities at the local level. More 
precisely, the referential refers to three dimensions: cognitive, normative and instrumental. The 
cognitive dimension regards how people interpret and define the problems that should be solved; 
the normative dimension is about values taken into account in the definition of problems and the 
implementation of measures to resolve them; the instrumental dimension regards the principles of 
action through which plans and programs to solve problems considered relevant or legitimate are 
separated from those that are considered illegitimate.
5 See Evers on the logic of “synergetic welfare mixes” (Evers 1993).
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opportunity they generally take advantage of. This is an investment strategy that has 
been well documented by Sen’s analyses on the building of capabilities (see, e.g., 
Sen 1992).
This political strategy of social responsibility is not necessarily opposed to a 
city’s economic-growth strategy. The growth machine (Molotch 1976) needs social 
policies to be effective as an innovation regime (Häussermann and Wurtzbacher 
2005). That is why our analysis was sensitive to the relationship between economic 
and social policies.6
2.2  Twenty Cities Compared
Based on these concepts and on the empirical analysis of 20 cities, we have devel-
oped a series of variables that reflect the political context, coalitions, orientations 
and values in the area of social policies and the context in which social policies are 
produced.7 These variables are at the core of the empirical analysis in each of the 20 
cities (Cattacin et al. 2012) and have been treated as independent variables whose 
specific constellations explain why social innovation takes place. In particular, in 
both the case studies and this comparative analysis, we have focussed on variables 
able to describe the political context, value orientations and conditions of social-
policy production.
The political context has been measured with the following variables:
1. Local government making intercity competition a top priority. With this variable, 
we measured the intensity with which governance is oriented towards growth 
and the attraction of elites (Molotch 1976).
2. Rescaling and deregulation policies at the national level. This variable measures 
the pressure on cities from national decisions to take responsibility for social 
policies (Kazepov 2005).
3. Political coalitions governing the city. With this variable, we measured the size 
of a coalition governing the city. It informs us about the strength of decisions 
taken by urban governments.
4. Social democracy or economic liberalism as the dominant orientation. This vari-
able identifies the general reference system in the city.
6 Traditionally, economic and social policies were thoroughly interwoven. As outlined in Esping-
Andersen’s seminal The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), capitalist economies and so-
cial policies developed concurrently with the welfare state, which either buffered the negative side 
effects of economic development or even facilitated economic growth by providing the necessary 
resources or supporting a business-friendly culture (Kaufmann 2015).
7 The 20 cities were part of the WILCO project and chosen heuristically with the idea to represent 
the different parts of the European urban landscape. Each country is represented by two cities, 
permitting to verify the impact of the nation-state but also the autonomy of cities inside a national 
and international legal framework. A secondary criterion was the presence, in these countries, of 
experienced research groups known by the research leaders of the WILCO project.
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 5. Co-operation or confrontation between social and economic lobbies at the local 
level and the attitude of the economic lobbies towards social welfare. This 
variable measures the level of conflict or co-operation between economic and 
social interests (Häussermann 2008).
 6. Strong external political influence on the local level regarding social policy (in 
particular through the policies of the European Union (EU) and the European 
Social Fund). This variable measures the independence of the city in develop-
ing solutions to social challenges.
The value orientations in the area of social policies were operationalised with the 
following variables:
 7. Orientation towards individual responsibility and empowerment. This variable 
indicates how social policies adapt to differences in the population through 
measures to individualise services, and how far social policies diverge from old 
schemes of resource scattering.
 8. Prevention policies and social investments. This variable measures whether cit-
ies are proactive in recognising social problems. It allows identifying cities that 
have a systematic approach towards social policies.
 9. Changing or stable social-policy orientations. This variable measures cities’ 
orientations towards innovation in regard to social policies.
The context of the production of social policies was summarised through three key 
variables:
10. Federalism and local autonomy. This variable measures the independence and 
financial autonomy of the city from national social policies. It also measures 
the strength of the local welfare state.
11. Co-decision logics of local welfare-state institutions (participation in networks 
of actors) and co-operation with non-profit organisations in the production of 
social policies.
12. The dominant welfare mix. This variable measures the degree to which the pro-
duction of social policies is distinguished by logics oriented towards the state 
or society (non-profit organisations).
In all cities, qualitative and partially quantitative data have been collected, permit-
ting us to describe the different ways in which social policies and social innovations 
are produced and how they are embedded.8 The data concerning the 12 variables are 
largely descriptive and were interpreted in various meetings involving the authors 
of the individual city reports until we arrived at a consensus concerning a general 
classification of each city through a simple scheme of representations of the values. 
Following the logic of the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA, see Ragin 1987) 
we dichotomised all variable values as 1 or 0 (some disputed cases received the 
value 0.5). The result was a sort of truth table indicating the combination of the 
presence or absence of specific characteristics from the above-mentioned variables. 
8 City reports are available on the WILCO project’s website: www.wilcoproject.eu.
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In the first step, all variables were eliminated that indicated the same value. These 
variables describe common trends for all cities (presented in Chap. 4.1), while the 
other variables describe the configuration specific to each city (see Table 2.1).
For general information about the data collection during this part of the project, 
we refer the reader to the introductory chapter. For specifics on the data collection 
and sources for each of the 20 cities and for the city chapters in this volume, we 
refer to the city reports available on the project website www.wilcoproject.eu.
The comparative analysis then tried to simplify the results of the truth table in 
different ways. First, it isolated variables that have the same or similar values (in 
Table 2.1, they are in italics); they probably influence social policy outputs but are 
not likely to determine key differences between cities. Second, it reorganised the 
table in a simplified way by putting forward similar constellations of variables. 
Table 2.2 indicates the final result of this reorganisation. Similar variables are ex-
cluded and cities with similar constellations or the same constellation are grouped. 
Four groups with similar constellations of variables resulted from this analysis.
Third, analysis had to address why certain cases are similar but nonetheless dif-
fer on some crucial variables. In Table 2.2, we identify four constellations and some 
varieties inside the constellations, which concern Varaždin, Geneva, Nijmegen, 
Plock, Warsaw and Zagreb (the explanatory differences are indicated in light grey). 
For the cities of Eastern Europe, we undoubtedly found that the explanation for the 
specific constellation of variables that places them in a given group is the strong 
influence of the EU on local social policies. Concerning Nijmegen and Geneva, the 
presence of a coalition government (the first variable in the table) is explained by 
the logic of the political system, which favours coalitions (Kriesi 1996). It is less 
easy to explain why Geneva is in the second group even though it is embedded in a 
strong federalist context. Patricia Naegeli, in her chapter in this book, explains this 
specificity through Geneva’s political orientation towards France. Naegeli argues 
that Geneva uses federalism to organise decision-making and policies according to 
a hierarchical, state-oriented logic, putting it nearer to French cities. Finally, we had 
to make sense of these groups and argue for a typology.
2.3  A Typology of Urban Governance
Analysing our 20 cities, we focused on common trends and main differences. We 
were interested in particular in a constellation of variables used to develop a typol-
ogy, more than on causalities, that were hard to postulate for such extreme differ-
entiated realities. Nevertheless, in the conclusion, we describe some elements that 
seem to indicate some kind of relation between a governance style and the potential 
for social innovation.
Regarding the common trends, all cities are experiencing major challenges and 
transformations in their attempts to improve the competitiveness of their economy 
without exposing the population to increased social threats. In the area of social pol-
icies, the driving forces are related to the competition between cities in the context 
 
312 Urban Governance and Social Innovations
T
ab
le
 2
.1
  
C
on
di
tio
ns
 fo
r s
oc
ia
l i
nn
ov
at
io
n 
at
 th
e 
ur
ba
n 
le
ve
l. 
(S
ou
rc
e:
 W
IL
C
O
 p
ro
je
ct
 2
01
4—
ci
ty
 re
po
rts
)
32 S. Cattacin and A. Zimmer
of the diminishing strength of the welfare state at the national level (as underlined 
by Kazepov 2008, 2005). Cities have been forced to increase their economic attrac-
tiveness by social challenges. If cities are not able to handle social problems, not 
only do they no longer attract new investors but existing investors also disappear, 
together with innovative elites (Häussermann et al. 2004).
In this context, the national welfare state not only finds it difficult to respond to 
urban social problems from the financial point of view, but it is also limited by the 
complexity required by policy answers. The regional and urban levels thus appear 
best suited to provide adequate services for complex social problems. There is no 
new front between national and urban levels, but there is a rearrangement of the 
welfare state, in which, as in the nineteenth century, the local (and in particular the 
urban) level becomes increasingly important (Reulecke 1995).
In this context, it is not surprising that cities in federal states (like Bern or Mün-
ster) have fewer difficulties in responding to these challenges or that cities’ room 
for manoeuvre depend on their economic strengths (as with Geneva and Nijmegen) 
and their political relevance. The contrasting figures are cities in unitary states that 
exhibit poor economic performance or that are marginal in their country or region. 
In our sample of cities, we find this weakness in Plock (Poland), Varaždin (Croatia) 
and Pamplona (Spain).
2.3.1  Major Policy Trends in the Governance of Social 
Challenges
These shared driving forces produce similar policy results, to a greater or lesser 
degree. Thus, common to urban policies in the area of social problems is the idea of 
Table 2.2  Grouping similar constellations: Towards a typology. (Source: WILCO project 2014—
city reports) 
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enablement: people, agents and networks must be helped to become as autonomous 
as possible. The legislative framework for such policies must be flexible in order 
to permit the continuous adaptation of policies, following evaluations and experi-
ments. Consequently, urban social policy is characterised more by pragmatism than 
by ideology or populism. In particular, the orientation in concrete situations opens 
a field of compromises and consensus, but also possibilities for preventive think-
ing. Four specific common trends in the governance of social challenges can be 
highlighted: co-production, a capabilities-based approach, decentralisation and ter-
ritorial focalisation:
• Co-production indicates the growing model of partnerships between public, for- 
and non-profit organisations found in all 20 cities (for the concept of co-produc-
tion, see Verschuere et al. 2012). The common trend indicates a transformation 
from state- or economy-driven urban governance to the co-production of policies 
and services.
• Investment in individual capabilities is the second common trend in these cities. 
It can take different forms, like individual accountability for solving problems, 
help to empower people to help themselves and orientations towards differences 
and capabilities. The trend has clearly moved from a perspective that focuses on 
welfare recipients to one that focuses on persons and person-centred services.
• Common to all cities is also a focus on democratic decentralisation. Instruments 
like participatory projects and mechanisms in neighbourhoods open public ad-
ministrations democratically. The trend is away from a hierarchical decision-
making system towards forms of co-decision-making.
• A final trend concerns the ways problems are addressed. In the cities we ana-
lysed we noted tendencies to focus less on groups and more on situations and 
territories, that is, to analyse concrete contexts before intervening and to act pre-
ventively through urban planning instruments and neighbourhood involvement. 
The general trend is away from specific problem orientation towards the search 
for a better quality of life in the city, for the wellbeing of inhabitants and visitors 
(commuters or tourists).
Beside these common trends, the 20 cities are characterised by some major differ-
ences concerning the ways in which social policies are tailored and related to urban 
governance.
2.3.2  Urban Welfare Governance
Working with the data gathered in the WILCO project makes it possible to under-
stand how social policies are situated within each specific city’s logic of governance. 
Our 20 cities certainly have common features, but they differ in the ways in which 
social policies are ideologically and practically justified. Following the process of 
typologising presented before, including temporal dynamics and information about 
values and policy choices, we have identified four kinds of regimes characterised 
by different relationships between social and economic policies at the city level.
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The first type of governance can be called the governance of co-operation, which 
is characterised by the continuous search for synergies between economic and so-
cial policies. The political consensus is fragile, but it stabilises ambivalences in the 
city’s driving coalitions around the idea of the innovative or creative (Florida 2005) 
city. The coalition’s major orientation is towards fostering urbanity as a project and 
as a way of life, bohemian and innovative, open to differences and responsive to 
marginality. Through urbanity—and this is the guiding hypothesis of this type of 
governance—economic dynamics can be improved. From the organisational point 
of view, this governance style privileges welfare-mix solutions. Values that all ac-
tors share are the idea of urbanity, pragmatism and efficiency. Ideologies are sec-
ondary in the definition of policy priorities. Examples of this governance style are 
Amsterdam, Bern, Münster, Barcelona and Varaždin. Varaždin’s orientation was 
developed following guidance from the EU.
The case of Münster, analysed by Christina Rentzsch in this book, illustrates 
these synergies between social and economic interests. A tradition of subsidiarity 
that developed in the shadow of the Catholic Church is characteristic of Münster’s 
social-policy tradition. Similarly to Geneva, Münster, a mid-sized town in northern 
Germany, is embedded in a federal system that assigns many duties and responsi-
bilities in welfare and social-policy areas to the local level. In accordance with the 
tradition of a conservative welfare regime, public–private partnerships, in particular 
with non-profits, are a further hallmark of social-service provision in Münster. Since 
the city used to be economically better off than many towns in northern Germany, 
and specifically in the Ruhr region, Münster is well known for its high standards 
regarding the provision of social services. Core beliefs regarding the importance of 
social policy in creating a liveable city are deeply embedded in Münster’s Catho-
lic tradition and have always been supported by the Christian Democratic Union, 
which remains the most important political force in the city. Although the dominant 
role of the Christian Democrats has been increasingly challenged since the 1970s, 
first by the Social Democrats and nowadays by the Green Party, neither the Social 
Democrats nor the Greens follow a neoliberal course questioning the necessity of 
policies trying to safeguard social cohesion.
But does the tradition of subsidiarity combined with a conservative party in 
power provide a fruitful ground for social innovation? The answer, based on the 
results of our empirical work in Münster, is yes. However, the “yes” comes with a 
question mark, indicating that the city provides space for social innovation but must 
still overcome hurdles and avoid risks. In a nutshell, it is not easy to make social in-
novations sustainable in Münster. In particular, two requirements must be met. First, 
if the innovation is developed or at least significantly supported by the municipality, 
there is a high chance that it will be accepted. Second, from a marketing point of 
view, the innovation has to be framed and advertised according to rationales that 
are developed and shared by an inner circle composed of the city’s most relevant 
stakeholders. Interestingly enough, starting in the late 1990s Münster initiated its 
strategic development process, titled City Marketing, with the aim of making the 
city more attractive to high-potential investors, specifically in the areas of housing 
and upscale retail.
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Today, there are two core beliefs that are widely shared by Münster’s business 
community, chief administrators and key representatives of the two major parties. 
The first is an “investment frame” according to which any policy has to pay off in 
the long run. Hence also in the area of social policies, any initiative has to either be 
an “investment”, for example in human capital, or aim at enabling the respective 
individual, group or local community to become self-sustainable. The second is a 
so-called prevention frame, according to which action, in particular in the area of 
social policies, should be taken at an early stage in order to prevent a downward de-
velopment. Thus, the two frames correspond and are related to each other. In order 
to attain legitimacy, social innovations have to be in accordance with both.
However, social innovations also have to be initiated and promoted by “the right 
people” in town. The results of the WILCO project show that there is a relatively 
small circle of stakeholders in Münster who meet regularly in the various round-
table and working-group settings initiated by the municipal administration in which 
crucial policy issues covering a broad range of topics are discussed. Indeed, the lo-
cal parliament long ago stopped being the central forum for decision-making. Since 
Münster’s business community is very homogeneous, consisting primarily of retail-
ers and representatives of saving banks and insurance companies, the municipal 
administration constitutes “the spider in the net”: it sets the agenda and promotes 
new initiatives. Newcomers—social entrepreneurs that are not mainstream and do 
not belong to the inner circle of decision makers—find it difficult to be acknowl-
edged and accepted in Münster and to have their proposed social innovations vali-
dated. Hence the city is characterised by a co-operative governance arrangement 
as regards social innovation, but innovative concepts and new ideas have to make 
their way into the “inner circle” of decision makers in Münster in order to be heard 
and recognised.
The second type of governance, called governance of growth, gives priority to 
economic policies. The orientation is anti-urban, and politics are strongly influenced 
by economic interest groups. This growth-machine orientation (Molotch 1976) pri-
vatises social problems as individual faults. Pamplona, Dover and Birmingham are 
examples of the predominance of this kind of governance. Birmingham in the UK, 
analysed in this book by Nadia Brookes, Jeremy Kendall and Lavinia Mitton, is a 
fine example of a city that follows this model in its attempt to reconcile social and 
economic policies. In the nineteenth century, the city used to be the “workshop of 
the world”. Even today, Birmingham’s political and welfare culture is consistent 
with the paradigm posed by Adam Smith, according to which a vibrant economy is 
the most effective underpinning for community development. Accordingly, gover-
nance of growth assigns social policy a subordinate role. In the case of Birmingham, 
this subordinate role is consistent with the tradition of a liberal welfare regime in 
which the market constitutes the prime source of individual wellbeing. Hence, as 
Brookes, Kendall and Mitton argue, “the city council has focused over the years 
on the promotion of local economic development, and the two policy priorities of 
economic growth and labour market activation and social inclusion have usually 
been dealt with separately”.
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Additionally, Birmingham constitutes a textbook example of how a city that is 
embedded in a unitary state is not in the position to develop visionary social poli-
cies that are independent from those of the central government. Instead, the city, in 
particular in the area of social policy, follows a stop-and-go policy of investment 
and retrenchment in lockstep with the policy directives and money that emanate 
from London. Against this background, innovations in the area of social policy are 
generally small-scale initiatives that have a realistic chance of becoming sustainable 
if they encompass a “market dimension” and are based on an entrepreneurial con-
cept that safeguards at least some financial independence from London. The overall 
shift from traditional big-industry managerialism to the current entrepreneurialism 
of the service and creative industries might provide Birmingham with the ability 
to reconcile its governance tradition with the demands of today’s local economies. 
However, the social innovations that emerge from this environment are not likely 
to be able to surmount the decisive problems faced by a large segment of Birming-
ham’s population that is not well educated and does not have the skills to work in 
the increasingly important creative sector. Therefore, it is most likely that the divide 
between rich and poor, and hence between the entrepreneurs and workforce of the 
new economy on the one hand and those who continue to identify with the way 
of life of the old working class on the other, will grow further and will not be sig-
nificantly addressed by small-scale social innovations that largely translate into the 
production and provision of social services for specific constituencies.
The third type of governance, called governance of social challenges, gives pri-
ority to social-policy orientations in the production of services. Economic dynamics 
are handled parallel to social policies and are neither related to nor in conflict with 
them. This governance arrangement follows more traditional social-welfare policies 
in which the local state plays the primary role in the production and distribution of 
services. Political parties and party politics define this more paternalistic orientation 
in the area of social policy. Shared values are solidarity and the social responsibility 
of the state. Cities like Malmö, Stockholm, Geneva, Lille, Nantes, Nijmegen, Bres-
cia, Zagreb, Warsaw and Plock are examples of this kind of governance. Concern-
ing Zagreb, Warsaw and Plock, we find again that the EU is the dominant partner in 
defining this governance style.
In Sweden, Malmö is an interesting case study regarding social innovation. Sim-
ilar to Birmingham, Malmö used to be a major industrial centre. But in the 1970s, 
the city was hit hard by the downturn in shipbuilding. Rising rates of unemployment 
and the deterioration of urban areas were some of the results of this development. 
Since then, Malmö has had to struggle with societal and economic difficulties that 
are not very common in Sweden. Furthermore, Malmö’s population, probably due 
to its geographical location vis-à-vis Continental Europe, had always been com-
paratively heterogeneous. When transnational migration started to intensify, Malmö 
developed into the most popular destination for immigrants to Sweden. At least one 
third of the citizens in Malmö were not born in Sweden. In some parts of the city, 
more than 80 % of the residents are of foreign origin. Again, this is very unusual for 
Sweden. From an institutional perspective, Sweden, much like the UK, is a unitary 
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state, but unlike in the UK, Swedish local communities enjoy a larger degree of 
independence from central government because public administration in Sweden 
is modelled after Germany and its tradition of local self-government (Gustafsson 
1988).
Against this background, the central topic addressed in the contribution by Ola 
Segnestam Larsson, Marie Nordfeldt and Anna Carrigan to this book is whether, 
how and to what extent Malmö’s urban governance arrangement turns to social 
innovations in order to tackle the city’s decisive problems and societal challeng-
es. Again, the results of the empirical research conducted by the Swedish team in 
Malmö highlight a significant degree of path dependency in local politics and urban 
governance. There is no doubt that the city council attempted to attract new indus-
tries and shift Malmö’s economy from the “big industry” of shipbuilding to services 
in the areas of education, the arts and culture. In Malmö, like elsewhere in Europe, 
urban economic development is synonymous with establishing a service-, science- 
and arts-oriented industry.
However, similarly to Birmingham but for a very different reason, the city’s 
master plan of rebuilding the economy does not allow much space for social innova-
tion. Certainly, from a political point of view Malmö stands out for continuity. Very 
much in contrast to the rest of Sweden, social democracy has not been abandoned 
in Malmö since the recession in the 1980s. This decision translates into a situa-
tion in which norms and values that have always been linked to social democracy, 
such as “social justice” and “fighting inequality”, continue to have a strong impact 
on local politics in the city, thus keeping neoliberal thinking, which has definitely 
gained ground in Sweden over the few last decades, at a distance. The public sector 
and hence the local government still perceive themselves as responsible for ad-
dressing social problems in Malmö, which the authors of the chapter characterise 
as “a city of many welfare projects”. However, there is some space for social in-
novation, as the chapter also demonstrates. And again, the projects are in line with 
the Swedish tradition of empowerment since they are put in place with the aim of 
integrating citizens into the labour market. But in contrast to the past, integration 
is not achieved in the traditional way, through education. Instead, the innovative 
aspects of the projects—the social innovations—consist of on-the-job learning and 
the embedding of education and training within an entrepreneurial approach to-
wards societal problems.
A similar situation can be found in Geneva. Naegeli’s contribution provides an 
in-depth analysis of the multi-layered governance structure of welfare policies in 
the city and the greater metropolitan area of Geneva. In many respects, Geneva, 
when compared to other Swiss cities, constitutes a deviant case. According to Nae-
geli, Geneva, highly influenced by the French tradition of generous welfare ben-
efits, looks back to a legacy of state-oriented welfare policies that have always 
been backed by a coalition of leftist parties in power in the city’s municipal council. 
Although politics in the cantonal parliament have always been dominated by centre-
right parties, cantonal and city levels have never been in disagreement regarding the 
core values of the welfare domain. Solidarity, a society of opportunities and equality 
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constitute the key features of a value set that is shared by parties across the political 
spectrum. According to Naegeli, key players largely agree on core values, but they 
differ significantly regarding how they should be put into practice. The left favours 
state action and a more or less top-down approach of social-policy implementa-
tion that does not leave much space for innovative approaches. The conservatives 
are more in line with the Swiss tradition of subsidiarity, which favours bottom-up 
approaches that preferably include non-profit organisations, civic engagement and 
citizen participation.
Since Geneva is one of the most affluent cities in Europe, support for social proj-
ects is not a controversial issue. As Naegeli argues, there are many social programs 
and a multitude of actors and providers of services that “constitute a labyrinth of lo-
cal welfare organizations”. However, the availability of resources and the complex 
set of actors do not translate into a promising and supportive situation for social in-
novation. The reasons for this stalemate are at least twofold. First, the political and 
business communities are more or less disentangled in Geneva; the two do not have 
much in common. Accordingly, social and economic policies are not interwoven; 
they each follow a separate road. The social domain therefore has developed into 
a prime domain of party politics. Second, the political arena in the city of Geneva 
is dominated by the left, which favours low-profile social innovations enacted pri-
marily within state services. In sum, the city follows a more traditional approach 
towards social policy that addresses social challenges primarily through publicly 
funded programs and services.
Finally, we have identified a fourth, conflictual, type of governance of social and 
economic challenges. In this governance arrangement, the combination of a weak 
local government and strong economic and social interest groups creates conflict 
between economic and social investments. The value orientation in the area of social 
policies is a conflictual one, with an opposition between a social and an economic 
lobby. Each social policy creates a debate between individualism and individual 
responsibility on the one hand and solidarity and collective responsibility on the 
other. Berlin and Milan are examples of this conflictual governance arrangement.
In the last few decades, Berlin has developed into one of the most attractive cities 
in Europe. Why? Why, in particular, do youth from all over Europe come to Berlin 
as a location to study, to live and to party? Benjamin Ewert, who emphasises the 
path dependency of urban governance and urban development in Berlin, addresses 
this issue. In a nutshell, his chapter argues that Berlin—due to its special situation as 
a border city in the middle of Europe, where two very distinct political systems and 
ideologies used to meet—provides plenty of space for different lifestyles, new proj-
ects and what Germans called “alternative” orientations. Ewert portrays the former 
West Berlin as a bohemian city in which the arts and culture flourished during the 
Cold War and where artists from all over the world used to work and simultaneously 
look for the experience of living in a so-called “frontier city”.
The specificity of West Berlin during the Cold War was made possible by a very 
generous transfer system of public subsidies. Until the breakdown of the Soviet 
bloc, almost everything in Berlin—jobs, rents, theatre tickets, etc.—was subsidised 
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by the German Federal Government. In terms of urban governance, this benevolent 
situation translated into a decoupling of the city’s social and economic politics. Or, 
to put it differently, for a long time the ability to attract business was very limited 
in West Berlin, in particular due to the logistics of a city situated very much in the 
Soviet bloc. Therefore, confronted with a declining population, the prime goal of 
West Berlin urban politics was to keep the city attractive for newcomers, students 
and members of the so-called creative class of artists and bohemians. However, 
with the fall of the wall, the geopolitical situation of Berlin changed significantly. 
The city is again the capital of Germany. Even today, it lives on public subsidies, 
although support from the federal government has been reduced continuously since 
the 1990s. Confronted with many societal challenges, the government of Berlin, 
similar to other cities, started an economic development program in which the cre-
ative industries—arts, culture and fashion as well as so-called lighthouse projects—
play a decisive role.
Similarly to Malmö, however, urban governance in Berlin was and continues 
to be influenced by ideas and concepts from the left, social democracy included. 
With some interruptions in the 1980s and 1990s, the Social Democratic Party has 
been in power in Berlin. The research under the umbrella of the WILCO project 
has focused on the district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, with a population of more 
than 270,000. Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg is still perceived as one of the bohemian 
hotspots of Berlin. The district government continues the long-standing tradition 
of the left being in power. Currently, the district is governed by a coalition of the 
Green Party and the Social Democrats. But the Left Party also has a traditional 
stronghold in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. This situation translates into a policy ori-
entation in which social policy issues play a significant role, and in which the more 
traditional social policy orientation of the Social Democrats is combined with the 
more participatory and entrepreneurial attitude of the Green Party. But in sharp 
contrast to former times, resources are scarce, and the ability of the ruling coalition 
to significantly support social innovations with public money is therefore limited. 
Furthermore, in sharp contrast to former times, Berlin has become very attractive 
for investment, particularly in the area of housing, which for decades was a real “no 
go” for investors because of what was then a declining population.
In sum, Berlin is still perceived as an El Dorado for “cheap living” and creative 
work. This image is supported by the Berlin government and in particular by the dis-
trict government of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. However, due to fiscal constraints, 
Berlin increasingly faces difficulties in living up to its image. The tradition of urban 
governance in which social and economic policies are largely de-coupled leads to 
the paradox that Berlin is still perceived as the metropolis of societal innovation and 
bohemianism while it is simultaneously becoming increasingly similar to other big 
European cities, where the flip-side of economic prosperity is increasing poverty 
and social exclusion.
Milan, analysed in this book by Giuliana Costa, Roberta Cucca and Rossana 
Torri, provides another interesting case study of this conflicting relationship be-
tween economic and social challenges. In this city, social policies have shifted sig-
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nificantly during recent decades. The Italian centre of banking and commerce used 
to be known as a “benevolent” city with a long tradition of social policies aiming to 
safeguard social cohesion. The social domain was also perceived as necessary to a 
striving economy. “Milanese citizenship” translated into a situation in which resi-
dents of Milan could count on the provision of social services and welfare programs 
that were exceptional in Italy.
However, at the beginning of the 1990s the attitude towards social issues sig-
nificantly changed in Milan. The local government struggled with far-reaching cor-
ruption scandals that challenged the then widely accepted image of Milan as the 
place in Italy “where business and ethics went hand in hand”. Moreover, left-wing 
city governments were followed by centre-right coalitions headed by mayors from 
Berlusconi’s party. Accordingly, the city significantly changed its attitude towards 
“the social”. Social policies were no longer perceived as an investment in the future 
of the young generations of Milan, but instead as having a negative impact on the 
economic development of the city. The move away from classical social policy 
was intensified by the fiscal crisis and the need to introduce austerity politics. At 
the same time, rent and housing costs increased steadily, in particular in the centre 
of the city, while the local government simultaneously abandoned a housing policy 
that did not exclusively address the needs of the middle class but also provided af-
fordable housing for less well-off members of the community.
At the turn of the millennium, a new coalition came into power that was and 
continues to be of a more leftist orientation and which has tried to replace the re-
strictive social policies of the past with a new approach focusing more on social 
cohesion, citizen participation and a renewed social-policy agenda. However, times 
have changed significantly. Against the background of fiscal crises and decreasing 
support from the regional and federal governments, there is not much space for ei-
ther social innovations or social policies that genuinely make a difference. What the 
current government tries to achieve is in accordance with a policy approach found 
all over Europe. So-called lighthouse projects, currently the Expo, are implemented 
with the goal of both attracting investment and improving the image of the city. 
However, these high-profile endeavours are increasingly out of reach for large por-
tions of the Milanese population, who struggle to make ends meet. In other words, 
governance in Milan does not address social and economic issues simultaneously. 
Instead, the local government tries to promote the economy, and it takes action in 
the social domain only if there is a significant challenge, as can be seen clearly in 
the area of housing. The social innovation in this policy area, which is described 
in the chapter by the Italian team, strongly builds on a public–private-partnership 
approach. The policy is made possible through the initiative of a large Italian foun-
dation. Hence, this path of innovation shows some similarities to those in big cities 
in the USA—Harlem in the 1980s and Detroit today—where private-sector founda-
tions provide the seed money for innovative policies.
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2.4  Conclusion
The urban welfare model as it has been developed since the Middle Ages in Europe 
is challenged by different contemporary tendencies. First, and most obviously, cit-
ies’ approaches to social policy have to react pragmatically to the retrenchment poli-
cies of the national welfare system—as Grymer had already observed in the 1970s 
(Grymer 1979). Responsibilities are handed down to the local level, and problems, 
generally related to forms of new poverty, are visible.
Second, these social problems are rarely included in the general social-securi-
ty systems of the national level and need to be addressed through social policies. 
Therefore, the urban level is also the primary place in which new social problems 
appear, and it is also the level that is forced to find solutions for them. The general 
trend towards a more diversified society—including marginality and other social 
problems that come with this diversification—finds its multifaceted reality in the 
city. Marginalised groups of all kinds, and not only a rich elite, are attracted by the 
promise of the city as a place for self-realisation and freedom (Cattacin 2009).
Finally, cities are confronted with the double task of meeting the demands by 
international mobile elites to produce an urban climate of well-being while dealing 
with crime attracted by that same climate. As wealth and poverty become concen-
trated in cities, municipal governments are challenged by the need to create social 
policies to compete for the rich.
The 20 cities analysed here are confronted with similar problems and challenges. 
Social innovations constitute just one tool to adjust their urban policies to chang-
ing conditions. Despite very different settings, the social innovations identified and 
researched in our project show many commonalities, as described in Chap. 9. The 
involvement of civil-society actors, the co-production of services, mixed financial 
arrangements and the rediscovery of the spatial or better urban dimension of social 
policy initiatives are just some of the characteristics of current social innovations. 
This chapter has focused on urban governance as a premise of any policy develop-
ment. We have specifically asked whether and how urban governance may facilitate 
or hinder the development and sustainability of social innovations. We have worked 
with the hypothesis that context matters, and that the political, cultural and institu-
tional dimensions of a given setting therefore have to be taken into account when 
analysing the emergence and establishment of social innovations.
The results of our analysis are mixed. There is no one best solution. But our 
analysis indicates that urban governance embedded in a federal system seems to 
facilitate the emergence and sustainability of social innovations because the local 
level is in a position to address social challenges independently. A strong tradition 
of local self-government constitutes a highly suitable environmental condition for 
social innovation. The same holds true for subsidiarity as a policy approach through 
which to address societal problems with the support of non-state actors, prefer-
ably civil-society organisations. Local governance arrangements that make use of 
subsidiarity to organise social services are comparatively more receptive to social 
innovations proposed by social actors. In contrast, countries with a top-down and 
government-based tradition of social-service provision, which constitutes one of the 
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key characteristics of a social-democratic welfare regime, are rather reluctant to ac-
cept and integrate new initiatives into their repertoire. Finally, coalitions of core ac-
tors that share common norms and values acknowledging that capitalist economies 
have to take the social into account in order to be sustainable are also conducive to 
social innovation. Interestingly, it does not really matter whether these core values 
are based on a social-democratic or a conservative tradition. The difference between 
the two traditions translates into a difference in the instruments and tools used, as 
the examples of Malmö and Münster clearly indicate.
Although social innovations are necessary tools for the reform and adaptation 
of the welfare state to the new societal challenges of our century, we also have to 
address at least one caveat. The social innovations we analysed are all small-scale 
initiatives; they are not related to citizen rights. By and large, they have not been 
thoroughly integrated into urban policies. Therefore, we have to be sceptical of 
expectations that social innovations are the one and only solution to the difficulties 
and problems of our mature welfare states and capitalist economies.
At the same time, the results presented here indicate that urban (and local) wel-
fare is becoming increasingly important in dealing with social challenges. There 
is also evidence of common trends in the way social issues are tackled. An inter-
esting result concerns the way cities from countries recently integrated into the 
EU shape their social policies. In these cities, policy prescriptions (and financial 
support) from the EU play a primary role in the production of concrete social poli-
cies—while the other cities experiment more with bottom-up and local solutions. 
The question arises of how sustainable imported solutions are in comparison with 
endogenous ones.9 An answer to this question would require longer-term monitor-
ing, which could be based on dimensions and insights from our project.
However, this comparative analysis also opens other questions that we can only 
discuss briefly in this chapter. First of all, identifying contexts more open to social 
innovation, as we have done, can be interpreted as a recommendation to change 
the way policies are created in specific contexts. But this is only partially true. 
The reality we analysed indicates a link between the wealth of a given city and 
its way of handling social policies. Social innovation is probably easier if there is 
a context of liberal experimentation, but also if there is a government orientation 
towards funding such innovation. But if money is scarce, how can a government 
promote a more economically and socially sustainable city? As Gerometta et al. ar-
gue, we think that the first step has to be forms of self-organisation and civil-society 
initiatives (Gerometta et al. 2005) that can be the engine for a better quality of 
life—which is the foundation for the attractiveness and economic development of a 
city. It would be an error to think that the opposite approach—improving economic 
performance in a socially hostile context—has the same consequences because the 
flexibilised economy, based on mobility and creativity, needs more than money. 
In other words, there is an intimate relationship between the new growth-oriented 
city and social policies and social innovations that promote economic development 
9 This question is not a new one as the discussion of the imported state by Badie, who analysed 
how Algerian institutions suffered from French domination, shows (Badie 1987).
432 Urban Governance and Social Innovations
while adequately responding to social challenges that cities—and no longer the na-
tional welfare state—have to deal with.
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Everybody on Board? Opportunity Structures 
for Social Innovations in Münster
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3.1  Introduction
In 2004, Münster received the international LivCom Award acknowledging the 
town as the Most Liveable City in the World. 1 Since then, the city has merchandised 
this image within and beyond the region (Hauff and Heineberg 2011; p. 5). The 
middle-sized town of Münster with its around 300,000 inhabitants is a flourishing 
city: immigration surpasses emigration, the large administrative and academic sec-
tors provide employment opportunities for the well educated, and the overall eight 
universities and their approximately 50,000 students buffer demographic change. 
Simultaneously, the prosperous socio-economic situation of Münster is enveloped 
by a conservative-Catholic culture, emphasizing solidarity with weaker members of 
the society and referring to subsidiarity as a key policy principle.
This chapter addresses the questions of how social innovations emerge in Mün-
ster and how they are embedded within the city’s governance arrangement. The 
analysis focuses on two major policy fields best reflecting Münster’s specific gover-
nance arrangement: labour market and housing policy.2 After an overview of admin-
istrative structures in Germany and specific city traditions (Sect. 3.2), the chapter 
1 The following article is based on research carried out as a part of the WILCO project from 2011 
until 2014 in Münster. The author is very grateful to Patrick Boadu, Danielle Gluns, Thorsten 
Hallmann and Andrea Walter.
2 The study and its data collection—conducted over the course of 4 years (2007–2011)—consisted 
of the following elements: interviews with politicians, administrative employees and civil society 
organizations at the local level; a detailed analysis of documents produced by the city council and 
the council‘s committees; an analysis of major articles of the leading local newspapers on selected 
issues, and for labor market policy an additional local magazine; several focus group interviews; 
as well as an analysis of the election programs of all relevant parties for the local elections in 2004 
and 2009.
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analyses Münster’s governance arrangement (Sect. 3.3) and addresses the topic of 
who makes things happen in the city in terms of coalition building. There is a strong 
focus on the interdependence between governance and social policy discourses. 
Despite some caveats, Münster is a city whose administration is inclined to open 
windows of opportunities for the implementation of social innovations (Chap. 4).
3.2  Münster’s Embeddedness in Germany’s Governance 
Arrangement
3.2.1  Cooperative Federalism, Self-government and 
Subsidiarity
In international comparisons, Germany stands out for a specific type of federalism: 
Sixteen states ( Länder) are bound together by “co-operative federalism” (Scharpf 
1976), a multilevel governance arrangement of interrelations between the federal, 
regional and local level, in which responsibilities are divided according to tasks 
and policy fields. Thus, German municipalities are not independent administrative 
units but embedded in a system of administrative regulations, inaugurated by the 
Länder and the federal government. Simultaneously, German municipalities look 
back upon a long tradition of self-government. Elections to the local parliament 
take place every 5 years, and local politicians enjoy a certain leeway of how poli-
cies are enacted. Albeit in close cooperation with the local administration, local 
parliaments guarantee the participation of citizens in local politics (Bogumil and 
Holtkamp 2006).
Furthermore, Germany is particularly noteworthy for neo-corporatist gover-
nance arrangements (Schmitter 1974), in which civil society organizations and as-
sociations ( Verbände) traditionally play a key role in the policy process, bridging 
the different territorial levels (local, subnational and federal) of the country (Zim-
mer et al. 2009). Legitimated by the principle of subsidiary neo-corporatism at the 
local level translates into a situation in which civil society organizations or non-
profit organizations (NPOs) are the prime providers of social services (Dahme and 
Wohlfahrt 2011; Evers et al. 2011a).
3.2.2  Münster: Desk of Westphalia—City Profile
Situated close to the Ruhr area of Germany, Münster has never been an industrial 
town, characterized by an entrepreneurial spirit and a governing elite of internation-
ally oriented businessmen. Instead, in the nineteenth century, the town became the 
host of a Prussian Military Base and developed into a stronghold of the Prussian 
Provincial Government. Today, the legacy of history is still strongly in place. There 
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are numerous public and semi-public administrative units operating in Münster, 
such as the Regional Government or the Pension Insurance Institute for Westphalia-
Lippe, a sub-district of the region of North Rhine-Westphalia. Until very recently, 
the British Rhine Army had their headquarters in Münster. Today, it only hosts the 
German Netherlands Corps, and soldiers no longer impact the culture of the city.
Against this background, Münster enjoys the image of being the “Desk of West-
phalia” (cf. Heineberg 2011; p. 268), a city in which blue-collar workers are more 
or less absent and where civil servants play a decisive role in city politics. The 
presence of numerous institutions of higher education such as Münster University, 
Münster Polytech, the University for Public Administration or the University for the 
Police adds to the picture of a city dominated by middle-class inhabitants, most of 
them being civil servants. All in all, the public sector constitutes the most important 
economic force in the city. Public sector dominance is hardly balanced by a class of 
merchants who similar to other traditional European cities and former trading posts 
today still run their shops in the centre of the picturesque medieval old town that 
constitutes the prime tourists attraction in Münster.
Besides its long tradition dating back to the Middle Ages and times of the former 
Hanse and its middle class, civil servant population, Münster is famous for being a 
stronghold of Catholicism in the North of Germany. Indeed, Münster used to be the 
centre of the Catholic counter-revolution at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
The famous Graf von Galen, who raised his voice against the rule of Hitler in the 
1930s, served as Archbishop in Münster. Since the late nineteenth century, Mün-
ster has been a stronghold of political Catholicism, in particular the Zentrum Party 
during the German Empire and the Weimar Republic, and the German Christian 
Democratic Party after 1945.
3.2.3  Winds of Change
The legacy of Roman Catholicism, the impact of the surrounding rural area of West-
phalia and the dominance of civil servants led the Christian Democratic Party to 
be the most important political force in the city. However, since the 1990s, new 
political forces, the Green Party and the Linke, have significantly challenged the 
conservative milieu of the city. Both were able to build constituencies within the 
post-materialist academic milieu in Münster.
In the 1990s, for the first time in Münster’s political history, the Christian Demo-
crats were not in power for one electoral term. Since then, the Mayor has been a 
Christian Democrat again. However, the directly elected conservative Mayor does 
no longer enjoy a comfortable majority in the city parliament; instead, he has to 
govern with shifting majorities of which a so-called clandestine coalition with the 
Social Democrats turned out to be the most stable government arrangement. The 
grand coalition in disguise reached its peak during the late 1990s and the early 
2000s, a period in which Münster embarked on a new approach of city development 
that slightly departed from classical neo-corporatism. Besides traditional civil soci-
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ety players, a broad spectrum of groups and constituencies were addressed and wel-
comed to participate in a long-term consultancy process. The outcome was a master 
plan for city development, closely combining city development and city marketing.3
The master plan highlights the necessity of becoming a city attractive for invest-
ments from local and regional business communities. For the first time in Münster’s 
post-war history, city development became a central issue based on a strategic plan 
for long-term investments and projects. Besides its novelty, however, the master 
plan also links up with Münster’s tradition as a middle-sized town and European 
city looking back to a subsidiary tradition of taking care for constituencies in the 
community who need help and public support. From an institutional point of view, 
the master plan encompassed the establishment of a new unit within the town hall, 
“Münster Marketing”. Münster Marketing is an independent organization hosted 
by the city administration and hence located in the town hall. Since its foundation 
in the early 2000s, Münster Marketing has developed into a very influential player 
within the city. Like “a spider in a net”, the chairwoman of Münster Marketing is 
highly connected and therefore able to monitor any development within the city. 
The central task of Münster Marketing is to get relevant stakeholders around the 
table whenever a new initiative or a new project is about to start and inaugurated 
in Münster. Due to its peculiar organizational setup, Münster Marketing enjoys ex-
cellent contacts within the city’s administration, the political sphere and the local 
business community. As such, Münster Marketing constitutes an institutionalized 
symbol for the Münster-specific “governance of co-operation”.
3.3  Münster’s “Governance of Cooperation”
As outlined in the previous chapter (Cattacin and Zimmer 2015), governance of 
cooperation is characterized by the continuous search for synergies between eco-
nomic and social policies. Although the search for investments constitutes the driv-
ing force of city politics, actors in Münster are sensible not to lose contact with the 
social domain. The underlying rational of action is pragmatism combined with effi-
ciency. Actors in the city search for practical solutions for today’s problems without 
giving up an investment-focused policy orientation. As outlined in the following 
section on “innovations” in the areas of housing and labour market policies, there 
seems to be a division of labour with regard to economic and social policies. Social 
policy is by and large considered to be the prime responsibility of public and hence 
the city’s administration, while business issues are primarily taken care of by the 
business community. Moreover, Münster’s governance of cooperation is inclined to 
empower citizens in order to make them fit for the market and hence to be able to 
help themselves.
3 Stadt Münster 2004: Integriertes Stadtentwicklungs- und Stadtmarketingkonzept Münster (ISM) 
Münster-Profil, Leitorientierungen und Leitprojekte. (http://www.muenster.de/stadt/stadtplanung/
pdf/Vorl118_04_und_Erg.pdf).
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This attitude is very much in line with the subsidiarity tradition of Münster in 
the welfare area. Overall, Münster’s governance of cooperation tries to follow an 
encompassing approach of bringing people with similar problems together in order 
to work out most practical solutions. The city continuously attempts to balance its 
investment orientation of the city, taken up in the late 1990s and working with the 
paradigm of the city as “a growth machine”. It refers to a “preventing frame” that 
is highly supported by representatives of the political parties, members of the city 
administration and civil society actors, including members of the local clergy. In the 
following, this chapter will first focus on the investment frame, which is linked to 
the “growth machine” paradigm; in the second step, this frame will be juxtaposed in 
opposition to the “prevention frame” of Münster’s cooperative governance coalition 
(the following chapter is based on WILCO report 4, Boadu et al. 2012).
3.3.1  Münster as “Growth Machine”: The Investment Frame
The “deep core” of the local coalition system is a frame of municipal management 
that invests all its resources in improving the city’s capacity for enhancing local 
(economic) growth and growth sustainment. Moreover, growth is perceived as the 
main factor for the wellbeing of citizens and for the city development. The frame 
originates from the theoretical premises described by Harvey Molotch in “The City 
as a Growth Machine” (Molotch 1976), which argues that growth should be an es-
sential imperative. The central conditions for growth are defined as follows:
1. A high level of competitiveness for companies and citizens with other cities, 
achievable through the improvement of both hard and soft site factors
2. A high level of attractiveness attained by means of city branding or marketing 
with a focus on high quality of life and a special lifestyle, as well as a “festival-
ization” of city policies: the concentration on highly marketable, prestige proj-
ects and actions (Häußermann and Siebel 1993)
3. An approach to city management that creates a market-friendly environment, 
thus making the city a viable target for private investment and enabling its effects 
to benefit the whole community
Since Münster fits these criteria perfectly, it presents a good example of “the city as 
growth machine”. This general orientation significantly influenced local discourse 
and translated into the establishment of an investment frame widely considered a 
success story in Münster. Over the years, it has gained increasing acceptance by a 
broad coalition of different actors, resulting in a relative stability of the frame since 
the early 1990s. It continues to be perpetuated by political subsystems in Münster 
within a wider coalition system. Apart from superficial modifications in rhetoric 
and action, the frame remains stable. “Münster Marketing”, the “Initiative for a 
Strong Inner City”, a lobby group of Münster’s merchants, the traditional guild of 
merchants “Kaufmannschaft” and of course the municipal department for the pro-
motion of the local economy (Wirtschaftsförderung) support the investment frame. 
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However, in the welfare domain, it is counterbalanced and complemented by a very 
different frame, which originates in the subsidiarity tradition of the city.
3.3.2  Münster a City Based on Subsidiarity: The “Prevention 
Frame”
“We should be careful and avoid that people, kids included, are faced with dif-
ficult situations in their lives. Instead of simply letting things happen, we should 
be preventive and start to empower people as early as possible”, the chairwoman 
of the Children and Youth Department of Münster stated in one of our interviews. 
The quote nicely encompasses the central idea of policy action before a significant 
problem comes to the fore. The idea of avoiding problems by providing citizens 
with tools and skills to help themselves is embedded in both political traditions 
most prominently influencing politics in Münster, Social Democracy and Christian 
Democracy, influenced by subsidiarity. Interviews conducted under the framework 
of the Welfare Innovations at the Local Level in Favour of Cohesion (WILCO) proj-
ect showed that the empowerment argument of the prevention frame was primarily 
referred to by members or representatives of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
in Münster. Their reference to the prevention frame was linked to considerations 
of equality, life changes and justice. Representatives of the Christian Democratic 
Party also turned to the prevention frame, in particular to legitimize social policies.
However, the underlying rationale they referred to it was quite different. In a nut-
shell, they pointed to a cost argument, claiming that it is cheaper to invest in preven-
tion now than to have to pay more for removal of the damage. Hence, a somehow 
economic logic is also inherent to the prevention frame. In Münster, the prevention 
frame is referred to in various social policy fields, surpassing the classic welfare 
or social policy toolbox. Under the Leitmotiv of the prevention frame, policy mea-
sures aim to ensure that all groups and individuals are empowered to participate as 
successfully as possible in the market. Hence, the two dominant policy frames in 
Münster counterbalance each other. However, at the same time there is a slight bias 
in favour of the investment frame because prevention policies might also be inaugu-
rated and put in place using the vocabulary of the investment frame.
3.3.3  The Policy Coalition
As indicated earlier, Münster is a very homogeneous city. Results of the WILCO 
project highlight that poverty and unemployment are not significant issues in Mün-
ster. Furthermore, the city counts among the very few in the region of North-Rhine 
Westphalia with a growing population. The number of unemployed citizens is 
below the country’s average rate of unemployment. The same holds true for the 
number of migrants. Indeed, the population with a migration background is very 
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limited in Münster. Furthermore, due to the attractiveness of the University, many 
citizens with migration background came to Münster in order to study. They stayed 
and started professional careers. Since big business is almost absent in Münster, 
homogeneity constitutes a characteristic feature of the city. Furthermore, some busi-
ness entities are indeed semi-public institutions, such as a quite influential saving 
bank or a major insurance company. Against this background, it does not come as 
a surprise that numerous circles and semi-public initiatives in Münster are serving 
as forums for discussion and policy deliberation. There is also significant overlap 
between the different groups and round tables that constitute a semi-public discur-
sive sphere in the city.
In summary, Münster is run and governed by a relatively small circle of engaged 
citizens, members of the city administration and representatives of merchants, civil 
society organizations and the two churches. The closeness of Münster’s elite cir-
cles has been the subject of various studies (Termeer 2010; Schwalb 2011; Paulsen 
2015) that unanimously testified to the significant importance of the city or mu-
nicipal administration. The important role of the administration has been further 
strengthened in recent years due to the fact that the Mayor, simultaneously head 
of the city government and chairman of the municipal administration, is directly 
elected by the local population and therefore enjoys a significant legitimacy.
However, homogeneity and a culture of making politics in small circles also 
have flip sides. As a newcomer, it is not easy to get access to those circles in the city 
where “fat cats keep in touch”. Indeed, homogeneity with respect to gender, class 
and, in particular, age was also the most significant characteristic of members of the 
respective policy coalitions identified under the framework of the WILCO project. 
During the time of the investigation, individuals mostly ran the city in their late 50s 
or mid-60s, irrespective of their background (political parties, business community 
or local administration). In summary, this generation shares the same ideas and 
concepts. It is tied together by a common culture of a time when Germany started 
to emancipate itself from the post-war period. It is also this very generation that is 
responsible for the gentrification of the inner cities.
Also, this generation supports a classical divide between economic and social 
policy. Not surprisingly, the majority of innovations identified in Münster by WIL-
CO were initiatives by the municipal administration, implemented through network 
governance or governance of cooperation between municipal administration and 
“outsiders”, that is members of the respective policy coalition. In order to highlight 
the decisive role of the city administration for innovations in the area of social 
policy, two innovations identified in Münster as part of the WILCO project will be 
portrayed in the following section beginning with a brief outline of the policy fields 
labour market and housing (The following chapter is based on WILCO report 3, 
Boadu et al. 2011).
52 C. Rentzsch
3.4  Governance Structures, Discourses and Innovations 
in Münster’s Labour Market and Housing Policy
3.4.1  Labour Market Policy in Münster
Compared to neighbouring regions and Germany in general, the labour market 
situation in Münster is significantly better. Unemployment is relatively low, even 
for disadvantaged groups such as migrants and adolescents; the presence of nearly 
50,000 students gives employers the possibility to recruit candidates from a vast 
pool of flexible, young and well-educated people interested in marginal part-time 
employment. Although Münster is not known for a long philosophy of local labour 
market policy4, a local labour market initiative was founded specifically targeting 
young adults; Arbeitsmarktinitiative Münster was launched during a social demo-
cratic and green party majority about 20 years ago. At that time, a number of youth 
training centres were started by the city or NPOs, but the conservative majority in 
Parliament largely reduced public spending on local labour market policies from 
1999 onwards. The European Social Fund (ESF) and/or the State of North Rhine-
Westphalia now fund initiatives formerly financed by the municipality. The ESF is 
an important financial pillar of local labour market projects.
Besides the two major public institutions responsible for labour market poli-
cies (Federal Agency for Employment and its local Jobcentres), the third sector and 
private organizations play a role in the provision of labour market programmes and 
activities as well (see Evers et al. 2011b/WILCO WP2 County report Germany). In 
Münster, the welfare associations of the churches are active in the field of labour 
market policy, that is Caritas and Diakonie, as well as local associations, initiatives 
and foundations. They offer personal advice and support on site, especially for spe-
cific groups of people, such as young adults or refugees5.
Additionally, relations between different actors in local labour market policy are 
institutionalized in the Advisory Board of the Jobcentre, which performs an advi-
sory function for the municipality but does not have any decision-making power. 
Although this board is a legal requirement, it was given additional weight in Mün-
ster, asking various actors to serve on the board with the aim of assessing local 
labour market policy. The Jobcentre’s Advisory Board consists of 16 regional rep-
resentatives from the field of labour market policy from administration, civil society 
and political parties; it becomes increasingly involved in the development of local 
4 As the parliamentary leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) states: “Economic and social 
policy is not made in Münster’s town hall. This can be seen in the mentality of local politics hand-
ing over labour market policy to the private sector; the economy that is responsible for creating 
jobs.” Interview with the parliamentary leader of the SDP in Münster.
5 One prominent example of a civil-society-driven project of collaboration between various actors 
in the field of employment policy is the MAMBA network, focusing on the qualification of refu-
gees and other migrants with a legalized residency status.
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labour market strategies in order to develop innovative approaches for the integra-
tion into the job market.6
Structural Change: Optionskommune
In Germany, the Federal Agency for Employment and its Jobcentres, local units 
taking care of the “hard-to-place” unemployed, is in charge of the implementation 
of labour market policies. However, the federal government provided an option for 
local governments to partly take over obligations and duties of the Federal Agency 
for Employment. Hence, the municipality was offered the possibility to integrate 
the local Jobcentres into their social service profile. This was decided by competi-
tive process on the basis of careful testing of proposals handed in by the respec-
tive communities. Once decided positively, the community was awarded the title 
Optionskommune, the respective city becomes responsible for placement and job 
search of long-term unemployed.
The application for becoming Optionskommune was prepared in 2010 by the city 
administration, in particular by the Department of Social Affairs, without consult-
ing many other constituencies. External expertise was called upon to highlight the 
advantages of the Optionskommune, but these documents only circulated within 
the administration. Nevertheless, the local parties supported the application for the 
Optionskommune because they hoped for a more purposeful, responsible and cross-
linked local labour market policy. More purposeful means that in future local ad-
ministration and policy-makers would deal with city-specific problems and federal 
funding would be used for different employment measures in Münster. More re-
sponsible implies that success or failure of certain measures would be evaluated lo-
cally, and that cooperation with subcontracting private or nonprofit partners would 
become more trusting and binding. Third, a more cross-linked labour market policy 
means improving the integration of social policy, educational policy, childcare and 
integration policy.
A municipality that “opts out” entrusts the local level with responsibility for the 
arrangements of local labour market policy and the allocation of federal funding. 
The introduction of this model constitutes a compromise between state and federal 
levels after the significant labour market reforms (the so-called Hartz laws) were 
approved in 2005. Jobcentres are responsible for payment, profiling and case man-
agement of unemployed clients as well as for helping them to access additional 
services such as childcare or debt counselling. Additionally, in order to increase 
employability, jobcentres have their own budgets at their disposal to pay providers 
responsible for the placement of unemployed people.
Labour Market Policy as “Investment in the Future?”
There is a broad consensus on the need to promote Münster both as part of a region 
and as a city in order to attract a broader spectrum of investors. This consensus 
6 “Well, the composition of the advisory board included many different providers of job cre-
ation measures, counselling centres, the university, economy and chambers, and the social sector 
was strongly represented as well.” Focus group interview II: District executive director of the 
Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband. Original quotation: Also die Besetzung des Beirates […] war-
en ganz viele Beschäftigungsträger, waren Beratungsstellen, waren sicherlich auch Universität, 
Wirtschaft und also die Kammern, aber der soziale Bereich war relativ stark vertreten.
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follows the belief that new jobs will be created if the region can attract more invest-
ment and the relocation of companies, and thereby help to overcome unemploy-
ment. Münster thus relies on “lighthouse projects” to erase the obsolete image of 
“Münster as an administration town”. In order to achieve this, the instrument of 
benchmarking has been increasingly applied in the field of labour market policy.
Despite the dominance of the investment frame, several groups in the field of 
labour market policy follow the prevention frame, arguing that one should “become 
active before the damage has been done” instead of supporting individual “prob-
lematic cases”.7 Youth unemployment in particular requires a specific focus on pre-
vention, since young people have limited access to the local job market. Youth un-
employment (especially during the transition from school to work) is a topic widely 
discussed in politics—by the administration, local media and in party programmes. 
Young people are considered to be one of the only groups given continuous care. 
Moreover, prevention in the sense of furthering education also meets the future 
demand for skilled employees.
With the transformation to Optionskommune, a shift of responsibilities occurred. 
Proponents of the Optionskommune highlight the opportunity to play a more active 
role as a municipality in the field of labour market policy and to tap into the poten-
tial offered by the good connections between public and private actors in the city. 
Building on experience and close networks with local businesses and employers, 
many local public actors expect to be able to organize more effective and efficient 
labour market integration to establish better ways of taking care of the unemployed 
and to achieve a stronger focus on preventative work. However, there remains one 
caveat. People taking administrative decisions, as one informant states, unfortu-
nately “do not speak the language of the people concerned. Not only do they not 
know how to address them, they do not speak their language”.8 Maybe the recently 
introduced advisory board will be able to break up these traditional lines of actions.
Optionskommune: An Example of Innovative Labour Market Policy
The Optionskommune follows the concept of subsidiarity, stating that the authority 
least centralized should handle matters. This concept fits into the overarching struc-
ture of the German welfare state and Münster’s main paradigms. As an innovative 
approach, it allows a different perspective on the unemployed: unemployment is 
not seen as an individual failure but mainly a structural problem. The development 
towards Optionskommune can be seen as an answer to these structural problems, as 
it brings social policy and the labour market together. The Optionskommune thus 
follows an empowerment approach: “We are moving away from taking care of the 
unemployed on the basis of software tools and towards the individuals and their 
7 Interview with the head of the Section for School, Advanced Training, Economy and School, 
Occupational Qualification. Original quotation: Mehr und mehr bemühe man sich darum, aktiv zu 
werden “bevor das Kind in den Brunnen gefallen ist”.
8 Focus group interview II: Head of the “House of the Assistance to the Homeless” ( Haus der 
Wohnungslosenhilfe = facility of the Bischof-Hermann-Stiftung for the support of the homeless). 
Original quotation: Und auch nicht die Sprache [der Betroffenen, C.R.]. Nicht nur Ansprache, 
auch nicht die Sprache.
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histories”9. Essentially, this model follows a decentralized approach: it assumes that 
if the Jobcentre is a local institution, which relies on local expertise and networks, 
it will be better situated to take care of the unemployed than the Federal Employ-
ment Agency. The Jobcentre allows addressing users in more individualized ways, 
eventually placing more people in paid labour.
Local authority is also trying to decrease bureaucracy in the Jobcentres for the 
benefit of clients since it improves the focus on individuals and their specific situa-
tions. It also supports the idea of giving caseworkers enough room to make indepen-
dent decisions in favour of the individuals. Altogether, the Optionskommune offers 
more freedom to use other more flexible and sustainable instruments in addressing 
users than the former model.
Even though this innovation is an instrument situated on a metalevel, it provides 
the context and structural framework for strategic and sustainable social innova-
tions within the local welfare system. It can be considered a basic precondition to 
pursue integrated local social policy that enables the administration to incorporate 
labour market policy into their local governance approach. The most challenging 
goal in this process was to bring together different participants, since they “spoke 
different languages. People working in social policy and the labour market area 
used the same words but told different stories. Working together on labour market 
policy while focusing on the various target groups was not possible in the past […] 
Being connected by the opting-out model is very valuable.”10
Therefore, the most innovative aspect of Optionskommune is the “chance of so-
cial policy and labour market policy in the city welding together”. Optionskommune 
opens up a potentially multipurpose scope for integrated approaches addressing 
social problems. Splitting funding between several social stakeholders is another 
positive outcome and a reason why the model seems to be a win-win situation for 
both the administration and social service providers. However, whether the Op-
tionskommune Münster will be successful in providing jobs more efficiently will 
depend heavily on the availability of local networks between the administration and 
the local labour market.
9 Interview with the head of the Social Department of the municipality. Original quotation: Sie 
nutzen nun einen anderen Beratungsansatz, der darauf beruht, einen Fall nicht mehr nur auf Basis 
von Software zu bearbeiten, sondern das Individuum mit ihrer oder seiner Geschichte anzuerken-
nen.
10  Focus group interview IV, Chief executive of the Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband. Original 
quotation: Man hat verschiedene Sprachen gesprochen. Die Sozial- und die Arbeitsmarktmen-
schen. Die haben diesel-ben Worte genutzt aber was anderes erzählt. Das gab es früher nicht. 
Dass man zielgruppenorientiert an der Arbeitsmarktpolitik [gearbeitet hat, C.R.]. […] Da sind 
dann auch alle Beteiligten durch die Option organisatorisch gebunden an einem Tisch. Und das 
ist sehr wertvoll.
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3.4.2  Housing Policy in Münster
Sexy Münster
From an investor’s point of view, Münster is a highly attractive city. The population 
is growing and the average income ranks above average—building or buying flats 
and houses in such a rich, growing city allows for successful businesses. However, 
what happens to those who are financially less equipped in a city with rent rates 
similar to those of Munich or Milan? It is becoming increasingly difficult for low-
income inhabitants to find affordable housing in Münster. Therefore, financially 
disadvantaged people only find flats by chance or among the rare offers of social 
housing associations. Nevertheless, providing sufficient social housing has not been 
a major issue for administration and politics in the last 10 years. The number of 
affordable social housing has significantly declined; new social housing is more ex-
pensive than old flats from the 1950s or the 1960s. But even those disappear rapidly 
as they are being converted into modern condos. Particularly in the centre of town, 
newly constructed buildings are chic, demonstrating wealth and prosperity. While 
in Münster’s centre flats have undergone large value increases, housing situations 
in several suburbs are desolate. Gentrification of the city centre and selected invest-
ments in some suburbs resulted in a segregation of unemployed and working poor 
in social hotspots.
Similar to labour market policy, the role of local governments in housing policies 
is quite limited. Housing has become a key area of business interest in Germany. 
Policy interference has almost always been exclusively based on indirect policy 
instruments, mostly incentives through tax benefits decided at federal or regional 
level of government. Hence, besides investing in government-owned housing stock 
or selling municipal building sites, the municipality does not enjoy much leeway 
for policy action. Key responsibility of municipalities in housing policy in Ger-
many is planning in terms of issuing zoning plans instead of building. Nevertheless, 
similar to other cities, Münster has worked out a strategic document for its housing 
policy. First initiated in 1993 and subsequently updated, Münster’s “Local Action 
Housing Program” is also the result of a round-table-based process of delibera-
tion. Representatives of various constituencies were involved but the Department of 
Housing and City Development continues to play the key role. A further key player 
of municipal housing policy in Münster is Wohn + Stadtbau, a housing association 
(planning, construction, selling and renting out) which is 100 % owned by the city 
of Münster. As already indicated, in the area of housing there is a forum of commu-
nication, chaired by the Head of the Department of Housing and City Development 
who is also the official representative of the Mayor. The forum titled “Housing in 
Münster” was founded in 2004 as an initiative of Münster’s administration. The 
working group exchanges information and provides political consultation, which 
means it is not in a position to make appeals or decisions for any political measures 
on housing. Since the group’s purpose is to establish trustful working conditions, 
meetings are not open to the public.
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Hotly Debated—Housing Policy
Although housing policy was always a topic for Münster’s local politics, it is not 
clear if and to what extent the continuous problems of demand, high prices and 
growing segregation will become the focus of policy measures in the future. The 
anticipated problems, as well as the problematic focal points, illustrate the press-
ing need to address Münster’s housing situation, since social division is becoming 
more and more visible. The city and politics are regarded as having little influence 
and steering competences in the housing policy field. Nevertheless, some experts 
in parties and administration recognize the growing pressure in the housing market 
and stress the necessity to act. This is why they work closely together in order to 
show that a cooperative governance arrangement exists in housing policy as well.
The well-established coalition system gives the impression of homogeneous 
opinion. Yet, this coalition is composed of the main agenda-setters, who aim for 
market provision whenever possible, and the local stakeholders, who propose “pre-
vention strategies”. Initially, the coalition sought to start an economic cycle in which 
the city would become more competitive in the acquisition of private investments 
in the local (high-end) housing market. The rationale was that this would provide 
economic growth and wellbeing to the entire community. Additionally, these new 
investments would raise the overall prestige and attractiveness of the city and spur 
new investments to keep the cycle going. Based on these assumptions, an important 
part of the city’s self-conception derives from the promotion of a high standard of 
living and attractive housing options, prominently featured in the city’s marketing 
efforts. Judging from the continuous and detailed coverage of such projects in the 
local media, larger and smaller urban development projects are of high interest to 
the local public. But housing and urban development issues are also debated rather 
fiercely in the city council and in its subcommittee. However, the market does not 
take responsibility for lower incomes. The dominating belief is that everyone will 
benefit from this development via “trickle down” effects.11
Focus on recent housing debates, which were mostly open to the public, shifted 
away from initiating growth and development towards a discussion about the ef-
fects of a high demand for commodities on the housing situation itself, namely (1) 
that affordable housing is rare and hard to acquire for socially disadvantaged citi-
zens, (2) that rents (for housing and business) are too high for healthy growth in the 
sector and (3) the acknowledgement that certain “neglected” neighbourhoods do not 
share positive growth and development effects. These effects are generally accepted 
as facts (cf. Breckner 2010; Holm 2011). Nevertheless, some still argue that rising 
rents are in fact an indicator for the success of the current municipal approach. On 
the contrary, others say that the municipality is not in a position to effectively in-
fluence the situation due to the structural characteristic of the housing field. Other 
11 “The housing market works by itself because demands are high. For the lower income section 
we have the city-owned housing association “Wohn + Stadtbau”. But also if there is construction 
for the higher income section, other housing units will become available for the lower section and 
benefit the market as a whole” (Interview with the chief editor of the Westfälische Nachrichten in 
Münster).
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advocates within the coalition claim that the city would have been able to do more 
in order to increase affordable housing yet gave up its prospects for action mostly 
due to budgetary restraints or voluntarily in favour of market provisions:
[…] All important projects in the last years have been investors’ decisions. Basically, we 
did not put a municipal project through since the Municipal Library. Those were projects 
implemented by private investors or by the Catholic Church, not by the municipality. And I 
think that is a huge danger in a city with that kind of financial volume.12
The housing field also reflects the city’s dominant discourse structure: Housing 
policy is mainly seen as an instrument for growth. The investment frame is again the 
dominant frame whereas social aspects play a minor role. Because of Münster’s po-
litical culture, important decision-makers have always been vigilant about prohibit-
ing developments that might seriously endanger the social balance in the city. This 
argument leads to a request for a more “sustainable” growth (prevention of market 
failure) and a call for caution about endangering the city’s attractiveness through 
social cleavages. Since it is agreed upon that disrupting the city’s social balance 
should be avoided, the need to improve the situation in already neglected neigh-
bourhoods with reactive measures is relatively undisputed in the political arena and 
the general public.
In this context, several experts refer to “healthy mixes”, understood as a mixture 
of different social groups inhabiting an area. They assume that if there is no such 
mix, people will be less likely to identify with their neighbourhood and owners will 
not invest in the housing stock as it may not pay off. “Sustainable neighbourhood 
development”, a preventative “spatial” social policy, does not seem to be heavily 
disputed within the city context. A general need for sustainable neighbourhood de-
velopment, a “healthy mix” of inhabitants and the need for affordable living spaces 
seem to be widely acknowledged by all actors involved, although the means to 
reach these goals are not agreed on since they are based on different problem analy-
ses. In consequence, the question of how the lack of affordable housing shall or 
could be countervailed is clearly the main line of public political dispute in the 
field. With regard to local political actors, the controversies run along traditional 
party lines, between investment and social perspectives. The administration’s role 
is criticized since it sides with market proponents, emphasizing that public housing 
cannot create enough affordable accommodation (Völker 2011).13 Local authori-
ties think it is more “useful to support lower income tenants with accommodation 
allowances.”14 The strength of the market thus remains the dominant line of argu-
12 Focus group interview I: member of the state parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia for the 
Christian Democratic Party.
13 Karin Völker (2011) Wohnraum wird immer teurer—Stadt Münster setzt auf freien Markt. 
(“Housing space is getting more expensive—The city of Münster bets on the free market”). West-
fälische Nachrichten, 16 September. http://www.wn.de/Muensterland/2011/09/Zahl-der-Sozial-
wohnungen-nimmt-ab-Wohnraum-wird-immer-teurer-Stadt-Muenster-setzt-auf-freien-Markt. Ac-
cessed 20 March 2015.
14 Dr. Winfried Michels, Institute for Settlement and Housing at the Münster University.
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ment, which means that members of the administration and other actors remain 
convinced that “the market works” (cf. Uplawski 2009).15
Innovative Housing Policy: Osthuesheide
Osthuesheide is a neighbourhood consisting of several blocks of apartment build-
ings. Constructed by a private company, the housing stock was once inhabited by 
members of the British army. As the apartments were gradually sold to private 
investors or individual owner-occupiers, a “circular and cumulative process of 
degradation”16 started: The low standard attracted mainly tenants and owners with 
fewer resources and necessary investments were omitted. In consequence, several 
apartments became uninhabitable; poverty and a high fluctuation of residents have 
become symptomatic of this area.
The fragmented ownership structure and lack of financial capacities of many 
owners were identified as the main obstacles for further private investment. Legally, 
only owners’ associations (WEG17) are able to make decisions on major invest-
ments. Therefore, three associations were formed; two associations decided in fa-
vour of investments but the third and largest association lacked a majority.
The administration took on a significant role throughout this process. In the first 
step, the municipality tried to use social work to counteract the negative housing 
situation and reputation of Osthuesheide, which resulted in very limited success. 
Consequently, owners were identified as the main addressees of public efforts: Fi-
nancial investors should be either forced to invest by majority decision or driven to 
sell their flats, whereas individual owner-occupiers should be convinced of joining 
the pro-renovation fraction and be assisted with the financial burden.
The core of the innovation Osthuesheide was the moderated process that fol-
lowed, initiated by the municipality in two of the associations with a high share of 
owner-occupiers. The general aim was to foster decisions for renovation without the 
municipality’s further financial engagement.18 The municipality developed three fi-
nancial options to meet the needs of heterogeneous ownership.
Despite this involvement, the direct intervention of the municipality was limited 
to improving the quality of the surroundings and changing the name of the neigh-
bourhood in order to improve its reputation. The city’s initial plan to purchase units 
was soon considered inappropriate, as owning only a low number of flats would not 
15 Klaus Uplawski (2009) Konfrontation in der Wohnungspolitik—Markt funktioniert (nicht) 
(“Confrontation in housing policy—the market (does not) work(s)”). Member of the Office for 
Urban Development, Urban and Traffic Planning. Westfälische Nachrichten, 28 May. http://www.
wn.de/Muenster/2009/05/Nachrichten-Muenster-Konfrontation-in-der-Wohnungspolitik-Markt-
funktioniert-nicht (accessed: 20.03.2015).
16 Title of a public protocol of the city council.
17 WEG = Wohnungseigentümergemeinschaften are associations of all owners of an apartment 
building or a housing estate. In yearly assemblies, they decide upon, for example, renovation/
modernization measures, contributions to a maintenance reserve fund, etc.
18  The aim of the renovation was not only to improve the living situation of existing tenants but 
also to attract new and well-to-do inhabitants to the area. The common catchphrase “to create a 
(healthy) social mix” was found with some variations in several council debates, some party pro-
grammes and a number of WILCO-related interviews.
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generate sufficient influence. There were also concerns that the municipality could 
be in danger of being legally liable in the event that owners’ associations were un-
able to repay their debts. In order to avoid this, a separate company was founded as 
a subsidiary of the communally owned Wohn + Stadtbau, “Wohnungsgesellschaft 
Große Lodden (WGL)”. This company was commissioned to buy flats in order to 
gain a (in the end successful) majority share in the third association, where both the 
need for investment and the number of flats owned by corporations were highest. 
The close connection between the established public housing company and the new 
company allowed obtaining a substantial loan for renovations, since Wohn + Stadt-
bau offered other houses as guarantees.
Both the moderated process and the renovation in all three associations repre-
sent a governance innovation in Münster. Interventions in the ownership structure 
of neglected neighbourhoods were never executed before, especially not to such a 
high degree in terms of financial volume. But the representatives of the WGL and 
the Municipal Office for Housing disagreed about the discursive shift in Münster’s 
local housing policy. According to the representative of the Municipal Office for 
Housing, a long-term re-communalisation of housing stock is unnecessary. Fur-
thermore, it would suffice to take up an intermediary role, for example, neglected 
blocks could be bought and resold to private owners based on a contract that in-
cluded obligations regarding the future development of neighbourhoods. This un-
derlines the predominance of market mechanisms in combination with a certain 
level of municipal control. This reliance on market mechanisms was only broken 
up in the “single case Osthuesheide” due to the fact that state and reputation of the 
neighbourhood was threatening the overarching image of Münster as an attractive 
location for private investments. This worry activated a broad number of stakehold-
ers and led to the acceptance of public intervention. Most of them consider the 
Osthuesheide renovation programme as highly successful and sustainable solution 
to the underlying problems (The following chapter is based on WILCO report 5, 
Boadu et al. 2013).
3.5  Windows of Opportunity for Social Innovations in 
Münster?
Which factors determine the success of the innovations “Optionskommune” and 
“Osthuesheide”? Firstly, drivers of the innovations had access to the local “coali-
tion system” and argued in accordance with dominant investment and prevention 
frames. A network of supporters was easily established. Secondly, the social en-
trepreneurs who promoted the innovations were members “of the club”, the elite 
network of those representatives of the local parties, the administration and the 
business community in Münster. Finally, in both cases, in-house lobbying within the 
local administration proved to be the most efficient path to success. In both cases, 
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it was the administration taking action, establishing a network of support and also 
safeguarding the necessary resources.
Although both innovations proved to be sustainable, their emergence and de-
velopment was not the result of a democratic process, but heavily backed by a net-
work of the Münster elite instead. Furthermore, both innovations were the results 
of top-down approaches initiated and put forward by the administration. Hence, 
one must admit that cooperative governance in Münster is pretty much a “closed 
shop” affair: homogenous groups of people sharing similar values and ideas what 
the city should look like and which direction it should develop. These members of 
the “club” are involved in different areas of social, economic and political life in 
Münster, a fact that further strengthens the coalition system and turns it into a quite 
sustainable and powerful governance arrangement. The “coalition” dominates the 
local discourse to such an extent that anybody who wants to accomplish something 
must accommodate the distinctive rationales of the investment or prevention frame. 
Hence, Münster provides a nice case study and textbook example for analysing 
the discursive turn in policy analysis. There is, indeed, the possibility to become a 
member of the “club”; however, he or she has to act and more importantly talk and 
argue in accordance with the discursive hegemony. Therefore, Münster is inclusive 
because getting people around the table and trying to get as many constituencies 
involved constitute a traditional trait of the city’s governance arrangement, but at 
the same time, there are a very few “fat cats” in Münster who are continuously in 
touch and who indeed govern the city.
Also, Münster can be characterized as a city in which the local welfare system is 
based on a coherent way of addressing social problems, referring to network-based 
solutions that include various actors of the society. Therefore, Münster does use 
various opportunities in order to become and stay a successful city—as long as one 
speaks the language of the dominant coalition.
Considering such a coalition system on the one hand and having a very specific 
(welfare) tradition in Münster on the other hand, the question arises how new ideas 
and social innovations can evolve when everything seems to be decided within a 
somewhat established “closed shop”?
The answer is that, in general, Münster is a city in which social innovations have 
a good chance of flourishing. However, such innovations only pick up speed in spe-
cific contexts. The general welfare frame has profound implications for social in-
novations since they are context-specific and embedded in a wider social, economic 
and political context (Moulaert et al. 2005). The context opens the windows of 
opportunity for social innovators and social entrepreneurs. It establishes the condi-
tions these actors encounter and can thereby promote or inhibit new ideas.
Yet, “context” also means local governance arrangements. Four different dimen-
sions are identified that characterize these kinds of arrangements and that stand for 
a specific type of urban governance. Münster represents an example of the dimen-
sion of “governance of cooperation”, characterized by a general orientation towards 
innovation in politics and economics. Particularly, the search for synergies between 
economics and social policies to foster the urban character of the city functions as 
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a guiding principle. From the organizational point of view, cooperative solutions 
between all local actors (administration, economy and civil society) are privileged 
in this search process. All actors involved broadly accept cooperation as the lead-
ing principle for city matters, resulting in the approach that “the more allies unite 
for a specific city matter, the greater the chance to push something through”.19 This 
governance arrangement supports the implementation of innovations and allows 
“another way of cooperative work could be established”.20
Apart from the overarching logic of the discursive frame and governance ar-
rangements, several other conditions must be fulfilled before social innovations can 
be implemented or even stimulated. The first condition concerns funding. Original 
idea and conditions must attract the interest of sponsors in the project. Sponsors 
have to be market-compliant, which means that they must comply with the lines 
of argument found in either the investment or the competitiveness discourse. They 
have to understand that this represents the dominant basis for decision-making. The 
second condition concerns legitimation, which means that basic legitimation for 
social innovation is given and accepted by the people involved. Referring to our 
results from the policy fields we analysed in Münster, an innovation is accepted 
as legitimate if it is presented within the investment frame. The third condition in-
volves the aspect of appeasement: Any social innovation that challenges the domi-
nant frame will only be supported if the innovators give up some of their resistance 
against the frame in exchange for financial or advocatory sponsorship. The support 
granted then serves the appeasement of possible opposition and is considered a 
win-win situation for all parties involved. Finally, the fourth condition concerns a 
pragmatic approach towards solving problems at the local level. Social innovations 
in Münster need to demonstrate a hands-on approach towards perceived problems. 
This relates to tangible target groups, deprived districts and so on, while more vi-
sionary approaches hardly have any chance of success.
The closed-shop mentality, the local welfare discourse with its focus on city 
growth, local governance arrangements, several conditions that have to be fulfilled 
to introduce social innovations as well as specific characteristics of local labour 
market and housing policies—all these dimensions can be found in Münster and 
must be considered in order to decide whether the initiation of social innovations is 
fostered or obstructed within the city. Hence, these dimensions create the context 
that opens the “windows of opportunities” for concrete social innovators and social 
entrepreneurs.
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Chapter 4
Inertia, Clearings, and Innovations in Malmö
Ola Segnestam Larsson, Marie Nordfeldt and Anna Carrigan
As social innovations move into the political limelight of many welfare societies, 
scholars are debating the underpinnings of such an appreciated phenomenon (e.g. 
Evers et al. 2014). Some argue that social innovations are primarily established as 
the result of the innovative nature of individual entrepreneurs (Hansson et al. 2014; 
Fagerberg 2006). The chapters of this book, in contrast, focus less on these types 
of micro-level explanations and more on how social innovations are connected to 
local welfare governance and politics (Cattacin and Zimmer 2015). With the sup-
port of a policy coalition framework (Sabatier 1998, 1999), local development and 
the formation of social innovations are studied in relation to local power structures 
and discourses. Hence, linkages are identified between particular social innovations 
and the local contexts that have served as fertile grounds, and research findings 
presented in this book highlight the centrality of these local contexts for how these 
innovations have developed as projects and processes (compare with Evers et al. 
2014). Thus, the main approach in this book is to analyse the degree to which social 
innovations are embedded in their local welfare environment.
This chapter contributes to the overall focus of this anthology in two ways. 
Firstly, we will present a case study of the city of Malmö that will serve as an 
illustration of how urban governance arrangements provide structures for social 
innovations and where Malmö is categorized as an example of the governance of 
social challenges (Cattacin and Zimmer 2015). By governance of social challeng-
es, Cattacin and Zimmer imply an urban governance arrangement in which state-
oriented initiatives in coordination with private non-profits develop social policies 
and could serve as a fertile environment for social innovations. The governance of 
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social challenges also implies that economic dynamics are handled parallel to social 
policies, the local state plays a primordial role in the production and distribution of 
services, and shared values are solidarity and the social responsibility of the state.
Secondly, this chapter also contributes to the debate on social innovations by 
arguing that one also needs to pay attention to the relationship between inertia, 
clearings in local contexts, and innovations in trying to understand the underpin-
nings of social innovations in local welfare regimes. While the policy coalition 
framework highlights how social innovations are connected to local development, 
power structures, and discourses (Sabatier 1998, 1999), we combine the framework 
with the concepts of inertia and clearings in order to explain the particular empirical 
and analytical results of the city of Malmö. Research on social and organizational 
change reveals somewhat paradoxically that inability and unwillingness to change 
may result in clearings being identified or opened in the social landscape in which 
innovations may develop (Ahrne and Papakostas 2001, 2002). In other words, rather 
than arguing that social innovations come to the fore as a result of the quality of cer-
tain individuals or being locally and socially promoted by various policy coalitions, 
we put forth that innovations may also emerge in clearings as a consequence of 
inertia among the various policy actors. The argument will be supported by a theory 
on how the establishment of new organizations contributes to social change—here 
adopted to the phenomenon of social innovations—and illustrated with case studies 
of social innovations in the local welfare regime of the city of Malmö in Sweden 
(Nordfeldt and Carrigan 2013; Segnestam Larsson and Carrigan 2013).
Specifically, in addition to describing the local welfare regime and a set of so-
cial innovations in the city of Malmö, the chapter analyses the different types of 
clearings that proved fertile for developing the highlighted three social innovations. 
The main conclusion is that it could be argued that ideological inertia enabled a 
shadowed, a guarded, and an abandoned clearing to provide time and space for a 
neighbourhood programme, an incubator, and an employment and empowerment 
project to develop as social innovations.
4.1  Inertia, Clearings, and Innovations
Before presenting the local welfare regime and a set of social innovations in the city 
of Malmö, the relationship between inertia and innovation is discussed. Inertia and 
innovation are often regarded as opposites in the literature. One classical example 
of such a position is how Schumpeter talked about creative destruction (Schumpeter 
1987). Periods of change are short and dramatic and are preceded and followed by 
longer periods of stability, and new innovations replace old structures by making 
the old structures disappear (cf. Bell 1974; Castells 1996; Giddens 1990). Ahrne and 
Papakostas, in their book Organisations, Society and Globalisation (2002; see also 
Ahrne and Papakostas 2001)1, argue instead that there is a strong interdependence 
1 Translation by the authors.
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between inertia and innovation, and that innovations do not have to be destructive 
in order to be established.
The assumption that inertia and innovations are interdependent does not imply 
total stability, however, as societies, sectors, and organizations change slowly, of-
tentimes along paths already laid out (Stinchcombe 1965). In understanding inertia 
as a driver to innovation, it is therefore useful to distinguish between the inability 
and the unwillingness to change or adopt quickly (Ahrne and Papakostas 2001, 
2002). Inability may be understood in terms of constraints related to and competi-
tion over scarce resources, established decision processes, and in the inability to 
perceive the possibility or need for change. One source of inability to change could 
be related to resources. The collective resources of, for example, an organization 
enable it to accomplish its activities. At the same time, however, they set limits for 
what an organization can do and how things can be done. Unwillingness could be 
more related to vested interests, ideological or cultural factors, and a fear of change. 
Unwillingness to change could, for example, be argued to be typical of many civil 
society organizations whose members will not accept too obvious deviations from 
the original ideology.
Rather, inertia makes innovation possible as a consequence of spaces—or what 
we prefer to refer to as clearings—being identified or opened in the social landscape, 
and therefore enabling resources for new innovations and organizations to emerge. 
According to dictionaries, the word clearing has several meanings, one of which is 
defined as a tract of land within a forest or other overgrown area from which trees 
and other obstructions have been removed (Collins dictionary 2012; p. 79). In this 
chapter, the concept of clearings is used in a similar fashion, but to denote spaces 
between existing organizations and projects in a social landscape. The reasoning 
behind the concept of clearings is that the social landscape is not completely covered 
with organizations or projects. The space between the boundaries of different orga-
nizations may be wider or smaller, but there will always be some space. Such spaces, 
however, may become the site of other organizations, projects, or—as in the case of 
this chapter—innovations. Analytical opposites of clearings in a social landscape 
could be processes related to organizations, projects, or innovations being crowded 
out (Markovits 1988) or organizationally “outflanked” (Mann 1986; p. 7).
It is the existence of these clearings that makes it unnecessary for new innovations 
to attack and destroy old structures in order to establish themselves, as innovations 
in these clearings can develop to differing degrees independent of the old struc-
tures. In order to illuminate relations between inertia and innovation, a framework 
of different types of clearings could be distinguished (Ahrne and Papakostas 2002; 
p. 113). The framework is used in this chapter to analyse the relationships between 
inertia, types of clearings, and innovations.
Free clearings Protected clearings
New Guarded
Old Regulated
Constructed Shadowed
Abandoned
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First of all, a difference needs to be made between free and protected clearings. 
When it comes to clearings that are not protected, that is, free clearings, there are 
varieties, such as old clearings that have existed for a long time without being oc-
cupied by organizations. We can think of old clearings in terms of unemployment 
or in terms of people having spare time for potentially organized activities such as 
politics or sports. There are also new clearings that may evolve. The development 
of technologies could serve as an example where new technical possibilities have 
opened up clearings in the social landscape. Abandoned clearings emerge when 
old established organizations move or rationalize their activities, where old castles 
turned into conference centres could serve as examples. The final variety of a free 
clearing is constructed clearings. We can think of cities providing infrastructure 
such as roads or electricity in order to prepare the ground for new enterprises or 
construction.
In the case of protected clearings, guardians and regulations could keep the ex-
istence of a clearing open, but protected. It may be because of ideological, legal 
frameworks, or moral commitments against such things as organized prostitution or 
child labour, or political commitments against certain kinds of business activities 
such as privately run labour exchange. There are also shadowed clearings, when, for 
example, new innovations or structures grow in the shadow of old organizations by 
using their resources or by being physically protected. Examples are student organi-
zations that grow in the shadow of universities or even new enterprises.
According to scholars Ahrne and Papakostas (2001, 2002), the different types of 
clearings interact in various ways with inertia in the form of inability or unwilling-
ness to change. The existence of free and unoccupied clearings could, for example, 
be considered as a case of inability to even see the possibility of entering such as 
clearing. Moreover, in protected clearings, established organizations may often be 
aware of such possibilities but are unwilling to engage in them or preventing others 
from innovating.
In this chapter, we will analyse the case of social innovations and the local wel-
fare regime in the city of Malmö in relation to inertia, clearings, and innovations. 
However, it should be mentioned that rather than to argue that the existence of 
clearings in a social landscape has a causal power in itself, we believe that analys-
ing innovations in relation to existing structures and organizations with the sup-
port of the concept is, firstly, a way to illuminate mechanisms of inertia in general 
and, secondly, a way to understand other and additional mechanisms that somewhat 
paradoxically proved fertile for developing social innovations in various forms of 
structures. As such, clearings and inertia enable us to interpret the relationships 
among social innovations and local welfare regimes differently.
4.2  A City of Many Welfare Projects
In order to situate and understand the welfare regime in Malmö and the role of so-
cial innovations in addressing lingering and emerging social problems, the national 
welfare structure and tradition in Sweden first needs to be briefly introduced, as 
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there are strong links between the national and the local level with a well-defined 
division of labour in relation to social welfare.
Sweden has become a textbook example of a welfare state based on a large pub-
lic sector, high taxes, and universal welfare services (Vamstad 2007). As an illustra-
tion, Sweden has spent a larger percentage of national income on welfare services 
than any other country in the world (Ginsburg 2001). One reason for this could 
be the shared consensus on the importance of the welfare state in Sweden by both 
Social Democrats and bourgeois governments, regardless of their ideological differ-
ences. Described as “a peculiar fusion of liberalism and socialism” (Esping-Ander-
sen 1990; p. 28), salient dimensions—that taken together could be said to define the 
welfare state of Sweden—include, for example, the principles of universalism and 
de-commodification of welfare services. Ensuring same rights for blue-collar and 
white-collar employees, one universal insurance system works for all in accordance 
with earnings. In terms of family policy, the welfare state takes preventive measures 
to render the costs of family life into a social matter and encourages independence 
from family (Vamstad 2007). Free of charge education from elementary school to 
university is another important part of the Swedish welfare system.
Similarly to the national level, the city of Malmö has a long history of being 
ruled by the Social democratic party, and since 1994, the Social democrats have 
been in majority or have been able to retain their influence by entering into coali-
tions with the Left and the Green party (Segnestam Larsson and Carrigan 2013). 
The dominant values impregnating the welfare regime could therefore be argued to 
be traditionally social democratic. For sure, statements found in the political party 
program for the Social democrats present the local welfare system as an instrument 
for fighting inequalities and an instrument that is closely connected to values such 
as social justice, class, equality, and sustainability (Social democratic party program 
2012). Moreover, class differences and other inequalities are believed to constrain 
individuals and the overall society as well as causing society to “drift apart” (2012; 
p. 8). The local welfare system is also linked discursively to concepts such as de-
mocracy and empowerment (Green party program 2010; the Left party program 
2012). There is also consensus among the various actors on the importance of local 
welfare for the citizens and that citizens should have the ability to influence the 
organization of local welfare.
Clear influences deriving from the national level pertain not only to the political 
ideologies but also to the actual organization of the welfare regime at the local level 
(Nordfeldt and Segnestam Larsson 2011). When the development of the Swedish 
welfare state accelerated after the Second World War, the parliament and the gov-
ernment at the time decided to continue that tradition by placing a great deal of the 
responsibility for public services with the local authorities (Vamstad 2007). As a 
consequence, the local authority in Malmö is responsible for a broad range of facili-
ties and services, entitled to levy income taxes on individuals, charge the citizens 
for various services, and legally obliged to provide certain basic services, such as 
education, care for the elderly, primary health care, social welfare benefits, local 
leisure activities, and the city district libraries (Segnestam Larsson and Carrigan 
2013). Affecting the local welfare system in Malmö is also nationally organized but 
locally located employment offices, regionally organized hospitals and healthcare 
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centres, as well as the regionally organized public transportation system (Nordfeldt 
and Segnestam Larsson 2011). In addition, the local welfare system includes local 
companies and other service and industrial companies requiring more business-like 
organizations. The city of Malmö also has a long history of civil society engagement.
4.3  Towards a Welfare Society
However, having introduced the particularities and stability over time in the Swed-
ish welfare state and the welfare regime in Malmö, recent times have witnessed a 
number of changes with far-reaching consequences. Economic reforms, privatiza-
tion, and deregulation over the past 30 years have altered the structural founda-
tion of the welfare state in Sweden (Hvinden and Johansson 2007; Vamstad 2007; 
Nordfeldt and Segnestam Larsson 2012). With strained budgets and unsolved social 
problems, central and local governments have been struggling to find urban gover-
nance arrangements and sustainable solutions to these challenges.
Some of these solutions have included the introduction of management models 
and principles into the public sector, sometimes dubbed as new public management, 
in order to make the welfare production more effective and results oriented (Green-
Pedersen 2002; Vamstad 2007; Nordfeldt and Segnestam Larsson 2012). Other so-
lutions have pointed to the need to focus on and include the citizen in the production 
of welfare services by, for example, providing the citizen with more options and the 
ability to influence the governance and services offered (Hvinden and Johansson 
2007; Pestoff et al. 2011). National and local governments have also been looking 
to the for-profit and the non-profit sectors to participate in the production of welfare 
services, challenging the previous preferences and ideological considerations for 
the public sector as the sole service provider (Rothstein 1994).
One outcome of these changes of a more discursive and political character is that 
the term welfare state is more and more considered as an antiquated leftover from 
the early phases of the Swedish welfare regime (Vamstad 2007). Many, politicians 
as well as academics, would like to replace the term with a new concept, focusing 
more on the welfare society. This phrase would according to its proponents imply 
a broader view of welfare that would include both public and non-public providers, 
but also formal and informal welfare activities (Nordfeldt and Carrigan 2013). It 
is within the context of the changing welfare society that one should interpret the 
awakening political interest in social innovations and social investments, at both 
the national and local levels, as a potential tool for addressing social problems and 
achieving social cohesion.
In addition to move from a welfare state to a welfare society, the local welfare 
regime in Malmö has also been affected by a number of changes taking place within 
the local economy (Segnestam Larsson and Carrigan 2013). On a more general 
level, following a period of social and economic stagnation during the 1970s and 
the 1980s, with more than 35,000 people leaving Malmö, the city has made attempts 
at transforming itself from an industrial city to a knowledge city (Salonen 2012). 
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Today Malmö could be considered a demographically dynamic city. Young people 
move to Malmö to study or to work, and there is both regional and transnational 
migration to the city. Important factors in the transformation of Malmö are a set 
of large-scale initiatives, including the establishment of a university college in the 
middle of the city and the economically important Öresund bridge to Denmark, es-
tablishing an economic and social region that transcends national borders (Salonen 
2012; Stigendahl and Östergren 2013; Segnestam Larsson and Carrigan 2013).
4.4  Lingering Social Problems
Despite ambitions to simultaneously reinvent the welfare regime and the local 
economy, lingering social problems remain, however, and new social tensions have 
arisen in the wake of the social and economic transformations.
Malmö has for several decades struggled with severe social problems, such as 
high unemployment, high costs of social benefits, and growing segregation (Nor-
dfeldt and Segnestam Larsson 2012). The level of employment is lower in Malmö 
than on average in Sweden, and there are significant differences between people 
born in Sweden and outside of Sweden, leading to a higher degree of social exclu-
sion and growing differences in living conditions among social groups (Stigendal 
and Östergren 2013). To these recurrent social problems, a list of growing problems 
could be added. Income inequalities have indeed increased in Sweden overall, but 
since the year 2000 income inequalities have grown more in Malmö than average 
in Sweden. The dynamic, demographic character of the city has also resulted in a 
higher degree of illegal immigrants and inhabitants outside of the workforce and the 
welfare system than in other Swedish cities (Salonen 2012).
In interviews with politicians and civil servants in the city council, a set of social 
problems were highlighted, including unemployment and segregation (Segnestam 
Larsson and Carrigan 2013). According to interviewed representatives, poverty is 
affecting people’s health, life expectancy, and could be considered a matter of life 
and death (e.g. interviews 5 and 6). Child poverty is also part of the discourse on 
local welfare and the proposed main problems. Another major problem in the city 
of Malmö is believed to be unemployment, in general, and youth unemployment, in 
particular (e.g. interviews 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, and 16).
We have had an enormous arrival of people to Malmö from other parts of Sweden and we 
have not been able to catch up. That is simply the case. We have not been able to catch up 
with this influx of people and we have not been able to identify job opportunities to the 
degree that would have been needed (Interview 13).
A third major problem area, as constructed by the policy discourse on local welfare, 
is segregation. Several of the respondents talked about the so-called million pro-
gram areas in relation to the perceived problem of segregation (e.g. interviews 1, 2, 
6, 9, 12, and 13). One of the respondents talked about a clustering of problems due 
to segregation:
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We have many geographical areas in which the population differs greatly from the average 
population in the city when it comes to participation on the labour market, results in school 
and so on. It is the concentration of problems in these areas that is the real challenge to the 
local welfare system (…) It is the housing situation that creates this kind of segregation. 
And as problems create more problems, these areas are, in a way, their own problem creator 
(Interview 12).
The interviewees also argued that a growing number of people have become ex-
cluded from the national social security system, for example, due to recent changes 
in regulations at the national level, among other things.
4.5  The Necessity to Act
An integrated part of the discourse on main problems in local welfare is the per-
ceived necessity to act in relation to the formulated problems (Segnestam Larsson 
and Carrigan 2013). Traditional solutions proposed by politicians, public sector rep-
resentatives, and civil society actors include to promote education and employment 
to battle poverty (Nordfeldt and Segnestam Larsson 2012). In accordance with the 
traditional welfare state ideology, employment is also considered to be important 
for social reasons and integration, constructing employment as the welfare solution 
to many, if not all, social problems.
Considering the gravity of the arising and enduring social problems, there is 
also an increasing awareness in Malmö of the need to find new solutions, outside 
of the paths already laid out (Segnestam Larsson and Carrigan 2013). Sweden in 
general and the city of Malmö are struggling with various issues related to welfare 
and all actors agree on the need to reform existing structures and to be open to new 
ideas, values, and instruments (e.g. Green party program, Social democratic party 
program, interviews 4, 6, and 11). As put in one of the interviews related to em-
ployment: “We have to think differently to get the citizens into the work force, we 
cannot keep on with the old” (Interview 6). One example of a proposed solution in 
Malmö is that several actors agree on the need to collaborate among different sec-
tors in society (Interviews 4, 6, 11, and 14). Accordingly, the Green party writes in 
its party program:
It is essential that the municipality has adequate resources in social services so that each 
person gets the help they need. At the same time, the non-profit sector carries out fantastic 
efforts and cooperation between the municipality and civil society is essential for creating 
a social safety net that works for everyone (Green party program 2010).
Other actors, such as the Swedish Democrats, concur:
With a clever design and marketing, we believe that many kind-hearted people living in 
Malmö are willing to make an effort in order to raise the quality of life for the old in our 
municipality and to support the many times hard working personnel in home care (Swedish 
democratic party program 2010).
Another answer to the increased level of collaboration and need for new solutions 
is spelled civil society. According to civil society representatives, there is a general 
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lack of knowledge regarding the role of civil society and what it has to offer (Inter-
views 3, 8, and 14). At the same time, there is agreement that new opportunities for 
civil society organizations in the development of local welfare should be created. 
The Left party argues that “associations and other organizations must be regarded as 
important review instances on political decisions” (Left party program 2012; p. 3).
One of the most talked-about solutions, however, is social innovation (Segnestam 
Larsson and Carrigan 2013). Innovations have been, and still are, mainly perceived 
to concern the launching of new products, inventions, and technical development 
in the minds of most politicians and practitioners in Sweden. Welfare development 
has, by tradition, not been considered as innovative (Rønning et al. 2013). Innova-
tion within the field of social welfare is nevertheless a recently awoken interest in 
some parts of the Swedish context (Hansson et al. 2014). The phenomenon of social 
innovation has consequently been made a key discursive node in the policy arena 
regarding local welfare in Malmö (e.g. Stigendal 2012). Representatives also argue 
that social innovation should be considered a cross-political concept in terms of its 
social and economic values, as it is hoped to attract people and organizations from 
various ideological backgrounds and positions (Interviews 2, 5, 12, and 16).
4.6  Three Social Innovations in Malmö
A limited set of social innovations could be identified in the local welfare landscape 
of Malmö during the time of the research project (Evers et al. 2014; Nordfeldt and 
Carrigan 2013). Three examples of innovative activities will be described below. 
These innovations are of different size and composition and include a broad neigh-
bourhood program, an incubator that at the same time is considered as a social 
innovation and a promoter of other social innovations, and an employment and 
empowerment project.
Starting with the broad neighbourhood program, “Områdesprogrammet” is a 
program aiming at revitalizing certain districts in Malmö out of socioeconomic 
stagnation. The program focuses primarily on creating more jobs and enhancing 
the living conditions first and foremost for the people living in selected districts. 
The program is organized into five “resource groups”, focusing on city develop-
ment, culture and recreation, the elderly, youth, and the labour market, and eco-
nomic growth. The main innovative feature of the Områdetsprogrammet, according 
to the involved actors, is that new solutions are sought through collaboration. In this 
context, collaboration seems to imply engaging and cooperating with the people 
living in the selected areas—as partners and co-producers, challenging the munici-
pal administration to work cross-administrational, and encouraging cross-sectoral 
cooperation among civil society organizations, companies, universities, and land-
lords, among others. Accordingly, involved participants highlight the importance 
of collaboration, working with existing means within existing infrastructures, and 
finding new solutions.
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Moving on to the incubator example, Coompanion Incubator serves as a green-
house for young and unemployed people and is financed by the European Social 
Fund. The target group is claimed to be challenged, inspired, and educated, and 
motivated by the Coompanion Incubator to set up their own business, be it private 
or organized as a cooperative. Only young and unemployed people registered with 
and directed by the national employment office are eligible for support, however, 
and it is the officer at the national employment office who decides whether or not a 
young unemployed person should be offered the support. The incubator could also 
offer the service of acting as an employer and managing mundane administrational 
tasks, enabling the individual to focus on the business idea. The combination of 
two features could be argued to function as the innovation in this example: the 
greenhouse service and the focus on a particular target group, young and unem-
ployed people.
Finally, the employment and empowerment project, Yalla Trappan, is described 
as a labour-integrated social enterprise. The idea behind the project derives from an 
initiative financed by the European Social Fund that focused on women’s entrepre-
neurship, integration, empowerment, education, and equality, and was later made 
permanent in the shape of Yalla Trappan. Today, the overall aim of the project is to 
provide work for women who otherwise would have had severe difficulties entering 
the labour market. In terms of activities, the project provides the local community 
with a conference centre, a coffee shop, a restaurant, a design and craftsmanship 
studio, and catering and cleaning services. The target group is offered employment 
and employment training in the various activities organized by the project in addi-
tion to Swedish tuition and education in health care. The project is organized as a 
cooperative enterprise. In terms of innovative features, the main contribution to the 
field of social innovations could most likely be linked to the focus on a particular, 
previously ignored, target group in combination with the project being organized as 
a cooperative enterprise.
The three highlighted social innovations in Malmö address social problems of 
political interest: stagnation, unemployment, and segregation. Common features 
across the three social innovations include training, entrepreneurship, empowering 
individuals, and collaboration among various actors and organizations. Portrayed in 
in this way, the three social innovations could be argued to represent new ideas and 
new ways of addressing social problems in the local context of Malmö (Nordfeldt 
and Carrigan 2013). Using the framework developed by Evers et al. (2014), these 
innovations could also be seen as focusing on the strengthening of individuals by, 
for example, investing in capabilities rather than targeting deficits, and by bridging 
the gaps between professional services and people’s life worlds. At the same time, 
when approached from the perspective proposed in this chapter, it could be argued 
that these innovations have developed in clearings, rather than being the outcome 
of certain enterprising individuals or being embedded within and supported by the 
legal and administrative framework of the overall welfare regime of Malmö.
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4.7  Fertile Clearings for Social Innovations
We put forth that the three social innovations emerged in clearings as a consequence 
of this unwillingness to change in the local welfare regime. Using the framework 
presented earlier in this chapter (Arhne and Papakostas 2001, 2002), we analyse 
and identify in this section the different types of clearings that proved fertile for 
developing the neighbourhood program, the incubator, and the employment and 
empowerment project.
Starting with the neighbourhood program, Områdesprogrammet, it was said that 
the main innovative feature was that new solutions were sought through cross-sec-
toral collaborations. This feature could serve as an indicator of a free and perhaps a 
new clearing, in which collaboration could have functioned as the technology that 
enabled the clearing to evolve. However, the fact that involved actors highlighted 
the importance of cross-administrational collaboration, in addition to the processes 
taking place within existing structures and with existing resources, instead indicates 
a protected clearing. Based on these features, we argue that the clearing making 
the neighbourhood program possible was a shadowed clearing, that is a case of a 
social innovation growing in the shadow of old and established structures, in an area 
that will allow the social innovation to grow by using resources from the existing 
structures.
Moving on the Coompanion Incubator, the existence of funding from the Euro-
pean Social Fund would indicate a free type of clearing in the local welfare land-
scape, open for this and other social innovations to access and use as a resource for 
development. However, similar to the complexity of the neighbourhood program, a 
particular dimension of the Coompanion Incubator suggests that this instead was a 
protected clearing. The fact that only young and unemployed people registered with 
and directed by the national employment office were eligible for support, in combi-
nation with the officer at the national employment office deciding whether or not a 
young unemployed person should be offered the support, insinuates that the clear-
ing should be regarded as a guarded clearing. The interpretation is therefore that the 
national employment office has recognized this clearing, but for various reasons has 
an interest in keeping it relatively closed by preventing anyone to enter without the 
consent of the office. Hypothetical reasons for guarding the clearing could be due to 
ideological or moral commitments or that the national employment office may feel 
threatened by the Incubator and therefore is trying to protect itself.
Finally, with regard to the employment and the empowerment project, Yalla 
Trappan, we argue that this is a case of a free clearing due to the existence of fund-
ing from the European Social Fund and the reliance on serving the local community. 
Having interpreted it as a free clearing, the question remains regarding the type of 
clearing. As the target group is described as previously ignored, we would argue that 
Yalla Trappan has emerged in a clearing abandoned by the local authorities. When 
organizations move or rationalize, all kinds of resources may be left behind, includ-
ing people, and such resources may become the resources of new social innovations 
and fit better into their form of organizing. In other words, as the local authority in 
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the traditions of the welfare state has a responsibility to serve this group, but has 
stopped these activities for various reasons, the clearing could best be described as 
abandoned rather than new, old, or constructed.
The three highlighted social innovations could be described to have emerged in 
different types of clearings: shadowed, protected, and abandoned. Having analysed 
and identified the relationship between clearing and social innovations has allowed 
a discussion on mechanisms of inertia. It has also enabled a different interpretation 
of what types of clearings that proved fertile for developing these social innovations 
in the local welfare regime in Malmö. However, were all clearings the result of the 
same type of inertia, or were there other forms of inertia in play?
4.8  Ideological Inertia in Malmö
As outlined in this chapter, deregulation within the field of local welfare, a political 
interest in alternative providers, and a high degree of self-governance at the local 
level would seem to provide plenty of opportunities for social innovations (Nord-
feldt and Carrigan 2013; Segnestam Larsson and Carrigan 2013). The description 
of the local policy context in Malmö would also indicate a favourable local context 
for social innovations to flourish. Surely, there is a shared view on the need for new 
solutions in local welfare, various actors agree on which social problems are most 
pressing, and there seems to be a political consensus with regard to the centrality of 
social innovation as a concept and practice. At the same time, given the relative lack 
of the number of social innovations as well as the negligible social impacts to date, 
it must be acknowledged that there exist elements in the political and social welfare 
landscape of Malmö preventing these and other innovations to grow. By adopting 
the concept of inertia and distinguishing between the inability and the unwilling-
ness to change (Ahrne and Papakostas 2001, 2002), this section argues that these 
elements in the local welfare regime of Malmö could be interpreted as an unwilling-
ness to change in the form of mainly political and ideological factors.
Even though there is agreement on which social problems are most pressing, one 
significant element of inertia is disagreements among the different actors and coali-
tions in Malmö regarding the methods and instruments to be used to address these 
social problems. As social innovation could be considered a method for addressing 
social problems, the political and ideological disagreements affect the possibilities 
for social innovations to take place.
Two points of disagreements related of relevance for social innovations are 
described here (Segnestam Larsson and Carrigan 2013). Starting with the role of 
the market and social innovations in local welfare, most political parties in Malmö 
seem to agree on the importance of creating a supportive institutional environment 
for private actors, entrepreneurs, and innovations in order to promote, for example, 
more employment opportunities (Social democratic party program 2012; Green 
party program 2010; Conservative party program 2012; Liberal party program 
2010). However, with regard to local welfare in particular, the coalitions disagree 
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on the role of private actors. The Left party does not recognize private actors at all, 
including civil society organizations, in local welfare.
These so-called voluntary choices are many times a way to put the responsibility for the 
structural problems on the individual; if you have chosen incorrectly, you are to blame. 
Choices that presume that there are winners also presume that there are losers in our soci-
ety. It often has the consequence that those who are well off are even better off and those 
who are struggling are worse off—we will get a divided city. A policy of privatization is 
marketed as choice. Welfare should be conducted without losers, be free from speculation 
and be distributed according to each and everyone’s needs (Left party program 2012; p. 10).
The political parties on the right, on the other hand, would like to encourage more 
private actors. Here follows an example from the Liberal party program:
More competition. It is the municipality’s responsibility to finance its duties. It is also the 
municipality that should ensure that you, the citizens, will get value for your money. How-
ever, it is not a mandatory task for the municipality to produce the welfare services. Private 
contractors can often do this better and less expensively. The Liberal Party in Malmö wants 
therefore to procure all municipal operations that do not constitute core municipal activi-
ties. (Liberal party program 2010; p. 8)
A related matter to the role of the market in local welfare concerns the role of finan-
cial profit as well as for-profit organizations. Both the Social democrats and the Left 
party have taken a hard stance against financial profit in local welfare in contrast to 
the opposing right wing political parties, making the funding of social innovations 
restricted.
Regarding the role of local welfare in the redistribution of resources, it would 
seem as if the Social democrats and the Left party construct the welfare system 
as primarily an equalizing tool (Social democratic party program 2012; Left party 
program 2012), whereas the right-wing parties focus more on using the local wel-
fare system to motivate unemployed to enter the labour market (Conservative party 
program 2012; Liberal party program 2010). An example of the conflict over the 
redistribution of resources and the role of local welfare concerns the case of child 
care fees. When the Social democrats and the Left party decided to cut the fee for 
child care for the poorest households in Malmö, the opposition argued that lowered 
fees should not be distributed in such a fashion that they might conflict with mo-
tivation to enter the labour market. This example illustrates well the conflict over 
the role of local welfare in redistribution, as the opposition focused on the conse-
quences for the level of employment in the area, whereas the majority focused child 
care as a tool for creating more equal living conditions. Moreover, the disagreement 
regarding redistribution of resources affects the possibilities for social innovations 
in general to develop, as no or very limited resources from the local welfare regime 
system were made available for the described three social innovations.
We interpret the disagreements on the role of the market and the redistribution 
of resources in the local welfare regime as an unwillingness to change rather than 
an inability to change. As described in section 4.1 of this chapter, inability may be 
understood in terms of constraints related to and competition over scarce resources, 
established decision processes, and in the inability to perceive the possibility or 
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need for change (Ahrne and Papakostas 2001, 2002). Even though the disagree-
ments could be regarded as a competition over scarce resources, we believe that 
the disagreements also could be interpreted as an unwillingness to change related 
to primarily ideological factors. Acknowledging and understanding these types of 
political and ideological disagreements concerning the role of local welfare would 
enable us to explain the relative lack of a significant number of social innovations 
and the negligible social impacts to date in Malmö.
Hence, from an analytical point of view, it could be argued that social innova-
tion as an idea, value, and instrument should be regarded as challenging established 
traditional welfare notions based on social democratic ideals in the city of Malmö, 
as inherent values are more related to a liberal political perspective on citizens, 
organizations and society (Segnestam Larsson and Carrigan 2013). Examples of 
these values include the focus on the individual as a focal point and the positive 
views on cross-sectoral collaborations and partnerships. Even though actors across 
the political spectrum seem to agree on the notion of social innovation and its role 
in reshaping current local welfare regimes, ideological inertia in the form of an 
unwillingness to change significant rules and regulations surrounding the welfare 
regime prevented more social innovations to emerge.
4.9  Shifting Scenery
This chapter has described the local welfare regime and a limited set of social in-
novations in Malmö in the context of an urban governance arrangement that could 
be categorized as the governance of social challenges (Cattacin and Zimmer 2015). 
In addition to highlighting common features and ongoing social and economic 
transformations, the chapter has analysed and identified the clearings (shadowed, 
guarded, and abandoned clearings) that proved fertile for developing the highlight-
ed three social innovations. The overall ambition, however, has been to contribute 
to the debate on the origins of social innovations. Rather than arguing that social 
innovations come to the fore as a result of the quality of certain individuals or being 
locally and socially embedded, we have put forth that innovations may also emerge 
in clearings as a consequence of inertia, in the case of Malmö in the shape and form 
of an unwillingness to change due to political and ideological factors. This ideologi-
cal inertia resulted somewhat paradoxically in clearings being identified and opened 
in the social landscape in which the three innovations could develop.
By having analysed how different types of inertia generated different clearings in 
Malmö, we have also provided a tentative and an alternative answer as to why social 
innovations emerged rather than established structures having addressed the identi-
fied social problems. In this way, we can see how the ideological inertia of the local 
welfare regime could be considered a precondition for and not an obstacle to the in-
novations. Hence, social innovations do not have to destroy the old ways of produc-
ing social cohesion in order to access resources, and the result may very well be an 
increased density of projects, organizations, and structures with new combinations 
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of old and new forms and changing patterns of interconnections (Ahrne and Papak-
ostas 2001, 2002). In other words, Malmö may yet witness a shifting scenery where 
many old forms and ingredients may be recognized, but in new constellations.
Approaching social innovations from the perspective of inertia and clearings has 
enabled us to interpret the relationships among the identified social innovations and 
the local welfare regimes in Malmö differently. It has also initiated a discussion on 
how ideological inertia related to a shadowed, a guarded, and an abandoned clear-
ing proved to be fertile for developing the three identified social innovations in the 
city. As such, it would seem as if one of the main recommendations stemming from 
this chapter would be that politicians and practitioners, wishing to promote social 
innovations as an instrument for social cohesion, also would have to fuel more 
ideological inertia in existing structures, as inertia could be considered one of many 
significant preconditions for change.
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Chapter 5
Birmingham, Priority to Economics, Social 
Innovation at the Margins
Nadia Brookes, Jeremy Kendall and Lavinia Mitton
5.1  Introduction
Birmingham is located in the West Midlands region of England and after the indus-
trial revolution became the ‘workshop of the world’, an economically important 
manufacturing centre (Aldred 2009). Today, Birmingham is the regional centre for 
business, retail and leisure. It is the largest city in the United Kingdom (UK) outside 
London and has a growing population of just over 1 million inhabitants. It has the 
youngest population of any major European city, over half the population is aged 
less than 35 years, and it is significantly diverse in terms of ethnic composition. 
Over half of Birmingham is within the most deprived 20 % of England and nearly 
40 % is in the most deprived 10 % (Department for Communities and Local Gov-
ernment 2010). Local government for the city is the metropolitan authority of Bir-
mingham City Council, the largest local authority in the UK made up of 40 wards 
(administrative/electoral districts).
Birmingham differed from many other large English local authorities following 
the second world war as these tended to be dominated by the Labour Party (Di 
Gaetano and Lawless 1999). In Birmingham, control of the city council moved 
back and forth between Labour and Conservative administrations until 1984 when 
a period of 20 years of Labour Party control began. The 2004 local elections re-
sulted in no political party with an overall majority and the Conservative Party and 
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the Liberal Democrats entered into a governing coalition. The Conservative leader 
of the council used the term ‘Progressive Partnership’ to describe the coalition, 
but over time Conservatives from within and outside Birmingham publicly ac-
cused the Conservative group of teaming up with the Liberal Democrats to pursue 
‘quasi-socialist’ policies (Birmingham Post 2011). Following the 2012 local elec-
tions, in a widely predicted result, the Labour Party won control of the city council 
once again.
Regardless of which party was in power, the city council fostered a cooperative 
relationship with the local business community. This strengthened in the 1980s with 
joint efforts to protect Birmingham from the negative economic effects of swift 
industrial decline. Also, at this time the Conservative central government did not 
support a central role for local authorities in local economic development, and part-
nership with local business was a way to circumvent this. For the past few decades 
Birmingham has pursued a pro-growth agenda and this has been described from 
different perspectives by several authors, particularly in the period between 1984 
and 2004 when the Labour Party controlled the Council. For example, the valid-
ity of the distributional consequences of growth-orientated economic development 
policies, in particular property-led approaches, have been questioned (Loftman and 
Nevin 1996), and the relationship between urban governance and industrial decline 
has been explored (Di Gaetano and Lawless 1999).
This chapter focuses primarily on the period from 2004 and begins with an ex-
amination of the values and orientations influencing social policies, followed by 
an analysis of what this means for social innovation, with a focus on labour market 
and housing and urban regeneration policy. In the final section, findings are brought 
together to illustrate how Birmingham as an example of a ‘governance of growth’ 
regime (see chapter on urban governance and social innovations) leads to social in-
novation ‘at the margins’.1
5.2  Context and Governance of Social Policies
To understand the interplay between welfare policies and social innovation it is 
necessary to understand the local context in which these occur. Several important 
factors are highlighted here which have had an impact on the local situation, in-
cluding the endurance of the pro-growth agenda, the importance of partnerships, 
the influence of central government, the role of devolved decision-making and the 
recent financial crisis.
1 The source material for this chapter included nine interviews with civil servants, policymak-
ers, representatives of the third sector and independent observers (plus a further eight connected 
to innovative projects within the city). Documentary analysis was conducted of: relevant local 
newspaper articles (2002–2012, 1493 sources), national newspaper articles relevant to the local 
situation (2002–2012, 354 sources) and minutes of council meetings and other documents/reports 
(2005–2012, 147 sources).
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The Enduring Pro-Growth Agenda
In the early 1980s Birmingham experienced industrial decline alongside deep re-
cession and this had a lasting influence on the city’s political thinking (Di Gaetano 
and Lawless 1999). Both main political parties made strong commitments to a pro-
growth agenda with the aim of reviving Birmingham’s economic performance. This 
agenda was an overlapping set of strategies which included those to preserve manu-
facturing and diversify industries, city centre regeneration and training and employ-
ment (Birmingham City Council 1989). The Labour administration that came to 
power after the 1984 local elections supported and protected the council leader who 
took forward plans to develop an international convention centre, an idea initially 
proposed by the previous administration. This convention centre was the start of 
what became to be known as the city’s ‘prestige project’, a strategy to regenerate 
the city centre. The administration subsequently planned the financing and imple-
mentation of other projects such as retail and office developments. Council civil 
servants were willing participants in this style of council decision-making as it en-
abled the projects to move forward with minimum disagreement and disruption. It 
has been suggested that this policy agenda resulted in a focus on economic growth 
rather than delivery of services and has been examined (and often criticised) by 
various academics, most notably Loftman and Nevin, and in the local press.
As Di Gaetano and Lawless (1999) describe, in 1993, a power struggle within 
the Labour group led to a new leader for the city council, who initially tried to re-
place the pro-growth policy with a ‘back-to-basics’ agenda focusing on education, 
social services and housing. Fewer resources available for economic development 
as a result of central government directives led to a focus on welfare areas. Despite 
this, the pro-growth coalition ensured that economic development remained a key 
element of the city’s policy agenda and there were still a number of large-scale 
development projects after the change in leadership. There were several reasons 
for this; a central government initiative, City Pride, brought the Labour leaders 
into increased contact with business leaders which in turn led to a closer working 
relationship. Also, within the Labour leadership there was a wide range of views 
on economic development, and several prominent Labour politicians actively sup-
ported the pro-growth agenda. Lastly, the pro-growth coalition had become deeply 
rooted in Birmingham’s governance arrangements. The Labour leadership and the 
pro-growth supporters came to an understanding where each publicly acknowl-
edged the importance of the other’s policy priorities.
The developments in Birmingham began under a strong Labour council who 
had a solid economic development and regeneration strategy. Albert Bore, council 
leader between 1999 and 2004, chaired the Economic Development Committee of 
the council throughout the whole period which contributed to continuity of local 
economic development policies. From 2004, the deputy leader of the council, a 
Liberal Democrat, was a millionaire entrepreneur and also a member of the growth 
coalition in the city. However, the new leadership was less embedded in the partner-
ships of the city and their approach ‘less pro-active and decisive in getting things 
done’ (Coulson and Ferrario 2007). However, the ‘prestige project’ still continued 
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with city centre projects such as the redevelopment of the main railway station and 
the building of the largest library in Europe taking place.
In 2012, following the Labour victory in the local election, Albert Bore was 
once again leader of the city council. His election campaign focused very much 
on the local economy, boosting local jobs and businesses such as: a new standard 
for achievement for schools to educate and train children for the skilled jobs of the 
future; fast-track plans for 6000 private sector jobs on derelict manufacturing sites; 
a requirement the £ 7.5 billion spent by public services supports local jobs and 
businesses; and new Birmingham housing partnerships to build affordable homes, 
creating jobs for local people (Labour Party 2012).
‘Closed’ Partnership Arrangements
‘Partnership’ has been a key feature in city council documents and a part of gover-
nance arrangements in Birmingham from the early 1980s. A partnership approach 
was seen as necessary for the delivery of the economic regeneration agenda, es-
pecially in the years when Conservative central government policies were largely 
unfavourable towards local government involvement in this. The overall view was 
that in Birmingham there were and are many organisations willing to collaborate 
with each other but not ready to give up their position and act in a secondary role. 
Organisations such as the council were dominant as they had clear roles, resources 
available to them, evidence of being able to deliver on plans and were seen as rep-
resentative of Birmingham. Therefore, Coulson and Ferrario (2007), for example, 
have described the institutional framework in Birmingham as having a core of dom-
inant organisations with a number of less powerful ones at the margins.
The city council is the central organisation in the city and has been an innovator 
in terms of the partnership approach; it has had a seat on almost all local partner-
ships and promotes and supports their effective working. For many years, this was a 
relatively ‘closed’ partnership of existing local political and economic power hold-
ers. However, this power dimension has evolved, a focus away from physical regen-
eration nationally, where the council had a significant role, to social issues that has 
meant that many other organisations have had a key role to play. The significance of 
Be Birmingham (the local strategic partnership) is an example of this with its role in 
implementing national programmes, and highlighting and co-ordinating discussions 
locally about an ‘inclusive city’. The influence of the third sector has been described 
as relatively weak with the relationship with the city council compared to a ‘parent 
and child’, but currently there was acknowledgement amongst local actors that this 
was improving.
Central Government Influence
Social policies in the UK tend to be centrally driven and funded, although there is 
often scope for local government to influence how these are implemented locally. 
After the Conservative government (1979–1997), urban regeneration programmes 
and initiatives were funded by resources allocated to partnerships on the basis of 
competitive bidding from local authorities through funds such as the City Challenge 
Fund and Single Regeneration Budget. This gave social issues a more prominent 
role and community participation entered the policy discourse. The new Labour 
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government (1997–2010) maintained the focus on community involvement and 
promoted a ‘joined up’ approach to urban regeneration, and central government 
funds were allocated on the basis of need. Birmingham has had a wide range of 
these regeneration and renewal programmes and initiatives over the years targeting 
both the city centre and neighbourhood areas. The Coalition government (2010–
present) greatly reduced the funding available for existing programmes from 2010 
and phased out the initiatives of the previous national government which impacted 
significantly on the city’s ability to continue welfare projects.
Devolved Decision-Making
In 2003, the Labour group took a decision to devolve some services and gover-
nance; devolved decision-making at a local level or ‘localisation’ was and is seen as 
the most effective way of defining social problems and coming up with appropri-
ate solutions. Localisation in this context means giving local areas more freedom 
to design services according to local needs and priorities, services such as leisure, 
housing, neighbourhood advice, libraries and youth and adult services. In the fol-
lowing year, the political party in control of the council changed and the governing 
coalition did attempt to introduce a version of devolution at various points in their 
administration. Alongside this, in 2005 disturbances occurred in certain areas of 
Birmingham partly as a result of racial tensions which resulted in the council focus-
ing on efforts to engage certain communities with the democratic process. There 
was a process of capability-building to help the dialogue between the council and 
the affected communities to lead and shape local programmes to address social is-
sues. It was not until 2008 though that responsibility and budgets for a number of 
services were devolved to district committees across the city (11 then 10). However, 
locally there was a view that the policy ‘lost its way’ as no real decisions were made 
about changing the way services were delivered such as using the third sector or 
basing provision on established local priorities. The loss of funding from central 
government for neighbourhood management was seen as one of the reasons for this 
as these council employees based in local areas had initially supported the process.
In 2010, there was a consultation about continuing with local decision-making 
and retaining executive powers with district committees, and all parties were keen 
to pursue the existing model. The Labour Party since their return to power in Bir-
mingham has set out their intention to ‘reinvigorate’ localisation, and restructuring 
of the council included a return to having a local services directorate with a frame-
work to deliver localisation. The aim is for 80 % of council services to sit out with 
the district committees. This is taking place in the context of a national government 
localism agenda which as one council officer stated is about “community-led inter-
ventions and the state not being so necessary”.
Social Inclusion
In 2010 and 2011, a number of factors came together which led to issues of social 
inclusion being brought to the fore in a way they had not before. Be Birmingham 
raised concerns about the continued existence of significant inequalities across the 
city after the publication of the Closing the Gap report (Be Birmingham 2011); in 
2011 disturbances once again occurred in Birmingham, and unprecedented budget 
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cuts were announced which would inevitably impact on local residents. Despite the 
urban regeneration of the city centre it was acknowledged by all political parties 
that inequality still existed and lasting change for people living in Birmingham’s 
most deprived neighbourhoods had not been achieved.
As a result of this, in 2011 the then deputy leader of the governing coalition 
asked the Bishop of Birmingham to lead a ‘commission’ to look at social inclusion. 
The Be Birmingham executive commissioned the Social Inclusion Process project 
with the aim of developing a new approach to raising aspirations and the quality of 
life of the most disadvantaged communities and neighbourhoods. When the Labour 
Party took control of the council they stated their intention was to make this their 
“number one priority” and one interviewee held the view that,
The attitude of the previous administration in Birmingham was to turn a blind eye to some 
of the, not necessarily the visible signs of the inequality, but some of the causes that sat 
behind it. And there was a political discomfort, if you like, in addressing what some of those 
things were. I mean we come from a slightly different position of being prepared to have an 
open discussion about why these inequalities are created and the root causes behind them.
The Social Inclusion Process has been widely acknowledged as a success in terms 
of starting a dialogue between a wide range of organisations and individuals across 
Birmingham, many of whom had not had this opportunity before. This is a move 
away from the more ‘closed’ partnerships of the past to a more inclusive engage-
ment with other local actors, but at present is still relatively marginal. Various ac-
tions and recommendations have been made which could have a direct influence on 
the local welfare system and how it operates, but it remains to be seen whether any 
lasting impact can be made without resources behind it.
Austerity
As with all local authorities in the UK, the majority of the city council’s income 
comes from central government. In the light of the national Spending Review by the 
current Coalition Government in 2010 and the accelerated reduction in the struc-
tural deficit, the current financial challenge facing the city council is to save ap-
proximately £ 300 million by 2014/2015. Birmingham City Council spends around 
£ 3.5 billion each year, about half of this is ring-fenced by central government or 
has statutory constraints (such as protecting the welfare of children) which means 
that the burden of savings will fall more heavily on certain areas of council services 
(such as social care, leisure facilities and economic regeneration) and on the council 
workforce (Birmingham City Council 2010a). In combination with the wider reces-
sion and the return to power of a leader who has always championed local economic 
development, this could mean there is potential for a continuing focus on economics 
rather than a broader social policy reform agenda.
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5.3  What Does Context Mean for Social Innovation?
As mentioned earlier, the centralised nature of government in the UK means that 
most social policy is determined at a national level. Local authorities such as Bir-
mingham are responsible for providing services to local residents such as education, 
social care and building planning permission. Direct responsibility for local hous-
ing policy does lie with the local authority but for other areas such as employment 
strategies this is more of a ‘caretaker’ role. With reference to the wider social policy 
framework described, this section highlights the two policy areas of the labour mar-
ket and housing and regeneration, and the opportunities or space this provides for 
social innovation.
Labour Market Policy
Birmingham has unemployment rates twice the national average and in some areas 
over 50 % of the working age population are not employed. The city also has the high-
est youth unemployment (those between the ages of 18 and 24) nationally. In some 
areas of Birmingham, unemployment has been an issue for two decades or more and 
there is recognition that this is a generational issue, as one council officer stated,
It is a generational issue now, it’s not just that they are unemployed, but the parents and 
grandparents have been unemployed.
Or more likely locked in a cycle of periods of unemployment and periods of low paid inse-
cure work and then back into periods of unemployment again.
Birmingham has been affected more than other cities by the recession, with welfare 
benefit claimant count rates rising faster and to higher levels than in other cities. A 
structural weakness in skills and a relatively high dependence on manufacturing are 
thought to have contributed to this.
The two policy priorities of economic growth and labour market activation or 
social inclusion have usually been dealt with separately; for example, the city coun-
cil and business stakeholders adopted an entrepreneurial model for infrastructure 
projects, but this may also have a knock-on effect of job creation. Access to labour 
market or social inclusion initiatives have been area-based, targeted at individuals, 
time-limited and conceived and funded by central government, but implemented at 
a local level.
The pro-growth emphasis can be illustrated by the comment of one council of-
ficer,
A key driver for Birmingham under any administration has been access to jobs and that 
means both an investment in skills for the population but also actively creating jobs and 
then connecting people to those jobs.
To address the decline in employment in traditional sectors this was linked to the 
regeneration strategy led by the city council. This aimed to encourage knowledge 
intensive professional services and also sectors involved in the visitor economy 
such as tourism, conferencing, hospitality, leisure and retail. However, many local 
residents lacked the skills to access the new jobs created in the service sector and 
these were increasingly filled by commuters in from neighbouring areas (Brookes 
et al. 2012). In 2008, it was still acknowledged that one of the challenges for the 
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city would be ‘maintaining growth in an increasingly knowledge-based economy 
without leaving behind a significant proportion of local residents’ (West Midlands 
Regional Observatory 2008). Birmingham was seen as good at creating jobs but not 
necessarily for people in those wards where unemployment sat at a higher level.
The new Labour administration still has a focus on job creation, promising to 
create thousands of jobs and tackle ingrained unemployment and poverty on a 
journey to make Birmingham the ‘enterprise capital of Britain’. The leader of the 
council has said that his priorities are jobs and enterprise, helping to get 52,000 
unemployed Birmingham residents into work. New economic growth zones are to 
be created, which are likely to benefit from incremental tax funding schemes (Bir-
mingham City Council 2013).
In terms of labour activation strategies, these are largely a function of national 
government. Delivering labour market integration in a ‘different way’ is not seen as 
possible without central government support financially. Employment strategies are 
a web of interlinked programmes and funding streams, and this complexity is due 
to the national agenda governed by more than one government department. In Bir-
mingham, local activity has been co-ordinated by JobCentrePlus and the Learning 
and Skills Council, national organisations with local delivery arms. The council has 
a small budget in comparison to the other organisations, but has been the account-
able body for a number of funding streams and therefore decisions as to how money 
is spent locally (usually through Be Birmingham). All three have been brought to-
gether through partnership arrangements.
Various central government initiatives aimed at the most deprived areas have 
been implemented through the city council in Birmingham since 2000, with either 
employment as their sole objective or one amongst others. For example, the Neigh-
bourhood Renewal Fund (2001–2008) did lead to strategies for local employer en-
gagement and access to employment and training but comparatively little of the 
locally determined spend was directed at employment targets. The most common 
approach was support for local voluntary organisations helping people who were 
out of work. The Single Regeneration Budget (2000–2007) included a number of 
innovative job creation and employment and skills projects focused on particular 
areas of the city. Unemployment did fall in the areas covered by the Single Regen-
eration Budget but also the number of jobs available fell with the continued decline 
of the manufacturing sector.
The Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF 2008–2011) resulted in the local co-
alition using the resources available to set up a cross-agency Integrated Employ-
ment and Skills model as the basis for employment support across the city and to 
fund projects targeting different groups and needs. The council, Learning and Skills 
Council and JobCentrePlus all signed up to this new way of commissioning and 
delivering services for the unemployed at a neighbourhood level. This was seen as 
a risky and radical strategy as it involved a major change to existing practice taking 
the focus away from a city-wide approach to contracting services locally.
The projects funded through the WNF covered a wide range of activities to sup-
port people to work. The Worklessness Innovation Fund set up through the WNF 
provided small grants for feasibility studies, demonstration projects and innova-
tive actions. Projects had to contribute to the outcome of increasing employment 
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and reducing poverty through targeted interventions to reduce worklessness in the 
most deprived neighbourhoods in the city. A total of 40 projects were supported and 
evaluation of the fund highlighted that it had been successful in trialling and devel-
oping approaches with a focus on the nature and quality of interaction with clients. 
Ultimately, with the withdrawal of both the WNF and resources for neighbourhood 
management, this approach was not sustained beyond 2011, and represents the last 
time local innovative activity in this area was directly supported on this scale.
In 2009 and 2010, elected members across all parties expressed concern that after 
regular updates on strategies and approaches to tackling unemployment and large 
amounts of money spent since 2007, they were still unclear as to the impact this 
had made (Birmingham City Council 2009). One initiative instigated by the central 
Labour government, the Future Jobs Fund (a subsidised employment scheme) was 
widely believed to be a success in Birmingham. Around 2000 young people, 45 % 
of whom went on to unsubsidised employment, benefited from the initiative. The 
national Coalition government abolished the Future Jobs Fund programme against 
the recommendations of the council. The current Labour administration has plans to 
recreate this with resources drawn together from a variety of sources (a recommen-
dation which came out of the Social Inclusion Process). This was widely reported 
in the local press. As the Council Business Plan (Birmingham City Council 2013) 
indicates,
We…are putting together £ 15 million of funding for our Birmingham Jobs Fund, to sup-
port employers taking on young people and give additional training and support to young 
people themselves. With such bold initiatives we are showing what we can do by working 
in partnership with others who share our aspirations for the city.
The initiatives and funds provided by central government to support areas with 
high unemployment have been both a facilitator and a barrier for the innovation 
‘journey’ in Birmingham. These initiatives have resulted in opportunities to fund a 
large number of locally selected, innovative, ‘successful’ projects which would not 
otherwise have occurred. However, ultimately the innovative projects funded have 
been small-scale and time limited. Some of the social innovations were perceived 
as a success but were still vulnerable; once grant funding was withdrawn there was 
no mainstreaming of services after each programme finished. These were low risk 
for the council to test out but alongside this they could only have a limited impact 
due to scale and were responsible for their own plans for sustainability beyond the 
life of the programmes. This was not always easy for the large number of third-
sector organisations who ran these projects where services were linked to contracts 
or grant income.
Housing Policy and Urban Regeneration
Birmingham is one of the largest social landlords in the UK with a long tradition 
of large-scale local state provision of housing services. It is currently responsible 
for 65,396 dwellings, holding 17 % of the housing stock of the city. Registered 
social landlords (RSLs, or third-sector housing associations) currently hold 40,579 
dwellings across 40 providers, the largest being Midland Heart. The council has a 
strategic role as well as a regulatory and house-building function. The council has 
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a long history of working in partnership with the local housing sector through the 
City Housing Partnership, comprising the council, housing associations, voluntary 
organisations and the private sector. At a national level, the Housing and Communi-
ties Agency and the HomeBuy Agency provide finance and co-ordinate the low-cost 
homeownership schemes. Regeneration of the physical environment and housing 
policy has often been intertwined.
With regards to social housing, in 2002 Birmingham decided to pursue the stock 
transfer policy option promoted by the national government to enable access to 
private finance and to pass management of its stock to housing associations. The 
reasons for this were a significant backlog of outstanding repairs and structural 
problems and a significant capital debt, but no resources to meet these commit-
ments. The national government inducement of cancelling existing capital debts 
and allowing the replacement landlords to borrow capital was attractive to Birming-
ham politicians and council officers. However, when balloted tenants rejected stock 
transfer by two-to-one and although the Labour leader of the council was in favour 
of this, there were many within the Labour group overtly opposed to stock transfer. 
The ‘no’ vote was seen as the result of weak political leadership, insufficient trade 
union support for transfer and a lack of faith by tenants in proposals, mainly uncon-
vinced by assurances about the extent of housing demolition and future rent levels 
(Daly et al. 2005).
The current challenge for Birmingham’s housing policy is that the city’s popula-
tion is increasing and is projected to grow by 100,000 residents to 1.1 million by 
2026. In total 90,000 additional households will be formed due to this and other 
demographic changes (Birmingham City Council 2010b). With the average city in-
come insufficient to buy an average priced property, there is collective recognition 
that additional social and affordable housing is needed across the city. Demand for 
social housing significantly outstrips supply and in 2012/2013 there was a waiting 
list for council housing of over 30,000 applicants. This has been a growing trend 
since the 1980s.
In terms of house-building, a conducive climate for new private housing devel-
opment was created from the 1990s through a link to the physical regeneration of 
the city centre, and residential development grew slowly but steadily in subsequent 
years (Barber 2007). This city living strategy was a significant driver for change in 
Birmingham’s housing markets. More than 9000 homes, 85 % for private sale were 
completed between 1995 and 2007 and there was evidence that these were adding 
to the diversity of housing options for middle- and high-income earners. However, 
city living remained a narrow market, dominated by young professionals, investor 
purchasers and rental occupation. The fact that no affordable housing was planned 
as part of this city centre regeneration strategy to encourage the creation of a new 
housing market was criticised by some local politicians.
The major debate in Birmingham, particularly since 2008, has been around the 
provision of affordable housing. The economic downturn resulted in a slowing 
down of the housing market, a major drop in house building and a more challeng-
ing environment for those seeking mortgage lending. A reduction in private-sector 
development activity and investment and the restrictions on public- and private-
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sector funding were seen to be affecting the provision of affordable housing. Local 
media reported frequently about the ‘housing crisis’ and included several reports 
about a group ‘Justice not Crisis’ who occupy derelict buildings in protest at the 
lack of affordable housing. For a number of years, the coalition council had sought 
to maximise receipts from land sales to assist with programmes such as the national 
Decent Homes Programme (which stock transfer was meant to support). Some ob-
servers thought that this was resulting in less land available for social and affordable 
housing developments. These claims were strongly refuted by the coalition Cabinet 
Member for Housing and the Birmingham Social Housing Partnership.
Regeneration activities in Birmingham received funding from the national Labour 
government from the late 1990s, the New Deal for Communities (1998–2008), Single 
Regeneration Budget (2001–2007) and Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (2001–2008). 
The Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders (2002–2011) focused on housing in par-
ticular, a controversial scheme of demolition, refurbishment and new home-building 
which aimed ‘to renew failing housing markets in nine designated areas of the North 
and Midlands of England’ including Birmingham (Cole and Flint 2007).
Regeneration in Birmingham was viewed by some local politicians and the press 
as having to a large extent ignored the social and community aspects. In some ar-
eas of Birmingham there was evidence of progress in physical change but not in 
‘bottom-up’ economic development, the social and community aspects and the con-
necting of these to the physical changes taking place. The approach was very much 
embedded in what has been described as the ‘old style’, with a focus on land and 
property interventions, securing funds and driving projects through (Barber and 
Eastaway 2010). This traditional approach which suited the city well in the past was 
embedded in local governance structures, and policymakers found it hard to work 
differently. Innovations were therefore only modest in scope. This way of working 
was also less helpful in delivering the ‘place-shaping’ role given to local authorities 
with the aim of creating places where people want to live, work and do business in 
collaboration with local communities.
Specifically in relation to housing, traditionally the housing associations were 
considered to be the house-builders. However, the coalition council moved to a 
more interactive exchange between the public and private sector to encourage 
house-building, supported by innovative practice in financing and planning. The 
council devised a way of delivering affordable but high-quality new homes that 
limited financial risk through the formation of the Birmingham Municipal Housing 
Trust (BMHT). Properties on BMHT sites were a mixture of council homes and 
those for outright sale built on council-owned land. An innovative financial model 
was developed in consultation with contractors that reduced up-front costs and re-
duced uncertainty over planning permission. Planning consent for each site was 
gained and paid for by the council before tenders were invited so potential partners 
could tender risk-free financially. The houses were then built on council-owned 
land with an agreed number of properties on each site allocated for social housing. 
Payment for property land was delayed until developers sold the homes and on a 
plot-by-plot basis. This model still operates in the city and has won awards for its 
innovative approach. However, the scale of house-building through BMHT will not 
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solve the issue of the need for homes required alone. Outside of this there has been 
small-scale innovative activity within the local housing sector but limited in scope.
The current Labour council set out its vision for housing in Birmingham (Bir-
mingham City Council 2013),
Our vision is to make individuals and families proud to live in Birmingham in a decent 
home at a price they can afford, enjoying stability whether they rent or buy.
To achieve this vision the council states it will: provide new affordable homes; 
aspire to provide decent homes for all; introduce a new deal for council tenants; 
give people a say in the future of their communities; and focus on homes and jobs. 
Various council statements and documents have given their support to innovation 
and creative thinking in housing policy but this has yet to translate into social in-
novation in this area.
5.4  Summary and Conclusion: Innovation at the Margins
This chapter has described a governance system in Birmingham that over the de-
cades has been rooted in a pro-growth strategy. This resulted in an environment 
not typically conducive to large-scale social innovation. The impact of history is of 
great significance with the devastating impact of recession and deindustrialisation 
that started in the 1980s, and that still continues today, influencing the policy and 
practice of actors in the city. The major, lasting innovation in the city is partnership 
working seen as essential to deliver the economic regeneration agenda. This oc-
curred in Birmingham long before it became part of popular policy discourse in the 
UK. This partnership approach was characterised by a focus on economic priorities 
and comprised a closed group of business and political leaders; however, over time 
there has been a shift to more inclusive engagement.
The situation in Birmingham reflected the change in urban policy described by 
Harvey (1989) as a shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. The city coun-
cil has focused over the years on the promotion of local economic development and 
employment growth and to a lesser extent on the provision of services. However, 
the council has always seen economic development as also serving the objective of 
improving the quality of life of its citizens. Therefore, policies do not always show 
a clear cut divide between social and economic policy.
In terms of employment strategies the focus has been on economic development 
and job creation but this has also been influenced by central government which has 
direct responsibility for activation policies. Innovative practice has been supported 
locally but only where this has been possible through central government resources; 
once this has been withdrawn the majority of projects cease to exist. The loss of a 
consistent integrated approach to employment and skills pioneered by Birmingham 
and other small-scale, promising projects is linked to this withdrawal of resources 
which has occurred due to not only the end of national programmes and austerity 
measures but also a change in national political outlook. The current local political 
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leadership will need to find ways to use existing resources more creatively if any 
innovative activity is to be supported as cuts to public spending are set to continue.
The huge housing problems in Birmingham mean that large scale social innova-
tion would be required to make any impact on this. However, there is little evidence 
of social innovation in housing and regeneration policy apart from the award-win-
ning BMHT which whilst successful in its current form is too small in scale to meet 
demand and therefore has limited impact. One local actor did highlight the fact that 
the housing sector more generally is not known for its innovative capacity so there 
may be wider issues at play.
To conclude, the situation in Birmingham describes a case of urban governance 
where solutions to social problems were stated in terms of economic priorities. In-
novation does occur but very much at the margins, through opportunistic and short-
term support for small-scale projects usually through national funding streams. 
Looking to the future, devolved decision-making was seen by local actors as a po-
tential vehicle for innovation at the (very) local level. This approach had not been 
without its difficulties over the years and so was not perceived as a solution that 
would happen ‘overnight’.
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Chapter 6
Social Policies and Governance in Geneva: 
What About Social Innovation?
Patricia Naegeli
6.1  Introduction
The governance of the Swiss welfare state is marked by the principle of subsidiar-
ity (Bütschi and Cattacin 1993), which favours private initiative before state action 
and according to which tasks are divided between the three territorial levels: the 
Confederation, the cantons and the municipalities. The result is multilevel gover-
nance (Scharpf 1994), both hierarchically within the state and, in principle at least, 
horizontally between all the welfare organisations involved (public and private for 
and non-profit; see Cattacin 1996). Until the mid-1970s, federal social policies and 
insurance were marginal, social benefits were mostly in the hands of private, sub-
sidised non-profit associations and social insurance was private and mutualised by 
working sector, ideology or religion. From 1975 to 1985, when other European 
countries were already cutting social benefits, the federal welfare state caught up 
and finally normalised its position within the rest of Europe (Cattacin 2006, p. 50). 
So, if in Switzerland basic social insurance1 has been progressively introduced and 
centralised (Gilliand 1988, pp. 39–58), following the principles of subsidiarity and 
federalism, the federal state determines through legislation a minimum level of so-
cial protection, giving the cantons and municipalities a great degree of freedom to 
improve and manage their own social policies.2 This path dependency (Merrien 
1990) results in significant cantonal autonomy and gives rise to huge differences 
1 For an overview of the adoption and implementation of social insurance legislation in Switzer-
land, see Gilliand (1988, p. 58).
2 In Switzerland, cantons and municipalities have a high degree of autonomy, particularly in areas 
such as education, healthcare and social policies. As a result, social policies can be very well de-
veloped in a canton or kept to the minimum level required by the Swiss Confederation. But it is 
precisely at the local level (cantons and municipalities) that innovation can be implemented most 
easily. An example of the division of powers between the federal and cantonal levels in social 
policy matters can be found in Armingeon et al. (2004, p. 22).
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in social benefits throughout the country (Armingeon et al. 2004; Höpflinger and 
Wyss 1994).
As argued by Cattacin (1996), it is exactly this local autonomy—a result of Swit-
zerland’s federal structure, according to which the national territory is divided into 
26 cantons—that makes possible innovative social policies at the local level. Ac-
cording to Bertozzi and Bonoli (2003), this cantonal freedom makes it possible to 
match local social needs and territorialised social policies. In their words:
While the federal structure of the state may have hindered the development of certain social 
policies, it has also fostered innovation at the local and cantonal levels as well as adaptation 
with respect to the social needs of territorial units. (Bertozzi and Bonoli 2003, p. 13)
So Swiss cantons should have enough room to manoeuvre to adapt their social poli-
cies to particular, territorialised needs. The major question of this chapter is whether 
this cantonal autonomy, particularly with respect to the governance of the social, re-
ally does lead to the implementation of innovative social policies.3 As an example, 
we analyse Geneva, which is known for its comparatively generous social policies 
(Höpflinger and Wyss 1994, p. 55, IDHEAP/BADAC 2010a, b, c, d, e4), and which, 
as a city-canton,5 has a particularly large degree of autonomy in determining its 
social policies. In the case of Geneva, references to the “local level” mostly apply 
to cantonal measures rather than city ones, for reasons that will appear throughout 
this chapter. We explore whether Geneva’s governance arrangements tend to favour 
or disfavour innovative social policies and which elements appear to hinder their 
emergence. As was underlined in Chap. 2 (Cattacin, Zimmer), by governance ar-
rangements we mean the outcome resulting from complex processes that involve a 
multitude of actors (the state, non-state organisations, the market) and which have 
to be understood in their context (the institutional context, the context of welfare 
governance arrangements and the local political culture). It will become clear that 
Geneva’s governance of the social policies, embedded in its context, tends to place 
the state and its administration, especially state councillors and civil servants, as the 
legitimate provider of social services. But this state orientation is only possible with 
3 What we mean by innovation will be defined later in this chapter.
4 Statistics on the website of the IDHEAP/BADAC (Institut des hautes études en administration 
publique/base de données des cantons et des villes suisse) show that the Canton of Geneva, in 
comparison with the other 25 cantons, has high expenses for culture and social activities (6.41 % 
of public expenses, rank 1) and social security (23.18 % of PE, rank 1) (IDHEAP/BADAC 2010a); 
has the second-highest per capita expenditures, after Basel-Stadt (IDHEAP/BADAC 2010b); has 
the second-highest income inequality (a Gini coefficient of 0.45) (IDHEAP/BADAC 2010c); has, 
together with the Canton of Zug, the second-highest number of additional social benefits (ID-
HEAP/BADAC 2010d); and is the administration with by far the highest number of subdivisions 
(105 services for 7 departments, rank 1) (IDHEAP/BADAC 2010e). It is important to notice that 
while Geneva consistently ranks second in many of these measures, the first place is not always 
occupied by the same canton.
5 Geneva is both a canton and a city. The Canton of Geneva encompasses 45 municipalities and 
476,000 inhabitants in a territory of 282 km2. The city of Geneva is the most important munici-
pality in the canton, with 195,160 residents. Its territory measures 15.9 km2 (statistics for end of 
2013). See Swissworld and Département fédéral des affaires étrangères (2014) and Ville de Ge-
nève (2014a). It is for this reason that we argue that the city is almost the canton and vice-versa.
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the support of non-profit organisations,6 which are heavily subsidised and whose 
demarcation from the public sector is often unclear. Furthermore, the importance 
of political parties in Geneva’s political culture and the influence of the republican 
model of neighbouring France, where power tends to be concentrated, may partly 
explain our findings. Economic actors are excluded from this state-orientated wel-
fare system. As a result of these factors, we hypothesise that social innovation is 
above all incremental and that when it does occur, it does so due to a certain con-
sensus among the implied actors. Indeed, despite political differences, the idea of 
working against poverty (what stakeholders call “solidarity”) seems to be, together 
with “personal responsibility”, the key deep core value, and the necessity of impos-
ing it mostly top-down justifies the state orientation. This basic consensus on this 
fuzzy concept of “solidarity” was emphasised by our interviewed stakeholders and 
is in line with our own observations.
This chapter was written within the framework of the European project Wel-
fare Innovations at the Local Level in Favour of Cohesion (WILCO). It includes a 
wide range of sources: political debates in city council and the cantonal parliament, 
the political programmes of most important parties, local newspaper articles, grey 
literature, statistical data provided by the public administration, 12 semi-directed 
interviews with local stakeholders7 and two focus groups to clarify diverging or 
shared positions regarding local welfare.8
The chapter is divided into five parts. First, we will introduce the main chal-
lenges in Geneva’s governance and identify the general tendencies of its local wel-
fare governance arrangements. Second, its local welfare state and social policies 
will be situated in the Swiss context. Third, hypotheses concerning Geneva’s main 
actors in the field of social policies will be developed. Sabatier’s approach (Sabatier 
1991, 1998), which assumes the existence of coalitions of values, and of power re-
lationships between these coalitions, leading to majorities and minorities in specific 
policy fields, will guide Part 3.9 More specifically, emphasising the importance of 
political parties within these coalitions, the balances of power over the last 20 years 
will be described. Fourth, an examination of the actual programmes of the main 
political parties and interviews with local stakeholders will reveal the core values 
of the local welfare state, while specific issues in the fields of unemployment and 
6 By non-profit organisations we mean organisations that provide welfare benefits but which are 
also an essential “[…] ‘public space in civil societies’ […] at the intersection between the state, the 
marketplace and the informal sector” (Evers 2000, p. 567).
7 For more information about the interviews, please see footnote 62.
8 I would like to thank the following people who have collaborated with me on the WILCO proj-
ect: Nathalie Kakpo, who did part of the field- and deskwork in Geneva; Sandro Cattacin for his 
critical and pertinent input; and Maxime Felder for his support and comments during the writing of 
this chapter. I would also like to thank Christian Jöhr of the Social Service of the City of Geneva, 
who was a helpful discussion partner regarding concrete issues in the city, and all persons who 
agreed to be interviewed during this research.
9 This approach assumes that the cities’ policies are influenced by a constellation of actors, namely 
policymakers, fieldworkers, scholars, civil servants and journalists, who share a common belief 
system (values, problems and perceptions) and are capable of acting in a coordinated way.
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childcare will strengthen our understanding thereof and permit us to define value 
coalitions. Fifth, we will question Geneva’s capacity to innovate in the area of social 
policies and examine whether its governance of social challenges results in innova-
tive social policies or the preservation of the status quo.
6.2  Geneva’s Challenges: Multilevel Governance and 
Multiple Territories
Geneva is part of one of the most dynamic regions in Switzerland, situated at the 
extreme southwest of the country. Home to several international organisations, an 
important banking sector and quality business services, as well as world-class re-
search centres, including the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN), 
Geneva is definitely an important international player in the globalised economy.
This aspect of the “International Geneva”, oriented beyond Switzerland’s na-
tional borders, is emphasised by local stakeholders and Geneva’s city marketing and 
goes hand in hand with its geographical location, which is almost outside the coun-
try (Cattacin and Kettenacker 2011). Indeed, Geneva is situated at the very edge of 
Switzerland, sharing only a 4.5-km border with the rest of Switzerland but a 103-km 
border with France.10 Notwithstanding its economic and international importance, 
the canton occupies a somewhat marginalised position within the country, and it 
is common to hear that Geneva is not “really Swiss”, whatever that might mean.11
This assumption is reinforced by the fact that Geneva’s main social challenges 
are not contained within the logic of borders and concern the whole metropolitan 
area of 918,000 inhabitants,12 namely the Grand Genève, which includes neigh-
bouring France and the Canton of Vaud (District of Nyon). At the end of 2013, 
cross-border workers, officially defined as “non-Swiss” people who live in neigh-
bouring France and work in Geneva, numbered 68,800. This is one quarter of all the 
cross-border workers in the country.13 It is interesting to note that the high numbers 
of Swiss who live in neighbouring France, often clandestinely, are not included in 
these statistics.14
Geneva’s social challenges are de facto supra-regional, although the logic of 
governance remains strongly territorialised, confined to the municipal and cantonal 
levels, as a result of which there is no territorial authority to solve important chal-
lenges such as delays in the construction of more public transit, traffic problems and 
the enormous problem of the lack of affordable housing. This incongruence between 
10 Source: Ville de Genève (2014a).
11 Source: Der Spiegel (1985).
12 Source: Grand Genève (2014a).
13 (Office cantonal de la statistique — OCSTAT/Département des finances 2013).
14 In 2009, two out of three new immigrants to France were Swiss (Grand Genève 2014a). But 
most of them do not declare that they live full-time in France and therefore do not pay taxes where 
they live, a significant problem for the French municipalities concerned.
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the nature of the problems, which are cross-border and regional, and the problem-
solving structures, which are strongly territorialised, is not unique to Geneva, of 
course, and it is especially common in states with different relatively autonomous 
and powerful levels of government, as is the case in Switzerland. According to Klöti 
1985, p. 13, 17, this situation can result in steering and legitimation problems in 
urban policies and conflicts of interest between the different levels of government:
That is why urban policies have to be able to handle a conflict of interest between 
supralocal requirements and local needs. Above all at the level of the agglomera-
tion, there is no authority that can intervene in a regulatory and coordinator manner 
(Klöti 1985, p. 17).
In the case of Geneva, a Grouping for Transfrontier Co-operation15 was officially 
created in 2012 for the purpose of governing the Grand Genève. It is an autonomous 
body under Swiss public law with legal personality and its own budget, and it is 
charged with realising projects within the Franco-Vaud-Geneva conurbation and 
deal with regional challenges. But uncooperative local authorities and regional gov-
ernments on both sides of the border confront this grouping and, most importantly, 
by the rise of the populist MCG (Geneva Citizens’ Movement),16 which leads to an 
“anti-cross-border workers” attitude, the most recent example of which is the recent 
popular vote against a cross-border construction project.17
While Grand Genève must remain in our minds when we speak about Geneva, 
this chapter focuses on the Canton of Geneva, which includes 45 municipalities, 
including its most important, which is of course the City of Geneva.18 Geneva’s 
unusual way of doing politics and governing its “small” territory, where the canton 
is almost the city and vice versa, is often pointed out by other parts of the country, 
which more or less explicitly criticise Geneva’s multilevel governance, where no 
one really knows “who does what” and that “wouldn’t exist if Geneva weren’t so 
rich”, as stated in a Bernese newspaper article (Chapman 2012).
Indeed, the same newspaper article refers to a crucial point in Geneva’s multilev-
el governance—disagreements between cantonal and city governments on impor-
tant political issues—and the ability to block important (cantonal or city) projects 
by exercising the municipal or cantonal right to a veto, for instance, for construc-
tion projects, not least because of NIMBYism.19 While tensions often crystallise 
between the city and the canton, the canton’s 44 other municipalities also represent 
15 Groupement de coopération transfrontalière (GLCT; Grand Genève 2014a).
16 In Part 3, we will discuss birth and rise of this political party.
17 In the aftermath of the Swiss popular initiative on 9 February 2014 (accepted by 50.34 % of vot-
ers), which requires the introduction of immigration quotas (60.9 % of Geneva’s population voted 
against it), the canton’s population voted against financial participation in a cross-border parking 
construction project, following the arguments of the MCG, which is opposed to any financial in-
vestment on the “French side” (De Weck 2014; La Tribune de Genève 2014).
18 For more details, please refer to footnote 5.
19 “More formally, Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) refers to the protectionist attitudes of and op-
positional tactics adopted by community groups facing an unwelcome development in their neigh-
bourhood” (Dear 1992, p. 288); see also Kübler (1995), who analysed these kinds of strategies in 
the field of urban drug policies.
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important political and financial constraints, even if their powers and financial re-
sources are less important than in other Swiss cantons.20 The consequence is that 
important projects may be paralysed, sometimes for decades,21 which is evidence 
for the argument that Geneva is stuck in a joint decision-making trap (in the sense of 
Scharpf 1985) that makes it difficult, because of cantonal or municipal “veto coali-
tions” (Czada 2003, p. 183), to overcome the status quo. According to Czada, a gov-
ernment’s ability to solve (social) problems rapidly (Czada 2003, p. 197) depends 
on the interplay of three dimensions: the degree of agreement between political par-
ties, the degree of corporatism and the nature of constitutional veto structures. In his 
opinion, Swiss democracy compensates for the threat posed by potential vetoes by 
producing strong legislative majorities, which has resulted in a political landscape 
that has been stable for many years. But this stability can also be endangered, as 
has been the case in Geneva (see Part 3 on the evolution of political forces). Fur-
thermore, difficulties related to multilevel governance also interfere with what we 
call the governance of the social and the provision of social services and benefits. 
Indeed, overlapping services between cantonal, city and municipal administrations, 
coupled with the multiplicity of private, above all non-profit, organisations, makes 
it difficult to even identify governance arrangements and service providers in this 
sector. The analysis of 120 qualitative interviews of vulnerable migrants who were 
or had been in touch with local welfare services in the 20 cities of the WILCO 
research22 indicates clearly that a multitude of (overlapping) services significantly 
discourages (vulnerable) people from claiming social benefits and leads to mistrust 
of the public administration (Cattacin and Naegeli 2014).23 Furthermore, services 
have also been criticised for not being able to address complex life situations result-
ing from intersecting problems, which may increase the risk of multiple discrimina-
tion (Hankivsky and Cormier 2010).
In Geneva, duties have been split between the canton, which is responsible for 
individual social assistance, and the municipalities, which are responsible for “com-
munitarian” and collective problems. For instance, the canton provides basic finan-
cial and individual social assistance through the Hospice Général, an autonomous 
public institution that was created in 1535 and is mandated by the canton.24 These 
financial benefits are sometimes supplemented by the City of Geneva through its 
own Social Service, meaning that a resident of the City of Geneva may receive a 
greater social allowance than someone who resides in another municipality within 
20 According to a newspaper article, the allowed budget for the municipalities constitutes less than 
20 % of all public expenses in the canton, which, according to Mabut (2014), is very low for Swiss 
municipalities.
21 For example, after 50 different proposals since the nineteenth century, plans to create some kind 
of link between the two shores of Lake Geneva (traversée de la rade) have still not been imple-
mented. See, for instance, Francey (2014).
22 For a description of the research, please refer to footnote 7.
23 If we add mistrust of public administrations to the mentioned overlapping services, which result 
in the feeling that one is lost in a labyrinth of welfare organisations, it is easy to understand why 
vulnerable people (in this case vulnerable migrants) may simply avoid claiming social benefits.
24 In the Swiss context, this is an exception; social assistance is usually provided by municipalities.
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the canton. Furthermore, the municipal Social Service works from the perspective 
of proximity to and the prevention of social problems and has developed a ter-
ritorialised “communitarian” approach that aims to reinforce social cohesion.25 As 
a result, a multitude of actors constitute a labyrinth of local welfare organisations, 
mostly non-profit organisations. Aware of the overlapping public services between 
the canton and the city, the current cantonal government has decided to disentangle 
its duties from those of its 45 municipalities (Mabut 2014; Moulin 2014), a task that 
it wants to complete in close cooperation with the Association of the Municipalities 
of Geneva and its representatives. A first technical report has just been published 
(Groupe de travail technique (GTT) 2014), whose purpose is to assess the current 
situation. According to this report, there are 12 main areas in which there is signifi-
cant overlap, including social services, where it is not always clear which duties be-
long to the municipalities and which to the canton because “the distinction between 
these two fields of public action is difficult to make, because every community 
social action aims finally to improve the social and economic situation of individu-
als” (Groupe de travail technique (GTT) 2014, p. 8).26
Our interviews with 12 local stakeholders and two focus-group discussions have 
shown a relatively clear consensus in the political arena regarding the necessity of 
keeping a strong local welfare state and on the view that it is the responsibility of 
the state (and e.g. not the private sector) to help vulnerable people. We may assume 
that this state-oriented welfare mix27 is specific to Geneva in Switzerland, which is 
known to correspond to a hybrid conservative-corporatist model with liberal ten-
dencies, according to the classical typology of Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 74–77), 
or to constitute a “compromise between Liberalism and Socialism” (Möckli 1988, 
p. 27). Indeed, for a long time the Swiss welfare state has been considered a wel-
fare laggard (Bonoli and Mach 2000, p. 140), especially regarding health insurance 
(which only became compulsory in 1996), family policy and long-term unemploy-
ment benefits. But this welfare laggard reputation has to be taken with a grain of 
salt. Indeed, Möckli (1988, pp. 24–25) has shown the pioneering character of some 
social and political laws, for instance, laws regarding the social protection of chil-
dren in factories (1815)28 and the first Swiss factory law of 1877, which introduced 
25 One of the innovations selected for study by the WILCO project was one of the organisations 
involved in implementing this “communitarian” work at the city level, namely the UAC (Union 
for Community Action), which is located in four areas of the city and whose principal aims are to 
connect relevant associations with interested civil-society participants and, therefore, to reinforce 
collective action through better coordination and networking (City of Geneva 2014).
26 Original quotation: “La distinction entre ces deux champs d’action publique pour sa part reste 
malaisée, toute action sociales communautaire visant au final à l’amélioration de la situation so-
ciale ou économique d’individus” (Groupe de travail technique (GTT) 2014, p. 8).
27 By welfare mix, we mean the interplay of public and private (non- and for-profit) organisations 
in the steering, planning and providing of social welfare services, or “the combination of different 
actors and sectors involved in coproducing welfare programs, services and/or goods” (Oosterlynck 
et al. 2013, p. 19). To examine the welfare mix is also to examine the diversity of the organisations 
involved.
28 The two pioneering cantons were Zurich and Thurgau, which were the first jurisdictions in 
Europe to pass legislation in favour of child labourers in factories, although it did not have any 
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the 11-h day, pioneering legislation for continental Europe. And more recently, as 
Cattacin (2006, p. 49) has demonstrated, the 1970s were a decade of growth for the 
Swiss welfare state, in contrast to other European states, which had already begun 
cutting their social spending by then. Furthermore, the specificities of federalism 
result in complex cohabitations between public and private structures, between the 
state, the economy and civil society (Cattacin 2006, p. 50), which can lead to the be-
lief that the welfare state at the federal level is weak. But the author underlines that 
today the Swiss federal welfare model, rather than being an exception, has become 
an international reference point for individualisation and activation processes:
The transformations of welfare pluralism in Switzerland in recent years have re-
sulted in the fact that it no longer is an exception, retarded, particularly complex or 
catching up, or reveals a counter-tendency, but has instead become an international 
reference point for the individualisation of responsibilities, the activation of citizens 
and even the strengthening of incentives and the moderation of the different welfare 
providers (Cattacin 2006, p. 69).29
Also, Swiss pensions and unemployment benefits tend to be generous in com-
parison with those of other European countries (Bonoli and Mach 2000, p. 140). 
As regards innovative and pioneering social policies, in short, Geneva once had the 
reputation of having both.
6.3  Pioneering Local Welfare State?
According to a newspaper article in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Geneva was once 
“a future-oriented laboratory for Switzerland […]” (Büchi 2012). It was the first 
canton, together with the Canton of Vaud, to introduce the right to vote for Swiss 
women in 1959, long before it was introduced at the federal level in 1971 and in 
other cantons. According to the same article, Geneva also had progressive urban 
planning and the most generous social policies of all the cantons, thanks to its ex-
panding financial sector. But the article also claims that Geneva’s potential for inno-
vation has run its course, and that “today, the Republic of Geneva is only a shadow 
of its former self” (Büchi 2012).
Even if it seems true, at first glance, that Geneva has actually lost its force to 
propose future-oriented projects and policies, some recent examples regarding Ge-
neva’s pioneering30 social policies can still be found. Indeed, in 1991, Geneva was 
impact (Möckli 1988, p. 24).
29 Original quotation: “Les transformations du welfare pluralism en Suisse durant ces dernières 
années en font aujourd’hui non plus un cas exceptionnel, retardé, particulièrement complexe ou 
encore en récupération en contre tendance, mais une référence internationale en ce qui concerne 
l’individualisation des responsabilités, l’activation des citoyens ou encore l’incitation et la mo-
dération des acteurs producteurs de bien-être” (Cattacin 2006, p. 69).
30 Of course, what is pioneering in a certain context is not necessarily so in another. In this ex-
ample, the context is the Swiss Confederation. We will return to this point when defining precisely 
what we mean by social innovation.
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the first and only canton to introduce the right for undocumented children to go to 
school (Halle 2011). In 2001, it implemented maternity leave at the cantonal level, 
while it was only adopted federally in 2005, exactly 60 years after a right to mater-
nity leave at the federal level was inscribed in the constitution, and this only after 
having been rejected four times by popular vote. Even so, federal maternity leave 
benefits are quite minimal—14 weeks of paid maternity leave at 80 % of the last 
salary—and address only working mothers or those who are at least registered with 
the unemployment office.
This example illustrates the function of the federal state: It intervenes only when 
it has to fulfil shortcomings in cantonal regulations and when broad coalitions at the 
national level demand its support to implement social policies that are not developed 
enough at the cantonal level (Cattacin 1996). Indeed, as said before, social policies are 
mainly managed at the cantonal and city levels, the three levels—federal, cantonal and 
municipal—cohabitating in multilevel governance, based on the constitution and history 
of the Swiss Confederation, which is directly linked with the principle of direct democ-
racy, and which itself requires negotiations between all actors that could potentially, and 
easily, launch a referendum against new laws. The path dependency characteristic of 
Switzerland31—the decentralisation or rescaling of social policies—seems to be com-
mon to most European countries, according to Kazepov:
As a reaction to the crisis of the welfare state, reform processes—in their double 
meaning of vertical and horizontal subsidiarisation—produced a steady shift from 
a vertical towards a horizontal coordination of social policies, which finds its ideal 
level of implementation in the local dimension. Despite the fact that these tenden-
cies are common to most European countries, the development and institutionali-
sation of the new governance arrangements do not converge. On the contrary, the 
results of these processes of change seem to produce a territorially structured diver-
sification […]. This diversification varies according to socio-economic context and 
institutional arrangements, with all the specificities this might entail: from a high 
degree of freedom of the Comunidades Autonomas in Spain, the Länder in Germany 
or the Cantons in Switzerland, to the relatively low intranational differentiation in 
France (Kazepov 2010, p. 49).
But this cantonal jurisdiction over social policy does not explain why Geneva’s 
social policies often exceed the minimal federal level and tend to be generous by 
Swiss standards. In their article “Swiss Worlds of Welfare” (Armingeon et al. 2004), 
the authors explain the significant variation in cantonal welfare regimes by socio-
economic variables and above all by the degree of urbanisation, which seems to be 
positively correlated with the election of left-wing parties, which favour a state-
oriented welfare policy. According to the authors:
31 The Swiss Constitution, which was adopted in 1874, did not grant any jurisdiction over social 
policies to the federal state. In 1890, a popular vote made it constitutionally possible for the first 
time for the Swiss Confederation to create national social policies through legislation. This vote 
was a key moment in the establishment of a national welfare state, which became increasingly 
powerful. This constitutional change resulted in the adoption in 1911 of the first national health 
and accident insurance (implemented in 1914 and 1918, respectively), and in the adoption of the 
old-age pension in 1946 (implemented in 1948). See (Gilliand 1988, pp. 55–57) for details.
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Urbanisation is obviously a major socio-economic explanatory variable for can-
tonal social security systems. Left-wing power is strongly and positively correlated 
with urbanisation (0.64): the more urban a canton, the higher the share of left-wing 
parties in government. On the other hand, the more rural a region, the better the 
odds for centrist parties (correlation with urbanisation: − 0.54). In contrast, the pow-
er of right-liberal government is not significantly related to urbanisation. Hence, 
one could argue that urbanisation is the major background variable explaining both 
worlds of welfare and the political strength of the left in Swiss cantons (Armingeon 
et al. 2004, p. 39).
Accordingly, Geneva’s high degree of urbanisation should tend to favour left-
wing parties and could therefore explain the state-oriented development of social 
policies. Moreover, Armingeon et al. (2004) categorise the Canton of Geneva as 
a social-democratic regime for three out of four of their selected variables,32 em-
phasising that it is one of the only cantons to possess a somewhat coherent welfare 
regime. It is also the only one that can be classified as social-democratic in the 
country (Armingeon et al. 2004, pp. 34–35).
6.4  Actors and Power Relations Around Social Policies
These interrogations raise the question of who are the actors who define social 
policies and the values behind them. According to Neidhart (1970, pp. 287 ff., 294, 
313) and Kriesi and Jegen (2001), direct democracy implies that political projects 
are largely debated in the administrative or pre-parliamentary arena and that these 
debates have to integrate negotiations from all kinds of actors to avoid the launching 
of a referendum against the proposed law or project. So direct democracy often im-
plies the finding of a consensus between the implied actors, and sometimes, when 
the debate is very conflictual, we can speak about a compromise rather than a con-
sensus. According to Sabatier (1991, 1998), the actors are constituted in competing 
advocacy coalitions33 within a policy subsystem34 that share a common belief sys-
tem organised around core values and secondary aspects. Within the core values, he 
32 The four variables are employment, education, taxation and social security.
33 “An advocacy coalition consists of actors from many public and private organizations at all lev-
els of government who share a set of basic beliefs (policy goals plus causal and other perceptions) 
and who seek to manipulate the rules of various governmental institutions to achieve those goals 
over time” (Sabatier 1991, pp. 151; 153). These coalitions develop power relations, which result in 
the emergence of majorities and minorities. Another definition is provided by Kriesi et al. (2006, 
p. 342): “[…] at a given moment, in a given subsystem, we are likely to find a limited number of 
coalitions with varying influence on the political processes within the subsystem. […] Coalitions 
can be composed of one type of actor only (homogeneous), or they can incorporate different actor 
types (heterogeneous).”
34 “A subsystem consists of actors from a variety of public and private organizations who are ac-
tively concerned with a policy problem or issue, […] and who regularly seek to influence public 
policy in that domain” (Sabatier 1998, p. 99).
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distinguishes the deep core, meaning fundamental normative and ontological axi-
oms, from the policy core, which are the strategies used to achieve the core values. 
Furthermore, Sabatier argues that the coalitions and core values remain relatively 
stable for a decade or longer and are therefore difficult to change. So policy learn-
ing most often only applies to the secondary aspects, which comprise a multitude of 
instrumental decisions that are necessary to implement the policy core. Kriesi et al. 
(2006, pp. 342–343), building on Sabatier’s theory regarding advocacy coalitions 
and the power distribution between them, add the idea of a relational perspective on 
the policy process. According to this theory, power is either fragmented or concen-
trated, and the type of interaction is characterised by the predominance of conflicts, 
bargaining or cooperation.
Of course, these policy-specific power structures are determined by the macro-
political context, meaning, among other things, the extent to which political actors 
are induced to co-operate informally (related to the distribution of power) and the 
policy phase, assuming that the type of interaction becomes more conflictual in 
critical policy phases. The power relations vary from one policy domain to another. 
According to Kriesi et al. (2006), Switzerland’s distribution of power is clearly 
fragmented and interaction tends to be cooperative rather than conflictual. But this 
does not mean that consensus democracies cannot be conflictual or bargaining as 
well, depending on the political issue involved.
Based on these theoretical findings, we assume that in Geneva, with respect to 
direct democracy and the welfare mix, which includes by necessity a fragmentation 
of power, state actors (state/city councillors and the related civil servants, often 
themselves members of political parties) and political parties are the dominant ac-
tors in determining local welfare policies. Therefore, they have a strong impact on 
defining the welfare state’s core values. If, following the principle of subsidiarity, 
non-profit organisations play an important role in welfare provision and are part of 
the debate, we expect their core values to largely be in line with those of the state, 
not least because of the important state subsidies they receive. In other words, we 
hypothesise that the above-mentioned groups dominate the advocacy coalitions that 
shape the core values of social policies, and that their goal in public debate is to 
link themselves with state-oriented welfare services, which develop from the values 
defined by them. In turn, we assume that the presence of this “strong” welfare state 
legitimises the predominance of political parties and state actors in public debate, 
leading to a sort of virtuous circle in which fundamental changes in values, and 
therefore in policies, are difficult to make. Following this logic, we assume that 
policy innovation therefore tends to be incremental, remaining within the existing 
logic of state orientation.
Finally, we may also attribute the predominance of political parties and stake-
holders from the public administration to the influence of neighbouring France, 
where power is more centralised. In this sense, Geneva presents a certain concentra-
tion of power and conflictual and ideological debates between political parties that 
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challenge state-centred administration and its stakeholders, sometimes leading to 
political deadlock.35
Following these assumptions, it is first necessary to examine the development of 
political forces in Geneva over the past two decades. We may then apprehend the 
core values of the local welfare state, especially in the fields of unemployment and 
childcare.
6.4.1  Canton of Geneva: From Two Coalitions to Three (and a 
Half)
As said before, Geneva has two elected assemblies: a cantonal parliament and a city 
council.36
The cantonal parliament (Grand Conseil) comprises 100 members who are elect-
ed by popular vote for 5 years,37 according to a proportional-representation electoral 
system. At the city level, the 80 members of the city council (Conseil Municipal) are 
elected every 4 years. There has been an important evolution in the constellations 
of power within these two legislative bodies over the past two decades. Regarding 
the composition of the Grand Conseil, between 1993 and 2001, there were only two 
(mutually opposed) coalitions: the Entente (centre-conservative parties, including 
the Liberals, the Radicals38 and the Christian Democratic Party) and the Alternative 
(left-wing parties, including the Socialists, the Greens and the Labour Party, the lat-
ter becoming the Left Alliance39 between 1993 and 2001). Traditionally, except in 
35 Examples of political deadlock are the linking of the two shores of Lake Geneva (footnote 22) 
and the expansion of the main railway station, which provoked lively debates and mobilised the 
inhabitants of the area behind the railway station; see, for instance, Pasteur and Armanios (2011). 
But also in Geneva, there is a desire for more political pragmatism and less ideology. One example 
is the recent cross-party group, which includes members of all political parties except the Swiss 
People’s Party (UDC), to start a pilot project to regulate the consumption of cannabis through Can-
nabis Consumer Associations; see, for instance, Zünd (2014).
36 Of course, all the other 44 municipalities also have their own city councils.
37 The mandate can be renewed indefinitely. Before the introduction of the new cantonal constitu-
tion in 2013 (accepted in October 2012), members were elected for 4 years (République et canton 
de Genève 2012a, Arts. 80–81; Arts. 101–102).
38 The Liberal Party and the Radical Party merged and became the Liberal-Radicals in 2013, after 
having lost four seats in the 2009 elections (Office cantonal de la statistique—OCSTAT/Chancel-
lerie d’Etat 2013a).
39 The Labour Party sat in the cantonal legislature from 1945 to 1989. In 1989 it was renamed the 
Left Alliance and gathered various far-left coalitions (for instance Solidarités and Independants). 
The party changed its name again in 2005 to the Ensemble à Gauche. It continues to group various 
far-left coalitions and sometimes struggles with internal divisions. Together with the Greens and 
the Socialists, it constitutes the so-called Alternative, in opposition to the Entente. It is interesting 
to note that the Ensemble à Gauche was absent from the cantonal legislature between 2005 and 
2013. For more information, see the official statistics of the canton (Office cantonal de la statis-
tique—OCSTAT/Chancellerie d’Etat 2013a).
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the 1997 election,40 the centre-conservative parties have always held a majority in 
the cantonal legislature. But since 2001, the legislature has also included the clearly 
right-wing Swiss People’s Party41 (UDC: Union Démocratique du Centre), and 
from 2005 on the Geneva Citizens’ Movement (MCG: Mouvement Citoyen Gene-
vois), which bases its programme on the protection of Geneva’s residents from the 
“invasion” of cross-border workers. This new party made a dramatic entry. Between 
2005 and 2013, it increased its seats from 9 to 20, and it also placed one member 
in the cantonal executive in 2013. The fact that the MCG shared a common list for 
the elections of the 2013 executive with the far-right UDC allows us to assume that 
it lies at the right end of the political spectrum, even though it claims to be “neither 
right nor left”,42 a dichotomy that it claims is “history” and is perpetuated by politi-
cal parties that do not respond to the needs of Geneva’s population.
So, regarding the cantonal parliament, we can speak about the end of an era of 
polarisation between left (Alternative) and centre-conservative parties (Entente), in 
favour of the existence of three or even four groups and a situation in which there 
is no longer any clear majority, and where the “historical parties” have to compete 
with far-right and populist parties, the latter (MCG) alternating between right and 
left ideologies, depending on the issue.43 Overall, the right is more powerful in 
parliament.44
The cantonal executive45 is also dominated by representatives from the centre-
conservative and right-wing parties. Except after the 2005 election, when four 
members of the Alternative46 faced three members of the Entente, the executive has 
always been right wing. As mentioned before, what was new in the 2013 elections 
was the election of one member of the MCG, placing the two members of the Alter-
native (one Socialist and one Green) in a very marginalised position.
The cantonal governance of Geneva historically has always been consistently 
conservative, a stability that is currently being challenged by the presence of the 
self-styled “non-determined” populist party MCG. At city council, however, until 
2011 the forces were exactly the opposite.
40 In 1997, the Alternative won a majority with 51 of the 100 seats (Office cantonal de la statis-
tique—OCSTAT/Chancellerie d’Etat 2013a).
41 The translation of the Union Démocratique du Centre as the Swiss People’s Party follows the 
party’s original name, which is Schweizerische Volkspartei.
42 “Neither left nor right” (MCG—Mouvement Citoyen Genevois 2014b).
43 Some argue that the MCG is on the left on social issues and on the right on security, European 
and immigration issue (Favre 2013).
44 Composition of the Geneva cantonal parliament 2013: Entente 35, Alternative 34, UDC 11 and 
MCG 20 (Office cantonal de la statistique—OCSTAT/Chancellerie d’Etat 2013a).
45 The cantonal executive is composed of seven state councillors who are elected directly by the 
population by majority vote. Since the 2012 change to the Geneva Constitution (entered into force 
in 2013), they are elected for 5 years. One member is designated president for the whole period 
and is the head of the newly constituted presidential department. The other six members are each 
in charge of a specific department (République et canton de Genève 2012b).
46 Two Socialists and two Greens for one Radical, one Liberal and one representative of the Chris-
tian Democratic Party (Office cantonal de la statistique—OCSTAT/Chancellerie d’Etat 2013b).
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6.4.2  The City of Geneva: From the Dominance of the Left to 
Complex Coalitions
From 1995 to 2011,47 the Alternative held an absolute majority in Geneva’s city 
council. It is interesting to note that in 1999, the Left Alliance, a coalition of far-left 
parties, was the most important party in city council, before the Socialists, which 
are the most important party today, followed directly by the Liberal-Radicals. As in 
the cantonal parliament, city council is no longer composed of its two opposite co-
alitions ( Entente and Alternative); instead, since 2003, and especially since 2011, it 
has also included the two “newcomers”: the Swiss People’s Party48 (UDC, far right) 
and the Geneva Citizens’ Movement (MCG). So, since the 2011 election, with 39 
of 80 seats, the Alternative has been just shy of an absolute majority and is obliged 
to seek some alliances outside of its long-term coalition, for instance with the MCG 
or the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), which can sometimes tilt the balance 
towards their political preferences. As in the canton, the minority parties have the 
power to tilt the balance between the two “traditional” coalitions, if we assume that 
the latter vote as a bloc in accordance with their parties’ instructions. As we will 
see below, however, things are not always that simple: Internal conflicts (above all 
within the far-left coalition) and moving coalitions depending on the policy issue 
involved are affecting the stability of the established coalitions.
At the executive level, things are more stable. From 1991 to 2011, the left had 
a majority—three out of five seats between 1991 and 1999, and four out of five 
between 1999 and 2011.49 So we have to keep in mind that the executive’s majority 
is no longer the same as that of the city council on which it relies, which creates 
additional tensions and sometimes causes political debates to take a long time when 
the issues are conflictual. One current example is the finally accepted renovation of 
Les Minoteries, a complex of 329 subsidised apartments owned by the city whose 
maintenance has been neglected for the past 40 years. The executive proposed a 
renovation of 90 million CHF (about 72 million €). The proposal was rejected twice 
47 Composition of the city-council coalitions from 1991 to 2011. 1991 Entente 40, Alternative 40; 
1995: Entente 36, Alternative 44; 1999 Entente 36, Alternative 44; 2003 Entente 27, Alternative 
44, UDC (far right) 9; 2007 Entente 29, Alternative 42, UDC 9; 2011 Entente 22, Alternative 39, 
UDC 8, MCG (populist) 11 (République et canton de Genève 2014).
48 In fact, the Swiss People’s Party (UDC) may be new in Geneva, but it is well established in the 
Swiss-German part of the country, being the predominant party in several regions. For an analysis 
of this party, see Mazzoleni (2008).
49 Executive, City of Geneva: 1991 Liberals 1, Radicals 1, Socialists 1, Greens 1, Labour Party 
1; 1995 same as in1991, but instead of Labour Party, Left Alliance; 1999 Liberals 1, Socialists 1, 
Labour Party 1, Left Alliance 1; 2003 same as 1999. 2007 Radicals 1, Socialists 2, Greens 1, À 
Gauche Toute 1 (new name for the Left Alliance); 2011 same as 2003, but À Gauche Toute became 
Ensemble à Gauche (Together on the Left). In 2012 a by-election replaced the radical magistrate 
with a member of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Note that the composition of the Left 
Alliance/Labour Party and its name changed for every election, so we can assume that the Left 
Alliance’s coalition is not stable at all. Source: (Office cantonal de la statistique—OCSTAT/Chan-
cellerie d’Etat 2012).
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by city council, and debates have been heated between the Alternative, which fa-
voured the renovation and the rest of the council ( Entente, UDC and MCG), which 
was opposed, principally because of the cost, demanding for a third time that the 
project be scaled down. Finally, a narrow majority accepted the renovation.50
6.5  Core Values and Strategies in the Political Arena
During these lively debates, the different parties’ core values become clear, as they 
do in the different party programmes51 and in our interviews and focus groups. We 
will focus on the core values regarding the local welfare state and specify the coali-
tions that have emerged for specific policy issues. Unemployment52 and childcare 
will serve to illustrate concrete policy orientations.
6.5.1  More or Less State Intervention?
In Geneva, core oppositions between political parties regarding the local welfare 
state are transforming the importance of the state, the fields of its interventions and 
how far its contributions are expected to go. It is not surprising that the more the 
parties can be categorised as being “on the left”, the more the state’s intervention is 
legitimated. For the Socialists, the state has a crucial role to play in the construction 
of society, which is based on solidarity, a society of opportunities and equalities, 
not of privileges. Other notions such as redistribution, access to public services, 
gender equality and jobs for all are the core values (deep core) indicated in their 
40-page programme for the 2013–2018 cantonal legislature.53 The Left Alliance’s 
policies are similar, but it emphasises class struggle and advocates policies that 
50 The third and final debate took place on 25 March 2014 at City Hall. These debates are always 
broadcast by Léman Bleu, the local television channel. The renovation project was finally ac-
cepted by a vote of 38 (the Alternative and two Independents) to 36 (Entente, UDC, MCG, the 
conservative, far-right and populist parties). There was one abstention (a member of the Greens), 
see Dethurens (2014).
51 Cantonal and city party programmes being identical, no distinction between the two levels has 
to be made.
52 In Switzerland, the economic crisis at the end of the 1980s marked a turning point regarding 
unemployment policies. In 1995, following the recommendation of the OECD Making Work Pay 
(Giraud 2007, p. 96), the Federal Unemployment Law was revised in the direction of workfare, 
activation, reciprocity and increased control over the unemployed. But this logic has been imple-
mented in different ways in different cantons. In Geneva, for instance, the focus has been on 
reintegration or even inclusion rather than control (Giraud 2007, p. 100). Since 1995, the cantons 
have had to fill the gap left by the reduction of federal assistance and implement social-assistance 
measures for the long-term unemployed who have exhausted their unemployment benefits, a new 
phenomenon in the country.
53 Party Programme of the Socialist Party of Geneva, 2013–2018 (Parti socialiste genevois 2013).
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are more radical and require maximal state intervention, for instance in matters of 
housing, childcare, unemployment and redistribution.54 For the Greens, the third 
traditional partner of these two parties, state intervention has to integrate the notion 
of sustainability.55 So all three parties propose greater redistribution and take on the 
wealthy in the canton, which, they claim, do not contribute as much as they should 
to public expenses. A shared value of this coalition is that the state should be the 
main regulator and provider of social services.
For the conservative and far-right parties, in contrast, state intervention should 
be kept to a minimum and bureaucracy and state expenses must be reduced (Radi-
cal-Liberals and Swiss People’s Party), or their increase has to be controlled (Chris-
tian Democratic Party), overlapping public services at the cantonal and federal lev-
els have to be eliminated and public administration and civil servants have to be 
re-evaluated. Notions like liberty, responsibility, solidarity, equality in rights and 
duties and prosperity are deep core values for the Liberal-Radical Party,56 while 
the Christian Democratic Party prefers a welfare mix, where non-profit organisa-
tions are seen as more able to solve social problems than the state57 but for-profit 
organisations are also understood to be essential for the well-being of society. All 
the three parties propose tax reductions. The MCG proposes that social welfare be 
maintained, but at the same time underlines the necessity to combat social fraud58 
(this last point is crucial for the UDC too). It has also adopted the slogan “Geneva 
first”, which is common among far-right and populist parties.59
From these party programmes, the differences between the political parties ap-
pear insurmountable, and we wonder how it is possible for Geneva to continue to 
have a “strong” welfare state with more social benefits than other cantons, as was 
54 In their programme, we can find phrases such as “social resistance”, “block the antisocial and 
antipopular politics of the right and far right” and “stop employers’ abuses” (Solidarités Genève 
2013).
55 See Les Verts Genevois (2013).
56 “The Liberal-Radical Party rejects the principle of assistance, rampant statism and all attempts 
at levelling on the basis that they kill personal initiative, the satisfaction derived from effort and 
work, entrepreneurship and exploration, all of which it promotes” (Les Libéraux-Radicaux de 
Genève—PLR 2013, p. 6). Original quotation: “Le PLR rejette le principe d’assistanat, l’étatisme 
rampant et toutes les tentatives de nivèlement par le bas qui tuent l’initiative personnelle, le goût 
de l’effort et du travail, la volonté d’entreprendre et d’explorer, qu’il promeut.”
57 “Indeed, the PDC believes that associations are the most effective way of promoting the politics 
of solidarity.” Original quotation: “En effet, le PDC considère que les associations sont les plus à 
même de mener des politiques de solidarité” (Parti démocrate chrétien Genève 2013).
58 Point 3 of the political charter of the party (MCG - Mouvement Citoyen Genevois 2014a).
59 For analyses of extreme-right movements in Switzerland, see Skenderovic and D’Amato (2008) 
and Skenderovic (2009).
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emphasised in the field of unemployment by the head of the Solidarity jobs60 at the 
Cantonal Office for Employment, during his interview.61
In my sense, this is rather unique in Switzerland: we are the only canton that 
has so many important additional cantonal welfare measures, at the cost of about 
60 million CHF,62 that are not covered by the LIASI.63 This is real, the human part 
of Geneva. And there is the real will of a canton-city to have a politics that reinte-
grates people (iIII, p. 8).
But if we look more attentively at the core values that are mentioned in the party 
programmes and also by our interviewed stakeholders, we can also see shared deep 
core values, characterised by notions like solidarity, humanism, individual respon-
sibility, respect for people and equal access to social opportunities. But with respect 
to the policy core, meaning the strategies used to attain the identified deep core, and 
even more the secondary aspects, we notice significant differences that correspond 
to classical right- and left-wing dichotomies regarding the role of the state, its legiti-
mate fields of intervention and, consequently, the amount of public taxes that have 
or do not have to be spent in these fields.
This agreement about deep core values, sometimes accompanied by a massive 
divergence in the policy core, is particularly pronounced in the fields of childcare 
and unemployment.
6.5.2  Childcare and Unemployment: State Versus Mixed 
Solutions
In the field of childcare, all parties except the Swiss People’s Party agree that there 
are insufficient numbers of childcare places available in the city and the canton. 
60 Solidarity jobs are jobs in the secondary labour market that are subsidised by the canton and 
target the long-term unemployed, are implemented by the Cantonal Office for Employment and 
were legitimised by popular vote in December 2007 (68.5 % in favour), see (République et canton 
de Genève 2007). While the Socialists and Greens agreed with the law, the far left, including trade 
unions, fought against it with the argument that it would result in downward pressure on wages and 
the use of cheap labour for public-administration jobs. Seven years after its introduction, debates 
on the issue remain heated, and there is increasing opposition to Solidarity jobs, including from the 
current socialist mayor of the city. See Syndicat interprofessionnel de travailleuses et travailleurs 
(Sit) (2013) and Salerno (2013).
61 As indicated above, 12 semi-directed interviews were conducted in Geneva with local stake-
holders during the WILCO research (see footnote 7) with a view to understanding their positions 
and core values regarding unemployment, childcare and housing, but also the local welfare system. 
The following topics were discussed in the interviews: the main problems and solutions in these 
areas; the reasons for a need to act, coalitions and the main differences between the stakeholders 
and between the parties in their positions and reasons for the importance or unimportance of the 
local welfare system. The analysis of the interviews is based on the actor-centred-institutionalism 
approach (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 1997).
62 About 49 million €.
63 The cantonal law regarding social assistance and social inclusion.
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There is a fundamental agreement about the need to increase the number of child-
care places, the legitimacy of childcare outside the family and the idea of the social 
investment state.64 But the strategies the parties advocate to attain this aim differ, 
the left advocating public childcare places, funded by public taxes and standardised 
by public regulations and norms, including qualification criteria for its personnel, 
the far-right and conservative parties demanding more of a welfare mix with pub-
lic–private partnerships, enterprise nurseries, nannies, etc., and less state regulation.
Regarding unemployment, coalitions are moving regarding secondary aspects. 
Traditionally, right-wing parties advocate individual responsibility and claim that 
it is up to the individual to adapt to structural changes in the labour market and 
make the main effort to (re)integrate. By contrast, left-wing parties stress structural 
problems, the inadequacy of the jobs on offer, and the need to reform the labour 
market itself, for instance by adapting it to help resolve long-term unemployment 
by creating a subsidised labour market for some employment areas, as was the case 
with the Solidarity jobs. So while the core legitimacy of the Solidarity jobs was not 
really questioned, the concrete application caused lively debates and disagreements 
inside the leftist coalition itself, mostly regarding the type of contracts and the pay. 
Finally the far left (including the trade unions) was and continues to be opposed to 
the Solidarity jobs, criticising their tendency to reduce wages and their poor work-
ing conditions. Surprisingly, the conservative and far-right parties (and the employ-
ers’ association) accepted the idea, not without difficulty, of creating this secondary 
labour market for long-term unemployment, but only under certain circumstances 
(salary below the market prices, no competition with the private sector).
These two examples show us that political parties agree on the fundamental deep 
core of the existence of a local welfare state, which guarantees protection and help 
in case of need. Conflicts therefore revolve around the amount of financial assis-
tance, for instance, or who the provider of the services should be. But we may 
assume that the shared deep core values are relatively stable65 and that discussions 
and consensus or compromise occur with respect to the policy core and especially 
secondary aspects.
As stated above, debates take often place in pre-parliamentary arenas, as a re-
sult of which coalitions also include non-state actors. According to the previously 
quoted head of the Solidarity jobs, the creation of these jobs was a real partnership. 
Before the law was passed, we had people around the table who were in favour or 
against. We reflected together on what the legislation should look like. It was a first 
in terms of partnership (iIII/p. 8).
This partnership between different stakeholders seems to indicate that political 
parties and civil servants in the public administration have to take associations (for 
64 For a constructive critique of the social investment state, see Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx 
(2011).
65 Even the Swiss People’s Party speaks about the “need to guarantee social security for future 
generations” (UDC 2013, p. 27) but argues that the best way to do so is through “more market, less 
bureaucracy, less state regulation” (UDC 2013, p. 29). Regarding childcare, it claims that a child 
will never feel better than at home with its family (UDC 2013, p. 25).
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instance, non-profits) into account in debates or even look to their expertise. Other 
interviewees stated that non-profit-sector lobbies carry a certain weight in political 
debates, which would seem to contradict our claim that social policies are above all 
shaped by state actors and political parties. Indeed, it is clear that the canton and the 
city often work with non-profit organisations in the field of social policies. But what 
about the for-profit sector? How mixed is Geneva’s welfare system, and what does 
it indicate about its governance and the distribution of power and type of interac-
tion? And lastly, what about social innovation? Are the local welfare governance 
arrangements favourable to social innovation?
6.6  Geneva’s Welfare Governance Arrangements: State 
and Non-Profit Without For-Profit? What About 
Social Innovation?
Debates about social innovation have given rise to a large body of literature in the 
social sciences. The concept itself is ambiguous and has become a confusing “buzz-
word”, as underlined by Moulaert et al. (2013, p. 13):
In our opinion, the lack of clarity about the term “social innovation” can be attributed not 
only to its evolving analytical status but also to its over-simplistic use as a buzzword in 
a multiplicity of policy practices associated, for example, with the rationalization of the 
welfare state and the commodification of sociocultural wellbeing. The appropriation of 
the term by “caring liberalism”, in one of its new incarnations, has added to a Babel-like 
terminological confusion. (Moulaert et al. 2013, p. 13)
Following the definition of Oosterlynck et al., social innovations are “locally em-
bedded practices, actions and policies that help socially excluded and impoverished 
individuals and social groups to satisfy basic needs for which they find no adequate 
solution in the private market or institutionalized welfare policies through processes 
of social learning, collective action and awareness raising” (2013, p. 4).
So while one important aspect of social innovation is that it occurs on the local 
level, it must also be understood over a larger scale and be spread by collective ac-
tion. According to Evers and Ewert, social innovation also involves the novelty of 
an idea in the given context. Social innovations are ideas, turned into practical ap-
proaches; which are new in the context where they appear; attracting hopes for bet-
ter coping strategies and solutions; marked by a high degree of risk and uncertainty 
due inter alia to the specific context wherein they appear. […] Social innovations 
are, in a significant way, new and disruptive toward the routines and structures pre-
vailing in a given (welfare) system or local setting (Evers and Ewert 2014, p. 11).
It is obvious that what is new in a certain context is not necessarily so in another. 
As a result, social innovation can be overlooked by researchers if the practice is 
already well known in other countries or localities.
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In Geneva, the policies analysed by the WILCO project66 and the social inno-
vations pursued67 reveal a welfare system in which the state (either the canton or 
the city), and particularly the stakeholders in the public administration, has the 
predominant role in establishing social policies and concrete programmes, backed 
(more or less) by the political parties. However, in the matter of the delivery of 
social services, the state relies on non-profit organisations where possible. These 
organisations are heavily subsidised, and their rules and programmes are built on 
those of the public service. Indeed, the Solidarity jobs are subsidised by the canton 
and located only in non-profit organisations, creating a secondary labour market. 
Subsidies are therefore given directly to the relevant associations, which execute 
the decided measure (to give work to long-term unemployed individuals far from 
the primary labour market). Other programmes and measures, such as the social 
innovations examined here, reveal the same tendency, where for-profit actors are 
either absent or marginal.68
In contrast, regarding for instance the integration of (young) unemployed indi-
viduals, the City of Bern has chosen to build coalitions with economic partners and 
creates job opportunities in the primary labour market. These public-private part-
nerships are initiated and coordinated by the state and are a type of “quasi-market 
solution”69 (Felder 2013, p. 25) to unemployment.
In Geneva, the welfare governance arrangements, which favour the interplay be-
tween the state and non-profit organisations, and in which economic actors are ab-
sent, raise different issues. Battaglini et al. (2001, p. 18) demonstrate the relatively 
high degree of autonomy of non-profit organisations to realise public policies in the 
Swiss context. But they also emphasise their weak formal recognition by the state, 
66 The policy fields examined by the WILCO project (running time 2010–2013) were childcare, 
subsidised housing and unemployment.
67 The three social innovations that were examined during the WILCO project were as follows. (1) 
The UAC, which is part of the city’s Social Service, and which has four offices, located in different 
areas of the city. Its principal aim is to connect relevant associations with interested participants 
in civil society and, therefore, to reinforce collective action through better coordination and net-
working. (2) The ORIF project, an NGO that works to reintegrate young marginalised adults who 
experience multiple difficulties (health, disabilities, learning problems, etc.) that hinder them from 
entering the labour market. Support is long term (3 years) and multi-dimensional. The project is 
funded by the Office for Disability Insurance and is therefore a public programme. (3) The Unit 
for Temporary Housing (ULT) offers subsidised, temporary housing to vulnerable populations, 
taking into account various dimensions of social marginalisation by offering support from a team 
employed by the city. More information about these three innovations can be found in the relevant 
chapter of the e-book of the project (Kakpo and Cattacin 2014, pp. 367–380).
68 This is the case for the ORIF project (see previous footnote). Its Geneva office, located in 
Vernier, focuses primarily on education and training rather than on professional integration but 
with the aim of building partnerships with private enterprises. However, the ORIF project is not 
specific to Geneva but was instead created by a medical doctor in the Canton of Vaud in 1948 and 
implemented in nine locations in the French speaking cantons. The office in Vernier opened in 
2007 (ORIF 2014).
69 In fact, the subsidies are part of the wage; for instance, if an individual working in a private 
company can only work part-time because of a disability, the state provides the other half of the 
salary. That is why it is only a “quasi-market solution”.
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not least because of a certain mistrust of these collective actors (2001, pp. 55, 58). 
Furthermore, non-profit organisations run the risk of being instrumentalised by the 
state, of being asked to act in neglected fields. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to 
clearly define the border separating the state from non-profit organisations, whose 
intertwined nature contributes to the blurring of that border. For Evers (2000, 2005), 
the borders between the different providers of social services have to be questioned 
and newly defined, because
changes in the development of welfare states (such as trends towards more autonomy 
of single service organizations and an increasing intertwining between state and market 
spheres), linked with a stronger impact of new forms of participation in civil society, have 
led to a hybridization process in many organizations that provide social services. […] It is 
often hard to say where the third sector ends and the public sector begins. Drawing a line 
between the state-public and the third sector is thus an essentially political task (Evers 
2005, p. 745).
In Geneva, it is not so much that the public sector is influenced by non-profit organ-
isations, as it is that non-profit organisations have to adapt to the regulations and 
logic of the public sector.
So, in a context characterised by a strong state actor, dependent non-profit organ-
isations that tend to be instrumentalised and the clear separation of social policy and 
private economic activity, what about social innovation?
In the social policies we analysed,70 we witness innovation in governance (con-
sultation between the public administration, political parties and non-profit organ-
isations), for instance, for the Solidarity jobs. Regarding the Union for Community 
Action,71 the innovation involves the ways in which users are addressed, regulations 
and rights, modes of working and financing. But our observations did not reveal 
innovations in the nature of the local welfare system—for example, outreach to all 
sectors of the local welfare system, decreased standardisation and increased diver-
sification of welfare arrangements, increased reliance on community components 
such as families and support networks in mixed welfare systems, the integration of 
economic and social logics or the integration of welfare and urban politics (Evers 
and Ewert 2014, pp. 22–24). Furthermore, the instrumentalisation of non-profit or-
ganisations by the state is not indicative of a major social innovation because “this 
instrumentalisation of organisations issued out of civil society runs the risk of de-
stroying their potential for innovation and the renewal of grassroots democracy” 
(Battaglini et al. 2001, p. 58).72
This does not mean that non-profit organisations in Geneva cannot propose any 
innovative ideas but rather that the canton or city puts its pattern on them. Fur-
thermore, what could be identified as bottom-up initiatives at first glance actually 
70 For the innovations investigated by the WILCO project, see footnote 68.
71 See footnote 68.
72 Original quotation: “[…] cette instrumentalisation des organisations issues de la société civile 
risque de mener à la destruction de leur potentiel d’innovation et de renouvellement de la démocra-
tie de proximité”.
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correspond to city policy: Citizens are “encouraged” by the city to organise73 and 
express themselves. Since 2008, the City of Geneva has for example set up some 
“district” or “neighbourhood contracts” that enable people from the area to express 
themselves in working groups or neighbourhood assemblies.74 Or social innovation 
is linked to citizens’ everyday lives, to their active involvement, which is part of the 
design of the local welfare state and has to be included in the analysis of the gov-
ernance (Evers 2005). It is not surprising that Geneva has the lowest rate of formal 
and informal volunteering in Switzerland (Gundelach et al. 2010; Kettenacker and 
Cattacin 2008; Office fédéral de la statistique (OFS) 2011, pp. 7–10).75 Or active 
citizen involvement is also part of bottom-up initiatives, which are a key component 
of innovative social policies (Oosterlynck et al. 2013, p. 4).
An interesting hypothesis for this low degree of citizen engagement is the lack 
of an established city identity, or in other words, “the identity of not having one” 
(Cattacin and Kettenacker 2011). This could explain why the city tries so hard to 
provide a link between the citizens and the “international” city.
These considerations lead us to conclude that Geneva’s social innovations tend 
to be incremental and happen above all within state services, and that, because of 
attempts to control spending, new services are rarely created. Therefore, social in-
novations tend to be initiated from the top or are quickly regulated and standardised 
by the state. This state orientation is in line with the key core values of the welfare 
state as outlined in this chapter. Indeed, we think that the strong state orientation 
in Geneva, preoccupied by rising inequality over the past two decades (Beer 2013, 
pp. 35–44), results from its desire to safeguard equality and solidarity among citi-
zens, values that are shared by the stakeholders and political parties. But we also 
witness state control over social and urban policies and the wish to remain the le-
gitimate source of them.
6.7  Conclusion
According to a former state councillor, Geneva’s governance is like a machine built 
by the famous artist Tinguely: “his nuts and bolts are very complex”.76 In this chap-
ter, we have demonstrated that Geneva’s welfare governance follows a more tradi-
tional social-welfare policy approach in which the state endorse social responsibil-
ity for its citizens and adopts the leading role in the production and distribution of 
services. Furthermore, political parties and state administration prevail in deciding 
which social policies are adopted. In this dynamic, economic considerations are 
73 An example is the annual Neighbours Day (La fête des voisins). Invitations can be downloaded 
from the city’s website. Neighbours Day began in Paris in 2000 and is now celebrated in 1400 cit-
ies in 36 countries). Geneva participated for the first time in 2004 (Ville de Genève 2014b).
74 For further information, see Ville de Genève (2013).
75 In general, engagement in informal and formal volunteering is much more important in the 
Swiss-German parts of the country than in the French-speaking parts.
76 Public conference, 07.04.2014, University of Geneva.
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not related to social policies but handled separately. Furthermore, in its approach to 
social policies, Geneva focuses on social problems and aims to integrate or include 
those who suffer from social exclusion, or, even better, to avoid having socially 
vulnerable individuals become socially excluded.77 Key values are equality and 
solidarity. To fulfil social policies, the state relies essentially on non-profit organ-
isations whose mandates are in accord with the public sector. As a result, non-profits 
run the risk of being instrumentalised by the state.
In Geneva, it is difficult to implement anything other than incremental social 
innovation for several reasons. First, conflicts between the two state levels in-
volved in Geneva’s governance (overlooking the governance of the Grand Genève) 
coupled, second, with the constitutional possibility of vetoes (by the two levels of 
government and also by popular referendum) are a clear obstacle to social innova-
tion. While Czada (2003, p. 175) argued that these veto-structures are compensated 
for by a strong, stable, legislative majority, such is no longer the case in Geneva, 
whose politics are challenged by two “newcomer” parties. Third, moving coalitions 
in the political arena in recent years and the fact that there is no clear majority often 
leads to long and heated debates, and we can hypothesise that the consequence is 
that possible innovations are not adopted in a timely manner. Fourth, a strong state 
orientation, which excludes partners from the private for-profit sector and whose 
structures and routines are difficult to change, decreases the likelihood that any 
social innovations other than incremental ones are adopted and favours “top-down” 
innovations over “bottom-up” ones. We also witness “weak active citizenship” in 
Geneva. The question of whether the observed state orientation is responsible for 
this lack of civil participation or if it is vice versa remains open.
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Chapter 7
Milan: A City Lost in the Transition from the 
Growth Machine Paradigm Towards a Social 
Innovation Approach
Giuliana Costa, Roberta Cucca and Rossana Torri
7.1  Introduction: Milan and Its Pragmatism in Local 
Welfare
Milan is considered to be the economic and financial capital of Italy. The apex of 
the former industrial triangle with Genoa and Turin in the Fordist era, it was one 
of the main destinations of internal migration from southern regions during the 
1950s–1970s period. Employment demand was very high, and it was a key factor 
in the social inclusion and upward mobility of newcomers. Employment opportuni-
ties also fostered the city’s capacity to pragmatically develop and consolidate social 
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solidarity networks and supports. A deep-rooted tradition stemming from a mediae-
val religious principle defined “Milanese citizenship” as a status that anybody com-
ing to the city could obtain by contributing to its welfare through work (Sabatinelli 
and Costa 2014; Costa and Sabatinelli 2013).
Until the 1980s (and since the end of WWII), Milan was also a highly dynamic 
context in terms of welfare provision, given that the municipal government was a 
very important actor in designing and providing social services, especially through 
huge investment in social and educational policies, sometimes also in some sort of 
competition with the national government (Agnoletto, 2006). This favourable situ-
ation started to change and deteriorate at the beginning of the 1990s, when the city 
was profoundly shaken by a far-reaching corruption scandal known as Tangentopoli 
(Bribesville). The “moral” capital of the country (so called also in opposition to 
Rome, the city of “opaque powers” and bureaucracy) thus in some way lost its im-
age as the place where business and ethics went hand in hand.
After the political collapse of the early 1990s and the introduction of the direct 
election of mayors in 1993,1 20 years of centre-right local governments followed, 
first with a Northern League majority (1993–1997) and then for 14 years with may-
ors from Berlusconi’s party (Costa and Sabatinelli 2013). In that period, the political 
coalition governing the city changed the approach to welfare. Social services started 
to be considered more as charitable actions for the most disadvantaged individu-
als than tools of social integration helpful for the economic growth of the city as a 
whole. Public expenditure devoted to sustaining the huge network of public services 
inherited from the previous administrations was increasingly considered to be more 
a cost for the local administration than a public investment for the social and eco-
nomic development of the territory. In terms of local development, the city started to 
adopt “entrepreneurial” policies aimed at the maximization of property values, which 
closely mirrored the ideal type of pro-growth urban regimes (Harvey 1989). This was 
done especially through strategies of urban planning that favoured the use of land 
more for private investment than for public purposes (Molotch and Vicari 2009). 
Consistently with this approach, housing policies aimed at fostering affordability 
were almost abandoned for more than two decades, and this can be considered one of 
the most important institutional factors worsening the conditions of social and spatial 
inequalities in Milan, which is regarded as the most unequal city in Italy (D’Ovidio 
2009) and one of the most unequal urban contexts in Europe (Cucca 2010).
Analysis of this transformation has been the focus of a large body of literature 
over the past decade, both in terms of social and economic trends (Ranci and Torri 
2007; Bonomi 2009; Lodigiani 2010) and as regards the city’s style of governance 
(Bricocoli and Savoldi 2010). In particular, as far as social policies are concerned, 
the literature has described how government coalitions boosted the use of some 
New Public Management instruments at municipal level, especially the contracting 
out or privatization of the provision of public and welfare services (Gori 2010). 
This fitted coherently with the frame being developed in the same years by the 
Lombardy region, which was characterized by the same continuity of centre-right 
coalitions (more specifically of Catholic inspiration; Gori 2005) emphasizing the 
1  For municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, based on a two-ballot system.
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creation of quasi-markets, users’ freedom of choice, the centrality of families as the 
main actors in the fight against social exclusion, and the use of cash-for-care tools 
such as vouchers (Pesenti and Merlo 2012). Also important in this period was the 
political emphasis on security issues, which went along with countering migration 
flows and tightening illegal migrants’ rights in terms of access to services either 
regulated at the local level (childcare services, school canteens, municipal housing) 
or delivered through national/regional programmes (health care; Sabatinelli and 
Costa 2014). As regards housing policies, scholars have highlighted the progressive 
reduction of initiatives in favour of the most marginal groups (Agustoni et al. 2012) 
also through stigmatization of the municipal housing stock as a place for migrants’ 
segregation, which was replaced by a new interest in the housing needs of the new 
“vulnerable middle class” (Cognetti 2011; Bricocoli and Cucca 2014; Costa and 
Sabatinelli 2013). To sum up, this approach led to disinvestment in welfare services 
directly provided by the municipality in favour of a more residual welfare system 
based on the involvement of non-profit and private organizations and investment 
in market-oriented tools. The city’s economic development through the promotion 
of international events (especially Expo 2015, see Costa 2014) and large real estate 
investments (Memo 2007; Anselmi 2013) moved to the forefront.
After scandals involving political actors, entrepreneurs, and also some non-profit 
organizations, as well as a huge and progressive increase of social inequalities in 
the city’s social structure, the municipal elections brought a new coalition to power. 
In the spring of 2011, a major change took place in the local administration. A 
candidate from a small leftist party (Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà, SEL), Giuliano 
Pisapia, who conducted a campaign widely supported by grassroots movements, 
won the primary elections of the centre-left coalition against the official candidate 
of the main centre-left party (Partito Democratico, PD). As a mayoral candidate, 
supported by a coalition of eight centre-left political parties and civic lists, Pisapia 
later won the municipal elections against the outgoing centre-right mayor by call-
ing for a new style of urban government more oriented to social justice and the 
wider participation of citizens in the decision-making process. “Participation” then 
became one of the watchwords of the new municipal administration, particularly in 
the field of social policies, as reported in the Development Plan for the Welfare of 
the City of Milan (2012).2
2 Where one reads: “The City of Milan has decided to share the methods, resources, and risks of 
construction and implementation of what should be considered a real ‘Strategic Welfare Plan’…
[whose goal is] to move beyond the traditional logic of the Area Plan. This makes it possible to 
create a system of relationships and networks able to express, in a completely original way, so-
cial demands and the responses to them. One of the guiding principles for the construction and 
management of this local welfare plan is greater participation and the real involvement of all the 
protagonists of local society. In the area of personal services, it is necessary to enhance the wealth 
of knowledge, skills, and experiences that the city has accumulated over time. According to the 
original Ambrosiano spirit, we have to combine solidarity with creativity and the capacity to in-
novate. This comes with the idea of reallocating the resources available in order to fight fragmenta-
tion and promote ‘social integration’” (p. 11, authors’ translation).
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Against this background, the aim of this chapter is to fill a gap in the existing 
literature by describing some developments of the governance system in the field 
of social policies between 2011–2014. It focuses on the housing sector because of 
the importance of the problems related to housing affordability in Milan and to the 
shortage of public housing provision. In the next section, we describe the transition 
period that the welfare governance system is now undergoing, especially as far as 
values and policy discourse are concerned. We will concentrate on the previous so-
cial policies governance system in the city, the values and objectives characterizing 
the political coalition’s welfare programme, and the governance system between 
2011–2014. We will argue that the current situation represents a compromise be-
tween new values and plans for municipal welfare and the legacy of the past (espe-
cially in terms of financial budget constraints), and we will highlight continuities 
and discontinuities with previous administrations.
In the third section, we will focus on trends in Milan’s housing policies in terms 
of governance and problematic issues, the purpose being to show why and how 
Milan is, according to the title given to this chapter, a city “lost in transition”. In the 
concluding section, we will discuss how the current municipal government is deal-
ing with the heavy financial legacy of the past and the barriers to promoting social 
innovation in housing and social policies according to the values that characterized 
the electoral campaign and its underlying political programme.
7.2  The Changing Governance of Social Policies in Milan
In this section, we analyse how the governance approach to local welfare has 
changed in Milan in recent years. Our focus is on the main transformations and on 
the obstacles to innovation that the current municipality is facing in governing and 
changing the city.
The last municipal elections represented an important turning point in terms of 
the rhetoric, values, networks of actors, and tools that have characterized the wel-
fare system governance in Milan. However, as the chapter highlights, a range of 
interrelated factors are hampering social innovation processes and outcomes in the 
city.
One issue concerns the role that public regulation assigns to local welfare. At 
the national level, the legal framework in the field of social policy is defined by 
Law 328/2000, which is based on the logic of vertical and horizontal subsidiarity.3 
This law introduced a cascade regulation pattern in which the state is responsible 
for the definition of general objectives and minimum assistance levels; regions are 
responsible for the planning and designing of social policies; provinces coordinate 
and support local levels; municipalities, also in associated form (social districts or 
ambits), are in charge of the implementation and delivery of services and supports 
3 This approach was confirmed by the 2001 constitutional reform, which strengthened this setting 
by introducing the concept of subsidiarity into the constitution (Constitutional Law 3/2001).
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(Barberis and Kazepov 2013).4 The principle of horizontal subsidiarity is instead 
interpreted as the engagement of the various social actors in the community through 
their involvement in both policy design and the provision of services.
The centrality of the regional level is particularly important in the case of Lom-
bardy, where the regional government has over the years designed a welfare model 
with its own strong identity (Pesenti and Merlo 2012; Gori 2005). In general, the 
municipality of Milan in all its main pillars adopted this governance model until 
2011. It is centred on the principle of horizontal subsidiarity (Pesenti 2007), and 
also on the leading role of the family as both supplier and consumer of services, 
which is recognized as comprising important social resources to be empowered 
and exploited (Gori 2005). Another pillar of this system is the freedom of choice 
for citizens as regards social services, which only need to be “accredited” by mu-
nicipalities so that they can be implemented by the local social assistance system. 
Since the introduction of the regional law no. 3/2008 (“Government of the Network 
of Social and Socio-Medical Services”), the practical application of these principles 
has been founded on the implementation of services that are granted annually after 
winning a public tender. The new municipal coalition has in part challenged the re-
gional approach to welfare, in particular with new keywords leading its action in the 
field of social policies: “a universalistic approach, not residual social policies” and 
“welfare as a tool to develop social capital”. Within this framework, welfare is also 
described as “a tool for local economic development that cannot be removed merely 
by following the rhetoric of the financial crisis, because welfare enables people to 
be creative, business-oriented and productive…” (Milan Municipality 2012, p. 5).
Another important change concerns policy targets. Roughly, we can state that 
centre-right parties claimed that families should be the beneficiaries of policies, 
defining “family” as the one based on marriage; they systematically opposed any 
proposed reform to regulate de facto couples, and even more so gay marriages. Re-
jected by the former administration, a municipal register for equal rights and duties 
for all forms of family arrangements was promised and then introduced by Giuliano 
Pisapia in September 2012. Enrolment on this register permits whatever kind of 
couple to be recognized by the city council (in terms of housing, assistance, school, 
culture, and sports), also in order to combat all forms of discrimination (particularly 
those related to sexual orientation).5 The first practical effects are already apparent. 
For example, the municipal anti-crisis fund6 has been opened up to unmarried cou-
ples enrolled on the municipal register regardless of their sexual orientation (also, 
the requirement of 5 years of residence in the city has been removed).
4 A recent national law (no. 56/2014) has introduced another level of government, the “Metropoli-
tan City”, which will require changes in terms of welfare policy planning. However, it is too early 
to state anything about this innovation.
5 A delegate of the senator for equal opportunities was also appointed to deal with anti-discrimi-
nation issues.
6 See Chap. 16 in this volume by Sabatinelli and Costa, “Fondazione Welfare Ambrosiano, Milan: 
‘We help you to help yourselves’”.
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However, it is mostly in terms of governance architecture that it is possible to 
recognize the greatest break with the past. Three years after the last municipal elec-
tions, the promotion of participation can be regarded as the main innovation in the 
local welfare system, while actions for more universalistic social policies have been 
blocked especially by the scarcity of funding. In terms of participation, close at-
tention has been paid to the involvement of citizens and third-sector actors, mainly 
associations. Firstly, two editions of the municipal “Social Policies Forum” have 
taken place in preparation for the local 3-year social plan (Piano di Zona, foreseen 
by the national law 328/00 entitled by the present administration “Welfare Develop-
ment Plan of the City of Milan 2012–2014”). Two editions of a participatory pro-
cess linked to the “Milan Children” project on childcare and family policies have 
also taken place,7 as well as the recent first edition of the “Forum of Youth Policies” 
(named “MI Generation Camp”), as shown in Table 7.1. The feature shared by these 
events is the participative method, which is used with the declared aim of includ-
ing organized groups and individual citizens in public agenda setting and decision-
making. In some cases, these processes have explicitly included steps and events 
localized in the municipality’s various districts.
This “participation turn” is a major difference with respect to the previous ad-
ministration’s approach, which predominantly consisted of hierarchical relations. It 
applied top-down decisions and transmitted information about changes already de-
cided with little room for discussion and very few occasions for feedback and voice 
from the peripheral levels, such as the service-level workers, the beneficiaries/us-
ers/citizens, or the neighbourhood-level representative bodies. However, to 2014, 
the promotion of this large-scale process of participation has been the most impor-
tant innovation. The local administration has made great efforts in implementing 
7 See Sabatinelli and Costa 2014.
Table 7.1  Social participation process architecture for design of the welfare plan. (Source: Milan 
Municipality 2012)
Conference Actors
Intra-institutional 
level
Local social insurance 
agency/municipality
Representatives of the municipality and the 
local welfare agency
Intra-departments Municipal deputy mayors
Municipality “Local Welfare Tomorrow” Young people under 30
Citizens and associations Citizens and associations
“Cultures of Welfare” Representatives of social services and 
professionals
Neighbourhoods Representatives of neighbourhood councils
Negotiation Unions and employers’ associations
Metropolitan region 
and Italy
Large Italian municipalities Deputy mayors on social policies at 
national level
Metropolitan municipalities Deputy mayors on social policies at 
metropolitan level
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this process. However, at the same time, actions to create a more universalistic 
welfare system (with the exception of the institution of the municipal registers for 
common-law marriages, as mentioned above) have been more limited. This has 
been due to various factors.
The first concerns severe budget constraints due to the concurrence of several 
phenomena, in particular the financial crisis and the increase in social demands. 
Since 2008, the economic downturn has led to an increase in unemployment, in the 
use of short-time work schedules and in atypical and fixed-term contracts instead of 
open-ended ones (Costa and Sabatinelli 2012). Another reason relates to austerity 
measures as well as to the related cuts to transfers from the national level to local 
bodies. It has been estimated that, over the past 5 years, the total amount of fund-
ing from the national to regional level has decreased from 1231 billion € in 2008 
to 575 million € in 2013, i.e. a reduction of 53.3 % (Polizzi et al. 2013). The third 
factor concerns the negative consequences of risky financial investments made by 
the previous administration that have further worsened the situation.
Moreover, it should also be stressed that the current local government has not 
always promoted welfare interventions as real priorities for the city, despite the ef-
forts of the Social Policy Department to keep a decent budget. This attitude can be 
observed, for example, on analysing the municipality’s approach to the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Contrary to other municipalities in Italy, Milan has made great efforts 
to respect the pact.8 These efforts have significantly affected the ability to cope with 
the negative social effects of the crisis. Given the insufficiency of public resources 
with which to respond to greater economic needs, especially third-sector and private 
actors have created solidarity funds and distributed forms of support, monetary and 
in-kind, to individuals and families hit by the recession. These funds are managed 
independently from the municipal administration.
It is, however, interesting to note that the municipal government instead pressed 
for a less restrictive pact in order to afford the development of infrastructural proj-
ects needed for the international Expo 2015. Expo 2015, indeed, can be considered 
the main significant project to promote the local economy in recent years. 
Despite the great efforts of the local administration to open up the decision-
making process through participation, the most important plans for the city’s future 
(i.e. Expo 2015) and, to 2014, the priorities of the urban agenda have not been 
significantly changed.
Within this general framework, in the next section we focus on housing policies 
as a case study to illustrate the dynamics described above. We have selected housing 
because this policy area is extremely important for understanding the ambiguities 
that characterize the governance mechanisms of economic and social policies in 
Milan. However, housing policies have also been the area in which some of the 
most interesting cases of social innovation have occurred. In the next section, we 
8 In 2012, the mayor of Turin, for example, decided to depart from the Stability Pact in order to 
preserve more funding for local welfare, especially in this period of economic crisis and particular 
social vulnerability for citizens.
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describe the specific governance of the housing sector in Milan and analyse social 
trends and the main policies related to housing. We present a significant case of 
social innovation in this field and discuss its strengths and weaknesses.
7.3  Affordable Housing Policies in Milan: Conflicting 
Narratives, Social Effects, and Governance Styles
Milan is classified as a “high tension municipality concerning housing”. Like other 
cities, it is subject to specific national and regional policy interventions, such as 
tax benefits for landlords that agree to rent out at prices lower than market ones 
or to postpone/suspend the eviction of tenants. For more than two decades, afford-
ability problems in the housing sector have been disregarded by the local adminis-
tration. This is because the housing market has been viewed as the main driver of 
the local economy’s expansion, according to the neo-liberal notion of a “growth 
machine” where the public and private sectors merge in a shared consensus that 
the central function of a city is to grow (Logan and Molotch 1987). The Milan 
private housing market is considered one of the most effervescent in the country 
(Costa and Sabatinelli 2013). Since the early 2000s, it has been positively affected 
by the reconversion of many areas to residential use, after a broad and rapid process 
of deindustrialization in strategic semi-central neighbourhoods. A large number of 
urban transformation projects have been launched, many of them via the so-called 
Integrated Action Plans (Piani Integrati di Intervento, PII), which aim to accelerate 
the administration’s approval of projects by providing exceptions to existing urban 
planning regulations. These large renewal programmes have been mainly based on 
property-led urban regeneration enabling the production of high-value housing in 
terms of the technology, size, and quality of the dwellings (Cognetti 2011; Mugnano 
and Palvarini 2011). Because of these characteristics, such dwellings are generally 
intended for medium-upper-class households and have very limited impact on a 
growing demand for affordable rental housing. The outcome of these processes has 
been the launch of approximately 150 urban transformation projects. In the coming 
years, this real estate development is likely to continue by using areas obtained from 
the sale of public properties and the conversion of land occupied by marshalling 
yards (Mugnano and Palvarini 2011).
The effect of introducing a high number of prestige housing units is an increase 
in total sales and the growth in sale and rental prices at the city level, not only in 
the areas developed. Also because of the presence of this prestigious and central 
segment of the housing market, the economic crisis (2007–2010) did not signifi-
cantly affect house prices in Milan. In the past 10 years, prices have continued to 
increase (especially in the historic centre) with a pause only in 2008–2009, which 
was very limited compared with other cities and trends in international housing 
markets (OECD 2010; Costa et al. 2014).
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Nevertheless, housing issues have entered the public agenda because of the se-
vere tensions in the market. While the centre-right local governments (1997/2011) 
intervened in the development to attract the affluent to the inner city, broader areas 
of the already-settled population—low- and medium-income households—have 
been made more vulnerable by the lack of affordable housing. As a consequence, 
growing amounts of young people, especially low-income ones leaving the parental 
households, have been expelled from the city. In the meantime, Milan has not yet 
been able to attract new residents. The inhabitants of the municipality increased by 
0.6 % between 2005 and 2010, while over the same period the provincial popula-
tion grew by 3.2 % and the regional population by 4.6 % (Costa and Sabatinelli 
2012). Moreover, the number of households with severe housing needs—such as 
extremely low-income households—has been increasing. In the period 2006–2009, 
the waiting list of households eligible for a public dwelling grew from approxi-
mately 13,000 to 20,500 (Costa and Sabatinelli 2012).
The recent global financial crisis and the ensuing long economic recession have 
exacerbated the problems by expanding the groups at risk of housing deprivation 
(Mugnano and Palvarini 2011). The number of families in difficulties with rent 
and loan repayments have increased. Eviction procedures—especially for arrears—
started to grow again after 2006 with a huge acceleration in 2010, and they almost 
tripled between 2009 and 2010. In 2013, eviction proceedings numbered 11,700, 
of which 7600 were for rent arrears (Ministry of Interior, various years). In public 
dwellings, the arrears on total due revenues rose from 5.5 % in 2001 to 10.2 % in 
2006 (Censis-Federcasa 2008)—an important indicator of the hardship suffered by 
the families resident in those dwellings.
In response to these pressures, the public housing stock—intended for house-
holds with severe housing needs—has progressively decreased owing to the lack 
of maintenance and the sale of significant amounts of units to tenants. The rev-
enues raised from these sales have been mainly used to cover budget deficits, and 
they have only minimally been reinvested in the rehabilitation of social housing 
units or the construction of new ones. The overall public stock in Milan consists of 
70,000 public housing units, 30,000 of which are intended for the lowest income 
groups (canone sociale), while approximately 18,000 eligible families are still on 
the waiting list. During 2010, only 700 public dwellings were assigned (Costa and 
Sabatinelli 2012). Moreover, housing benefits like rental subsidies for low-income 
families in private dwellings (Fondo Sostegno Affitto) have been reduced owing to 
the current phase of fiscal retrenchment. In this context, the public response to the 
affordability issue in Milan has mostly consisted in a new generation of policies and 
programmes called housing sociale. This new concept has had great influence on 
the public debate in the past decade (Plebani 2011), catalysing change and “innova-
tion” in the housing policy field. Housing sociale is the way in which the Lombardy 
region reflects the new intent and concept of housing policy: Social housing is no 
longer conceived as permanent support for disadvantaged people in economic dif-
ficulties, rather, it is starting to be viewed as a service to help tenants emerge from 
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a situation of uncertainty (Plebani and Marotta 2011). In this frame, social housing 
action is not directed to the weakest social groups, but is the instrument with which 
to respond to temporary critical housing situations of the middle classes.
This new approach has been mainly implemented in the Milanese context through 
exploitation of different urban planning regulations and tools, such as equalization 
in the “Transfer of Development Rights” (TDR), planning gains, and negotiations, 
which have recently been introduced in several municipal schemes. In this context, 
“social housing” mainly consists in a public–private partnership where the public 
actor provides building areas free of charge for private developers to build housing, 
which is partly to be rented or sold below the market prices. The public–private in-
tegration concerns both the actors and the resources although public participation is 
a small part of the total investment, which creates a “flywheel effect” for private ini-
tiatives. A large number of public areas have been made available to private inves-
tors in order to produce houses both for sale at fixed prices and as accommodation 
at moderate or social rents. In order to involve private operators, the State Property 
Office puts these areas, which were planned to provide public services and facili-
ties, out to tender, but no rules have been introduced so that the private schemes 
provide for a quota of rented social housing (Pogliani 2011). For example, two of 
the main projects ongoing in the city centre do not comprise any public provision of 
social housing, which is provided by private operators, entirely to their advantage. 
In 2005, the municipality launched the programme entitled “20,000 housing units 
for social aims” to be developed on 46 publicly owned areas according to a scheme 
whereby land is given for free to developers under public bid procedures. In 2009, 
3380 housing units (Abitare 1, 2, 3) were under project in 15 mixed neighbour-
hoods, where private developers, cooperatives, and third-sector organizations were 
involved. As we shall see below, a further 580 housing units in three neighbour-
hoods have been delivered by a bank foundation (Fondazione Cariplo). A total of 
3960 housing units (instead of the 20,000 promised) have been constructed, but 
only one third of them (1200) for rent (Pogliani 2011).
As a matter of fact, the overall outcomes of this measure have been rather scant. 
On the one hand, the new stock provided a certain number of rental units affordable 
only by a small proportion of vulnerable households, the rent rate being not much 
less than the comparable market rate (called in Italian canone moderato). On the 
other hand, the number of social housing units affordable by low- and very-low-in-
come families has been even smaller, if compared to the former, because developers 
have preferred to invest in more profitable high-quality housing. As a consequence, 
also the idea of “social mix” extensively used in the argumentative register of public 
action (Bricocoli and Savoldi 2014) has been very weakly promoted, given that the 
bulk of the new stock consisting of high-profile housing is to be sold on the private 
market. At present, and to sum up, one observes a sort of “polarized scenario” in the 
Milanese housing system, which is characterized, on the one hand, by the presence 
of housing exclusion or housing deprivation and, on the other, by a large proportion 
of well-housed people (Mugnano and Palvarini 2011).
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The most important innovative experience in this new field of housing sociale 
concerns the Fondazione Housing Sociale (FHS), a pioneering actor that created 
the first ethical fund for social housing in Italy, anticipating ad hoc legislation and 
policymaking (Costa and Sabatinelli 2013). The Fondazione Cariplo, the largest 
“foundation with a bank origin” in Italy, founded the FHS in 2004. Since 1999, it 
has tackled the issue of disadvantaged housing conditions by contributing to the 
realization of housing projects dedicated to the weakest segments of the popula-
tion mainly through grants to third-sector organizations (Barbetta and Urbani 2007; 
Urbani 2009). Aware of the limited amount of resources available in the form of 
grants, the foundation decided to experiment with innovative financing instruments 
based on sustainability and ethical investments (and no longer on grants) in order 
to extend the range of social housing projects involving other public and private 
institutions and actors. The initiative thus took concrete form in the Social Housing 
Programme and the creation of the FHS, instituted to implement the former.
Supported by the Lombardy region and Anci Lombardia (the association of 
Lombardy municipalities), FHS plays an active role in the Italian real estate sector 
by taking an innovative approach to social housing as a way to handle diverse hous-
ing needs. It promotes access to housing by persons in the “grey area” (those who 
are not eligible for public housing but at the same time are not financially able to 
enter the private market), and it seeks to ensure the empowerment and social inte-
gration of residents. The work of FHS has been developed along three main axes: 
promoting ethical financing initiatives (and in particular real estate funds dedicated 
to social housing), testing innovative non-profit management models, and develop-
ing project design tools to be shared by trans-sectorial operators. The initial endow-
ment by Fondazione Cariplo enabled the FHS to enter the real estate sector and 
create an ethical fund, the Fondo Abitare Sociale 1, in 2005. The fund was restricted 
to institutional investors such as public institutions, large firms, and bank founda-
tions. Its purpose was to finance housing initiatives (new stock and services) aimed 
at supplying affordable rental dwellings by supporting the efforts of the public ad-
ministration and the third-sector agencies, and with particular regard to students, 
elderly people, one-income families, migrants, young people, and, more generally, 
those unable to afford market prices to cope with their housing needs. The fund, 
now transformed and called the Fondo Immobiliare Lombardia (FIL) was open to 
“non-speculative investors” and assured yearly returns in the range of 2–4 % plus 
inflation. The fund’s investors have been described in the literature as “patient in-
vestors” (Giaimo 2011). The FHS’s task is therefore a complex one: to encourage 
different actors to pursue common goals, attract investments in social housing proj-
ects, monitor their results, and develop sustainable management models that can be 
replicated in contexts other than Milan or Lombardy. In Italy, seeking sustainability 
mainly means finding economic and financial conditions that make social housing 
projects attractive not only to dedicated actors (like the FHS) or public ones but also 
to private actors. Accordingly, the FHS must and wants to be fully embedded in the 
local welfare system, in the awareness that its projects need to be supported by local 
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authorities and partners that have (by mission or convenience) the same long-term 
horizon for investments.
Since the FIL was established, four projects have been developed in the munici-
pality of Milan, namely Cenni di Cambiamento, Figino Borgo Sostenibile, Maison 
du Monde 36, and Abit@giovani. All these projects have been developed with the 
Milan municipality and are based on various public–private partnerships, as well as 
trying to respond to middle-class housing needs.9 At present, only one of these proj-
ects—Cenni di Cambiamento—has given rise to lived spaces. The project’s final 
costs amount to around 21.7 million €, and 123 dwellings have been constructed, 
of which 40 % are devoted to sustainable rent, 10 % to social rent, 40 % to rent-to-
buy, while the rest have been granted to third-sector associations to be assigned or 
put out to tender by the Cariplo Foundation. The average monthly rent of a 70 m2 
apartment is around 450 €. Eligible applications (by persons with an annual income 
of less than 40,000 €, but 2.5–3 times higher than the annual rent) are almost three 
times greater than the supply. A protest by housing activists was staged on the oc-
casion of the inauguration of the new buildings. Its purpose was to fight evictions 
and propose self-building and self-renovation practices instead of expensive social 
housing projects (national newspaper La Repubblica, local pages, November 2013).
The most positive aspects of this scheme (that need to be developed further for 
definitive conclusions to be drawn in terms of sustainability) have been the align-
ment of the FHS’s policies with public ones, the enactment of public–private part-
nerships and resource pooling, the development of new models of social housing 
oriented to high building standards and focused social mix criteria (which is pos-
sible because of the derogation of allocation criteria for public dwellings), and, 
above all, the scaling up of the first ethical fund, which now is much wider and 
richer, and the inspiration for other contexts and groups of actors around Italy. But 
the case of the FHS should be read considering that it is backed by a very large and 
rich institution. Fondazione Cariplo is one of the biggest foundations in the world. 
In all its key initiatives, the FHS has been able to rely on Cariplo’s resources, both 
financial and more intangible. Moreover, the FHS has been able to use some of the 
last empty plots to develop its projects thanks to conventions with the municipality 
of Milan. Social housing initiatives generally require complex management and 
the participation of different actors if they are to be attractive and compatible with 
private and public aims at the same time.
Some observers maintain that the FHS and the FIL are using their resources very 
slowly and that they are not risking enough to produce affordable dwellings. More-
over, they are using (like other operators) public resources (mostly public land) to 
produce too small amounts of housing to rent. Some criticisms are stronger, in the 
sense that they accuse subjects like the FHS of draining extremely scarce public 
resources from the most needy and deprived in the housing market (Sabatinelli and 
9 All of them aim to develop communities of residents that organize themselves to manage their 
spaces and common life.
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Costa 2013). Whatever the case, it can be stated that this experience has numerous 
shortcomings. Firstly, on the public land granted by the municipality (land that is 
extremely scarce in the city) very few affordable dwellings have been provided, es-
pecially if one considers the housing emergency in Milan. Secondly, this innovation 
is especially oriented to test social, functional, and tenure mix, while the housing 
emergency especially affects very-low-income citizens, who crowd the long wait-
ing list to access the municipal housing stock.
After 3 years of the new municipal government, however, it is not possible to find 
other significant social innovation schemes in this strategic policy area. Numerous 
rhetorical discourses on the capacity of housing sociale to deal with housing needs 
have presented private actors and mixed ones (like the ethical funds) as a panacea 
for the city’s housing problems. In fact, local difficulties are also represented by the 
resignation of the deputy mayor for housing policy in 2013 (who now represents 
the centre-left alliance in the regional council, governed by the centre-right), who 
tried, while in the municipality, to work on some important issues: among them, a 
new governance system for the municipal housing sector (with more responsibility 
for management of the stock given to the municipal government); the correct allo-
cation of many vacant public dwellings; and experimental regulation of the private 
rental market. Instead, the main expectations for the future are now placed in the 
new Piano di Governo del Territorio (the urban planning instrument adopted in 
Lombardy cities), which imposes a very modest share of affordable housing units 
for new housing projects. However, it is quite probable that, owing to the critical 
situation of the construction sector in the city, few social housing units will be pro-
vided in the coming years.
To sum up, while a social innovation approach in housing policies is widely rec-
ognized in the case of the FHS by both the social innovators and the policy commu-
nity at the local and the national level, we would highlight some general conditions 
that make policy innovation especially difficult to implement and spread in Milan.
According to Moulaert et al. (2005), social innovation is driven by history and 
the social context. This is partly structural, partly institutional determination. In 
regard to the institutional dimension, Milan has a legacy of social pluralism and 
multiple power centres, which has always engaged the municipality in constant 
confrontation with an array of economic interests and social issues. This fragmenta-
tion has hampered the capacity of the local administration to affirm an integrative 
and inclusive vision connecting the multifaceted networks of actors in Milan. Some 
argue that this lack of strategic governance capacity and the traditional weakness 
of formal government are offset by innovative capacities in the economy and civil 
society (Bolocan Goldstein 2009).
On the other hand, the lack of strategic governance and a poorly developed “pub-
lic realm” within which the opportunities and challenges created by all these inven-
tive actions can be retained generates the continuing neglect of many social issues 
and the ignoring of major future problems. Furthermore, multiple innovation and 
bottom-up initiatives tend to compete and clash with each other (Healey 2007).
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7.4  Concluding Remarks: Local Development, Social 
Innovation, and Governance Alternatives
In this chapter, we have described the transition of the ongoing welfare policies 
governance system in Milan over recent decades. Milan as a case study yields un-
derstanding of the barriers that local governments, especially in the countries most 
affected by the recession, face in promoting a system of governance oriented to 
social innovation, and in which social policies (even if weak) are supposed to play 
an important role in promoting local development. After many years of profound 
changes, Milan has currently reached deadlock in terms of policy innovation. From 
the 1950s to the 1980s, the city was highly dynamic in terms of welfare provision, 
given that the municipal government was a central actor in designing and providing 
social services as tools for economic and social development. From the 1990s to 
2011, the municipal government instead played a weak role as director of a system 
of governance in which welfare was residual and was based on the involvement 
of non-profit and private organizations, but only as providers. During those two 
decades, the right-wing coalition governing Milan adopted a basically market-ori-
ented style of governance (Molotch and Vicari 2009). The period was dominated by 
the rhetoric that creation of a “good business climate” was an effective way to foster 
growth and innovation but also to eradicate poverty and to deliver, in the long run, 
higher standards of living to the mass of the population (Harvey 1989). However, 
those years were marked by a huge increase in the social inequalities characterizing 
the social structure of the city (D’Ovidio 2009).
In 2011, municipal elections rewarded a new coalition proposing a style of gov-
ernance more oriented to a “social innovation approach”. However, the difficult fi-
nancial situation inherited by the municipality from the past, and austerity measures 
imposed by the national government, have reduced the ambitions of the current mu-
nicipal government in regard to social policies. In this chapter, we have highlighted 
that values expressed in the welfare plan have not yet been translated into effective 
actions. According to this document, for example, welfare measures are important 
investments for local development “that the rhetoric of the economic crisis is not 
supposed to limit” (Municipality of Milan 2012, p. 5). However, the efforts to re-
spect the Stability Pact have greatly restricted welfare investments. Moreover, the 
municipal government has been pressurizing the national government to redesign 
the Stability Pact so that it was able to afford the public costs of the forthcoming 
International Expo 2015, while pressures to support welfare services have been 
weaker. Indeed, also the new municipal government regards this event as the main 
chance for the city’s future economic and social development. Within the dimen-
sions proposed by Cattacin and Zimmer in Chap. 2 of this volume, we can argue that 
Milan has been following a pattern of local development based on a concurrence 
of public investment in economic or social initiatives, while the rhetoric and values 
of the electoral campaign and the coalition programme have been more oriented to 
governance of social innovation.
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In fact, social innovation has to date been promoted mainly in some procedural 
aspects of governance (the large-scale participation in the definition of the welfare 
plan) and as regards certain social rights (the register to regulate de facto couples). 
Conversely, welfare provisions and services have not been innovated to a signifi-
cant extent.
The analysis of housing policies as a case study highlights this situation very 
well. This is a policy field crucial for Milan because affordability problems are 
among the most important factors affecting social inequality and social exclusion 
in the city. However, this issue has long been neglected, while the real estate mar-
ket has functioned as the driver of the city’s economic growth. At the same time, 
this is also a sector where some interesting innovations involving private and non-
profit actors, such as the FHS, were proposed by the previous administration. This 
is an interesting case of “process innovation” because it emphasises a different way 
to provide affordable housing through new financing instruments and more col-
laborative and participative management models. On the other hand, some argue 
(Moulaert et al. 2005) that, in the current phase of welfare state retrenchment, the 
“product” dimension (provision of public services and redistributive measures) is 
re-emerging as a major issue. The lack of a clear, comprehensive strategy by the 
public administration to solve the urgent problem of providing affordable housing 
for low-income groups tends to undermine the innovative capacity of such projects, 
which are not fully recognized by people and are often criticized for creating a mis-
match between the new supply (targeted on middle-income families and partly ori-
ented towards home ownership) and a growing social demand for affordable hous-
ing (largely unsatisfied for low-income groups). Moreover, the strategy’s potential 
for replicability and transfer is rather limited because of the unique conditions under 
which the projects described have been developed (above all, the financial role of 
the Cariplo Foundation, which guarantees against all potential risks and critical 
events). Furthermore, from the recent enforcement of laws and regulations at the 
central level (Legislative Decree 112/2008), a clear definition of what housing for 
the most vulnerable groups should be remains highly undetermined (social hous-
ing, subsidized housing or the Italian expressions “housing sociale” and Edilizia 
Residenziale Sociale designate with different emphases a way to provide affordable 
housing solutions to low-income households). Nor has the municipality of Milan 
spelled out a clear strategy to remedy this vacuum: a strategy to tackle inequalities 
and promote social inclusion at the local level risks being missed.
To sum up, Milan’s situation describes a case of urban governance where no 
clear priorities are stated in terms of the city’s social and economic development. 
Social innovation in Milan can be viewed as an array of largely disconnected and 
fragmented activities and projects. As far as housing policy is concerned, emerging 
innovative approaches (such as those described above) suffer from a lack of inte-
gration within common frames of reference, values, and orientations, which would 
make priority setting more objective, systematic, and transparent and impacts more 
clearly measurable. The city, pressured by the crisis and the austerity measures until 
the beginning of Expo 2015, has had little room for manoeuvre in defining a new 
municipal agenda that can significantly make the difference in comparison with the 
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previous administration. In fact, the local government and other important actors 
in the city’s governance system (such as third-sector agencies involved in social 
policies and entrepreneurs) have been heavily concentrated on the very difficult 
preparations for this international event (Costa 2014). Within this context, the de-
sired transition to a style of government more open to social innovation and social 
justice has been “postponed”, being affected by strong path dependency. Only after 
the end of Expo 2015, it will be possible to assess if the city will be able to recover 
the beneficial effects of a season of local mobilization in favour of a more inclusive 
approach to social innovation. Some recent programs launched by the Social Policy 
Department and the Department for Innovation and Labour Market Policies seem to 
be oriented towards this direction.
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Chapter 8
Poor but Sexy? Berlin as a Context for Social 
Innovation
Benjamin Ewert
8.1  Introduction
Since Germany’s reunification, Berlin has benefitted much from the myth of being 
“poor but sexy” (Mayor Wowereit in Frey 2003). The popular slogan, referring to 
the coexistence of deprivation and creativity in the city, was a good expression of 
the Berlin zeitgeist. Representing a kind of social compromise, Berlin promised “a 
good life for little money” for everyone, not at least because of low rents.
Hence, for many years, Berlin provided a favourable context for social innova-
tion. From the 1960s onwards, the former “front city” had been an eldorado for 
agents of change—bohemians, alternative and creative people—who came to West 
Berlin to pursue unconventional solutions to everyday problems. For instance, new 
forms of parent-run childcare stem from that time, as do participatory schemes for 
housing and urban renewal. However, those attempts at “making a difference” took 
place against a backdrop of huge state subsidies and redistributive welfare policies 
that provided leeway for “social experimentalism”. Today’s social innovations in 
Berlin are still shaped by this “cultural heritage”, which has contributed much to 
the city’s self-promotion as “poor but sexy”. However, as it is the main argument of 
this chapter, Berlin’s innovative capital may dry up in the near future due to the re-
emergence of social challenges that tend to eclipse the rewards and improvements 
emanating from social innovation. Because Berlin is no longer an “island” but a 
part of international relations under the rising pressure of global investment and 
capitalist dynamics, traditional social problems are back: a sharper divide between 
rich and poor people, insecurity and gentrification. As a result, the space for many 
citizens that could afford to live in Berlin on a low income is increasingly being 
squeezed. For them, the “new” Berlin entails no promises in terms of wages, per-
sonal development and social security.
© The Author(s) 2016
T. Brandsen et al. (eds.), Social Innovations in the Urban Context, 
Nonprofit and Civil Society Studies, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21551-8_8
144 B. Ewert
This chapter deals with Berlin’s changing context factors to foster social in-
novation. In this respect, two major developments are crucial: On the one hand, 
state welfare policies have become much “leaner”, i.e. efficiency oriented and risk 
averse, conceiving every investment as something that has to “pay off” in the future. 
On the other hand, the scope of markets has colonized many life worlds and settings 
(making Berlin to a “catwalk” for flashy lifestyles and tastes) that once provided 
the “creative class” (Florida 2009) with shelter and inspiration. Welfare innovations 
for social cohesion eke out a niche existence, struggling continuously for resources 
and public attention. In short, it remains to be seen whether welfare politics and 
social innovators will find new interplays for remaking social policies innovative 
and powerful, or whether social innovations and their support will become limited 
to subsidizing rescue and emergency programmes.
This chapter is divided into four parts. Part one (Sect. 8.2) focuses on theoretical 
strands that have to be addressed in order to make a context-centred perspective 
valuable in the analysis of social innovation. Part two (Sect. 8.3) deals with Berlin 
and city policies as a specific context for social innovation. Part three (Sect. 8.4) of 
the chapter sheds light on the general shift in Berlin from a traditional social policy 
to a policy of modernization that allows limited space and resources for social in-
novation. Part four (Sect. 8.5) relates the theoretical insights concerning context 
factors to the empirical findings.
8.2  What Makes a Context-Centred Perspective Valuable?
Setting aside all their differences, major theoretical concepts in policy analysis (Ma-
jone 1997; Sabatier 1998) share one basic assumption: Ideas, orientations and values 
in politics and policies matter a great deal. They make a decisive difference when 
it comes to a context-centred perspective (see for an overview Pollitt 2013) that 
sheds light on the ways in which local welfare systems and political administrative 
systems (PAS) cope with cultural, social and economic challenges that co-shape the 
urban context. For instance, most of the innovative approaches, studied in Berlin, 
are kind of knot-points, where needs, ideas and aspirations assume concrete organ-
isational forms that differ from the local mainstream of policies in place. Yet at the 
same time, they are interrelated with them, be it due to the fact that an innovation 
can also be part of a reform approach in the PAS, co-funded by it or simply linked 
to it through the criticism, suggestions and messages that come from the innovators.
In order to outline the orientations and values that are shaping the Berlin context 
and discussing these orientations in relation to innovative approaches in housing, 
childcare and family care and employment policies, three particular concerns guide 
the analysis:
• Plurality of discourses: To understand the interplay of politics and social innova-
tions, it is important to view them within the tension field formed by the juxtapo-
sition and rivalry of different discourses (see Schmidt 2010)—as, for example, 
one that is very much about classical welfare issues, another that is much more 
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managerial and still another where concerns of autonomy, participation and plu-
ralism prevail (Evers 2010). Berlin has always been characterized by competing 
concepts of “a better city” that were not exclusive but coexisted and stimulated 
each other. In other words, they all left their mark on the urban landscape. For 
instance, in the field of housing and urban revitalization a plurality of discourses 
has long meant that large-scale programmes, such as those to promote “careful 
urban renewal”, pursued by the city government were challenged (or even sub-
verted) by various citizen initiatives such as the squatter movement (Holm and 
Kuhn 2011). Similarly, alternative concepts for childcare (e.g. so-called Kinder-
laden pursuing an anti-authoritarian upbringing of children in West Berlin) and 
concerning working life (e.g. rejecting the use of “state dosh” for alternative 
projects in the field of social work) emerged from Berlin’s counterculture.
• The impact of history: Practices and values that guide action and politics have 
been very much affected by the historical developments and experiences that 
make up the “multi-layered historicity of the present” (Haggrén et al. 2013). 
A tableau of coexisting values and policy orientations and reasoning about its 
possible changes can only be created when one takes account of these histori-
cal underpinnings. Thus Berlin, and in particular its local welfare policies, can 
only be understood against the backdrop of the changing history of the city. For 
instance, average rents in Berlin are still relatively low compared to other ma-
jor German cities (e.g. Hamburg and Munich) because the housing supply was 
heavily subsidized by the federal state until the 2000s. Nevertheless, the steady 
rise of rents and its effect on the social mixture within inner-city districts has 
today become Berlin’s most controversial issue. Likewise, developments in the 
field of employment may be misinterpreted without a healthy dose of historical 
evidence: While some regions in southern Germany (e.g. in some regions in 
Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg) are heading towards full employment, un-
employment in Berlin is still in the double-digit range. One reason for this is the 
inherited structural weakness of the local economy that is service based but lacks 
jobs in traditional industries (Allon 2013, p. 289). With regard to childcare and 
family care, Berlin remains a divided city (despite a process of gradual conver-
gence) due to different policy legacies: In East Berlin (where childcare policies 
were characterized by a “work-centred approach” during German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) times), childcare coverage (and supply) for children aged 0–3 is 
significantly higher than in West Berlin, where traditionally there was part-time 
care for children aged 3–6 in kindergartens.
• Differences between policy fields: It is not only the difference between old and 
new, and left and right orientations that can be observed but also the specific-
ity of discursive constellations in policy fields constituted by “‘horizontal’ and 
‘vertical’ components” (Kendall 2003, p. 7), i.e. local and federal competences 
to change politics. While there may often be a kind of overarching narrative, 
shaped by national politics and dominating local coalitions, due to a number 
of factors, situations in policy fields may vary quite considerably. Moreover, 
innovative ideas, while backed by the community of experts in a policy field, 
may often be restricted by the locally prevailing general discourse or vice versa. 
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For instance, the impact of a pronounced productivist discourse in the field of 
childcare emanating from the federal level implies fewer limits for innovative 
concepts at the local level compared to labour market politics where federal 
guidelines are much more rigid. Hence, local innovations in child and family 
policies such as family centres are promoted and supported by authorities be-
cause there is an overall agreement that “their time has come”. On the other 
hand, Berlin’s few innovative projects in the field of employment—in terms of 
style, approaches pursued and the addressing of users—have to be seen in sharp 
contrast to official, employability-guided policies.
The line of argument in this chapter takes place against the backdrop of this theo-
retical framework. If appropriate, references to single concerns will be made. More-
over, due to significant differences within policy fields, the empirical section of the 
chapter is structured by them (see Sect. 8.3).
8.3  Context Factors in Berlin
To analyse the interplay between welfare politics and social innovation in Berlin, a 
profound understanding of the local context is needed. Three factors, briefly intro-
duced below, are crucial in this respect: the city’s creative and innovation-friendly 
citizenry, the socio-spatial concept of the “Berlin mixture” and legacies of social 
policy. Despite significant differences within policy fields (e.g. due to federal leg-
islation), these factors make up the sociocultural framework, including dominating 
attitudes and mentalities through which social innovation has appeared in Berlin.
Creative Citizens
Historically, Berlin’s sociocultural attraction has been boosted by its special posi-
tion during the era of division between East and West, its role in the times of the 
new social and cultural movements of the sixties and seventies and the dynamic 
that was set free in the aftermath of Germany’s reunification (Häußermann and 
Kapphan 2009). All three phases swept large numbers of people, literally speak-
ing “change agents”, into the city who sustainably co-designed Berlin as a place 
for unconventional lifestyles and creative solutions for everyday challenges. The 
former West Berlin, in particular the district of Kreuzberg (Kil and Silver 2006), 
played host to the students’ revolution and the new ecological, feminist and anti-
authoritarian movements and their counterculture, becoming the ultimate vanishing 
point for dropouts, nonconformists and “artists of life” who built up a collective al-
ternative model to West German mainstream culture by pursuing innovative social 
practices such as living in autonomous communities, working in cooperatives or 
establishing anti-authoritarian forms of childcare. At each turn and under changing 
conditions, the aspirations behind social and cultural innovations changed in colour 
and composition. Since the 2000s, city marketers have promoted Berlin actively as 
a “metropolis of creativity” (Schmidt 2014) that seeks to give culturepreneurs “a 
stage set for their activities” (Colomb and Kalandides 2010, p. 185).
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“Berlin Mixture”
It is an open secret that “Berlin has always hosted poverty better than other Eu-
ropean capitals” (Slobodian and Sterling 2013, p. 2). But what is this judgement 
based on? Against the backdrop of lower industrial development, a distinctive ter-
ritorial and social mix characterizes Berlin where rich and poor people live loosely 
together. On the one hand, this mix refers to the sound balance of inhabitants in 
Berlin’s numerous Kieze, a local synonym for integrated urban neighbourhoods. On 
the other hand, the term refers to a specific local settlement structure, supported by 
authorities, that allows the juxtaposition of housing facilities and local businesses. 
A combination of both aspects, a mixed structure of residents and settlements in the 
neighbourhoods, became known by the term “Berlin mixture” during the years of 
rapid industrial expansion in Germany in the middle of the nineteenth century and 
remains to this day.
Social Policy Legacies
Local authority policies had a huge impact on Berlin’s urban and social develop-
ment. Largely in the hands of social democrats (who have taken part in every ad-
ministration since 1945 bar one), public servants have worked under the banner of 
“equality” and “social protection”. However, Berlin’s special status also has had to 
take account of the fact that, although until the 1960s Berlin was an example for 
classical, post-war welfare policies, West Berlin became “the front of the Cold War” 
after the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and was, therefore, heavily subsidized 
by the federal government in order to compensate for the city’s weak economic situ-
ation and to remain competitive with East Berlin and the GDR. Traditionally, pub-
lic authorities have been inclined to pursue large-scale development programmes 
known as “careful urban renewal” (1979–1987), “urban renewal areas” (since 
1994) or “urban redevelopment scheme East and West” (since 2002).
In a nutshell, the lesson emanating from these contextual factors, especially in 
terms of their impact on innovations, can be summed up like this: Berlin had over 
the years been home to a juxtaposition of traditional local welfare politics and val-
ues with a strong sense of innovation and innovators focusing on values that were 
more to do with personalising welfare systems and opening them up to new life-
styles and aspirations. During the long period before reunification, the city was 
subject to limited growth pressure and served as “a window of the West”, supported 
by considerable welfare subsidies, all of which made Berlin an affordable and rather 
secure place for both the large array of lower-income groups—“the scenic poor and 
the clever unemployed who make the city so attractive” (Slobodian and Sterling 
2013, p. 2)—and those groups that formed part of new social and cultural move-
ments and searched for new forms of quality of life with different ideas about risks 
and chances. Now, under the rising pressure of international investment, capitalist 
dynamics are back and along with them greater inequalities, insecurity and gentri-
fication. Classical social problems are now setting in. In times of financial crisis, 
the city government cannot mitigate these problems using the traditional means of 
social and urban policies. This represents a clear danger to the space and support 
enjoyed by innovators who sought to create a better quality of life and refine social 
support systems bottom-up.
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8.4  Insights from Three Local Contexts of Social Policy
What do these context factors mean for social policy in practice? What impact do 
historical developments and legacies have on today’s structuring and design of dif-
ferent policy fields? Empirically, with a particular eye on social innovation and 
social cohesion, three areas were crucial for our research: housing and urban de-
velopment, labour market policies and childcare and family care. With respect to 
the overall orientations and values that guide local politics in Berlin, the debates 
around issues of housing and urban development currently have the strongest link 
with the dominant political and public controversy around Berlin’s development 
and the blend and balance of values that guide it. This section has therefore been 
placed first. After that, the sections that follow describe the situation in policy fields 
such as childcare and family care and labour market policies. Each section includes 
a separate subsection on “Spaces for Innovations”, making references to routine-
breaking initiatives and projects within the respective policy field.
In methodological terms, this chapter is based on 18 interviews with civil ser-
vants, policy makers and representatives from third-sector organizations and in-
novative projects in the district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, which represents a 
kind of showcase for developments in Berlin as a whole. Additionally, a document 
analysis of local newspaper articles, party programs and city council minutes was 
carried out. Moreover, we draw on a transcript of a grassroots meeting organized in 
February 2013, documenting a lively debate between the experts mentioned above.
8.4.1  The Context of Housing and Urban Planning
Berlin is constantly growing. According to estimates, the city’s population (3.53 mil-
lion in 2013) will increase by about 7.2 % (250,000 people) by 2030. The rising 
population leads directly to the question of where newcomers should live in the 
future. Today, there is a shortfall of about 428,000 affordable homes for Berlin’s 
recipients of social assistance. While currently rents are rising everywhere in Ger-
many, the situation in Berlin, where average rents of 7 €/m2 are still much lower 
than in Munich (9.99 €/m2), Stuttgart (7.42 €/m2) or Cologne (7.36 €/m2), is critical 
because the city has been traditionally a “paradise for tenants”. No other major city 
in Germany has had such a generous amount of “cheap space” at its disposal—not 
only as a place for everyone to live but also as a place to realize new ideas of urban 
living through innovative projects. On the one hand, this kind of decadent charm 
and aura of decay made Berlin a “Mecca for the creative class” (Slobodian and 
Sterling 2013, p. 2). On the other hand, bohemians and hipsters—the harbingers of 
gentrification—were followed by “investors and real-estate interests” (Allon 2013, 
p. 299). Consequently, housing, ignored as a policy field for a decade, has moved 
to the top of the political agenda and with it a range of unresolved conflicts. The 
complexity of the issue concerns its interconnected dimensions of equality (housing 
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as a social right), social cohesion (which depends on mixed neighbourhoods) and 
general priorities of urban planning (based on citizens’ involvement or the prospect 
of profits).
Old and New Challenges in Urban Planning
In 2001, the Berlin Senate decided to downsize their social housing programmes 
to zero and embarked on a rigid austerity policy. Practically, the follow-up funding 
for social housing from the federal state of Berlin, substituting West Germany’s 
subsidies after 1989, was abolished and housing stocks were privatized en masse. 
From 1990 till 2010, the number of state-owned dwellings shrank dramatically from 
480,000 to 270,000 and with it the Berlin Senate’s impact on the local housing 
market (Holm 2011).
Officially, this critical juncture (the end of federal subsidies and privatization of 
dwellings) was legitimized by the view that “Berlin has no housing problem but a 
poverty problem”, as one interviewee put it. In 1999 the Berlin Senate reacted to 
early signs of urban decay and two-tier neighbourhoods by implementing “neigh-
bourhood management” (NM) areas, an approach to “soft urban renewal” and so-
cial cohesion belonging to the federal programme “social city”. In a sense, NM, 
rebuked by critics as a helpless attempt to compensate the previous social housing 
policy, ought to have been a remedy for the presumed losers from neoliberal urban 
development processes: the long-term unemployed, poor and/or poorly educated 
people, the elderly and migrants. By concentrating more on qualitative (e.g. social 
and economic conditions of neighbourhoods) than on quantitative problems (e.g. 
more social housing), NM has marked a paradigm shift in urban development poli-
cies (OECD 2003).
Nonetheless, in terms of traditional housing policies, the 2000s were, retrospec-
tively, almost “wasted years” during which cost containment outweighed any at-
tempts to regulate rents or expand the capacity of social housing. This had explo-
sive social consequences, for instance, the displacement of long-term residents from 
inner-city districts (a process that started in 2011), which have hit Berlin politics 
catching it quite unprepared. Suddenly, the official line of reasoning, downplay-
ing the existence of any problems by referring to the (relatively low) average level 
of rents and housing vacancies in outskirts of the city, conflicted harshly with the 
public perception: The loss of neighbours and friends forced to move into cheaper 
flats. In the face of these displacement processes, Mayor Wowereit’s motto “there is 
no right to live in the city centre” (quote from 2011) seemed rather cynical, and the 
need for a new, post-austerity housing policy was clear for all to see. But how was 
it possible to reinvent social housing in a city that was simply “broke” and that has 
only 270,000 flats (Holm 2011) at its disposal? This shifts the perspective to a more 
fundamental question: How should public space be handled?
Space for Innovations
While questions of city planning remain an issue for professionals, a more public 
and more general debate on a revised property policy for Berlin has recently started. 
Calls for a structural policy change, claiming a balanced set of criteria for the ten-
dering of urban property, which has been solely based on profit maximization in 
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the past, came from actors outside the established political arena. Ad hoc groups of 
tenants who risked losing their homes and a citizen initiative called “Rethinking the 
City” have evoked fresh discussion on the old question “who owns the city”. As a 
first success, Berlin’s senator of finance announced a pilot project, providing for the 
sale of up to 14 state-owned properties for a fair market value to non-profit housing 
companies. However, many more far-reaching goals, such as more participation 
by citizens in the development of public property and a moratorium on all current 
property sales, are requested by the initiative. “It’s impossible to change Berlin’s 
property policy all at once; we therefore need a moratorium that allows public rea-
soning”, says a speaker of the initiative.
The issue of ownerships concerns not only housing but also non-profit projects, 
promising “social dividends” instead of easy money, as in urban gardening. In this 
respect, Prinzessinnengärten in Kreuzberg are a glowing example of creative urban 
renewal. The project, which uses urban waste land on a temporary basis (meaning 
that the project may end abruptly if the city council decides to sell the area to an 
investor), has generated multidimensional returns for the district such as providing 
a green oasis, educating urbanites on the basics of gardening and bringing very 
different people together. “This is what it takes to maintain the Kiez”, states Rob-
ert Shaw, co-founder of the Prinzessinnengärten, who claims planning security for 
the project. Franz Schulz, district mayor of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (from 2006 
to 2013), supports the idea of changing public property policies. “Urban property 
has to be sold with regard to investors’ concepts for neighbourhood development 
and requires dialogue with the citizens concerned in advance”, says Schulz. The 
mayor refers to pioneering projects in his district such as the art and creative quarter 
Südliche Friedrichstadt. There tendering for vacant lots is based on the quality of 
the investors’ concept of urban renewal in the first place and is linked to a struc-
tured consultation procedure involving residents, applicants and decision makers. 
The actual amount of the respective bid plays a role as well but only accounts for 
40 % of the final decision. Obviously, such innovative procedures of participatory 
tendering cannot stop large-scale gentrification processes; nevertheless, they have 
an immense symbolic value by setting a counterpoint to the ongoing reshaping of 
“previously marginal spaces like Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg” (Allon 2013, p. 299) 
into “centres of wealth generation, middle-class employment, and valuable real es-
tate” (Allon 2013).
Another attempt at more sustainable urban development in Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg tries to bridge concerns of saving space and diversifying the local econ-
omy. For instance, a so-called owner salon has been invented—a regular occasion 
where small-business owners in distinctive neighbourhoods gather informally un-
der the patronage of the unit for business promotion. The goal of such meetings is 
to sensitize owners, who normally have little “real” contact with the district and 
its residents, for social and economic concerns in the neighbourhood, in particular 
the loss of diversity in the local settlement structure (which characterized the “Ber-
lin mixture” in the past) due to the process of gentrification. “Nowadays, letting a 
building to rich tenants and investment firms is much more lucrative than letting 
it to local businesses”, states Martina Nowak, head of the district’s unit for busi-
ness promotion. Consequently, the district’s colourful collection of residents, retail 
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shops and service providers risks disappearing, which in turn may affect homeown-
ers’ long-term returns on investment. “Nobody, moves to Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg 
because of its uniformity; it’s the district’s vivid mixture that inspires newcomers”, 
adds Ms. Nowak whose unit is searching for empty plots and vacant premises that 
might be interesting for start-ups and creative businesses. Since the existing poten-
tial has been largely exhausted, local owners’ commitment to co-design the future 
of the district is of the utmost importance. In this respect, Planet Modular is a local 
role model: The alliance of small- and medium-size companies from the hobby and 
crafts sector has revitalized the local economy by building a huge “creative store” 
at the Moritzplatz in Kreuzberg. Furthermore, Planet Modulor is part of a creative 
network that aims to integrate economic, social and cultural projects into the urban 
environment.
8.4.2  The Context of Child and Family Policy
Essentially, the local public discourse on child and family policy in Berlin conforms 
to federal policy guidelines. Accordingly, an expansion of crèches and day-care 
places combined with family-minded approaches such as family centres are almost 
the only alternatives. Hence, local policies have been evaluated solely to the extent 
to which they conform to “good practice” as defined by newspapers and the parlia-
mentary public. Critique or genuine local debate—where contradictory statements 
are reciprocally related to one another—do not exist; instead, local particularities 
(or “obstacles” to achieving the policy goals mentioned) are reported from time to 
time. In this respect, three facts make Berlin distinctive: First, Berlin is the “city 
of babies” with the highest birth rate of any German metropolis. Among Berlin’s 
districts, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg’s baby boom is the biggest (with 11.9 births per 
1000 inhabitants). Second, one third of all families in Berlin are “one-parent fami-
lies” which in almost all cases are socio-economically deprived. Third, about one 
fifth of families are considered as “less educated” and, as such, reliant on support 
measures. As a result, questions of sufficient provision and (equal) access to child-
care facilities make up the local contribution to the general German debate on child 
and family policy. Key values and recurrent issues in this context, expressed by 
interviewees and in official statements by stakeholders, are “equal opportunities”, 
“choice”, “early childhood education” and “more flexible time schedules and regu-
lations” at childcare facilities.
At first glance, the situation concerning childcare arrangements in Berlin seems 
much better than elsewhere in Germany. The city charges minimal fees for childcare 
places. Moreover, the percentage of children being cared for in a kindergarten or 
crèche in Berlin is very high: 94 % among children aged 3–6, 77 % among 2-year-
olds and 49 % among 1-year-olds. Thus Berlin is a national pioneer with regard to 
children aged 0–3 visiting a crèche. However, local problems concern the distribu-
tion of childcare places available, flexible caring arrangements and low-threshold 
support for families under stress. With a special view on Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, 
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it is clear that district authorities pursue strong “family-oriented” policies. The di-
versity of local needs is regularly assessed through a very detailed analysis. For 
instance, the child and youth welfare office has built up a standing working group 
called “baby boom”, after miscalculating the demand for kindergartens in the early 
2000s, in order to react to the district’s increasing birth rates. In addition, the district 
is a pioneer within Berlin because it pursues integrated concepts such as family 
centres conceptualized according to the “early excellence approach” and involving 
parents closely (see e.g. Lewis 2011). However, there is a lack of supply with regard 
to crèches, kindergartens and family centres equally. “Currently, we are unable to 
satisfy families’ demand for services”, admits Thomas Harkenthal, head of the local 
child and youth welfare office. The department projects a shortfall of about 1600 
childcare places until 2015. In practice, this scarcity undermines the claim for equal 
opportunities among all children—a key value of the local authority. Some local 
childcare providers take advantage of the imbalance between demand and supply 
by charging parents just to put them on the waiting list for a place at their facility 
or demanding admission fees of up to 500 €. Others collect fees, up to 300 € per 
month, for “additional services” such as early language support, music or sport les-
sons. Although this de facto practice of social selection violates public law, anxious 
parents tend to be willing to pay extra charges.
Space for Innovations
Overall, there is strong local coalition between public servants and civil society 
actors in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg to invent and pursue more complex and innova-
tive approaches in childcare policies. Three examples of social innovation should 
be mentioned. First, family centres, recognized as very effective facilities for chil-
dren and parents in the neighbourhood, are innovative institutions in the context of 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. Nonetheless, family centres are still widely perceived 
by authorities as add-on arrangements rather than as regular service providers. In 
order to consolidate their position, family centres’ services—for instance additional 
educational services for children or occasions for informal meetings for parents—
require continuous financing (currently centres are run on 1-year-contracts) from 
the Berlin Senate. Second, the neighbourhood mothers project—migrants as men-
tors, bridging the gap between troubled (migrant) families and the requirements of 
public life—is a flagship project in the district, managed by the Diakonie, a welfare 
association. The work of the neighbourhood mothers project—despite being under-
funded and time-limited—is especially welcomed as complementing support con-
cerning the integration of migrant families. Furthermore, district authorities have 
committed themselves to take on some neighbourhood mothers, completing a vo-
cational training as “social assistants”, after the project runs out. A third innovation 
deals with women, especially lone mothers. They are supported by Frieda, a local 
women’s centre. Like the neighbourhood mothers project, Frieda provides infor-
mal help based on the assumption that clients need more than a kindergarten place. 
Frieda not only advises lone mothers but provides several low-threshold services 
such as a café, regular breakfast meetings and excursions so that women who are 
often socially isolated can make new social contacts.
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As the interviewees representing the three innovations reported almost unani-
mously, cooperation with district authorities and councillors and, vice versa, with 
childcare and family care providers is marked by mutual understanding and very 
much focused on issues and problem-solving. For instance, heads of family centres 
and project leaders praise the district authorities for their support and local prag-
matism (e.g. when dealing with legal requirements) but accuse the senate (which 
decides the budget for Berlin’s family-minded policies) for its lack of action. Ac-
tually, the political clout of the local coalition for child and family issues at the 
district level remains rather weak. Both, project operators and district authorities 
are equally “supplicants” of the Senate that cannot do much except put forward ar-
guments for more financial support. On the other hand, their powerlessness in terms 
of budget planning reinforces the bonding effect among local actors, who perceive 
themselves equally as victims of the Senate’s austerity policy, which is regarded as 
family unfriendly.
8.4.3  The Context of Employment
Generally, the discourse on employment is, even more than the field of child and 
family policy, dominated by federal policies and decisions. The reasons for that are, 
on the one hand, the fact that the employment field is centrally regulated by the 
Federal Employment Agency (FEA) and its local branches and job centres and, on 
the other hand, the enormous impact of the Hartz reforms, which came into force 
in 2003. Especially, Hartz IV, a federal law that merged unemployment and social 
assistance and forces job seekers to accept any job that they are offered, represents 
a paradigm shift in the German labour market. As a result, almost any discourse on 
employment in Germany centres on the consequences of the Hartz reforms such as 
the implementation of activation schemes, the punishment of those who refuse to 
cooperate, the quality of labour and the special needs of children and youngsters 
with unemployed parents. Moreover, Hartz IV recipients face strict housing regula-
tions: For a single household, rent subsidies are capped to 415 € in Berlin. Given the 
overstretched housing market, this “frozen subsidy” banishes de facto the long-term 
unemployed from better neighbourhoods in the city centre.
Beyond these ongoing controversies, there is relatively little space for debate on 
the innovative features of the local labour market, and policy programmes that give 
employment issues a local flavour are few and far between. Browsing through Ber-
lin newspapers, one easily gets the impression that the city combines many negative 
aspects of the contested labour market reforms of 2003. The city is dubbed “capital 
of the long-term unemployed” or “capital of the poor and uneducated”, and this is 
(more or less) backed up by data: In 2011, 20.7 % of Berlin’s population received 
Hartz IV benefits. Particularly problematic was the situation for youngsters, who 
face a local unemployment rate of 13 % (twice as high as the German average) and 
children, since every third child lives on social transfer money. In addition, in 2012, 
126,000 employees depended on substituting social benefits despite having a job, 
indicating a massive extension of the low-pay sector during the last years.
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Space for Innovations
Visions outlined for the whole city, attempting to reposition Germany‘s capital as 
one of Europe’s truly global metropolitan areas, include for example a “new indus-
trialization of Berlin”, or the building of a “creative and sustainable city”, where 
good labour is equally shared between all inhabitants. Berlin’s creative economy 
also has its cultural roots in the new social movements that sprang up in the 1970s 
which promoted new forms of micro-solidarities and participatory concepts as an 
alternative to the much-criticized traditional forms of state-based solidarity (Evers 
2010, p. 52). In contrast to the initiatives for employment mentioned above, such 
a perspective focuses on new concepts of growth and economic development and 
only indirectly on the creation of jobs. Instead, discourses such as the “creative 
economy” aim to change the dynamic of doing business and business promotion in 
a post-industrial age. However, there is a significant gap, which has not yet been 
filled by the political concepts of urban and social change, between the vague, 
cultural ideas of Berlin’s future and the vast number of promising local projects 
(Schneekloth 2009). Boosting Berlin’s creative class—e.g. music and fashion la-
bels, clubs, ateliers but also IT start-ups and (social) media companies—has become 
a strategy within local economic policy since the 2000s. In the absence of strong 
traditional industrial sectors, local politics embrace “creativity” as a value and a 
vehicle for future economic growth. According to Senate authorities, Berlin’s rising 
“creative cluster”, which generates 16 % of the city’s overall economic output per 
year (25 billion €), employs about 200,000 people. In order to consolidate this posi-
tive trend, a steering group, initiated by the Senate, is developing integrated policy 
recommendations and providing an online portal where entrepreneurs and creative 
workers can network across sectors. In particular, entrepreneurs and creative start-
ups require infrastructural support, such as affordable office buildings that allow 
exchange between creative workers. Due to the enormous dynamism of the cre-
ative economy, leaving Berlin for another, more favourable, business location is 
a permanent option for start-up companies. The problem of the Senate’s current 
“cluster management” is its relative blindness to the local conditions for creative 
entrepreneurialism. A “creative urban wonderland”, as one interviewee remarked 
mockingly, needs more than an “ultimate master plan”; above all, a flourishing of 
creative business ideas needs local spaces for entrepreneurial leeway.
In conclusion one might say that the example of Berlin demonstrates that unem-
ployment as an issue can be tackled from a number of perspectives: as a side effect 
of low economic dynamism, as a structural problem with a long local history, as a 
challenge to create better transitions from schools and vocational trainings to the 
labour market and, finally, from the perspective of reintegrating people into the 
existing labour market (public and private). In Berlin, employment policy is very 
much focused on the employability-oriented job centre approach, while more com-
plex approaches that involve new concepts for growth and sustainable jobs have, so 
far, been secondary.
What are the main differences between local innovations—such as “job explor-
er”, a project in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg that matches local companies and pupils 
at an early stage—and mainstream employment policies? First, projects for labour 
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market integration operate at the district level and focus on the particularities of the 
local context, while the job centre pursues large-scale, standardized programmes. 
Second, local approaches deal with unemployed people in groups, acknowledging 
that they are part of a local community, while mainstream policies address jobseek-
ers as individuals whose social relationships are rather irrelevant. Third, complex 
approaches offer tailor-made and personalized support packages, while the portfo-
lio of the job centre is limited to managerialist and impersonal devices. To sum up, 
the key difference concerns the overall perspective of the employment policy: Does 
it combine aspects of social and labour market integration or is it reduced to the 
principle of employability?
8.5  Summary and Conclusions
Mayor Wowereit’s dictum of 2003 that Berlin is “poor but sexy” seems outdated 
and appears rather shallow today. Instead, one may conclude without cynicism that 
“Berlin has embraced an economic model that makes poverty pay” (Slobodian and 
Sterling 2013, p. 2) by attracting creative people and tourists in large numbers. 
At the same time, Berlin is well on its way to dry out the breeding grounds for its 
“sexiness”, perceived as the city’s constant capacity to invent alternative lifestyles 
and unconventional solutions to daily-life challenges. However, Berlin’s unspoken 
promise to its citizens that a decent but also exciting life remains possible despite a 
lower income and a marginal social status was validated only for a finite period of 
history. In this respect, the impact of history cannot be overstated: The city’s attrac-
tiveness rested much on its previous status as an “island of bliss” where real-world 
hardships were at least partly suspended and where people’s self-realization was 
supported through low rents and generous social benefits. In the aftermath of Ger-
many’s reunification, Berlin’s social appeal increased temporarily due to the dou-
bling of space and, therewith, the emergence of additional niches for nonconformist 
ways of life and living. In addition, “constant change, experimentation, trend setting 
and creativity” (Colomb and Kalandides 2010, p. 184), which the city had produced 
before in abundance without making a fuss, became ennobled as “hallmarks of Ber-
lin” (Colomb and Kalandides 2010). Retrospectively, it is difficult to identify at 
which point exactly Berlin’s social beat got out of sync, though it must have been in 
the early 2000s when the city arrived on the brightly illuminated stage of the global-
ized world (Krätke 2001). From then on, the city’s rare gift for embracing pluralism 
and innovation was no longer protected by historical particularities and privileges 
but contested by, above all, the same capitalist dynamics that have been observed in 
other metropolis many times before (see for an overview: Kazepov 2005).
However, this climate of comprehensive change has affected each area of social 
policy differently due to powerful discourses that shaped previous policies, historic 
crossroads and field-specific regulations. What conclusions can be drawn for Berlin 
from the empirical evidence compiled in this chapter? Once more, the answers vary 
significantly in each policy field.
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Changes in the field of housing are the most severe and irreversible in the short 
term. The selling off of state-owned dwellings to private investors during the early 
2000s has reduced the Berlin Senate’s room for manoeuvre to reinvent a social 
housing policy drastically. What is more, city authorities have developed no new 
strategies for mitigating the problem of rising rents and scarce living space. Instead, 
they stick to rather “mechanical master plans” that are doomed to failure because of 
their inability to react to the diversity of the urban landscape. Innovative approaches 
do exist, such as the piecemeal restructuring of Berlin’s inner-city districts in order 
to use space resources more efficiently, but the Berlin Senate does not support them. 
Meanwhile, the crowding out of tenants in inner-city districts like Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg is intensifying.
Despite also being affected by austerity policies and rising demand, the situation 
is different in the field of childcare and family care. Berlin benefitted much from the 
political and cultural shift in this field, as shown in the expansion of crèches decreed 
by federal legislation and the increased international attention to discourses such as 
those on “early childhood education” (Moss 2008) and “family-minded policies” 
(Clarke and Hughes 2010). Moreover, existing innovative offers, such as family 
centres or neighbourhood mothers, enrich the local provision of services. However, 
what is still missing is a clear commitment, in terms of long-term financing, from 
the Berlin Senate to integrate such innovations in the regular local welfare system. 
In the face of rising social inequality and the creeping disintegration of the “Berlin 
mixture”, which guaranteed a certain level of social cohesion in the past, future 
investment in complementary and preventative childcare and family care services 
seems inevitable.
In Germany, the field of employment is regulated by the FEA in a highly top-
down manner. Consequently, attempts to implement labour market integration in a 
“different way” are hardly possible without support by and cooperation with FEA 
branches or job centres. However, just a few small-scale projects (e.g. “Neighbour-
hood Mothers” or “Job Explorer”) pursuing an innovative approach towards work 
integration have been devised by joint efforts. What is also missing is an integrated 
approach to deal with the growing urban underclass (e.g. uneducated migrants and 
youngsters, bohemians, single parents and long-term trainees). Current initiatives 
by the Berlin Senate are of little help for local jobseekers. Instead, ambitious at-
tempts to re-establish the city as a hub for services and the creative economy are 
attracting mobile and better-educated people in the first place. Once more, local 
projects are the most promising, such as those that stimulate entrepreneurialism (see 
e.g. “Kreuzberg acts”, Chap. 15 of this volume) and thereby help people to benefit 
from booming sectors such as the creative industry, healthcare or tourism.
Finally, the question remains whether Berlin remains to be a “daredevil social 
experiment” (Schmidt 2014) where social innovations of the future will be devel-
oped, tested and promoted. Much will depend on the city government’s capacity 
to forge a new framework of innovation politics that goes beyond opportunistic 
support and short-term subsidies for projects that are useful on a temporary basis. 
Such politics requires a risk-taking culture, financial support and, above all, an un-
derstanding that innovators need free space for experimentation—both physically 
and mentally.
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Chapter 9
Social Innovations as Messages: Democratic 
Experimentation in Local Welfare Systems
Adalbert Evers and Taco Brandsen
9.1  Social Innovations as Messages—an Approach and a 
Metaphor
The aim of this contribution is a twofold one. First of all, we want to present in a 
concise manner what kind of inspiration can be derived from the 77 local social in-
novations in the 20 cities that have been analysed in the welfare innovations at the 
local level in favour of cohesion (WILCO) project. What can be learned from them 
for the further development and restructuring of local welfare systems when deal-
ing with the challenge of strengthening social inclusion? Secondly, we want to shed 
light on the procedural aspect of innovation—how can civil society actors, policy-
makers and administrators make better use of such social innovations, or to put it 
in more analytical terms, how to understand better the interaction between given 
social and welfare systems and innovations? With respect to both of these issues, 
innovative contents of cases and problems of diffusion of innovation, we propose to 
use the “message” metaphor.
First, let us briefly describe the empirical and methodological basis of this chap-
ter. The introduction to this book already outlined roughly the concept of social 
innovation we worked with and the general method of analysis of the international 
research project. Therefore, we can restrict ourselves to point out the guiding orien-
tations for selecting innovations.
First of all, we selected only local innovations that were past inception stage. Ac-
cording to this criterion, every innovation selected for investigation has existed for 
at least 1 year (since March 2011). Thus, all social innovations we looked at were 
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about ideas or approaches that had already been implemented in practice to some 
degree. Each innovation selected by our teams entailed a practical project that had 
been realised. As it turned out, this project was either an organisation or an organisa-
tional subunit with new services that clearly differed from what existed so far in the 
field or a measure/intervention such as a new transfer, tax or resource arrangement. 
However, as the selected cases in this chapter show, local social innovations can 
also take other forms. Innovations always have a background of orientating streams 
of values and thinking as well as associated practices that back up and inspire them. 
A local network rather than a single organisational unit may represent innovations. 
Therefore, speaking about social innovations can refer to a large project, but also 
to a cluster of small, similar projects. In such case, the task was to describe the 
whole cluster and zoom in on one or two of the small cases, to get a sense of the 
micro-dynamics. In case the innovation was part of a government program meant to 
promote, finance and regulate an innovative approach, only those innovations from 
wider national programs that could be seen as “local”, in the sense that there was a 
considerable degree of freedom to shape them in the local context, were selected. It 
was a mandatory requirement of WILCO to feature between three and six innova-
tions in each city. The actual number of cases chosen in a city depended largely on 
the complexity of the respective cases.
Given the enormous diversity of social innovations, we suggested only three 
“analysis grids” for all teams to use when observing selected innovations. Hence, 
the selected case studies in this chapter have been organised along three basic 
themes: (a) conceptions and ways of addressing users, (b) internal organisation and 
modes of working, and (c) interaction with the local welfare system. Altogether, 
we tried to obtain both a very concrete and sensitive picture of the individual in-
novation and an intelligible way to draw “messages” that were interesting also for 
colleagues working on the issue in other countries and settings.
9.1.1  The Concept of Messages
What do we mean when we suggest understanding innovations as “messages”? First 
of all it means that beyond their immediate effect in the location where they take 
shape they may trigger similar actions elsewhere. In the field of welfare policies and 
services, which we studied, this may take the form of values and convictions that 
inspire them and which they want to promote, proposals they entail, and lessons to 
be learned. Obviously this calls for an analytical process of looking at the more gen-
eral meaning of innovative ways of coping with problems that have come up recur-
rently in different local settings and circumstances. In the first part of this chapter, 
we will therefore present our reading of the messages implied in the innovations 
under study. References will be made to five dimensions of these innovations that 
we found especially telling.
However, understanding social innovations as messages also means looking at 
innovations as processes of transmission between actor and local context. Such a 
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process can set a new practice into motion and address broader networks of civil 
society, political and administrative actors, possibly market actors as well. Are they 
willing to pay attention to such messages? What determines the different degrees of 
readiness among these actors to take up messages? And moreover, what influences 
the capabilities to “read” and the ways of interpreting them? All this may concern 
innovations and innovators themselves, the degree to which they actively care for 
broadening their action and winning support, but it mainly concerns contexts and 
the ability of systems—here welfare systems—to adopt innovations. The second 
part of this chapter will reflect on these questions, focusing on the difference it 
makes once an innovation is non-market based and in its essence non-technical, 
such as social innovations, taking shape in local milieus and welfare systems.
Obviously the metaphor of “messages” may in many ways be insufficient and 
questionable. Studies of innovation usually prefer the “diffusion” metaphor, and 
we also use it in this contribution. It takes account of the fact that innovations are a 
kind of “message into the open”, without any specific or exclusive addressee. Many 
effects and messages of innovations are beyond the control of the innovators. How-
ever, speaking about “messages” has the advantage of including not only processes 
(of diffusion) but also issues related to content (new values, practices, policies). 
Furthermore, looking for “senders” and “receivers” allows us to study not merely 
systems and structures but also the actors who are responsible for dealing with a 
message, its contents and readings.
What are the main messages we found in the approaches and instruments used in 
local social innovations studied as part of the WILCO project? The first part of the 
chapter will deal with this question. What can be said about the processes of trans-
mitting, accepting, rejecting or reading such messages (what is mostly called the 
process of diffusion)?What are the challenges when it comes to linking social inno-
vations and social policies? This will be taken up in the second part of the chapter.
9.1.2  Recurring and Shared Features of Welfare Innovations—
Five Key Messages
When analysing the cases of innovation, our aim was to find out whether there are 
recurring features that give them a distinct profile. Altogether they represent forms 
of acting and thinking that can be defined first of all in negative terms—breaking 
up with the traditions both of what we call “industrial welfare” and the more recent 
wave of managerial and neo-liberal reforms.
However, as we will show, these innovations can also be defined in positive 
terms. Recurring features point to a certain style of doing things, a shared culture 
and perspective of thinking and acting across national borders that makes a dif-
ference to the past. It was a key task of our analysis to deal with the question what 
can be generalised from these innovations, their approaches and the tools and in-
struments developed by them—not only in the special local system within which 
an innovation was taking place but also at the level of an international debate on 
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local welfare systems, their institutions, rules, services, modes of governance and 
kinds of welfare mixes. Therefore we focused on commonalities and messages they 
entailed for the actors concerned, especially for policymakers, administrators and 
experts. Our findings (for a more detailed analysis of the findings presented in this 
paragraph see Evers et al. 2014 and Evers and Ewert 2015) have been ordered under 
five headings:
• Ways of addressing users
• Regulations and rights
• Governance
• Methods of working and financing
• Challenges to framing welfare systems
Table 9.1 shows in which areas the main emphasis of the respective 14 cases is to 
be found, but it notes as well one or two other fields where the basically polyvalent 
social innovations can be seen as illustrative.
The innovative approaches found in above fields obviously do not represent a 
kind of social or political programme. Rather, they are messages in terms of a loose 
assemblage of elements of a kind of “cultural turn” in dealing with issues of welfare 
and more specifically social inclusion. Different political actors and parties can take 
up concerns and aspirations of innovations and turn their contents and uses into 
different directions. Therefore the following points listed will attain more precise 
meaning over time, according to the way wider social and policy context integrate 
them into their discourses (Schmidt 2010). Linking social and economic concerns 
or striving for more flexibility and personalisation, for example, can take on quite 
Table 9.1  Five dimensions of local social innovation—the emphasis of the cases presented
New ways of 
addressing 
users
Innovations 
in regulations 
and rights
Innovations 
in governance
Innovative 
methods of 
working and 
financing
Challenging 
the local wel-
fare system
Warsaw XX X
Zagreb XX X
Amsterdam X XX
Lille X XX
Pamplona X XX X
Berlin X X XX
Milan X XX X
Stockholm XX X X
Nijmegen X XX X
Birmingham(1) XX X
Birmingham(2) X X XX
Münster X X X XX
Barcelona X XX X
Bern XX
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different meanings. We will take up the importance of (discursive) contexts and the 
different faces of “mainstreaming” innovations in the second part of this chapter.
Message One—About New Ways of Addressing Users
The majority of social innovations chosen for inclusion in the study were service in-
novations. Since services are generally organised along less-closed and standardised 
lines than income transfer (for example, in pensions systems), it is little wonder that 
they provide more fertile ground for small-scale innovations.
The overall message of finding new ways of addressing users shows itself pri-
marily in the search for new service relationships that reduce the dependency of us-
ers and strengthen their capabilities by opening up new opportunities or enhancing 
their skills. The theoretical debates on co-production (Verschuere et al. 2012) find 
a good illustrative counterpart in many of the case studies presented in this chapter. 
The orientation towards users and citizens featured in these cases implies a desire to 
avoid stigmatisation. Most of the occupational and social integration programmes 
provided as part of workfare policies (Handler 2004) employ strict targeting that 
clearly indicates who is “in” and who is “out”, along with detailed rules and require-
ments governing the process of admission and integration. For instance, being en-
titled or forced to take part in a special programme for the long-term unemployed is 
linked with various forms of categorisation, classification and control. By contrast, 
many of the innovations addressing issues such as occupational and social integra-
tion take a more loose and open approach that does not impose admission require-
ments on (potential) users and does not prescribe in detail how reintegration should 
proceed and which stages it should include.
While public administration and welfare bureaucracies are separating between 
different tasks, needs and groups, it has become increasingly difficult to adequately 
meet the complex and often unique needs of customers in a highly segmented sys-
tem. Bundling existing support measures tends to be complicated and discourag-
ing. However, among the selection of innovations studied, there were a number of 
organisations that developed personalised support packages that allow access to 
otherwise separate forms of support.
Cultural and ethnic diversity and the problems of poverty and social exclusion 
have increased in the age of large-scale migration, unemployment and growing in-
equality. This makes it increasingly difficult for services and professionals to reach 
groups that need their help most, often because the services offered are simply not 
known, are too difficult to understand or are not taken up due to a lack of trust. 
Finding innovative ways of bridging the gap between professional services and real 
people’s lives has been a recurrent challenge met by innovations we studied.
The various features of a different approach to users just mentioned is nicely 
illustrated in one of the case studies in this chapter about an innovative network pro-
viding new forms of support for children and single mothers, often vulnerable and 
living under stressful socioeconomic conditions. It was set up by a Swedish associa-
tion operating mainly in the Stockholm area (see: Nordfeldt et al. in this chapter). 
The services that address children encourage group formation and shared activities 
while simultaneously organising individualised support in the form of fairs where 
mothers receive personal counselling by invited experts from different fields.
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Message Two—About Innovations in Regulations and Rights
These days, working and living patterns are changing and less continuous; zones 
of transition between life situations and life stages are becoming more complicated 
(Bovenberg 2008). Traditional services cannot always cope with these complexi-
ties. This may mean being out of school but not yet in a job, on the track back to 
employment but without access to a place to live. Often this coincides with other 
acute problems that may require immediate help. What some have called “new so-
cial risks” (Bonoli 2005) cannot be dealt with using the manual of standard risks. 
Innovative ways of offering a quick fix, often provisionally, may well be the critical 
missing link when it comes to providing living and working arrangements that keep 
people “in the game”. Quite a number of social innovations studied in the WILCO 
project involve establishing flexible forms of ad hoc support that meet newly emerg-
ing risks short-term. One telling example is the Welfare Foundation Ambrosiano in 
Milan, Italy (see Sabatinelli and Costa in this chapter), that supported individuals 
and families who were temporarily in need for various reasons (redundancy, illness 
and so on) through quick micro-credits, regardless of their previous or current type 
of employment contract and country of origin.
Traditionally, most public welfare services have the status of rights that are un-
conditional, insofar as they simply require a set of material preconditions to be ful-
filled. A new tendency in welfare arrangements (see Evers and Guillemard 2013), 
particularly in the field of “workfare”, is for clients to enter a form of contractual 
relationship in which the preconditions for support concern their future behaviour. 
This requires clients to take exclusive responsibility for themselves. Among the set 
of innovations studied, there were also other types of moves from rights to con-
tracts, defining the notion of “giving something back for what one gets from soci-
ety” more broadly. People received access to goods and services once they commit-
ted to doing something for others in the form of volunteer work or providing clearly 
defined personal support for vulnerable people in the community. One example of 
this is Time for a Roof, an intergenerational home-sharing service in Nantes, France 
(see Coqblin and Fraisse 2014 in: Evers a. o. 93). It offered cheap accommodation 
to students who entered into an intergenerational cohabitation arrangement.
Message Three—About Innovations in Governance
The social innovations under study all represented a combination of new social 
“products” and new social “processes”, the latter term referring to the internal or-
ganisation of decision-making and interaction with the environment, the public, 
various stakeholders, social partners and political and administrative authorities. 
Many social innovations that seek to develop new kinds of services also have a gov-
ernance dimension. However, for some innovations, influencing and changing the 
system of governance was their main goal (see Moore and Hartley 2009; Lévesque 
2013). This is the case, for instance, in the Citizen’s Agreement for an inclusive Bar-
celona. More than 500 participating entities in spheres such as the economy, culture, 
education, health and housing worked on a new participative governance structure 
(see Montagut et al. in this book). Likewise in Bern (see Felder in this chapter) 
where new integration guidelines that became mandatory for public stakeholders 
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were developed through a cooperative process in a working group of administrators, 
experts and representatives of local NGOs.
Traditional service organisations and systems tend to focus almost exclusively 
on their respective special tasks, effectively functioning in silos (Boyle et al. 2010). 
Social innovations, by contrast, are characterised by bringing together what is sepa-
rate—ideas, concerns or practices—fostering units and types of organisations that 
operate in a more embedded and networked way. A good example are the Neigh-
bourhood Stores for Education, Research and Talent Development (BOOT) in Am-
sterdam (see Broersma et al. in this chapter), where teachers and students from uni-
versities cooperated with activists in a community development programme linking 
governmental, not-for-profit and business organisations.
Innovation also means addressing issues, concerns and related forms of self-
organisation in a way that is more in tune with changing challenges and pressures. 
When it comes to women’s concerns, networks such as the MaMa Foundation in 
Warsaw (see Siemieńska et al. in this chapter) or the association Parents in Action 
(RODA; see Bezovan et al. in this chapter) overcame the traditionally restricted 
focus on achieving the same role as men in a labour market designed for men. 
They gave certain groups a voice in the public domain, highlighting new concerns 
that were previously seen simply as private issues, exposing local systems that un-
der both socialist and post-socialist regimes displayed little interest in the manifold 
challenges of care. In doing so, these initiatives raised awareness of new ways of 
working and family life and brought them onto the public policy agenda. These and 
other innovative projects were eager to discover new ways of organising debates, 
deliberation processes and types of publicity, in order to set agendas and establish a 
new consensus on priorities.
Building issue-based coalitions and partnerships can be seen as denser forms of 
networking, often concerned with raising awareness of a particular issue. Establish-
ing these kinds of partnerships, which are both unified and plural, is an important 
and innovative aspect of policymaking and fostering participation in governance. 
In addition to examples from urban housing and neighbourhood regeneration, the 
already mentioned Foundation Ambrosiano in Milan in this chapter provides a good 
example of bringing together stakeholders from diverse social and political arenas: 
the municipality, the province, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the 
three main trade unions, binding them into a pluralistic yet coherent alliance.
Message Four—About Innovative Methods of Working and Financing
When innovation means dealing differently with a given challenge or pressure, this 
often involves ways of accepting and living with worsening material conditions. 
Innovative projects and organisations with precarious funding are affected all the 
more by trends to be observed in todays’ labour markets: limited contracts that 
offer no security. Of course one could speculate that this is partly compensated 
by an atmosphere of creativity and cooperation, more positive stress than the one 
produced by hierarchies. Trust-based relationships may allow many of the various 
contributors to participate for a while and accept short-term contracts, secure in 
the knowledge that a new contract is possible once circumstances allow. Still, trust 
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building, cooperation and unwritten rules of respect can hardly be regarded as a 
reliable antidote to missing job security.
Furthermore, models for taking part in social innovation projects are typically 
much more diverse than in the public or business sector since they include not only 
various forms of (casually) paid employment but also many forms of voluntary and 
civic contributions. The latter range from short-term activism to regular long-term 
unpaid volunteering, from hands-on volunteer work to regular contributions in the 
form of civic engagement on a board of management. Hendrickson and Estany’s 
contribution on Neighbourhood Children Services in Pamplona in this chapter is 
an illustrative example. This innovation provides leisure activities for children and 
young people such as activity groups, playgrounds, summer camps and neighbour-
hood festivals. In the working structure, one can find volunteers and paid practi-
tioners from neighbourhood associations, cooperating with directors both of local 
social services and the associations themselves. For its network and activities, this 
combination of professional and lay contributions is indispensable.
People working in innovative projects must typically manage tasks that fall out-
side the limits of traditional professions and the divisions of labour that they imply 
(Brandsen and Honingh 2013). They might have to learn to converse with various 
kinds of users, clients, co-citizens and volunteers; sometimes they are specialists, 
entrepreneurs and managers simultaneously. Many of them need a combination of 
both technical and social knowledge. This kind of “re-professionalisation” process 
may, for example, involve collaborators who are architects by training but work si-
multaneously as community organisers and mediators. The social innovation based 
in a neighbourhood called Ilot Stephenson near Lille (see Fraisse in this chapter) 
features a group of architects supporting inhabitants in renovating their own houses 
under the slogan “Faire ensemble, le grand ensemble” (roughly translated: “work-
ing together to build the whole urban area”). This is a good example of a new kind 
of professionalism that combines previously fragmented knowledge.
Many, if not the majority of the social innovations we studied, are based on 
combining multiple sources of funding. The mix varies, and often state financing 
remains the most important component. But usually there is some degree of (finan-
cial) co-responsibility on the part of other organisations from civil society and/or 
the business sector. Furthermore, funding arrangements are usually precarious and 
limited in time. Examples of the possibilities and limitations of innovative projects 
that work with short-term funding, combining resources from different stakehold-
ers, can be found in many innovations presented in this book (see, for instance, the 
contribution on work corporations in Nijmegen and their resource mix).
Message Five—About the Need to Question How (Local) Welfare Systems are 
Framed
The WILCO project sought to examine the possible contributions of social innova-
tions to changes and developments in local welfare systems. It was understood that 
this label meant more than just local welfare-state institutions. Referring to a wel-
fare system usually means including—in addition to the local welfare state and mu-
nicipal welfare—welfare-related activities and responsibilities from the third sector, 
the market sector, communities and the family (Evers and Laville 2004).
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The cases of social innovations we examined demonstrate the mutual relation-
ships that exist between all four components of (local) welfare systems—(local) 
state, business, third sector and informal networks of community and family life. 
There was considerable variation in the level and impact of state funding and sup-
port for social innovations. The organisations involved often took on a hybrid char-
acter (see, e.g. Fledderus et al. in this chapter). Social innovations can therefore best 
be captured by concepts of welfare based on deliberate mixing and pluralism among 
actors, resources and responsibilities.
Innovation becomes difficult, if not impossible, wherever the right to act, organ-
ise or provide differently is denied. This can be the case in both large private-sector 
business organisations, which are managed centrally, and in certain market sectors 
that are controlled by private sector oligopolies. Hence, giving room for social in-
novations often implies aiming for more diversity and more localisation in welfare 
arrangements. What is more, supporting innovation means opting for arrangements 
that allow a new balance between guaranteed equal standards and diversity.
It is no coincidence that the social innovations considered in this chapter are 
largely located at the intersection of welfare and urban development. Traditionally, 
local and urban politics have been less prominent in the system of public policy-
making. This is likely to change, as Barber (2013) recently argued. Policy fields 
that are usually excluded from the welfare system, such as environmental policy or 
cultural activities, play an important role in socially innovative developments. As 
Brookes et al. show in this chapter, Birmingham operates with a locality approach 
to worklessness, where the packages of employment, skill-development and social 
integration measures are developed and tailored on “ward” levels (neighbourhoods 
of about 30.00 inhabitants), turning work integration programs into community-led, 
neighbourhood-specific approaches. The program “Kreuzberg acts” (see Ewert and 
Evers in this chapter) and the Ilot Stephenson project from Lille are also focusing 
on neighbourhoods, bringing together issues of individual consultancy and con-
cerns with community revitalisation by networking and trust building among local 
stakeholders.
All these examples illustrate another major aspect of many social innovations: 
the upgrading of the community component in mixed welfare systems and of the de-
velopment of innovative forms operating at the interface of public and community 
spheres, sharing responsibility between the two.
In contrast to most of the previous points, the integration of social and economic 
logics is much better established as a concern in debates on future welfare systems. 
The economisation of all spheres and an increasing focus on productivity are one 
side of the coin. On the other, there is the debate on the welfare state as a “social 
investment state” (Morel et al. 2012). This advocates modernising public welfare 
through an approach that stresses the positive economic effects of social policy in-
tervention in education, family support, and in occupational and social integration. 
In urban regeneration, social innovations seeking to combine the active participa-
tion of people as co-producers and co-decision-makers with public and private in-
vestment can be seen as part of this perspective on social investment as a means of 
societal development.
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Summing up, the local innovations we observed—besides specific tools and 
aims mentioned before—represent an important way of reconfiguring mixed wel-
fare systems, an observation likewise made by Jenson (2013) who even argues that 
this might be their main role.
9.2  Sending and Receiving—the Diffusion of Social 
Innovations
The following part discusses our analysis of diffusion processes. The sample of 
social innovations studied in the project is not quantitatively representative of dif-
fusion potential, which makes firm statements on how much diffusion occurs im-
possible (which is, in any case, very difficult methodologically). Furthermore, the 
focus was on relations within the local context. However, the broad variety of types 
of innovations, the nature of which has been sketched in the first part of this chapter, 
allows us to draw some analytically generalizable conclusions concerning the na-
ture of the process. We will focus on aspects of the process that are most distinctive 
of social innovation and on those specifically relevant to the third sector. We will 
continue to use the metaphor of sending and receiving messages.
Basically this metaphor, with its strengths and shortcomings, can be used for all 
kinds of innovation: market- or non-market-based, those technical in nature, others 
that are more about organisational devices and those concerning social relations 
and lifestyles. One should however recognise the special nature of this final type of 
social innovations (non-market-based and non-technical), which mostly develop at 
the local level in specific places (Zapf 1989). They have some distinctive features 
compared to innovations more generally. Specifically, three characteristics can be 
noted, which will be referred back later:
1. Social innovations usually relate to services, not products. As Osborne and Stro-
kosch (2013) emphasised, this makes them different from other types of innova-
tion in that they relate to ongoing relationships rather than discrete transactions 
and to outcomes rather than outputs.
2. As a consequence, this type of innovations is usually embedded in specific social 
relations. This, in turn, means that they are more contextually bound than their 
technological counterparts. An iPad will continue to function in the same way 
whether it is used in Stockholm, Dover or Belgrade. The same cannot be said of 
approaches or schemes that work with people and rely on specific regulations 
and cultures to be effective. This is very relevant to the issue of diffusion, as it 
becomes much more complicated both in terms of objectives and process. Inno-
vations invented in specific locations and setting cannot simply be “scaled up” 
as they require various ways of partial adoption and special readings.
3. Local social innovations address a specific type of need, a social need not yet 
sufficiently addressed by government programmes and markets. By implication, 
the majority are non-marketable. While many innovations originate from busi-
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nesses, most innovations in local welfare originate in non-market contexts and 
respective social milieus, like the voluntary sector or social movements (accord-
ing to some definitions of social innovations, exclusively so). Their social 
character is specific. This again has consequences for processes of diffusion, 
scaling-up, popularising or mainstreaming.
Taking these specificities into account, we can sum up the problems with trans-
ferring messages from social innovations that surfaced during the research in six 
paragraphs.
Risky Journeys: The Diffusion of Non-technical and Non-market-based In-
novations
The literature on the diffusion of innovations primarily concentrates on the busi-
ness sector and therefore principally on diffusion in a market context. As we noted 
before, this is not the realm of all innovations, including most social innovations in 
the welfare domain, and we will see that it has consequences for the ultimate analy-
sis of the process. Therefore it is useful to consider insights from literature outside 
market contexts.
There is by now a substantial body of literature on innovations in the public 
sector, under the label of “policy transfer”. This work on policy diffusion examines 
how policies spread across different administrations, adapting (or not) to different 
institutional conditions (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). For instance, it has been used 
to explain the diffusion of monetary policy across member states of the European 
Union with their own different formal structures and administrative cultures (Ra-
daelli 2000) or the spread of public management practices across different coun-
tries, in which the same instrument or policy can have very different meanings 
depending on where they are implemented (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Brandsen 
and Kim 2010).
Actual diffusion processes differ strongly in terms of what is diffused (e.g. ob-
jectives, contents, concepts, structures, instruments) and the degree to which some-
thing is diffused (ranging from straight copying to light inspiration, with various 
hybrid variations in between). Furthermore, it has to be kept in mind that journeys 
from “senders” to “receivers/adopters” are mostly risky and sometimes intricate 
(Nowotny 1997). There are many reasons why innovations may not diffuse from 
their place of origin. Others may get lost on the journey, damaged, changed in con-
tent or taken up and used by adopters other than innovators had thought of. While 
research on diffusion tends to focus on the process of adoption, especially of suc-
cessful cases of adoption, one should ideally also examine failed cases or those 
cases where an innovation could have been relevant, but was never considered.
What also becomes more complex in a public context is the issue of motives 
for diffusion, which is straightforward (or at least presumed to be so) among com-
mercial businesses. The incentives for policymakers and civil servants are more 
complex. While they can be driven by the desire for problem solving, they can 
also be motivated by political gain and/or complex political strategies. Hence, the 
question of motivation (or lack of it) is important in the analysis of the diffusion of 
social innovations.
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The literature also pays much attention to obstacles to diffusion that result from 
the nature of the innovation itself. In line with Rogers’ work (1962), it suggests that 
the more complex innovations are (in terms of goals, assumed causalities, effects) 
the harder it gets to take them from one place to another. The more resilient the 
destination context (e.g. due to the strength of a dominant discourse or top-heavy 
regulation), the less likely it is to succeed. Transfer success also depends on capac-
ity and resources available. The empirical results of the WILCO project show that 
the same applies to social innovations.
Even though there is an already burgeoning literature on innovation transfer, 
questions about what is specific about the diffusion of social innovations remain. 
Non-technical and non-market-based innovations are generally more diverse in 
terms of organisational properties or lifestyles compared to technical innovations 
designed for mass markets. Yet, to be fair, the difference is not always as drastic as 
the one between a cell phone and a new mode of participation in urban planning. 
Many new mass products are sold with varieties that allow marketing geared to the 
different tastes of consumers in different cultures and regions. Still, the differential 
impact of “local” as compared to “global” features remains an important topic for 
research to investigate what is specific for social innovations.
Spreading Rather Than Being Sent: The Opaque Nature of Diffusion Pro-
cesses
When the process of diffusion is studied across a wider range of cases, the sender-
receiver metaphor quickly becomes unsatisfactory as, however bad the connection, 
however confusing the conference call, one usually knows who is at the other end 
of the line. Not so for diffusion because the process is so hard to trace.
Johnson dealt with the difference between areas such as the business sector, 
where innovations can be formalised, sold or withheld by license, and the often tak-
en-for-granted fact that most social innovations develop in the public realm where 
they are basically free for use (2010, p. 240 f.). However, one of our case studies 
(Ewert and Evers in this chapter) shows that in the social realm there is also a ten-
sion between diffusion by innovation as an “open source” and diffusion channelled 
by competition. Projects and organisations such as Lok.aMotion, dealing with in-
novative concepts for community development and community-based business in 
Berlin-Kreuzberg, must act under conditions of “co-ompetition” where cooperation 
and competition merge. They often feel that their concepts are not simply taken up, 
but “stolen”.
This dilemma is hard to overcome because cases where a clear origin and “au-
thor” of a social innovation can be identified are hard to find. Many of the case 
studies presented in this book are innovative in the local place where they crystal-
lise but resemble concepts and ideas elsewhere. This holds true for quite a number 
of innovations presented in this book: the essentials of work integration enterprises 
and the variant discussed with examples from Nijmegen, the prevention visits for 
improving local child protection in Münster (Walter and Gluns) or the housing re-
vitalisation schemes from the outskirts of Lille (Fraisse). These are varieties within 
a national or international innovative stream and orientations. The fact that respon-
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dents attribute an innovation to a particular project or locality does not mean that 
it was necessarily the only or even the original source of an idea. Several similar 
schemes often pioneer in different places during the same period. While certain 
projects can be hailed as emblematic of a trend, it does not necessarily mean that 
they are the sole source of it.
Local social innovations that are not exclusive to one place show at least four 
different constellations:
(a) They may have a predominantly bottom-up character, promoted by third sec-
tor organisations and the cultural orientations of the specific environment they 
emerge from (see, e.g. the cases from Sweden and France in this chapter).
(b) They may develop through joint action in a cross-sectorial local network, 
where the initiative may come from “policy entrepreneurs” as local parties, 
policymakers and administrators, as in the cases from Bern and Barcelona.
(c) They may take shape as local varieties within a national programme or frame-
work which experiments with new ideas and scales them up, as can be observed 
in Birmingham or Münster.
(d) Finally there are cases of social innovation in which the centre of gravity is 
located neither centrally nor locally but in nationwide civil society networks, 
as in initiatives such as the MaMa Foundation or the RODA network which 
started through Internet contacts (see Siemieńska et al. and Bežovan et al. in 
this chapter).
The (Un)Willing Sender
It is often taken for granted that the person who sends a message does so on purpose. 
In other words, we assume that the innovator has an interest in getting a message 
across. This makes perfect sense in a market context, where diffusion often results 
in profits. The social innovation literature stressing the entrepreneurial and leader-
ship side of the phenomenon (e.g. Goldsmith 2010) and research on innovations in 
social movements (Moulaert et al. 2005) also assumes a strong will to “spread the 
message” and change the world.
However, the findings from the WILCO project show that many social innova-
tions are generated by actors, often from the voluntary sector who have no direct in-
terest beyond their local contexts. They concentrate on their immediate milieu, where 
they feel understood, encouraged and supported. A detailed look at cases in this chap-
ter that concentrate on surviving and solidifying on the place where they operate such 
as the Fondazione Welfare Ambrosiano in Milano or the Neighbourhood Children 
Services in Pamplona shows that these are often groups of people or organisations 
that took action in the face of a pressing local need: Children went hungry, women 
were abused, young men wandered the streets aimlessly. They devoted great energy 
to get their initiative off the ground, scraping together resources and building on local 
knowledge (Scott 1998). “Selling” their innovation in another city, let alone another 
country, seems out of their reach and potential, therefore out of sight and thought.
This again points to the essential difference with other types of innovations. A 
company like Apple did not design its iPads for the local Californian market, but 
in the hope of selling them around the world. In fact, they would not have invested 
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in the idea, had they not been confident that they could sell these devices in a great 
many places. By contrast, social innovations tend to have no market value, and 
there is no financial incentive to spread them. This does not mean that there are 
no incentives at all: Idealism and the search for a better social status can go a long 
way. Nevertheless, in Rogers’ terms, many local innovations may be weak in the 
“knowledge” and “persuasion” phases of the adoption process. Both the active en-
trepreneurs, civic activists and leaders in social movements highlighted in much of 
the literature are just one group, and perhaps only a minor one, of social innovators 
in local welfare. Due to their concern with wider support and publicity, their impor-
tance tends to be overrated.
Intermediaries
However, that does not mean that there is necessarily a hard distinction between 
innovations designed only for use locally and those designed to be part of an (in-
ter)national movement for social change and innovation. An important and related 
finding concerns the role of intermediaries (in Rogers’ terms, the opinion leaders 
and change agents). More than other types of innovation, social innovations require 
intermediary agents for successful diffusion. They can be important for both: bring-
ing ideas from the realms of politics and academia “down to earth”, into realms ac-
cessible to local associations and projects and endorsing and passing over concepts 
and ideas from the “grassroots” to a larger public.
Among the cases of local social innovations presented in this book, a good exam-
ple of such an intermediary organisation is Fryhuset, which has general competence 
in social action and advocacy, taking up and linking the special project on children 
and single mothers to other initiatives. Some of the innovations studied and present-
ed in the following chapters, such as the MaMa foundation or the RODA network, 
focus foremost on this intermediary level. In both cases, there is no strict separation 
between nationwide concerns with innovative measures and steps towards legisla-
tion, on the one hand, and giving support to local groups and initiatives on the other. 
Intermediary action can also come from the side of governments, businesses, social 
enterprises and professional groups. In Poland, for instance, it was interesting to 
see the important role of lawyers. Dealing with a legalistic administrative culture, 
they were the right people to make the translation between bottom-up initiatives 
and government officials (see the resp. contributions on Polish social innovations 
such as “The foundation for the development beyond Borders” in Evers et al. 2014, 
p. 250).
Writing Messages: The Process Prior to Transmission and Adoption
A process of reconstruction and translation requires new ways of collaboration be-
tween governments and citizens, for example, as well as new ways of thinking. The 
empirical material in this book shows that in local welfare this process does not start 
with the adoption of an innovation adopted, but usually well before that. A good 
idea is not convincing in itself—only when people are open to it. What this means is 
that adopting an innovation from elsewhere is, from the perspective of the adopting 
parties, not fundamentally different from inventing one. After all, it requires similar 
breakthroughs in institutional routines, whether of content, collaboration or other 
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aspects of working. Theoretically, it means that the analysis of diffusion must start 
before the actual adoption of an innovation.
The underlying question is to what extent the innovative capacity is reflected in 
what is adopted (a specific approach to solving a problem) or rather in the ground-
work that is done before adoption (getting the right people together, getting minds 
ready for new options, and so forth). This is highly relevant to public administration 
reform because it means that simply finding the right kinds of policy approaches or 
instruments in itself is not enough.
However, instead of going into a chicken and egg controversy about the impact 
of “winds of change” and of innovations that both build on and promote them, the 
focus should be on the links between both phenomena. All case studies in this book 
illustrate such links one way or the other, which may to different degrees be mutu-
ally enforcing.
Different Readings Merging: The Adoption of Innovations as Bricolage
Sending a message the author usually hopes for it to find its destination with its 
content intact. It would be intolerable if someone took it and rephrased it in her or 
his own words. Yet this is exactly what must happen in a successful process of dif-
fusion. It is rare for a certain project or approach to be copied from one place to an-
other unchanged. If so, it usually concerns simple schemes that can be implemented 
more or less independently from regulation or policy and which require only limited 
collaboration between local actors. An example are the Neighbourhood Mothers, a 
Dutch scheme in which migrant women are used as intermediaries to counsel other 
migrant women (a notoriously difficult group for authorities to reach) on issues 
such as social security, healthy lifestyles and parenting (see for the case from Berlin: 
Evers et al. 2014, p. 124). Dealing with similar constituencies and relying on little 
regulatory support, it was a concept easy to spread.
This no longer works with more complex innovations in welfare, however, as 
they tend to deal with difficult social problems and difficult constituencies. Ap-
proaches or projects need to be adapted to new contexts, they call for changes in 
institutional routines and the values that guide them. The literature on diffusion in 
terms of “transfer” and “franchising” of special organisational concepts is missing 
many potential ways for “mainstreaming”. Quite often processes of diffusion and 
mainstreaming entail mutual adjustment. The shape of a collaborative arrangement 
may have to be altered, for example, because responsibilities for a certain policy 
area are distributed differently in governments at different levels or because ser-
vices are provided privately in one country and publicly in the other. The innovation 
will be reshaped, whether due to a different socio-economic and regulatory environ-
ment or for reasons of a different dominant policy discourse.
In many cases, the development of social innovations can be conceived of as a 
back and forth process between the characteristics of a social innovation and the 
specific environment of markets, state institutions and civil society into which they 
spread. The respective discourses (Schmidt 2010) through which the innovation is 
read, justified or rejected take a key role in this process. They influence the recep-
tiveness of actors and contexts as well as the reading of and role given to innova-
tions in local welfare systems.
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This process can be decoded with the set of basic “messages” we discussed ear-
lier in this chapter: services that lead towards co-production rather than merely sup-
plying; rules and regulations that upgrade the impact of a “quick fix”, by referring 
to social rights that take a long time to take real shape; forms of governance that 
give a new role to stakeholders from civil society; patterns of governance that imply 
lower thresholds for the contributions of not only paid experts and politicians but 
also of civic activists, social entrepreneurs and volunteers; a different division of 
responsibilities between business sector, state institutions, citizens and their com-
munities. Each of these messages points towards a different “culture” of welfare 
and social inclusion and can be read and interpreted quite differently, depending on 
the ideological and political discourses they are incorporated in.
In their seminal study on “The New Spirit of Capitalism”, Boltanski and Chia-
pello (2005) have shown how “autonomy” and “flexibility”, topics that emerged 
from the social movements of the early 1970s, were turned into centrepieces of 
justification for the restructuring of labour markets and conditions by businesses. 
This is a superb example of how aspirations and messages from social innovators 
can be read in different ways. They acquire different meanings, depending on the 
position given to them in the discursive context. This is testament to the open and 
risky nature of innovations. From such a process of mainstreaming, concepts such 
as “activation” and “empowerment” can emerge with different purposes and differ-
ent meanings. They can relate to strengthening a sense of duty and commitment to 
goals set by the administration; alternatively, they can refer to strengthening capaci-
ties for individual and joint action, activating not only individual competence but 
also sources of support and solidarity. The study on prevention visits in families in 
the city of Münster in this book describes the controversy at the outset of this inno-
vation whether to develop it as a special measure for troubled families only or as an 
open offer to families more widely. In the case of Neighbourhood Children Services 
in Pamplona, innovative association-based approaches received widespread support 
from opposing parties partly because each political camp could read it in its own 
particular way—as a means for community-based self-help against more state wel-
fare or as a means for building a more cooperative welfare system.
There is an inevitable ambivalence about innovations and their introduction to 
local welfare systems. On the one hand, they represent real new elements of sup-
port. On the other hand, their ultimate meaning only becomes apparent when taking 
account of the discursive framework in which they operate. Processes of popularis-
ing and mainstreaming innovations through negotiations will therefore mostly cre-
ate hybrids of different ideas and inspirations. They are formed through a process 
of bricolage, a term from the famous anthropologist Lévi-Strauss (1966), which 
means to construct a new entity out of (mostly) old pieces. The nature of this bri-
colage can differ quite strongly. At one end of the spectrum, there are innovations 
copied in a straightforward manner, for example, through a franchising method. 
At the other end are innovations that are not scaled or diffused directly, but which 
have an indirect effect, by suffusing the values they build upon to other places. In 
between stand various innovations of which only parts are transferred, which are 
fused with local elements and possibly even imbued with different sets of values. It 
is no wonder that research on diffusion is methodologically so difficult.
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9.3  Conclusions
Using the metaphor of social innovations as messages allows integrating two as-
pects of social innovations that often get separated: (a) the content of innovative 
solutions—in this case in the field of welfare policies and services—and (b) social 
innovation as a process in which systems and politics—here, local welfare sys-
tems—deal with such solutions.
With respect to both content and policies, we systematically analysed evidence 
collected as part of WILCO to identify recurrent approaches and instruments used in 
local social innovations. The central aim was to draw messages on a more abstract 
level from our sample and to make them more overtly relevant both to academic 
debates and to practitioners working in other settings and countries. We classified 
them as five challenges: finding new ways to address users, innovating regulations 
and rights, ways of governance, modes of working and financing and the transfor-
mation of established local welfare mixes.
A significant message resulting from our work is that, if taken seriously, many 
new approaches are not the quick-fix solutions they were often intended to be. They 
are not available simply at the push of a button. There seem to be wide gaps between 
prevailing modes of policies, politics and organisation on the one hand and social 
innovations on the other. Bringing both sides together can demand a long learning 
process.
Despite their differences, the social policy community of theorists, experts and 
practitioners tends to operate within a shared paradigm that makes it difficult to 
incorporate innovations into the social policy vocabulary. To break through this, at 
least three prevailing perspectives must be questioned.
The first perspective to question is one that implies an exclusive link between 
social change and (national) state reform. If one revisits the history of the welfare 
state, it is to a large extent one of social innovations taken up or rejected, margin-
alised or mainstreamed. Social movements and organisations have always played 
an important role in inventing and creating welfare arrangements of their own—
mutuals in the field of social security, cooperatives as early “social enterprises”, 
voluntary associations establishing and running all kinds of services. Although 
much work in the third sector research community has examined this legacy of 
contributions from the third sector and civil society to welfare state development 
(see, e.g. the contributions in Evers and Laville 2004), the social policy research 
community has largely ignored it, treating welfare state reform almost exclusively 
as a set of top-down reforms.
Secondly, one should question interpretations of justice and stratification that 
lead to an emphasis on standardisation and uniform institutional arrangements, so 
characteristic of the basic belief system the modern welfare state was built upon 
(see Wagner 1994). It is crucial to reconsider how reliability and equality can be 
combined with room for social innovation and diversity. In order to achieve both, a 
balance must be struck between a guaranteed level of protection by regulations and 
the preservation of open spaces for change through innovation.
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Finally, many governance concepts still imply a central role for decision-making 
by powerful elites. Yet, if top-down and bottom-up initiatives are to be reconciled, 
public policies should be less about imposing change and more about preparing it 
through experiments and pilots. These should be designed to learn from social com-
petences, accumulated through the change makers that have invented and carried 
them through (Then and Mildenberger 2014). In the debates on the persistence of 
hierarchy (Lynn 2011) and new forms of governance that are sensible for this chal-
lenge, some have labelled such an approach “democratic experimentalism” (Sabel 
2012). Nudging change and preparing reform in this manner should be higher on 
the policy agenda.
These critical remarks point towards the conclusions of the second part of this 
chapter, which discussed how social innovations change once they become part of a 
local welfare system and spread from one place to another. Specifically, it focused 
on how diffusion of social innovations in local welfare is qualitatively distinct from 
the diffusion of other types of innovations. Typical of social innovations is their 
strong link to specific contexts. Exactly because they evolve within social relation-
ships and rely upon the collaboration of various different actors, they are relatively 
hard to transplant from one context to another.
Furthermore, those who invented a new local social innovation are often not pri-
marily interested in diffusion since they were originally motivated to solve a local 
problem. This is a fundamental difference with innovations in a business context 
because there the objective is to spread products as far and wide as possible.
The process of winning importance also appears to be different from the mar-
keting of innovative products and purposeful mainstreaming by policymakers and 
administrators. Theoretically, one would expect the bottleneck in social innovation 
in a complex field such as welfare to be flaws in adaptation processes, but this does 
not appear to be the case in practice (as compared, for instance, to the diffusion of 
governmental innovations). One possible explanation is that social innovations tend 
to have a strong bottom-up element that allows them to evolve organically, with 
large contributions from local people and voluntary organisations. This is part of 
a transformative process prior to the adoption of an innovation that changes local 
social relations, for instance, by giving the voluntary sector a greater role in shaping 
local services. The actual innovation is just the final stage of this process and not 
necessarily the most important part of it.
The findings point towards a bias in the research on diffusion. It tends to empha-
sise the adoption of an innovation, failing to cover the process of transformation in 
social relations that occur ahead of adoption. By implication, it overstates the role 
of organisations involved in the direct transfer of innovations (particularly profes-
sional networks) and underestimates the role of actors involved in the wider process 
of local transformation, including citizens and voluntary organisations.
Arguably, the cumulative effect of small initiatives is of far greater importance 
to society than the few examples that achieve wider and more visible impact. In any 
case, research on social innovation should not restrict its focus on success (in the 
sense of being taken up and mainstreamed). Where social innovations survive in 
more difficult environments, their impact on mainstream welfare is more indirect—
as one element in a cultural turn that may be quietly successful in the long run, even 
if many innovations fail at the first attempt.
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Chapter 10
Warsaw: Paving New Ways for Participation of 
Mothers, Fathers, and Children in Local Public 
and Social Life—The MaMa Foundation
Renata Siemieńska, Anna Domaradzka and Ilona Matysiak
10.1  Introduction
Typically, activities falling into the category of civil activism arise from every-
day problems and needs of individuals as well as groups. Those civic activities are 
therefore not profit oriented, but change oriented and often reflect existing gaps in 
social support system (Young 1999). One of the clear examples of this type of so-
cial initiative is MaMa Foundation, which emerged as an answer to unmet needs of 
mothers with small children. It is also one of the best examples of possible positive 
impact of local civil society organization (CSO) on public administration as well as 
local welfare policies.
MaMa Foundation’s success story is even more telling in context of Polish low 
rates of CSOs’ participation and declining belief in organizations such as trade 
unions, professional associations, and special interest associations now widespread 
in many European Union countries. As Eurobarometer data collected in 2013 
shows, the share of respondents who reported that they did not need such organiza-
tions ranged between 23 % in Estonia and 55 % in Romania, with 43 % in Poland 
(Flash Eurobarometer 373 2013, p. 7). Generally, this opinion is stronger in the 
newer democracies.
However, it should be said that the participation in organizations is, in fact, only 
one of many forms of possible civic involvement. As Polish data shows, activities 
undertaken by individuals and informal groups have a significant role in this respect 
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(CBOS 2011a). Also, both recent financial crisis and experiences gained through 
the implementation of different projects by CSOs and informal groups, strength-
ened the awareness of Polish society that working together with other people fa-
cilitates solving problems of their communities (neighbourhoods, villages, towns). 
Between 2002 and 2012, belief in the value of working together increased consider-
ably, from 50 to 72 % (CBOS 2011b). Prevalence of this opinion can be considered 
as an important step forward in building social and cultural capital in Poland.
Frequently, joint activities start as an (informal) initiative on the part of individu-
als or groups, which are later transformed into formal CSOs for various reasons, for 
example, to be entitled to get financial support from public authorities or to have 
the formal status required to cooperate with public agencies. In Poland, people are 
more likely to participate in organizations having grassroots origins, initiated by 
individuals they know through their social network. This is due to the low level 
of citizens’ trust in all kinds of public institutions and authorities (WVS 2012, un-
published), suspected of protecting only their own interests and not those of the 
citizens. MaMa Foundation, which was established by the group of young, highly 
educated mothers, is a good example of this trajectory. Stemming from an informal 
group of women experiencing similar life situation—having a small child and strug-
gling to remain publicly active—this initiative transformed into highly innovative 
and influential CSO, giving voice to needs of both mothers and parents. Moreover, 
some of their projects become institutionalized, after local authorities decided to 
include them in their formal policies.
10.2  Warsaw As a Context of Innovation
The city of Warsaw is both the largest and most diverse in Poland, in terms of 
dynamic labour market, social problems as well as needs of its residents. In recent 
years, parents of young children become one of the most visible interests groups in 
the city, lobbing for new solutions in childcare or protesting against city regulations 
restricting the access to kindergartens and daycares.
Up to now, some chaos in implementation of the local social policy led to a situa-
tion when childcare needs were not sufficiently met by public system. For example, 
in 2012, in many districts in Warsaw, public daycares lacked over 6000 places (PAP 
2012). This created the situation in which the residents “took the matter into their 
own hands” and came up with their own solutions to existing problems, often be-
coming animators of social innovation. For instance, problems with the institutional 
infrastructure related to childcare in Warsaw, particularly in the dynamically grow-
ing parts of the city, encouraged the inhabitants to develop civic initiatives in order 
to make the authorities engaged in new investments accountable for satisfactorily 
solving those issues. Also, civil society bodies were organizing new types of care 
facilities, to fill the existing gap in public services.
MaMa Foundation is a very successful example of this type of initiative, already 
serving as a role model to several similar grassroots’ organizations in the city. The 
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Foundation has an integrative and innovative approach to tackling many problems 
connected with parenting in the big city, constantly developing new projects and 
ideas. The issues MaMa works with include city mobility of parents with small 
children, economic reactivation and social inclusion of women as well as problems 
connected with modern parenting.
The importance and visibility of those issues is growing in Warsaw, where, due 
to high in-migration levels and demographic change, the number of children at 
kindergarten age steadily increases. Predictions indicate that subsequent years will 
be those of a baby boom, which makes childcare policy of interest to politicians 
and parents. Also, the cultural shift expressed in higher life aspirations is chang-
ing parents’ expectations and puts a new pressure on policymakers. It is especially 
visible in Warsaw, where number of young and highly educated professional men 
and women settle down, taking advantage of the good employment possibilities. 
This may explain the received publicity of MaMa Foundation since its first aware-
ness campaigns. Media visibility was one of the important factors translating the 
Foundation postulates into political pressure that influenced decisions of the local 
authorities and administration in Warsaw.
10.3  The Foundation
MaMa Foundation is a non-profit organization established in Warsaw in June 2006 
by a group of young, highly educated women, mothers of small children. Its activi-
ties are based on the idea that mothers and fathers with small children should be able 
to increase their participation in the local public and social life through elimination 
of social, cultural and architectonic barriers. The Foundation’s ideas and projects 
are rooted in social economy, ideas of social solidarity and feminism. Currently, the 
MaMa Foundation not only addresses the needs of parents with small children liv-
ing in Warsaw, but also supports refugees and disabled people. It lobbies on national 
and local level, working with public authorities and institutions, business, as well 
as media.
10.3.1  Types of Services and Ways of Addressing Users
Main types of MaMa Foundation’s activities include social campaigns, free work-
shops and trainings, legal, psychological and civil advice, cultural, artistic and 
educational projects, as well as publishing and research initiatives focused on em-
powerment of women. Many of the listed activities take place in MaMa Café—a 
parents-friendly cafeteria located in the centre of Warsaw, rented on preferential 
terms from the local authorities.
One of the best-known Foundation’s projects is “O Mamma Mia! I cannot drive 
my pram in here!”. It is a social campaign for adapting public space for prams 
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and wheelchairs. It has been running since 2006 and includes systematic moni-
toring, taking into account specific needs of parents with small children and peo-
ple with disabilities. Public places such as railway and metro stations, public of-
fices, and transportation hubs are regularly evaluated. The results of the project 
include the publication of Warsaw Friendly for Parents—a handbook directed to 
local authorities and formulating standards, which should be met by parents- and 
children-friendly architecture and infrastructure. Other examples of similar aware-
ness-raising projects are “Horror stories”—a campaign about mothers’ rights as em-
ployees; “Boys don’t pay”—a campaign emphasizing problems with fathers, who 
avoid paying alimony; a campaign focused on problems of pregnant women and 
lone mothers in urban space (including photo contests “Mum speaks now!” or “Bel-
lybutton—hub of the universe”).
Also, MaMa Foundation voices concerns about the rights of women who do not 
work professionally but are stay-at-home mothers and wives. In recent years, two 
projects regarding this issue were implemented: “List of domestic tasks” and “War-
saw Housewives’ Club”. As for the first project, in cooperation with a group of ex-
perts, the organization has formulated recommendations for the Polish Parliament 
emphasizing the economic value of work performed by women at home: “We show 
and calculate it precisely that housework performed by women (…) is quantifiable 
and it is possible to calculate its precise value in money. (…) It is not all about pay-
ing women for doing housework, but about actually seeing this work, being able to 
notice it” (MaMa Foundation representative).
The project “Warsaw Housewives’ Club” included workshops aimed at increas-
ing awareness of women in terms of partnership-based division of tasks at home and 
providing the participants with specific tools that could help them in negotiations 
with their husbands or partners.
The workshops, trainings and legal advice offered by MaMa Foundation address 
women getting back to work after maternal leave, mothers, who organize initia-
tives supporting other mothers, as well as female refugees and victims of domestic 
violence. Apart from that, since 2007, the Foundation inspired the establishment of 
local moms’ clubs in different Warsaw districts. They all provide free workshops 
for mothers, local leaders and representatives of local authorities and create friendly 
space for meetings and exchanging experiences. One such local moms’ club is lo-
cated in one of the most deprived areas in Warsaw—Targówek district. When the 
club was closed due to the end of the project, the group of its former participants 
decided to set up their own independent organization called Mom’s Power Founda-
tion, which, to some extent, continues the activities of the club by offering free ser-
vices for parents from the district. This case shows how MaMa Foundation triggers 
other local initiatives and inspires similar projects all over Warsaw.
Another example of MaMa’s initiatives was the “Moms’ Cooperative” innova-
tive training project, which was aimed at creating a new, independent social coop-
erative, giving employment to unemployed mothers. Its main goal was to support 
women who are threatened with social exclusion, in terms of their education, in-
tegration into the society and their future chances on the labour market. It includ-
ed both vocational and psychological trainings in order to strengthen the overall 
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potential of unemployed women. The project included 10 young, lone mothers from 
Warsaw, who gave birth to their children before being 18 years old and were long-
term unemployed (more than 2 years, usually because of childcare duties) (MaMa 
Cooperative 2011).
The specific activities within the project included educational workshops on so-
cial economy, social cooperatives, self-employment, marketing and promotion, folk 
art, and psychological motivations. In consequence, the participants set up Moms’ 
Cooperative, which creates, promotes, and distributes regional and local handmade 
products inspired by Polish folk art (toys, jewellery, bags, cell-phones’ accessories, 
souvenirs for tourists, and office supplies). Now, Moms’ Cooperative operates in-
dependently from MaMa Foundation, trying to find place for its products on the 
local and national market. The idea of this project emerged from the cooperation 
between MaMa Foundation with two partners from the private sector: The Orbis 
Hotel Group and the Accor Foundation. The social cooperative of young and lone 
unemployed mothers from Warsaw is claimed to be the first initiative of this kind 
in Poland and serves as an example for other similar initiatives all over the country.
Other, cultural, artistic and educational projects run by MaMa Foundation in-
clude: “Baby at the cinema,” organized in cooperation with cinemas in Warsaw, 
which enables parents to watch films while their children play with babysitters; 
“Mothers’ Art”—the exhibition of modern art created by mothers; “MaMa Per-
form”—performative workshops for mothers; publishing books for adults (such as 
anthology “What does it mean to be a mother in Poland”) and stories for children; 
workshops for children in the Warsaw Museum of Modern Art; as well as “Scien-
tific Café”—meetings and discussions for parents with children.
10.3.2  Internal Organization and Modes of Working
All the people who currently manage MaMa Foundation (chair, members of the 
board and employees) are mothers and Warsaw residents, who personally experi-
enced various problems related to being a mother in the capital. Foundation’s chair-
woman is Sylwia Chutnik, a known feminist, successful writer and certified guide 
to Warsaw. MaMa Foundation currently employs two people (temporarily, within 
the budgets of particular projects) and cooperates with about ten volunteers on a 
regular basis. The organization is also supported by a group of lawyers, psycholo-
gists, trainers, scientists and artists, who take part in its activities when needed. As a 
main rule of all MaMa programs, even when an initiative is directed only to adults, 
the Foundation allows the participation of children or provides free childcare during 
workshops, trainings or meetings.
The Foundation cooperates regularly with Warsaw authorities in order to de-
velop mother- and child-friendly public spaces and policies. The members of Foun-
dation’s board, employees and experts participate in public debates and express in 
media their opinions on mothers’ situation in private and professional life. Usually, 
the Foundation tries to spread its message among different social groups at the same 
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time: “The initiative is, in fact, aimed at several social groups. The women—this is 
the workshop part, the society as a whole—some of the social campaigns and the 
recommendations, aimed at politicians representing all options in the Parliament 
and the local authorities, not only politicians, but also officers of specific depart-
ments or offices” (MaMa Foundation representative).
MaMa Foundation cooperates with great variety of local and national entities, 
such as Association for Legal Intervention, various women’s organizations, Insti-
tute of Public Affairs (think-thank research organization), Warsaw Municipal Of-
fice, local authorities in several Warsaw’s districts, local politicians and public in-
stitutions such as Warsaw Labour Office. It also participates in several third sector 
coalitions, including women’s organizations as well as associations for the disabled.
Up to now, MaMa Foundation’s crucial projects were financed by: the Accor 
Foundation (private sector), Warsaw Labour Office (public sector), Trust for Civil 
Society for Central and Eastern Europe (public charity incorporated under the laws 
of the USA), and European Social Fund. Apart from that, the Foundation has the 
status of a Public Benefit Organization, which means that, according to Polish law, 
it is allowed to receive 1 % of income tax from individuals. To receive such status, 
an organization has to be a foundation or association (political parties and trade 
unions do not qualify), involved in specific activities related to public benefit as 
described by the law, and being sufficiently transparent in its activities, governance 
and finances.
10.3.3  Embeddedness in the Local Welfare System
MaMa Foundation’s initiatives strongly affected local public discourse on moth-
ers and fathers with small children, defining them as a group with particular needs 
and problems, especially regarding the participation in public life and city space 
mobility. The Foundation contributed significantly to a growing awareness of pub-
lic officials on the importance of mother and child-friendly architecture and infra-
structure. None of those issues were seriously addressed in Warsaw before.
MaMa Foundation stresses also the important issue of reconciliation of work and 
care by emphasizing that motherhood does not have to be an obstacle to personal 
and professional development of women. Apart from that, the Foundation offers 
solutions in terms of employment and childcare, which are innovative and alterna-
tive to those provided by public institutions. For example, Moms’ Cooperative con-
cerns such specific subgroup as long-term unemployed mothers by using innovative 
means based on the concepts of social economy.
Through its lobbying activities, MaMa Foundation challenges the common be-
lief that women on maternal leave are satisfied to spend time with their children at 
home, in local shops and on playgrounds. They argue that this type of social and 
spatial isolation of young mothers often results in their sense of loneliness and de-
pression. Regarding these problems, MaMa Foundation established several “Local 
Moms’ Clubs” in different parts of Warsaw, where mothers can come with their chil-
dren, meet with other people, exchange experiences and take part in free workshops 
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and trainings. Apart from that, the Foundation provides great variety of cultural and 
educational activities, which are directed to women or parents with children.
The activities of MaMa Foundation are followed with interest by organiza-
tions and institutions in other Polish cities as well as abroad. The project “Warsaw 
Housewives’ Club” is being implemented in Berlin, and a female representative of 
the Ukrainian Parliament has also displayed some interest in establishing similar 
projects in her country. Last but not least, the projects of MaMa Foundation trig-
ger, intentionally or spontaneously, multiplication of local initiatives, which are of-
ten implemented by MaMa’s actions beneficiaries, strengthening potential of local 
communities to solve their own problems.
10.4  Conclusions
MaMa Foundation is an innovative initiative established by a group of highly edu-
cated young women, who continue identifying new problems important for women 
and families living in the city. The organization fits perfectly the Dalton’s broader 
description of reactions of societies living in contemporary democratic systems. As 
Dalton wrote: “People today are also more conscious of their political rights and 
more demanding in their individualism. The new style of citizens’ politics encour-
ages a diversity of political interests (issue publics), instrumental and flexible voting 
choices, and more direct styles of political action (…) This interest groups signify 
a new way of organizing interests and mobilizing opinion.” (2002, pp. 253–254)
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Chapter 11
Zagreb: Parents in Action—Innovative Ways of 
Support and Policies for Children, Women and 
Families
Gojko Bežovan, Jelena Matančević and Danijel Baturina
11.1  Introduction
Unlike the social policies in the majority of other Croatian cites, the social policy 
in Zagreb is often referred to as comprehensive and generous. The core of social 
policy of the city is a set of diverse social assistance measures (benefits), covering 
a wide range of beneficiary groups, whereas social services can be regarded as less 
developed. However, those fields neither seem to build up a coherent system nor do 
they have a strategic policy orientation. Nevertheless, over the past decade, there 
has been a noticeable development of local (public) services and recognition of new 
vulnerable social groups. The examples are services for the homeless, public kitch-
ens, shelters for victims of domestic violence, disabled people, etc. The problem of 
insufficient coordination between different city departments and the lack of profes-
sionals’ comprehension of a wider social system is very visible. Developmental chal-
lenge of social care system identified as coordination of government and city social 
programmes has not been properly addressed in policy papers yet (Bežovan 2009; 
Bežovan and Zrinščak 2001). Bearing in mind population coverage and the levels of 
social rights, it can be said that Zagreb serves almost as a “local welfare state” due to 
its stable budget, which provides generous and comprehensive social programmes. 
Owing to that, even civil society can get more funds from the city budget.
The concept of social innovation, its meaning and understanding in the general 
public and even within the academic community, is rather new and vague. There 
is a scarcity of policy and academic papers that deal with social innovations. Civil 
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society organisations seem to be more receptive to the concept, which has slowly 
started to permeate the civic discourse. Also, recent research (Bežovan 2009, 2010) 
on the roles and contribution of local stakeholders to development of welfare mix 
has shown that civil society organisations (CSOs) are more familiar with the social 
innovations concept than state organisations.
Identified social innovations in Croatia reveal some particular characteristics of 
development and diffusion. Firstly, there is the importance of social and cultural 
capital. Mutual trust and engagement of the better-off and better-educated citizens 
are an important prerequisite for the success of innovation. It was also shown that 
personal capacity and entrepreneurial orientation of the initiators, who are often 
inspired by ideas or movements from abroad, play an important role. Such civic 
entrepreneurs, as Goldsmith explains, can act as catalysts for transformative change 
(Goldsmith et al. 2010). Secondly, particular innovations are seen as a part of Euro-
peanisation process, which creates new programmatic and financial frameworks for 
development of innovations. Thirdly, since social innovations in Croatia predomi-
nantly occur within civil society, their success and sustainability largely depend on 
the sensibility and professional capacities of policymakers and public officials, as 
well as their support.
This chapter presents the case of the CSO Roditelji u akciji–Parents in Action 
(RODA), which is perceived as innovative in the field of childcare. The innovative 
dimension of RODA is twofold. On the one hand, it has developed over time into 
a prominent stakeholder of family policy in Croatia, which has shifted the family 
matters from the realm of “private” and put them on the public agenda. Secondly, in 
terms of service production, RODA has evolved from the advocacy to production, 
and they are now recognised as a good example of social entrepreneurship as an 
emerging practice in Croatia.
The case study is conducted on the basis of desk research, interviews with the 
key stakeholders from RODA and a focus group on social innovations in Zagreb.
The Context of Family Policy As for the family policy in Croatia, it is manifested 
mostly through material benefits, such as children’s allowances, tax reliefs and 
maternity leaves, rather than through provision of services for children. To some 
extent, this is related to the structure of traditional family: Women used to work 
less, while relatives and members of extended families used to be on hand. The 
lack of childcare services is particularly evident in large cities, where nurseries and 
kindergartens often cannot accommodate the children of working parents (Zrinščak 
2008; Dobrotić et al. 2010). The coverage of children aged 3+ in kindergartens is 
55 % on average in Croatia, which is below the coverage of most EU member states, 
while the coverage of children under 3 with nurseries programme is 19 % (Matković 
and Dobrotić 2013). Due to insufficient institutional capacities, informal and unpaid 
family support is still a widespread strategy of ensuring childcare.
At the same time, the research suggests that Zagreb might have a more devel-
oped infrastructure of (formal) support to parents, since the survey of the quality of 
life has shown that respondents from Zagreb reported problems of reconciling work 
and family lives to a lesser degree. It should be stressed, however, that the coverage 
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of children in kindergartens (aged 3–4) in Zagreb and the Zagreb County is above 
68 %, which is at the same time the greatest share among all counties in Croatia 
(Dobrotić 2007; Dobrotić et al. 2010).
According to the National Family Policy Strategy (2003), an increase in the 
number of childcare institutions and increase in the number of children covered 
with organised preschool care and education was one of the priority areas for fam-
ily policy development. This strategy also proposed measures related to education 
and training of parents, incentives for implementation of programmes of civil or-
ganisations, educational programmes that include education on family, partnership, 
parenthood, etc. It was pointed out that family policy should therefore contribute 
to creating a friendly, social environment, which would help families solve a va-
riety of problems, first and foremost the ones related to children’s development. 
The problem of accommodation of children in preschool institutions becomes a 
part of national public debates only occasionally, as this is the service that is under 
the responsibility of local authorities. Rarely have there been cases of protests or 
highlighting problems in ways that would capture wide public attention. The prac-
tice of parent associations and their organised efforts to improve the provision of 
childcare services as beneficiaries were almost non-existent before. RODA was one 
of the first CSOs in that still generally underdeveloped area and became the most 
prominent one. The issue of placing children in nurseries and kindergartens in Za-
greb would usually appear on the agenda in early autumn only, when some children 
would be left without a place in a kindergarten. Due to the pressure of extensive 
numbers of children not enrolled, the number of private kindergartens and different 
forms of informal playrooms has increased significantly.
The childcare policy in Zagreb has been one of the high political interests in 
recent years, with frequent changes regarding financial aspects, as well as the field 
of value-loaded discussions. It is also a policy field that has mobilised different 
stakeholders, and it is one of the rather exceptional examples of the mobilisation of 
service users (parents) for advocacy regarding local welfare policies.
11.2  RODA
The association RODA—Parents in Action—was founded in mid-2001, as a spon-
taneous reaction of parents, women with children, who raised their voices against 
reduction in maternity allowance and protested in front of the government office. 
The women connected through the Internet. The association continued to advocate 
the rights of parents persistently until the maternity allowance was increased and 
the maternity leave became longer and more flexible.
With its innovative programme of activities, the association was formed in the 
social space that was previously considered private, and in traditional societies per-
ceived as the responsibility of parents and their extended families. The need for 
such an initiative came with the increase in number of young families with children, 
with better education, in a big city (Zagreb), who do not have the support of parents 
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and close relatives and still face the challenge of reconciling professional and fam-
ily commitments. Initially, the efforts of the association centred on the protection of 
vested social rights, but owing to a lot of volunteer work and enthusiasm, the initia-
tive resulted in multidimensional social change and social innovation.
11.2.1  Internal Organisation and Modes of Working
The activities of the association are mainly financed through the state and city pro-
grammes which support civil society. Citizens have been participating with small-
scale donations, while a company donated 100,000.00 HRK (about 13,150.00 €) 
to RODA instead of giving out the money for Christmas cards and gifts. RODA 
also receives various kinds of nonmonetary assistance, and they are allowed to use 
a storage space free of charge. Initially, they decided not to accept donations from 
companies that violate the International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Sub-
stitutes, tobacco and pharmaceutical industries and the companies using unethical 
marketing targeting children. Despite the various sources of support, the activities 
of RODA rely mostly on voluntary engagement of members.
The deep involvement of RODA in active parenting initiatives has resulted in 
a social entrepreneurship project of sewing and selling cloth diapers and connect-
ed products. Since 2004, RODA has been promoting the use of cloth diapers as 
a healthier, more environmental friendly and cheaper solution, and they launched 
the whole venture in 2006. With the production of cloth diapers, RODA has set 
an example of social entrepreneurship among associations. A high-quality product 
made from natural materials, healthy and safe for children, is manufactured, while 
disabled and difficult-to-employ persons are involved in the production. The pro-
duction facilities are established within Vocational High School in Varaždin, and 
there are 56 women working there. Social entrepreneurship is sustainable, it brings 
profit to the association, develops and expands and creates new jobs. The profits 
generated are reinvested in the business and core activities of the organisation. The 
association has recently established a limited liability company for further produc-
tion of cloth diapers.
RODA has 12 branches throughout Croatia, and they have organised various 
activities in more than 50 cities and towns in Croatia. What now exists is a strong 
network embedded in society, which is the voice of advocacy for social change.
In order to strengthen its mission and public acceptance, every year RODA gives 
out awards to the relevant stakeholders who have contributed to fulfilling the mis-
sion of their organisation within the society. They also give out a kind of anti-award 
to those who have been prominent in their negative approach to the vision of the 
association. In 2011, this anti-award went to the Croatian Minister of Health, who 
had advocated a restrictive law on medically assisted reproduction.
RODA is known to the wider public through the RODA forum, which has over 
40,000 monthly visits. This is the platform where new members with new ideas ap-
pear, and they contribute to strengthening the community spirit of the association 
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and its constant renewal. This usually refers to the first experience of membership in 
an organisation and first experience of volunteering. New members always have the 
time and passion to volunteer and help the others, and they also develop their own 
character in that way: It is not only about giving, but also receiving to a great extent. 
Advising other people is a completely new experience for them—to have a feeling 
that they help the others and that others believe them. These are solid foundations 
of a sustainable social network ready to take on the new challenges.
The main organising principle is that the association is managed like a house-
hold, with better-educated members: 95 % of them have never been members of any 
associations before. Ideas and projects belong to the association, while volunteer 
work builds trust and the atmosphere in which members are accepted and respected 
and they enjoy support of others.
The fact is that these are the middle-class persons who are quite well off, and 
none of them receives income-tested children’s allowance, so the association is not 
concerned with this topic. Their members are a specific group with similar back-
ground, which directs their interests and values to a certain extent. This is why they 
often cannot perceive the position and priorities of low-income mothers. In this 
case, civic initiative produced in the CSO belongs to well-off families from young 
generation exclusively.
The dynamics of social innovation remains visible here through the provision of 
services: There are tangible and recognisable results. However, advocacy activities 
are harder to see and they provide long-term results. These two processes and pri-
orities in the association are intertwined. As an association, RODA keeps changing 
as the children grow up, and this is something that will be interesting to follow in 
the future. It is simply the dynamics that is difficult to predict. We are talking about 
a sense of membership in the network in which women share the same or similar 
values. This is the support that many people need in their lives. The strength and 
substance of the women is felt in the association. Interestingly enough, none of 
the politicians has approached the association or expressed direct interest in their 
work.1 It might be seen as a critical issue in terms of governance and perception 
of this group among politicians as the “opposition”. Although they are regularly 
financed by the state due the quality of their projects, they are not sufficiently rec-
ognised by politicians for their actions, and the politicians do not perceive them as 
strategic partners in policy making. This witnesses to weak capacity of politicians 
and fragmentation of society.
However, RODA operates in a society where too many people remain silent 
about things that bother or disturb them; they do not protest, they were raised to 
obey. If they seek changes, they have to speak publicly about it: The service provid-
ers will hear them in one way or the other. What is announced publicly always has a 
certain resonance. Through such public speech and statements, RODA has become 
1 However, in the case of discussion on the increase in prices for children daycare, some stakehold-
ers felt that civil society organizations were happy to come under the umbrella of political parties, 
this association included, as it meets their interest.
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a recognisable stakeholder in the family policy, which improves the quality of pro-
grammes for children, their accommodation and diet.
Adequate levels of trust and promoted norms and values are shared by all mem-
bers of the association, especially the ones practicing volunteer work. In that way, 
the contribution to social capital multiplication has been made, as a basis for social 
innovation in the association and beyond. “Mobilisation and organising around a 
shared vision of change” (Moulaert and Mehmood 2013, p. 448) is an added value 
of this innovation. In this case, social change is visible in an area that used to be the 
area of privacy and the space of few government services. It was a framework for 
social innovation that strengthened the social cohesion in general public.
RODA has passed their knowledge and skills to the organisations in South East 
Europe, in Sarajevo, Belgrade and other cities. However, it has been impossible 
to implement such a programme in these countries, as there is neither willingness 
nor need for volunteer work. So in this case, it can be clearly stated that social in-
novation emerged from civil engagement and volunteer work of citizens, as a kind 
of collective action (Habisch and Loza Adaui 2013), making effort to protect and 
promote their interests.
11.2.2  Concepts and Ways of Addressing Users
By promoting and advocating the rights of children, RODA has impacted changes in 
public policies for children, women and families. Through their consistent coopera-
tion with the media, they have made a recognisable influence on public opinion and 
lobbied for changes in childcare. For the first time in public policy, being involved 
in a copayment scheme, they come up with the image of the services co-producer, 
having vested in the quality of service for which they are paying. RODA encourages 
active and responsible parenting through direct support and assistance to parents, 
equipping them with skills and knowledge, empowering them and making them 
better advocates of the rights of their children. They are joined and networked, 
which makes them strong and decisive in their public statements.
Parents are the ones who make decisions about their children. The children do 
not belong to the institutions, but parents can affect the quality of services that chil-
dren receive in childcare institutions.
RODA has become an important stakeholder in the debate on the right to ad-
equate maternity allowance and maternity leave, the right to medically assisted re-
production, pregnancy and improving birthing conditions, as well as promotion, 
education and counselling on breastfeeding, education and support to parents and 
children safety in traffic.
The association has gradually developed into some kind of a “union of parents”. 
They have created a new paradigm of parenting in Croatia, promoting the idea that 
children need their parents and their greater affection. This kind of attachment par-
enting is based on emotions and first experience of parenthood. “When you do not 
have a family to help you, you turn to those similar to yourself.”
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RODA is familiar with the problems of many parents barely surviving, seeking 
their help: They state the cases of families of five who live in apartments of 26 m2. 
The housing situation is a limiting factor in the expansion of families and the deci-
sion to have two or more children. Temporary, 1-year employment contracts also 
present certain constraints. The association has helped some families to cover de-
layed rent payments.
For 8 years, RODA has been providing support and advice on breastfeeding 
through their breastfeeding hotline. They have also organised a school of breast-
feeding, a conference and printed and distributed relevant materials. These activities 
become a strong lever for the social integration of young mothers. This innovation 
can be studied also as gender and parenthood relations about social arrangement 
and capacity to organise daily life (André 2013, pp. 414–415).
Considering the vulnerability of children in their parents’ cars, RODA launched 
an initiative for proper use of car seats for children. The result of the initiative was 
the increase in the number of children who are driven in car seats, as well as in the 
proportion of car seats that are correctly installed and used appropriately. In the 
framework of this programme, a large number of brochures have been printed and 
good cooperation with the police has been established, in so far as they organised 
quick traffic controls near kindergartens and on the city roads.
Four times a year, RODA organises sales of second-hand children’s clothing, 
shoes and equipment. So far, 30 sales were held, and each was visited by an average 
of 800 parents. Organising such a 3-day event requires the help of 40 volunteers.
As the children of parents belonging to this association grow up, RODA might 
develop programmes for teenagers in the scope of its future activities.
11.2.3  Interaction with the Local Welfare System
As a well-known stakeholder and advocate of social services for children, RODA 
had an impact on the practice of making and implementing childcare policy in Za-
greb. In partnership with other organisations, they have exerted pressure on the city 
administration to organise a special session of the Committee for Education and 
Sports, the body of the City Council, the topic being the prices of childcare services 
in Zagreb. Instead of paying for the cost of services on the income-test basis, they 
insisted parents should be means-tested (income, property, etc.). Raising the issue 
of the means test as a prerequisite for eligibility to social rights is a big and impor-
tant thing in the national social welfare system. With such impact, the proposal of 
increasing the cost for such services on an income-test basis has not been accepted.2
Also, RODA put on the agenda the issue of quality of childcare services in terms 
of space per child in kindergartens, quality of food for children and educational pro-
grammes. In representing users of services, they are very much respected as a stake-
holder, and they are gradually witnessing a process of quality service improvement.
2 At that time, there was strong opposition to the Mayor in the City Council.
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After RODA’s actions, CSOs of parents have become a visible part of the gov-
ernance structure of the local welfare system, which made the local welfare system 
more vibrant and responsive to the public and, specifically, to beneficiaries of social 
services. As the media were covering all debates and events, the general public got a 
sense of importance of CSOs and, in this case, of self-organised mothers.
For the first time, this case opened a debate on public issues where citizens have 
vested interests and showed strengths of a civil organisation addressing public is-
sues and influencing policy process. With this experience, a new culture of com-
munication and relationship of the city with CSOs might be seen.
11.3  Conclusions
In transitional countries, civil society is a space for the self-organisation and mo-
bilisation of citizens to protect and to promote their interests. Civic norms, values 
and networks produce a necessary level of social capital to build trust among local 
stakeholders and to strengthen social cohesion.
In this case, there existed a fertile soil for social innovations and, after a cer-
tain period of time, social entrepreneurship. RODA was established as a success-
ful social innovation because it was in possession of certain social capital mostly 
from middle class citizens that were its key actors. Also, they were among the first 
organisations that actively worked in family policy area counting on engagement 
of families. They became recognised and branded themselves so they are now the 
organisation that almost every mother has heard about, which contributes to their 
success as social innovation. It is obvious that developmental capacity of this inno-
vation, being owned by a civic organisation, increases on a steady basis.
Empirical evidence says that civil society is a space for self-organisation and self-
promotion of the middle class, which is the core of “urban citizenship”. It brings 
the issue of fragmentation of the space of civil society as a relevant topic for further 
research. Important question is the one of capacities and inequalities. What are the 
differences in possibilities of organisations with developed social connections and 
social capital derived from their middle class status as opposed to the organisations 
founded by lower class citizens? Also, what are the differences between urban and 
rural based organisation?
The case made impact on the local and national welfare systems in terms of 
policy making process and governance producing new welfare culture in this field. 
Besides such promising development of the analysed social innovation in the space 
of civil society, the social welfare system, which is in the hands of government and 
the city, has still not become the space of viable social innovations. Overregulation 
and paternalistic style of government, where the authorities own public policy, re-
mains the major obstacle for developing social innovations (Bežovan et al. 2013). 
Some earlier research (Bežovan 2010) identifies the problems of a lack of coordi-
nation and poor cooperation between different local stakeholders. Mobilisation of 
local stakeholders and facilitation of social change appears to be a demanding and 
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difficult process that capacitive organisations such as RODA need to overcome to 
develop social innovations.
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Chapter 12
Amsterdam: Neighbourhood Stores for 
Education, Research, and Talent Development—
The BOOT Project
Francesca Broersma, Taco Brandsen and Joost Fledderus
12.1  Introduction
Amsterdam is increasingly torn—between wanting to be a “social” city on the one 
hand, and a “competitive” city on the other. The fact that the Labour Party ( Partij 
van de Arbeid, or PvdA) was the largest party in the municipal council from the end 
of the Second World War until 2014 and that the mayor has always been a member 
of this party during this period indicates that Amsterdam is, to this day, a city that 
treasures a secure safety net for the more vulnerable segments of society. Yet, the 
fact that during the last two decades the municipal coalition has included represen-
tatives from the left to the right side of the political spectrum shows that the stronger 
leftist tendencies once there in the past have made way for a more moderated ideol-
ogy. Whilst equality and solidarity are undoubtedly still defining values in the social 
and political mentality of Amsterdam, the city has progressively become more and 
more open to the ideas of differentiation and efficiency.
An important recent occurrence that marked the way in which Amsterdam cur-
rently approaches the provision of local welfare services was the introduction of the 
national Community Development Programme (wijkaanpak) in 2007, an integrated, 
more holistic approach towards neighbourhood regeneration; besides improving the 
physical environment, the wijkaanpak aims to enhance the broader liveability (leef-
baarheid) in disadvantaged neighbourhoods—that is, to improve the social and the 
economic environment too. Moreover, in the wijkaanpak, citizen participation is 
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key. At the same time, the wijkaanpak encourages various actors that are involved 
in the provision of welfare services at the local level to engage in new partnerships 
with other actors that are operating within their same neighbourhoods. In practice, 
the wijkaanpak has been pushing for all of the various actors involved in the provi-
sion of welfare services in Amsterdam to join forces and tackle societal problems in 
a more coordinated and more efficient manner. Existing (welfare) organizations are 
thus increasingly forced to reconsider not only their approach towards the provision 
of welfare services but also their (traditional) organizational culture.
Neighbourhood Stores for Education, Research, and Talent Development ( Buur-
twinkels voor Onderzoek, Onderwijs en Talentontwikkeling, or BOOT) can be seen 
as a confluence of these developments, a national drive towards more collaboration 
and a local evolution towards pragmatic, tailored solutions to the problems of spe-
cific areas.
12.2  Neighbourhood Stores for Education, Research, and 
Talent Development (Buurtwinkels voor Onderzoek, 
Onderwijs en Talentontwikkeling)
The nationally implemented Community Development Programme (wijkaanpak) 
that started in 2007 raised the question about how the Hogeschool van Amsterdam 
(HvA)—the largest institute for higher professional education in Amsterdam—could 
connect the knowledge and the competences of its students, teachers, researchers, 
and network to the so-called problem areas (aandachtswijken) in Amsterdam, in 
such a way as to contribute to the socioeconomic development of these neighbour-
hoods. In the meanwhile, the HvA aspired to be the university of Amsterdam, for 
Amsterdam. Hence, in consultation with the municipality, the HvA came up with 
the BOOT concept.
The first BOOT was opened in 2008, and by now there are four BOOTs in four 
different city districts (West, Oost, Zuid-Oost, and Nieuw-West). Various pro-
grammes of different domains of the university give their students the opportunity 
to do an internship for a minimum of 5 months and a maximum of 10 months, 4–5 
days a week, at one of the BOOTs. These domains include the Domain of Economics 
and Management ( Domein Economie en Management, or DEM), the Domain Tech-
nique (Domein Techniek), and the Domain Society and Law ( Domein Maatschap-
pij en Recht, or DMR). Accordingly, various services are offered at BOOTs. The 
standard set of services that are provided in all BOOTs comprises financial, legal, 
social, and nutritional consultation hours, homework support for 6–10-year-olds, 
and an atelier for urban renewal. In addition, depending on the specific needs of the 
neighbourhood/residents/organizations, BOOTs may also engage in other activities.
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12.2.1  Conceptions and Ways of Addressing Users
In reality, there are different kinds of users of BOOTs. From the perspective of the 
university, the main users are the students—BOOTs are set up and supported by the 
HvA so that their students can gain practical experience and their teachers are more 
in contact with their work field. Ultimately, for the university, what matters the most 
is that through the BOOTs, they are able to educate better social workers for the 
future. At the same time, BOOTs are also used by city districts and local (welfare) 
organizations to conduct research projects and/or to help them in their provision of 
(welfare) services. Last but certainly not the least, BOOTs are used by residents of 
deprived neighbourhoods, who resort to the students for personal advice as well as 
for help to organize activities in their neighbourhood.
For the residents of disadvantaged neighbourhoods to which students in the 
BOOTs are offering their services, BOOTs appear to be an easily accessible point of 
information and assistance. Whilst some residents, for one reason or another, may 
be more hesitant to approach formal services that are provided by more traditional 
(municipal) welfare organizations, they seem to be less hesitant to approach the 
(students in the) BOOTs for help. Moreover, residents that resort to BOOTs seem to 
value the fact that students take their time to figure things out for them and that they 
try to offer more personalized assistance than they do in other existing welfare orga-
nizations/associations. That on average 350–500 residents visit the various BOOT 
locations every week indicates that residents of disadvantaged neighbourhoods ap-
preciate the existence of a BOOT in their vicinity.
12.2.2  Internal Organization and Modes of Working
The way in which BOOTs are internally organized is mainly decided by the Am-
sterdam University of Applied Sciences. The HvA delivers most of the staff for the 
BOOTs (be they students, teachers, or mentors), it supplies the bulk of the funding 
(most of the participating “domains” at the university contribute a certain amount 
of money to be able to pay for the staff and the necessary equipment), and its aca-
demic schedule decides the timeframe of the activities that are carried out in the 
BOOTs. However, in most cases, housing corporations provide the location, and 
the city districts pay the fixed costs such as gas, electricity, water, and Internet. In 
some cases, BOOTs have set up a so-called Neighbourhood Partner Agreement (wi-
jkpartnerovereenkomst), which is an agreement between the BOOT and partnering 
organizations in which BOOT promises to provide certain services in return for a 
location/compensation of the fixed costs. In other cases, it is the city district itself 
that asked for a BOOT to be set up and thus also provides a location for them. By 
now, all BOOTs have not only a standard set of services that they provide but they 
also carry out additional services/activities depending on the specific needs and 
desires of residents and organizations in the neighbourhood, like the manager of 
202 F. Broersma et al.
BOOT explains: “It’s a bit like a menu, where you can choose: I want a BOOT with 
the standard set of services. But if you want BOOT to carry out extra projects on top 
of those […] then that is also financed separately”(Manager BOOT).
The modes of working, though—in terms of the services that a BOOT offers—
are very much based on the needs of the neighbourhood in which a BOOT is located. 
In fact, BOOTs seek to fill the gaps in welfare provision that are left by other (mu-
nicipal) welfare organizations that are already active in the neighbourhood—either 
by offering specific types of services or by targeting specific groups of residents. To 
be able to fill this gap and to adjust the services that are offered by BOOTs to those 
that are provided by other organizations, close collaboration with existing (welfare) 
organizations in the neighbourhood is crucial.
12.2.3  Interaction with the Local Welfare System
As BOOTs focus on providing welfare services that are not yet being offered 
(enough) in a particular neighbourhood, there is a strong interaction with the local 
welfare system in the different neighbourhoods in which they are located, and they 
maintain a closely cooperating network of partners. In fact, the most innovative 
aspect of BOOTs is the binding role that an educational facility like the HvA—as a 
fresh and more neutral actor in the field of welfare provision—plays between differ-
ent (welfare) organizations that are operating within the same territorial boundaries, 
yet not necessarily cooperating much. When BOOTs first started, for many welfare 
organizations that were already in those neighbourhoods, this was a difficult transi-
tion to make, as they had been used to providing a particular service in a certain way 
and were generally very much focused towards the inside—on their own activities/
organization. BOOTs bring many of these different, so far disconnected, actors to-
gether, which not only provides a clearer overview of the services that are present in 
a certain neighbourhood and of those that are lacking but it also stimulates all part-
nering organizations to have a more outward look. As the manager of BOOT noted:
(…) You have to give it a lot of time to build up a trusting relationship. And, the most 
important—and in that you can educate other organizations a bit too—is that you put the 
residents at the centre of it all. Because it’s actually a bit weird that you would see this as 
competition … You have been put there with money from the government to carry out ser-
vices for the residents. If you can do that better with someone else’s help, it is a bit weird if 
you wouldn’t want to do that. But that is something that with the Community Development 
Program (‘wijkaanpak’) was a cultural process also. Organizations were very much turned 
towards themselves, and well, they had to start working more result-driven. […] While, the 
point of the ‘wijkaanpak’ was that you would bring your forces together to solve societal 
problems. […] And I think that we… because we were independent—so we were not part 
of the municipality, or of housing corporations, or welfare organizations—we tried to get 
everybody to turn a bit more towards the outside (Manager BOOT).
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12.2.4  Future Developments
The entire BOOT concept is based on nonprofit-making growth model, which may 
be difficult to maintain in a future where all partners are facing budget cuts. BOOTs 
too are thus constantly looking for ways to innovate themselves, so they can some-
how continue to offer their services in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The BOOT 
manager stressed the importance of mobilising and pooling different resources:
At some point the city district is going to pull itself back more, simply because they are not 
getting any money for this anymore. And then you have to look at (…) how you can keep 
this going, without costing more money, but that you still grow. […] So you have to look 
how you can create an exchange system with existing partners, so they can keep their costs 
low by using students. […] We are especially busy with looking at how residents—because 
there is of course a lot of knowledge also with residents, and time, unfortunately these days 
also with people who are highly qualified, but that are unemployed—to look at how they 
can guide the students for a part. […] That would be great, matching the trend that residents 
themselves are looking for themselves how to organize things.
BOOT—for which the motivation and the driving force comes from more “com-
mon” educational facilities—is perhaps a type of innovation that is more likely to be 
diffused in an international context, and, as a matter of fact, already is:
We talk a lot with other educational facilities—like ROC, in Holland, the University of 
Applied Sciences in Nijmegen—to see how they could do that within their own context. 
And that gives us a lot of interesting information. So there are also other BOOT concepts 
in other parts of the Netherlands, who do it in their own way. That fits with their university; 
that fits with the needs of the residents that live in those neighbourhoods. And that is a 
movement that I think has been very good, to see how higher educational facilities can do 
more than just education in the traditional way. But how can you really use that exchange 
with the city? And that’s a trend that you see in the whole of the Netherlands, even in 
Europe (Manager BOOT).
What certainly helps diffusion is the existence of an extensive network of third 
sector (welfare) organizations and the presence of local governments that take on a 
leading and steering role. In the case of Amsterdam, the fact that there are already 
many local welfare provisions in place means that knowledge and personnel are 
often there, but it is a matter of coordinating efforts more efficiently. While local 
governments may not be able to provide financial support the way they used to in 
the past, it is all the more important that they remain active in bringing scattered 
and disjointed (welfare) organizations closer together. In Amsterdam, although the 
public administration surrounding welfare provisions is bulky and fragmented, the 
fact that it is a capital city that wants to set an example in the Netherlands also puts 
pressure on the administration to be innovative and dynamic. In other words, politi-
cally, a change of (organizational) culture must be supported and encouraged.
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12.3  Conclusion
Due to its particular (political) history and (administrative) structure, Amsterdam 
has an extensive and intricate system of separate and rather compartmentalized ac-
tors involved in the provision of local welfare services. Every city district has its 
own (welfare) programme and organizations, and due to the availability of suf-
ficient funding/subsidies, all of these actors have long had the possibility of work-
ing fairly independently from one another. Instead, at the moment, the political 
discourse in Amsterdam calls for social innovations that target social cohesion at 
the local level in an efficient manner. Hence, the political discourse favours social 
innovations that promote closer collaboration between the many (disjointed) actors 
that are involved in the provision of welfare services at the local level and that en-
courage new actors—including for example universities—to step up to the plate. In 
particular, the innovations that seem to enjoy most (political/financial) support are 
those that seek to combine both the social and the competitive side of the city and 
try to bridge the gap between those two (so far rather disconnected) worlds. BOOTs 
are a prime example of this.
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Chapter 13
Lille Metropolis: Co-production of Housing 
in a Major Urban Renewal District
Laurent Fraisse
13.1  Introduction
Union is the name of one of the biggest urban renewal projects in the Roubaix-
Tourcoing-Wattrelot district (Lille Metropolis). In a post-industrial site spreading 
across 80 ha, a large project has been planned combining an eco-neighbourhood, a 
business hub and new housing, including 30 % of social housing. In a district called 
Ilot Stephenson at the periphery of this area, a protest by inhabitants against the de-
molition of their popular housing led to an innovative housing co-production action 
between architects, local authorities and an inhabitants’ organisation. Access to 30 
homes at reduced cost has been achieved thanks to an innovative mode of architec-
tural intervention that encourages inhabitants’ participation in the self-rehabilitation 
of their neighbourhood. This emblematic initiative has inspired and has been inte-
grated into the broader participative governance process of one of the most ambi-
tious urban renewal projects in northern France.
This innovation-driven urban process has to be understood in the context of a 
long de-industrialisation process within the Lille Metropolitan area and the Nord-
Pas-de Calais region. This process has strongly affected the historical working class 
and inclusion in the labour market of new generations, who face high degrees of 
unemployment and a rise in social vulnerabilities. The area’s industrial background 
has also impacted on the nature of housing, with a large stock of working-class 
houses, former blue-collar dormitories that have become de facto social housing. A 
lot of them have been left unused for many years and tend not to comply with health 
and safety regulations, with tenants living in very poor, even insalubrious condi-
tions (inadequate heating system, substandard water supply, etc.). In this context, 
metropolitan urban policies have aimed at investing in urban renewal and housing 
construction to improve urban living conditions but also to promote economic re-
generation. This urban renewal operation has been politically one of the significant 
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projects launched and managed by the Lille Metropolis Urban Community (LMCU) 
which gathered 85 municipalities, large cities (Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing) and their 
independent suburbs, and was governed by a left wing coalition between 2008 and 
2014.
On a wider scale, the background to this innovation is a period of urban policies 
in the 2000s characterised by a vast national programme of urban renewal targeting 
deprived districts. Several hundred demolition-reconstruction operations covering 
large social housing complexes built during the 1960s and 1970s have taken place 
in the suburbs of France’s big cities. Focusing mainly on the architectural and con-
struction aspects, the role and participation of inhabitants in such urban renewal 
projects has often been the subject of controversy (Donzelot and Epstein 2006; Hall 
and Hickman 2011). The Ilot Stephenson initiative could be considered as a pilot 
project to test an alternative approach to urban renewal (Fraisse 2013). Architect 
Patrick Bouchain and his colleagues launched the concept Construisons ensemble, 
Le Grand ensemble [Working together to build the whole urban area], which was 
tested between 2009 and 2012 (Bouchain and David 2010).
13.2  The Ilot Stephenson Rehabilitation
The story of the Ilot Stephenson neighbourhood started with a conflict at the be-
ginning of the 2000s when the inhabitants of this small working-class neighbour-
hood located at the periphery of the Union urban renewal project learnt that the 
municipality would purchase their houses and then demolish them. They organised 
themselves into an organisation named Rase pas mon quartier [Don’t demolish my 
neighbourhood] and initiated actions protesting against the project with some sup-
port from various elected opposition members.
After several years, they succeeded in stopping the demolition project in 2004. 
In 2007, the Lille Metropolis authorities decided to transfer the management of the 
whole Union urban renewal development to the semi-public company, SEM Ville 
Renouvelée, with an obligation to properly integrate sustainable development and 
participatory approaches. After 3 years, during which nothing happened, the Ilot 
Stephenson project was the first operation launched in an atmosphere of mutual 
mistrust between inhabitants and urban planners. The mayor of Tourcoing and SEM 
Ville Renouvelée decided to call on architect Patrick Bouchain and his team to re-
think the urban project with the inhabitants of the neighbourhood.
After a contentious atmosphere between inhabitants and local authorities, new 
ways of addressing inhabitants of the Stephenson neighbourhood emerged and 
opened up a new period of collaboration. An innovative architectural intervention 
based on participative and local co-production has led to the rehabilitation of 30 
historical houses and the improvement of 24 inhabited houses. Of this, 12 have been 
purchased by a social landlord. Several have taken on a self-rehabilitation dimen-
sion and were sold at a lower price. In addition, architecture skills and urban project 
management were available for any owners or tenants making housing improve-
ments (thermal and energetic diagnosis, insulation, etc.).
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13.3  Approaches and Ways of Addressing Users
The Ilot Stephenson project is a new architectural and urban planning experiment 
conceptualised by Patrick Bouchain and his architects’ firm, Construire. They are 
part of the architectural movement that considers that building cities should not 
only be a matter for specialists (architects, urban planners, property developers, so-
cial landlords, etc.) and that inhabitants should not be passive subjects who are gen-
erally excluded from most social housing, construction and urban renewal projects. 
Inhabitants’ participation in the production of social housing or rehabilitation of 
urban areas is one of the key principles for improving cohabitation in the city. In this 
context, the recent and systematic demolition-reconstruction incentives in France 
do not sufficiently take into account people’s lives and the neighbourhood’s history.
“Building is living” is one of the principles of a new interaction with residents. It 
means that the building phase is no longer regarded as a parenthesis in inhabitants’ 
lives, but as an important opportunity for public expression and civic participation 
seen as a condition for sustainable and efficient housing rehabilitation. Conceptu-
ally, the building site is no longer seen as a no man’s land and a temporary phase in 
the life of the neighbourhood but as a dynamic episode in the lives of the inhabit-
ants.
Concretely, the architects immersed themselves in the Stephenson neighbour-
hood by locating part of their office in an old electronics workshop. This daily 
presence changed relationships with inhabitants and other stakeholders as well as 
the architects’ perception of the initial architectural scheme, by setting it against the 
habits and needs of everyday life. They knew whom to contact for any daily issues 
on the building site. The electronics workshop was also transformed into a public 
space where a large model of the urban project was reconstructed for the inhab-
itants. Several meetings with residents, elected representatives, technicians from 
local authorities and representatives of local organisations were organised for pre-
senting and discussing adaptation of the initial plan. Regular workshops and con-
ferences were organised in the electronics workshop bringing together the current 
and future inhabitants and exploring topics such as making compost or recovering 
wastewater. Educational activities were also planned with children.
The new approach to the urban renewal project led to concrete and substan-
tive changes for the community. Beyond the concrete rehabilitation or improve-
ment of about 60 houses that should initially have been pulled down, the public 
exhibition and discussion of the large-scale model led to a change in the initial 
architectural proposal. Initially located just in front of some tall buildings planned 
for the eco-neighbourhood, the rehabilitation of small traditional houses presented 
the problem of a disproportionate scale and of perspective. A consensual agree-
ment between all stakeholders has been reached based on the revision of the urban 
plan involving the progressive transition of the height of the buildings adjacent 
to the Stephenson neighbourhood. Moreover, the architects mediated discussions 
about the future of the cul-de-sac that the urban planners wanted to open to traffic, 
whereas families wanted to keep it as a secured space where children could run 
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around and play safely. The compromise was to partially open the cul-de-sac, mak-
ing it accessible to pedestrians and bikes but not cars. The construction of the first 
model of renewed housing that the residents agreed on was visited by present and 
future inhabitants. The idea was to meet and involve future residents in the district 
before they moved in.
The Ilot Stephenson project has also inspired and strengthened the gover-
nance of the whole urban renewal planning process. The semi-public company 
SEM Ville Renouvelée has adopted a participatory approach by implementing the 
eco-neighbourhood. Factors include the co-production of a sustainable development 
framework. Its formulation has not only involved the different local authorities and 
housing developers but also groups of local non-profit organisations called Collec-
tif de l’Union. This group of local organisations and citizens demanded, from the 
beginning of the Union urban renewal plan, integration of employment, social and 
ecological aspects alongside the initial business and construction dimensions. Some 
collective proposals coming from local residents associations were formulated in 
2010 to include grassroots projects and participation by inhabitants within the urban 
planning scheme. These claims, by degrees, took into account and partially im-
pacted urban governance planning. Thus, the framework for the eco-neighbourhood 
adopted in 2007 was revised 4 years later in order to adjust to new needs expressed 
by local actors, local institutions’ strategies and national legislation. Moreover, a 
charter of participation was drawn up with the different Union stakeholders. The 
active involvement of the group of local organisations led to the creation of a spe-
cific fund for resident participation by the local authorities in order to support local 
initiatives connected to the renewal urban project. Finally, the creation of a “House 
of the Union” has been inspired by the internal organisation and working methods 
used by the electronics workshop experiment. The Union group of local organisa-
tions has been put in charge of running the space.
13.4  Internal Organisation and Working Methods
As the Stephenson project has demonstrated, opening a building site can involve 
several innovative aspects in the architectural working methods. The most important 
aspect is the temporary establishment of at least one architect in the neighbourhood 
during the building or rehabilitation phase. This new architectural position means a 
form of commitment in the community beyond a simple technical role. Concretely, 
part of the architects’ firm is established in the district, which is considered as a 
place of work. This sort of architect’s immersion has been pushed beyond working 
in the neighbourhood, like in the Stephenson operation, to actually living with the 
inhabitants, as has been the case in a similar rehabilitation of old working-class 
houses in Boulogne-sur-Mer on the west coast of the Nord-Pas de Calais region.
The presence of the architects’ office implies the mobilisation of new profession-
al practices and skills due to the fact that the architect and the development project 
are embedded in neighbourhood life. One of the results is the trend for tailor-made 
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approaches to housing rehabilitation that take into account domestic situations. Far 
from the sort of standardised urban construction that requires the same building 
materials throughout, a normalisation of inhabited rooms as well as heating and 
insulation systems, the architect tries to adapt interior and exterior construction 
through a compromise between urban requirements and inhabitants’ concrete needs. 
This can lead, for example, to the installation of a new wood stove that most of the 
families use rather than the heat pump initially planned by the social landlords. The 
idea is that new housing standards are not always more sustainable and efficient if 
they are too far removed from tenants’ habits. The architects also play the role of 
political regulator and social mediator in relationships between the local authorities, 
social landlords and inhabitants. Gaining the trust of inhabitants and getting them 
to agree to interventions at their homes, especially in a contentious context, means 
avoiding inappropriate decisions that risk halting the operation. For instance, archi-
tects may have to negotiate a lower and more progressive rent increase with social 
landlords than originally planned for the renovated houses.
New working methods also mean interactions with professionals (social workers, 
social entrepreneurs, artists, volunteers, etc.) who are involved in the neighbour-
hood in order to organise activities for and with the inhabitants during the building 
period. To a certain extent, the architect becomes a kind of community developer by 
facilitating the creation of public spaces and open meetings, by organising visits and 
animations with children, by being in contact with social services or work integra-
tion enterprises to obtain better access to rights or work opportunities for residents, 
by encouraging the intervention of artists in cultural events on the building site, etc. 
An initiative mentioned as unusual for local urban planners has been the contribu-
tion of students from Tourcoing Beaux Arts School who created a temporary art per-
formance within the houses under renovation. One example in Boulogne-sur-Mer 
has been the participation of a number of inhabitants involved in self-renovation 
of their homes in building skills training sessions that potentially open up new job 
perspectives to them.
In the case of Ilot Stephenson, the architects’ presence also led to the involvement 
of local building artisans. This was facilitated by public procurement contracts di-
vided into small batches, and the fact that the location of the architect’s office at the 
building venue also changed the rhythm of professional interactions with construc-
tion workers who did not have to wait for the architect’s traditional weekly visit to 
the building site for solving practical issues.
At the urban planners’ level, the main change in working methods was the 2007 
creation of a new statute of technician in charge of sustainable development and in-
habitants’ participation, introduced when management of the urban renewal project 
was transferred to SEM Ville Renouvelée. It is an innovation in a professional milieu 
dominated by architects and urban planners who are not used to and do not know 
how to work with groups of inhabitants, local organisations and neighbourhood 
councils. Urban planners have learnt to systematically present and discuss the urban 
project with residents within the different neighbourhood councils as well as on ad 
hoc committees.
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13.5  Embeddedness in the Local Welfare System
From a local political issue to an emblematic and publicised project, the Ilot Ste-
phenson story has profoundly influenced the Tourcoing mayor, urban planners from 
SEM Ville Renouvelée and Lille Metropolis and other stakeholders in the project. 
It has definitely led to the integration of a human and participatory dimension in 
urban planning and urban renewal projects. According to the architects, calling into 
question, even if partially, the plan for a large and emblematic urban renewal project 
already voted in by the local authorities remains quite rare.
Although such innovations are quite sensitive to the local context, several fac-
tors can be identified for explaining why it has worked. Firstly, Ilot Stephenson, 
like the housing rehabilitation in Boulogne-sur-Mer, was considered a problematic 
zone within the initial urban renewal plan. Faced with deadlock situations such 
as residents’ protests or the retrenchment of welfare services, local policymakers 
opened their minds to new ideas and agreed to explore new urban solutions. Con-
sequently, the political will of the mayor was fundamental for long-term support 
for the architects in the face of scepticism expressed at the beginning by a number 
of social landlords, local urban planners and social workers. Secondly, the national 
reputation of the architect and his connections with the political network are another 
important factor, not only for launching such a specific experiment, but also for 
integrating and legitimizing it with networks, processes and resources from other 
scales. Thirdly, it is worth noting that the contract mechanism used for this ex-
periment is also unusual for this kind of urban operation. Whereas local authorities 
usually turn to public procurement for urban planning projects, this was a partner-
ship agreement (convention de partenariat), which provided the contractual frame 
between the architects’ firm and SEM Ville Renouvelée. An adapted contracting 
mechanism is favourable to this sort of tailor-made urban project.
Finally, the Ilot Stephenson case is interesting because conceptualisation is an 
ongoing process, expressed by the slogan Faire ensemble, Le Grand ensemble 
[“Working together to build the whole urban area”], which has been tested suc-
cessfully in other places, such as the rehabilitation of all the precarious housing on 
a street in Boulogne-sur-Mer. This ability of the Construire architects to transform 
local experiments within a specific context into a more or less mainstream concept 
is crucial for being able to influence collective representations of what is or is not 
innovative, and to become relevant to people and institutions from outside. Archi-
tects regularly conceptualise and communicate on a new urban approach to social 
housing construction and urban rehabilitation through publications, conferences 
and videos.
In addition, one of the architects who worked in the Stephenson neighbourhood 
throughout the entire project won a prize for young urban planners in 2012. The Ilot 
Stephenson project has been subject to local publicity and media coverage with a 
special website and numerous articles in the regional press. The inhabitants’ organ-
isation was often solicited by journalists. Stephenson has gradually become a kind 
of showcase project, with all the risks of overexposure in terms of expectations cre-
ated. Whereas the Ilot Stephenson was a local political problem at the beginning of 
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the 2000s, 10 years on, it has become an emblematic success promoted by the local 
authorities. Attention for the project goes far beyond the local community. Many 
professors and students of architectural schools, delegations of technicians from 
other cities and even international visitors have visited the building site and met the 
architects and urban planning team.
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Chapter 14
Pamplona: Neighbourhood Children 
Services—A Grassroots and Local Council 
Initiative
Manuel Aguilar Hendrickson and Marta Llobet Estany
14.1  Introduction
In this chapter, we analyse a programme that was born of a grassroots initiative 
of several neighbourhood associations and was taken up by the local council of 
Pamplona. During the early 1990s, several neighbourhood associations set up edu-
cational activities for children that the local authorities integrated into their children 
services structure as “community children teams” aimed at providing “community 
preventive action services”. This has developed into a specific model of local pub-
lic service provision by community organisations where many of the complexities 
and ambivalences of the co-production of services and of social innovations may 
be seen.
14.2  The Context
Pamplona is the capital of Navarra, a small region in Northern Spain. Its urban area 
of 353,000 inhabitants makes up for slightly over half of the region’s population.
The regional and local governments have frequently boasted of having a level of 
social service provision clearly above the Spanish average, and of “pioneering” the 
development of social services. Financially and politically strong regional and local 
governments in a small, comparatively wealthy and less unequal region has allowed 
for a stronger development of social services. In some cases, especially during the 
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1980s and early 1990s, this meant the introduction of services previously unknown 
in the region.
Civil society organisations have a long tradition in Navarra. This stems from a 
strong conservative tradition of local self-government, going back to the “Carlist” 
traditionalism of the nineteenth century, from the strength of the Catholic Church 
and its organisations, and from the complex political development of these tradi-
tions since the 1960s. The radical changes undergone in Navarra since the 1960s 
transformed a rural agrarian region into an industrial and service-based one, con-
centrated most of its population in the capital, Pamplona, and opened up dramatic 
political cleavages between left and right, and between Basque nationalism and 
Navarrese regionalism.
Third sector organisations emerging of these processes are generally very much 
respected by most of the political and social spectrum, as they represent the soli-
daristic “soul” of Navarra and its concern for the weakest. Although social innova-
tion does not seem to be an explicit political priority, new initiatives coming from 
these organisations are usually seen with sympathy, even when they challenge the 
dominant views in the political sphere. In many cases, the orientations and values 
of these initiatives openly depart from dominant orientations, as for example when 
flexibility and “informality” in the way of addressing users are opposed to for-
malised “managerial” approaches, or when the social value of workplace relations 
is opposed to dominant “work-first” activation approaches (Aguilar Hendrickson 
2013).
These innovative initiatives may be integrated in several ways. In some cases, 
they may be seen as limited actions for some special cases that fall out of the main-
stream programs, and require a careful personalised treatment, for which TSOs 
seem to be the perfect solution. This may be widely accepted by the left (as a way 
of expanding social action when it is not possible to do it directly by means of 
public programs) and the right that feels quite comfortable when expanding the role 
of TSOs and limiting direct public provision. In other cases, a widespread political 
consensus may not translate into actual priorities. The possibility of integrating the 
initiatives into two different (and sometimes opposed) narratives helps to establish 
consensus in many cases.
Aside from TSO initiatives and government predisposition towards allowing 
TSOs to develop their initiatives, pressure from the European Union (EU) and the 
central government have played a role. The pressure to establish action plans for 
social inclusion (Navarra set up its own plan long before it became compulsory) has 
eased the development of some initiatives (something has to be done in a specific 
field). On the other hand, the widespread discourse on “best practices” has encour-
aged the development of innovative initiatives, although they do not always make 
their way into the mainstream.
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14.3  The Development of Neighbourhood Children’s 
Services in Pamplona
The group of associations we are analysing in Pamplona carry out social activities 
aimed at the prevention of social problems amongst children. It is the result of a 
movement of community associations that developed leisure activities for children 
and of their integration into the local government structure of social services, while 
retaining a peculiar way of working.
The first of these associations, Umetxea Sanduzelai, was created in 1990. They 
tried to keep a balance between their traditional “political” role of claiming for more 
and better services in their neighbourhood and a new role as service providers. They 
tried to create social and cultural projects, mostly aimed at children, pooling the re-
sources of several neighbourhood groups. These projects became quite successful. 
By 1994, some people in the local social services begin to see that these associations 
are being more successful in this field than their own public prevention programs, 
which many people in the neighbourhoods thought quite useless.
The neighbourhood associations have been suspect for possible sympathies with 
radical left wing parties and radical Basque nationalism, which in the context of 
political violence and of a serious political cleavage between Basque nationalism 
and Navarrese regionalism certainly did not make relationships easy. Somewhat 
surprisingly, it was a centre-right regionalist councillor who decided to establish a 
long-term agreement between the municipality and the associations. Although there 
was a strong and politicised debate, in the end the councillor said that “they work 
fine and they are much less expensive than other providers”.
Since 1995 in one neighbourhood and since 1997 in the other three, these as-
sociations are responsible for the so-called Community Preventive Action Service, 
a part of the local Family and Children Welfare Program. The typical activities of 
these programmes are leisure activities for different groups of children, including 
activity groups and playgrounds for the youngest, summer camps, neighbourhood 
festivals and networking amongst teenagers (2011). In some cases, it has meant 
not encouraging but supporting and accompanying actions like the squatting of an 
abandoned factory.
The future of the program has been uncertain in several occasions. The agree-
ments established in 1995–1997 ended in 2013. The local council has favoured 
since the late 1990s private providers that fit better into an entrepreneurial model, 
with whom they agree specific outcomes and targets in a much more managerial 
way. The existing TSOs are much more flexible, they are able to mobilise much 
more local resources, but they do so by being less hierarchic and formal in their 
relation with the local government. After a complex process, the agreements have 
been renewed for several years.
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14.3.1  Conceptions and Ways of Addressing Users
The traditional boundaries between practitioners and service users are somewhat 
blurred in these projects. There are certainly practitioners, who get paid for their job 
and are bound by a contract with the local council, but they are neighbours as well, 
and a local neighbourhood association hires them. Since they organise activities for 
the young and children, volunteer neighbours who take part in the activities carry 
out a large part of the actual implementation of the project (thus, they are service 
users and producers at the same time). And although some specific work is done 
to integrate children with special difficulties in the activities, there is no visible 
difference between them and other participants. “In our projects volunteers are as 
important as professional practitioners. Volunteers are not of the kind that shows up 
for an hour, but people who live here. (…) We promote the rights of the kids, so the 
kids are our bosses. They [the local government managers] don’t think in terms of 
rights, they told us don’t talk about rights, talk about problems and needs”.
The concept of neighbourhood is central to the work of these projects. Even 
if neighbourhoods may be relatively small, the feeling of belonging may be very 
strong, and it is very significant for newcomers (migrants) as well.
In Pamplona the question of locality is very important. Whoever hasn’t experienced it and 
doesn’t know a neighbourhood has a citywide outlook. That’s what happens to local coun-
cillors, (…) who don’t know about it and don’t understand it. If you take away the idea of 
neighbourhood from these kids you’ll kill them. For migrants, their only identity here is that 
of the neighbourhood. They’re neither from Pamplona nor from Spain, but they’re certainly 
from San Jorge [the name of one of the neighbourhoods].
The project works specifically with children with special needs both integrating 
them into activities and offering personal support and accompaniment. This role 
is different from the one played by ordinary child support services, which should 
be seen as different and separated. “[Control and support] should be separated, not 
only conceptually but in practice as well. Our space should be a space to look ahead 
and theirs as a space of protection if the children’s rights are being violated”.
14.3.2  Organisation and Modes of Working
The concept of working to promote the rights of children appears to be connected 
to the concept of autonomy of the projects, even if they belong to the local govern-
ment. The projects consider themselves accountable first to the children and the 
neighbours.
[In our case] either the project is based on the concept of rights or we don’t do it. The ques-
tion of our autonomy is basic, because without it we can’t carry them out, and our autonomy 
has practical effects, for it allows us a margin of flexibility and of method innovation that 
other projects don’t have. In our team sometimes each [of the three formally hired educa-
tors/social workers] takes responsibility for an area, but sometimes a few youngsters join us 
and its 5 or 6 of us managing the project. We can do that, but public employees can’t, and 
private providers can only do it at the expense of their workers.
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14.3.3  Governance
The triangle made up of the local council (responsible for the service as a whole), 
the associations (who have a legal agreement with the local council to carry it out) 
and the practitioners (who are employees of the association but are, in practice, 
integrated in the local social services organisation) allows for the aforementioned 
autonomy of the projects. Practitioners tend to speak the same language (with some 
nuances) as the local social services staff, but the leaders of the associations are lo-
cal neighbours with a strong commitment to their neighbours and tend to be much 
more “straight to the point”.
The kind of associations we work in is special, and our bosses are our fellows in all its 
complexity. (…) There was one of those meetings with the local council after a cutback 
of 50 per cent of our activity budget. We were very angry, and we as a team wrote down a 
document against the cutback, and the director of social services said she had nothing to 
talk with us and that she’d only talk to the leaders of the association, to our bosses. OK, go 
ahead! Now she prefers to talk to us.
The relationship between the associations and the local council is quite conflictive, 
in spite of, or maybe because of, a close relationship as direct providers of services 
commissioned by the local council.
14.4  Conclusions
The experience of the Neighbourhood Children’s Services raises some interesting 
questions on the political and social conditions of innovative practices. One might 
tend to believe that innovations are more likely to appear and develop in contexts 
where there is a strong political commitment to promote innovation and where such 
commitment is more consistent, less affected by partisan quarrelling, and where 
actors such as governing bodies and innovation developers are open to cooperate in 
good terms. One might as well associate innovation with developed and knowledge-
oriented environments. This case seems to support a rather different view. Some 
successful innovations (having lasted almost 20 years and a positive record of re-
sults is arguably success) may be possible in a context where innovation was not a 
priority and where political rivalries and mistrust (specifically between innovation 
developers and governing bodies) were, and still are, quite strong. This suggests 
that in some cases “disorganised” and conflictual environments may leave more 
gaps open to innovative initiatives than consistent ones. It certainly does not make 
the life and work of innovators easier, but it may give them more leeway. Innova-
tions may be “easier” in such contexts when it is possible to integrate them into 
different, sometimes opposite, narratives. In our case, proximity to users, flexibility 
and user participation and coproduction could be put into a left wing innovative and 
participatory narrative, but also into a right wing traditional conservative narrative 
on community involvement.
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Chapter 15
Berlin: Kreuzberg Acts—Entrepreneurship 
in the District
Benjamin Ewert and Adalbert Evers
15.1  Introduction
This chapter looks at Lok.a.Motion, a social enterprise in the district of Friedrichs-
hain-Kreuzberg in Berlin, and specifically one of its projects: Kreuzberg Acts.1 The 
project stimulates entrepreneurship among job-seeking residents and supports lo-
cal entrepreneurs. The intellectual framework in which Lok.a.Motion is embedded 
is made up of three discourses: on social entrepreneurship, urban and community 
development and the local economy. In practical terms, the Kreuzberg Acts project 
pursues a twofold approach towards social inclusion: on the one hand, jobseekers 
and local entrepreneurs receive comprehensive consultancy. For instance, partici-
pants are coached in how to apply for public subsidies for entrepreneurial activities 
or how to launch an effective marketing campaign. On the other hand, the project 
is striving for street credibility by building bridges to the local economy. From a 
funding perspective, the project bridges European, federal and local labour market 
programmes and thus breaks the usual patterns of vocational training. In order to il-
lustrate and contextualize Lok.a.Motion and Kreuzberg Acts,2 we will describe five 
dimensions: (1) the innovative aspects of the project, (2) the types of services and 
1 The project ran from 2009 to 2012. Nevertheless, the chapter is written in present tense to allow 
for easy reading.
2 Besides the analysis of grey literature (conceptional guidelines, internal documents, press re-
leases) and newspaper articles, this chapter is based on two expert interviews with the managers of 
Lok.a.Motion and Kreuzberg Acts and one interview with a female entrepreneur—an experienced 
user of the project. The interviews were carried out in August 2012 and transcripted by the author.
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the way of addressing users, (3) Lok.a.Motion’s internal organization and modes of 
working, (4) the embeddedness of the project in the local welfare system and (5) to 
conclude, the general lessons to be learnt from the innovation.
15.2  Kreuzberg Acts: The Innovation
Innovation results in the intertwining of economic and social concerns by link-
ing two issues that are usually separated: on the one hand, individual consultancy 
and guidance for entrepreneurs seeking to strengthen their businesses; on the other 
hand, a concern with community revitalization by restoring confidence among lo-
cal stakeholders. Kreuzberg Acts thus combines approaches that have so far been 
pursued in parallel, that is, in the sectors of employment and urban development.
Originally founded as a nonprofit organization for youth welfare and the lo-
cal economy, the provider of the project, Lok.a.Motion, recast its organizational 
form by itself becoming a social enterprise (see for an overview Nyssens 2006; 
Ridley-Duff and Bull 2011) that generated a culture of mutual trust among relevant 
stakeholders in the district. In practice, as stated by Ms. Kiczka-Halit, the manager 
of Lok.a.Motion, “wrap-around activities” such as networking, lobbying and pub-
lic relations work help to foster sustainable cooperation and partnerships between 
local authorities, businesses and civil society actors (see for an overview Blok-
land and Savage 2008). As an intersection between European and federal (vertical) 
programmes for promoting self-employment and local (horizontal) approaches that 
promote urban development, Lok.a.Motion opens up new opportunities for support-
ing jobseekers and struggling entrepreneurs by devising small-scale business ideas 
that are compatible with the local social ecology. Hence, the social enterprise’s work 
is characterized by the tailor-made bundling of resources, a commitment to urban 
renewal and a unique understanding of the nature of local governance. Dedicated to 
people’s economic and social inclusion, Lok.a.Motion wants to make a difference 
in a district that is characterized by a challenging degree of diversity and inequality. 
Respective needs are met through networked, continually refined, schemes that are 
carefully adopted to the specific character of the local economy.
15.2.1  Types of Services and Ways of Addressing Users
According to the conceptual guideline of Kreuzberg Acts, social inclusion is thought 
of as something that is present in a local environment and depends strongly on the 
range of people’s opportunities to realize their entrepreneurial potential. As such, 
service offers are twofold: On the one hand, people are encouraged in their deci-
sion to become self-employed by the provision of support to improve their skills 
as entrepreneurs before applying for a start-up financing grant. On the other hand, 
individual consultancy and coaching is accompanied by collective support for the 
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local community of existing entrepreneurs who are struggling to stabilize their 
businesses. The collective dimension of the project includes developing common 
marketing campaigns, facilitating networking and boosting joint ventures between 
local businesses. “We not only help individual local entrepreneurs to make the best 
of their potential, but we also feel responsible for the long-term development of the 
district’s local economy”, explained the project manager.
The project has reinforced local social inclusion in various ways. First of all, 
stabilizing and building up local business helps people to keep in the world of work 
and to get them off the dole. However, project leaders apply a broader notion of 
social inclusion, meaning more than just being independent of social assistance. 
Social inclusion is understood as an open process that is not divided into single stag-
es consisting merely of on-the-job training. Instead, two aspects are intertwined: 
qualifying and strengthening of people as local entrepreneurs and helping to bring 
about a vivid local community that people belong to and can participate in eas-
ily (Blokland and Nast 2014). Perceiving project users as social beings embedded 
within a local context calls for an approach that is sensitive to people’s multiple 
ties and requires complex ways of addressing users. For instance, one entrepreneur, 
a 25-year-old owner of an American diner restaurant, reported that she had been 
visited continuously by a consultant of Kreuzberg Acts who addressed her from the 
beginning as a member of the local community of entrepreneurs—a dimension of 
belonging she had not been aware of previously. After strengthening the “we-feel-
ing” through, for example, regular get-togethers of local entrepreneurs and/or joint 
ventures (e.g. exhibitions from local artists in shops and bistro cafés), project users 
have been addressed in other identities too. First of all, as local entrepreneurs, they 
have been challenged to adapt their businesses to the local environment in a sustain-
able way. This requires not only a solid entrepreneurial spirit—namely, “being fully 
convinced of their own business idea and ready to work on it seven days a week for 
at least 14 hours”, as one entrepreneur user put it—but also a sense of the neigh-
bourhood where the start-up should succeed. In order to develop the latter, project 
leaders organized several workshops where participants mapped the diversity of the 
local economy, identified vacancies, analyzed needs and consumer preferences and 
were trained as experts for the respective location.
Moreover, Kreuzberg Acts addresses project users both as citizens with social 
and economic rights, who are entitled to subsidies or start-up grants from the federal 
state or the European Union, and as active citizens, who can co-shape the develop-
ment of the urban space in which they live and work. On the one hand, this means 
consulting entrepreneurs about existing financial support schemes, legal rights and 
duties. On the other hand, project leaders activate their clientele as active commu-
nity members, focusing on the social and political processes that may affect their 
economic success as (future) entrepreneurs. In short, due to strong local references, 
Kreuzberg Acts addresses entrepreneurs as citizens and community members within 
the local economy. In all these roles, project participants learn not only that their 
entrepreneurial success depends on their individual competences and on sufficient 
incubation time for their business idea but also that it is inseparably linked to the 
overall development of the local area.
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15.2.2  Internal Organization and Modes of Working
Kreuzberg Acts operates in three neighbourhoods that have special development 
needs. All of them belong to the neighbourhood management programme that com-
bines spatial and urban planning with sectorial policy interventions. The project is 
funded by a federal programme of the European Social Fund (ESF) called Educa-
tion, Economy and Labour in the Neighbourhood, which aims at innovative inter-
ventions in managed neighbourhoods. Kreuzberg Acts is one of several projects 
organized by Lok.a.Motion, an organization that operates at the crossroads between 
the European and federal labour market programmes and the local level. In recent 
years, Lok.a.Motion has run four major projects and has initiated several forms 
of cooperation with local stakeholders. Pursuing an increasingly entrepreneurial 
approach, Lok.a.Motion now has the legal status of a nonprofit limited liability 
company. Its managers apply their conviction that labour market policies have to 
combine social and economic aspects to the development of their own organization. 
Gradually, a project-orientated consultancy has emerged that now comprises a core 
of eight to ten permanent employees and a wider pool of contract-based freelancers, 
who are engaged when their services are required.
With respect to internal working relations, Lok.a.Motion represents a sharp 
contrast to the traditional public administration, in which the number of staff is 
stable and jobs are socially protected. The enterprise thus promotes a working cul-
ture that can withstand financial uncertainties and changing situations concerning 
project tenders in an unstable environment. Having few permanent staff enables 
Lok.a.Motion to decide whether a certain project actually suits its key professional 
principle: that any engagement must pursue the development of the social environ-
ment where it takes place. The flip side of this high degree of flexibility is that 
Lok.a.motion is not a good employer in traditional terms. The social enterprise re-
lies on insecure, precarious jobs. “Everybody who works for us knows that her/his 
job is limited but could be extended through the approval of future projects”, states 
Ms. Kiczka-Halit, the manager of Lok.a.Motion.
15.2.3  Embeddedness of the Project in the Local Welfare System
Kreuzberg Acts is a hybrid in the local welfare system, being both embedded and 
disembedded at once. This ambiguity is mirrored in the project’s relations to the job 
centre and local authorities, the two most important welfare providers at local level. 
Although both institutions acknowledge the work of the project, Kreuzberg Acts is 
perceived mainly as an ad-hoc consultant for vocational training while lacking the 
status as an ordinary service provider with regular funding. As a result, Kreuzberg 
Acts fills a rather uncertain intermediate position that requires a cooperative manner 
and a trust-generating relationship with local stakeholders.
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However, this approach has its limits due to the constant need for “co-
ompetition”—a term coined by Ray Noorda, founder of a software company, for 
the business sector (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996, pp. 4–5)—which refers to 
both a co-operative and competitive relationship with other projects. On the one 
hand, social enterprises such as Lok.a.Motion have to defend their project designs 
and modes of working against the theft of innovative ideas (a danger that calls for a 
patent law for innovative concepts). On the other hand, close cooperation and regu-
lar knowledge exchange with similar projects is a precondition to having a stake in 
the local welfare system. Nonetheless, fruitful cooperation with competitors and 
partners is still possible, as demonstrated by common workshops for developing 
integrated approaches to socio-spatial challenges, for example.
In comparison to the working culture of established welfare institutions, the way 
of addressing users is what differentiates Kreuzberg Acts the most. This is a world 
away from the job centre approach of integrating people. Here, the project’s process-
orientated approach, which involves encouraging people to realize their entrepre-
neurial potential in a gentle way, coincides with the job centre’s perspective based 
on the verdict of employability. “There is no lobby for the unemployed founding 
a start-up as an aspect of social reintegration”, says the manager of Lok.a.Motion, 
who misses sufficient opportunities and time for people to develop their own ideas. 
Instead, the job centre, in its rush to get people into employment, fears that the self-
employed, especially when starting up, will become still more dependent on trans-
fer payments and therefore will not disappear from the unemployment statistics.
Measured in terms of cooperation with local and state authorities, Lok.a.Motion 
is a fairly well-embedded partner. Within the past ten years, Lok.a.Motion took 
part continuously in a range of local programmes that dealt with the support of 
entrepreneurship and raised hopes for regular financing. However, the fundamental 
federal law for start-up financing, which applies to all the relevant programmes, 
has been reformed several times. As a result, the route to self-employment became 
more complicated. Instead of being “pushed” into self-employment schemes, ap-
plicants must nowadays be “pulled”, receiving grants after a complex procedure to 
prove that they cannot find a “normal job” as an employee and that they have suf-
ficient entrepreneurial skills to risk self-employment. Based on these changes, the 
Berlin Senate and district authorities reduced their financial commitment to impos-
ing programmes for future entrepreneurs. “We are noticing a backwards develop-
ment”, says Ms. Kiczka-Halit, adding that especially at the Senate level, the term 
entrepreneur is used exclusively for high potentials that should build up the city’s 
much-vaunted creative economy. This kind of risk-averse attitude is typical of the 
Berlin authorities, which allow innovators on the ground very little leeway for ex-
perimentation but are only prepared to commit if social investments are absolutely 
sure to pay off. For instance, Lok.a.Motion’s proposal for providing start-ups with a 
so-called “experimental budget” that may help them to build up operating business 
structures was rejected by district authorities.
Despite these shortcomings in terms of institutional support, Lok.a.Motion has 
developed strategies for using the local welfare system for its own goals. In this 
respect, gaining change agents for certain endeavours has proved a promising ap-
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proach. Convincing the district mayor or the manager of the job centre of a specific 
project, for example, has turned out to be more successful than attempting to break 
down routine patterns of vocational training all at once. Thus, as Ms. Kiczka-Halit 
puts it, “building up networks of open-minded supporters” is a precondition for 
transforming an inventive approach into an innovation.
15.3  Conclusion
Is the innovative approach of Kreuzberg Acts transferrable to or replicable in other 
welfare systems? Basically, the project is dedicated to improving labour market 
perspectives for local citizens facing socio-economic change in their neighbour-
hoods. However, the way that the project responds to this challenge is not bound to 
a particular location. Three general lessons can be learnt from the project:
First, social and economic concerns need to be bridged by an integrated ap-
proach that is adapted carefully to a manageable area. Hence, a tight bundling of lo-
cal key issues, such as urban development, unemployment and citizen participation, 
is necessary in order to arrive at coherent solutions.
Second, innovators have to cross the divide between enabling individual project 
participants on the one hand and a collective commitment to community work on 
the other hand. As such, investments in wrap-around-activities beyond the core of 
the project and efforts to gain strategic partners (who may further disseminate the 
innovation) will pay off in the long term.
Third, people’s overall benefit from an innovative project seems more sustain-
able if they are addressed as full persons with multiple identities and numerous ties 
within a social environment. Thus, entrepreneurs should also be strengthened as 
embedded citizens (civic entrepreneurs) and community members by locally ap-
propriate support measures.
Finally, a critical reflection is needed on the overall status of social innovations. 
In contrast to socio-technological innovations (e.g. car-sharing) or creative start-ups 
(e.g. in the fields of design and lifestyle), piecemeal innovations such as Kreuz-
berg Acts seem to have less sex appeal. Aiming at social cohesion and community 
renewal in the first place, social projects have difficulty garnering sufficient sup-
port—especially at a time when public policy is focusing on stimulating all kinds of 
entrepreneurialism, purely and simply.
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Chapter 16
Milan: “We Help You to Help Yourself”—The 
Project of the Fondazione Welfare Ambrosiano
Stefania Sabatinelli and Giuliana Costa
16.1  Milan and the Context of Innovation in Welfare 
Policies
Milan is the economic and financial capital of Italy, as well as one of the most dy-
namic cities in the country. A shift to tertiary and advanced tertiary sectors has been 
the main characteristic of the city’s economy in recent decades. Nevertheless, the 
financial and economic crisis that first erupted in 2008 and is still on-going in Italy 
hit the city rather hard, with an increase in unemployment, the use of short-time 
work schedules, as well as the use of atypical freelance and fixed-term contracts 
instead of permanent ones. From the political point of view, the city underwent a 
radical change in 2011: after 20 years of right-wing local governments, the munici-
pal elections were won by Giuliano Pisapia and his centre-leftist coalition, thanks 
to a campaign focused on the ideas of change, transparency and citizens’ participa-
tion. Since then, the new administration’s action has been somewhat restricted by 
severe budget constraints due to the concurrence of the following factors: the in-
crease in social demands related to the economic crisis; the introduction of austerity 
measures, with cuts in transfers from the national government to local authorities; 
and the negative consequences of risky financial investments made by the previous 
administration (Costa and Sabatinelli 2012).
Nevertheless, the administration, along with other local stakeholders, has sought 
to cope with emerging needs by pledging that “nobody will be left behind” and 
devolving resources to innovate its welfare system. It should be borne in mind that, 
thanks to ample opportunities for social inclusion through employment, Milan has 
long had a reputation for social solidarity. A deep-rooted legacy with mediaeval 
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(religious) origins defines “Milanese citizenship” as a status that anybody coming 
to the city may obtain by contributing to its welfare through work. This distinctive 
feature has been reinterpreted in the economic crisis. In 2010, during the previous 
administration, an anti-crisis fund was put in place for a wide variety of support ac-
tions, but due to very stringent access criteria, it was practically never used. Since 
2012–2013, the new administration has changed the access criteria and pluralised 
its destination. Moreover, given the insufficiency of public resources with which 
to tackle the increase in economic needs, nonpublic actors have created solidarity 
funds that distribute forms of support, monetary and in kind, to individuals and 
families hit by the recession. These funds are managed rather independently from 
the municipal administration. For example, The Catholic Archbishop and Curia 
have created a solidarity fund that pays modest benefits to individuals and families 
signalled by municipal social services which cannot help them because they are 
ineligible for municipal income support, which is severely limited by budgetary 
constraints.
The case of social innovation presented here refers to the recently instituted 
Fondazione Welfare Ambrosiano (Milan Welfare Foundation, FWA). Created on an 
anti-crisis logic and perspective, the FWA’s action combines traditional elements 
of Welfare Ambrosiano1 with new ones in order to help people overcome their 
economic and social difficulties or alleviate them. Thanks to a complex alliance 
among diverse stakeholders, the Foundation addresses uncoped needs by promoting 
guarantee funds to facilitate access to credit via the micro-credit instrument (Yunus 
1998). This is its core activity at present, and it constitutes a new kind of support in 
the local welfare system.
16.2  Fondazione Welfare Ambrosiano: Basic Features
The Fondazione2 Welfare Ambrosiano is a quite new agency in Milan’s welfare 
system. It was created through the efforts of Milanese trade unions, which had ac-
cumulated 6 million € during the 1970s from collective bargaining and allocated 
this capital to the city for the implementation of social development programmes. 
The FWA was set up by a heterogeneous group of stakeholders: the Municipality of 
Milan; the Province of Milan; the Milan Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Crafts 
and Agriculture and the three main trade unions (Confederazione Generale Itali-
ana del Lavoro, CGIL, Camera del Lavoro Metropolitana; Confederazione Italiana 
Sindacati Lavoratori, CISL, Unione Sindacale Territoriale di Milano and Unione 
Italiana del Lavoro, UIL Milano e Lombardia). After being announced in 2007 by 
the former mayor of Milan and created in 2009, the foundation began its activities 
only in 2011 under the new municipal administration. The long gestation was due 
1 The expression refers to the distinctive welfare system of Milan. “Ambrosiano” is synonymous 
for “Milanese”, which stems from the name of the city’s patron saint, Ambrogio.
2 A foundation is a body made up of capital used to pursue a specific goal, either directly, through 
its organisation, or indirectly, by financing other subjects that pursue the same goal.
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to “technical difficulties” related to the possibility of issuing loans to citizens, for 
which it was necessary to reach agreements with banks that decided to join the proj-
ect (Percorsi di secondo welfare 2011). The FWA pursued an agreement with the 
National Association of Banks, but the attempt was unsuccessful.
Two thirds of the available budget is allocated to innovative local welfare initia-
tives designed and developed jointly by the members of the Foundation and other 
third-sector bodies, such as Caritas Ambrosiana and Fondazione Cariplo, a large 
bank foundation. The FWA’s mission is to support individuals and families that 
either live or work in Milan or want to start a business within the city’s admin-
istrative boundaries, regardless of their place of origin and their previous or cur-
rent type of work contract, and that are in temporary need for various reasons (job 
loss, illness, etc.). They may be either persons who are not protected by existing, 
category-based social protection measures, and are therefore exposed to new forms 
of social exclusion, or persons or families that are not in disadvantaged conditions 
but are at risk—due to temporary and unexpected difficulties—of falling into real 
poverty. The aim, therefore, is not to substitute for the existing institutions assisting 
long-term situations of need (such as long-term unemployment); rather, the aim is 
to intercept the short-term risks of workers or jobless people with exceptional eco-
nomic problems that often have serious long-lasting negative effects for the entire 
household. For instance, families with budget problems may make decisions, such 
as interruption of the children’s university education, which they would not make in 
other circumstances and which may affect the future of family members in the long 
run, since they are hard to catch up later.
The targets of the foundation’s measures are therefore all persons living or work-
ing in Milan with economic problems that make it difficult for them to make ends 
meet. The definition of the household is flexible: for instance, it disregards whether 
the applicants are married, separated or cohabitating. This reflects the secular orien-
tation of the foundation and its members, which distinguishes it from other bodies, 
especially confessional ones, acting in the area. Two fundamental features of the 
foundation’s action are an active approach and rotation in the use of funds. The 
active approach is reflected in its slogan: “We help you to help yourself”, which 
underlines that recipients must commit themselves to projecting their own pathway 
in solving their problems. Rotation in use of the funds is obtained—as we shall 
see—by privileging financing tools such as micro-credit, as opposed to nonrepay-
able loans; this policy is specifically due to the intent of the trade unions involved 
to create economic capital for the city that will last in time.
16.3  The Core Activity: Micro-credit Guarantees, a New 
Welfare Instrument
The first goal of the foundation is to build instruments to counter one of the main 
negative effects of the present financial and economic crisis, that is, the credit 
crunch, which prevents—more than ever before—many individuals with few re-
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sources from accessing bank loans however deserving their need and/or feasible 
their projects may be. The FWA favours access to micro-credit by so-called non-
bankable persons, that is, ones with little or no chance of accessing bank credit 
because of a lack of guarantees and/or past records as “bad payers”.
Two basic types of micro-credit are foreseen:
• “Social credit”, reserved for persons who—especially, but not only because of 
the crisis—cannot afford expenses such as the payment of university fees for 
their children or unexpected healthcare costs
• Credit for self-employment, in order to overcome unemployment or underem-
ployment or severe job precariousness
The micro-credit is accessed through a network of selected local bodies operating 
as “front desks”, which intercept needs. The idea is not to create new structures 
or offices besides the existing ones, but rather to work with organisations already 
dealing with poverty and vulnerability in the city so that they become the “opera-
tional branches” of the FWA. These bodies are asked to stand “moral surety” for 
the families that they introduce to the foundation. They carry out a first screening 
of applicants and may direct them to other welfare agencies (managed by public or 
third-sector bodies) that may be more appropriate for their case. If the case appears 
to have a profile that fulfils the requirements for access to micro-credit, a second 
interview is organised with an expert of the Association of Bank Volunteers for So-
cial Initiatives (Volontari Bancari per le Iniziative nel Sociale, Vo.b.i.s.). During this 
interview, an analysis of needs and/or the project is carried out, a feasibility study is 
formulated, and a business plan is outlined in the case of enterprise development. If 
the person is accepted into the microcredit scheme, moral and bureaucratic support 
is provided throughout the project’s development.
The sums loaned range between 2,000 and 20,000 € per applicant. On the basis 
of the preliminary inquiry, the front desk submits the application to a commission 
of the FWA, which may or may not approve the project. If the project is approved, 
the FWA issues a guarantee of 80 % of the capital. With this guarantee, applicants 
can apply for credit at one of the banks that have signed the agreement with the 
foundation,3 which in principle should process the application within 30 days and—
if it is approved—allocate the money. The aim of FWA at this stage is to ensure that 
the banks have no reason to refuse the credit request.
The loan is granted essentially on the basis of a trust relationship. The interest 
rates are much lower than the average bank rates, and they are differentiated by type 
of credit: 4 % for social credit (against an average rate for credit to persons of 11.2 % 
set by Banca d’Italia) and 6.5 % for self-employment credit (against an average 
rate of 10.2 % for credit to firms). The repayment terms are such that they should 
be sustainable by all borrowers: during the first year, only interest is repaid; capital 
repayment begins after the first 12 months and can be spread over up to 6 years. In 
the case of insolvency, the foundation covers up to 80 % of the capital. This level 
3 Banca Intesa Sanpaolo, Banca Popolare di Milano, Banca Popolare Commercio Industria and 
Permicro (an operator specialised in micro-credit and a partner of the FWA).
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will soon be changed to 75 % because new laws have imposed a maximum level on 
guarantee percentages.
According to the analysis of the applications received in the first 2 years of the 
programme, between October 2011 and December 2013, a total of 881 applications 
were officially registered, 71 % of them for social credit and 29 % for self-employ-
ment (Bramanti and Spina 2013). About 347 credits were issued, representing 40 % 
of total applications (85 % for social credit and 15 % for self-employment ones) for 
a total of 2,271,900 €. More than 50 % received a negative evaluation by the FWA’s 
technical committee, because of unfulfilled requirements or excessive indebtedness 
(Mallone 2012).
Three quarters of applicants were resident in the municipality of Milan; they 
were rather balanced by gender (56 % men and 44 % women in the overall period), 
but diversified by age: 33 % were aged 41–50; 26 % 31–40; 22 % 51–60; while 
those aged over 60 represented only 6 % of applicants in 2012 (Bramanti and Spina 
2012). Applications by young unemployed persons living with their parents were 
generally refused because such applicants did not match the profile of beneficiaries 
that could overcome a temporary difficulty with the FWA’s help.
Among social credit applications, the main reasons for them were housing ex-
penses, debt discharge or reduction, and family needs, followed by training expens-
es, healthcare expenses and mortgage loans. Indebtedness of the household was re-
sponsible for most of the applicants’ situations, together with job loss by one of the 
family members, or the presence of atypical contracts (Mallone 2012). Social credit 
was granted to migrants in 47 % of cases, and to Italians in the remaining 53 %. The 
amounts awarded were rather modest: 60 % of applications for social credit were in 
the lowest amount range, between 2000 and 5000 €, even if the average sum was 
5625.93 € (Bramanti and Spina 2013).
Applications for self-employment credit concerned start-up projects in half of 
the cases; in the other half, they were made because of economic difficulties or the 
need of already-existing businesses to purchase goods or services. The amounts paid 
were higher than in the case of social credit: 43 % of self-employment applications 
were for between 17,100 and 20,000 €, but the average sum paid was 15,768.52 €. 
Most beneficiaries of this kind of credit were Italians (69 %). The selection for self-
employment micro-credit is rather strict: around 30 % of applications were accepted 
in 2011–2012 (Mallone 2012), and less than this percentage thereafter. Most start-
ups are in the personal services sector.
According to the most recent information on repayments, the vast majority of 
beneficiaries of micro-credit loans are repaying their debts without problems after 
the first 12 months. Only a few of them are in arrears or already in litigation. An 
interesting fact is that 60 % of recipients are employees, which shows the extent to 
which the FWA is working to fill the gaps in the existing welfare system. In 2013, 
the number of micro-credit recipients decreased markedly, partly because the pro-
gramme had no longer been advertised since its launch.
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16.4  New Frontiers: FWA as an Innovator in the Local 
Welfare System
The FWA case shows that social innovation can stem from the need to use available 
resources differently, and that in times of hardship, it is all the more important to 
continue the commitment to welfare issues and not abdicate it because of the lack 
of resources. The crucial factor has been the endeavour to implement the circular 
use of available capital to enhance the recipients’ participation and empowerment as 
they are helped to overcome a transitory difficult moment by also mobilising their 
own resources and being responsible for their personal project.
Created as an anti-crisis initiative, the FWA is currently envisaging its role also 
beyond the end of the recession. New projects are in progress. A programme that 
aims to anticipate the payment of unemployment benefits and short-time work 
schemes to concerned workers has recently been started because the bureaucratic 
procedures generally last several months before the benefits are effectively paid.4 
The FWA and the partner banks will then be repaid by the National Social Security 
Institute (Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale, INPS), thus maintaining the 
rotation of resources approach. The FWA has instituted a separate guarantee fund 
(2 million €) for this purpose, and between September and January 2013, it received 
more than 450 applications for cash advances.
Another recent project involves support by means of long-term “honour loans” 
to specific students and their families. At present, the beneficiaries are students at 
the “Accademia Teatro la Scala” of Milan, who must study for many years before 
being able to work and earn a living. Other projects in progress aim at revising and 
updating—after a proposal by the trade unions—the nineteenth-century tradition 
of the società di mutuo soccorso (friendly societies),5 the purpose being to fill the 
gaps in category-based social protection as it has evolved in Italy. The intention 
is to develop the first open (not category-based) health fund to cover targets and 
needs not addressed by the existing National Health System.6 Based on a preven-
tion philosophy, the programme will furnish dental assessment for children, cancer 
screening for women and/or different forms of home care for older adults. The new-
est project run by FWA (since 2015) is “Abitare Sociale”, an agency whose aim is to 
find affordable housing solutions in the private market for those who are not eligible 
for public housing, supporting both tenants and homeowners with guarantees for ar-
rears and advice in the application of a specific contract called “canone concordato” 
(Lodi Rizzini 2015). 
In 2013, a new microcredit scheme was launched by the FWA jointly with the 
Milan municipality, which decided to dedicate a specific guarantee fund (800,000 €) 
4 http://www.fwamilano.org/index.phtml?Id_VMenu=1010. Accessed 13 April 2015.
5 A famous case based in Milan was the Friendly Society of Railway Workers of Northern Italy, 
now named “Cesare Pozzo”, after one of the first and most influential presidents of the association.
6 In Italy, health protection has been universalistic since 1978, when the National Health System 
was created. Some corporatist funds continued to exist in parallel, granting a wider coverage only 
to their members.
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to potential young entrepreneurs (aged under 35) who are not fully bankable. The 
maximum loan will be higher than that of the micro-credit scheme illustrated above: 
25,000 €. Given that the selection for this kind of credit has been quite hard these 
2 years, a special focus on the youngest applicants has been considered a strategic 
goal for local actors. The FWA and its network are involved because of their experi-
ence and skills in managing micro-credit projects. Those selected will benefit from 
professional consultancy and monitoring from FWA.
To conclude, it should be stressed that supporting access to micro-credit can 
prove to be a good solution only for some applicants, and it is not appropriate for 
all of them (Moiso 2012). Applicants should demonstrate that they are committed 
to their projects and not being too vulnerable to assume relatively high indebted-
ness risks. The FWA is working to increase life chances of some groups and even 
if the numbers are still rather low, it is innovating the local welfare system in order 
to enlarge its scope and capacity to intercept grey areas of needs. The strength of 
the FWA’s activity is that it does not substitute for existing forms of protection but 
instead attempts to fill the gaps in the existing welfare system for specific targets 
with well-timed interventions.
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Chapter 17
Stockholm: Innovative Ways of Supporting 
Children of Single (Lone) Mothers
Marie Nordfeldt, Ola Segnestam Larsson and Anna Carrigan
17.1  Introduction
Innovation within the field of social welfare is a recently awoken interest in the 
Swedish context. Innovations have been, and are still, very much related to the 
launching of new products, inventions and technical development. Welfare devel-
opment has, by tradition, not been considered as innovative (Rønning et al. 2013). 
Innovation has also mainly been related to the private—for-profit—sector and, 
since the development of the welfare state in the mid-1900s, the field of welfare in 
Sweden has been dominated by services produced by the public sector. However, 
there is awakening political interest in social innovations and social investments, 
both at national and local levels. This development is taking place in a changing 
welfare context with structural changes in terms of deregulation and privatisation. 
These changes have opened up opportunities for alternative producers of welfare 
services (see e.g. Svedberg and Olsson 2010). Moreover, with strained budgets and 
unsolved social problems, local and central governments are looking to the for-prof-
it and the non-profit sectors for innovations and entrepreneurial initiatives (Carrigan 
and Nordfeldt 2013, WP5).
In this chapter, we describe an innovative project developed within a civil soci-
ety organisation named Fryshuset. The local context for this innovation is the city of 
Stockholm in Sweden. Stockholm can be described as a growing city with a strong 
labour market of, for example, advanced businesses and information and commu-
nications technology (ICT). (OECD 2006). Compared with the rest of the country, 
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Stockholm stands out as having the highest rates of employment and highest activ-
ity rate and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Hermelin 2011).
On the other hand, Stockholm is struggling with many problems similar to other 
large cities in Europe, for example, housing shortage, homelessness, segregation 
and social exclusion. A fast growing population puts enormous pressure on the 
housing market, and the construction of new housing has not kept pace with this 
demand, which has led to a severe housing shortage in the whole Stockholm region 
(Länsstyrelsen 2012; Boverket 2012).
The high employment rate does not apply to the whole population. Unemploy-
ment rates for young people are substantially higher than for the older groups, and 
young adults are increasingly employed on temporary contracts. This is also the 
case for inhabitants born abroad and especially for migrants from countries outside 
the European Union/European Free Trade Association (EU/EFTA; Nordfeldt 2012, 
WP3). Among the young unemployed, there is a group at risk of long-term exclu-
sion from the labour market and consequently at risk of deprivation and problematic 
living conditions (Angelin 2010). This is the group of young people not in employ-
ment, education or training (NEET). The NEET group is, in comparison to many 
other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries, relatively small in Sweden. However, the group is still significant and over-
represented in certain areas in the city of Stockholm (Arbetsförmedlingen 2013). 
These young people, at the risk of social exclusion, are a main target group for the 
organisation Fryshuset that will be further described below.
Diversity and Choice—Catchwords in the Local Political Debate
Deregulation and legislation on competitive procurement (LOU), ideas of “user 
choice” and a new legislation—the Law on Freedom of Choice (Lagen om valfri-
het, LOV)—have made it possible for municipalities to engage alternative service 
providers in social welfare. In Stockholm, the governing right-wing majority, which 
was in power between 2006 and 2014, pursued a strong policy of marketisation and 
privatisation.
This development could serve as a window of opportunities for innovation (cf. 
Ahrne and Papakostas 2002). Still, there does not seem to be any outspoken inter-
est in ideas of social innovation among politicians and other local stakeholders in 
Stockholm. This lack of interest may appear somewhat contradictory considering 
the strong emphasis on diversity and consumer choice described above. So far, this 
has primarily been implemented by private businesses (and, to a more limited de-
gree, civil society organisations), being involved within the field of health care, 
social services (primarily within elderly care) and the housing market (Segnestam 
Larsson and Carrigan 2013, WP4).
In the local political debate, there seems to be agreement across the political 
scale regarding the role of civil society in local welfare, that is, as long as the discus-
sion does not comprise civil society actors in relation to privatisation of social wel-
fare. The issue of alternative actors producing welfare services is subject to political 
disagreements that follow the traditional political lines with, for example, political 
parties on the right side of the spectrum for alternative organisations, such as private 
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and civil society organisations, while the political parties on the left prefer pub-
lically funded and publically produced welfare services (Segnestam Larsson and 
Carrigan 2013, WP4). Between the local government and civil society organisations 
(CSOs) working in the field of social welfare, a “compact” has been formulated 
and agreed upon. The aim of the compact is to serve as a platform for dialogue and 
cooperation between the local authorities and CSOs. There are pronounced expec-
tations on the civil society to play an active part in the renewal of social welfare 
(Segnestam Larsson and Carrigan 2013). There seems thus to be some ambivalence 
inherent in this interest when, at the same time, the procurement of services from 
CSOs are very limited compared to private businesses.
17.2  Children of Single (Lone) Mothers (Barn till 
Ensamma Mammor)
The project, Children of Single (Lone) Mothers, was developed as an activity with-
in in the frame of the foundation Fryshuset, headed by the Young Men’s Christian 
Association (YMCA). When Fryshuset started in Stockholm in 1984, it was located 
in a former cold storage building (hence the name Fryshuset, meaning “cold stor-
age” in Swedish). The creation of the organisation can be seen as a response to 
young people’s needs.
During its lifetime, Fryshuset has become a well-known and entrepreneurial or-
ganisation with a wide range of different activities. Today, Fryshuset runs schools 
and social programs as well as vocational training and seminars and conferences. 
Further, it also runs courses in theatre, music, sport, hosting events, concerts, parties 
and discotheques. Public funding covers around 5 % of the activities, and the rest 
is financed by a mixture of grants, endowments and fees for services such as edu-
cational and social programs (fees that are not paid by young people or individual 
clients but by cooperational partners and government agencies). Fryshuset also runs 
activities in Malmö and Gothenburg. Throughout its lifetime, Fryshuset has worked 
to find new and innovative solutions to social youth issues and problems. Within the 
organisation, new projects have constantly been started. Fryshuset also cooperates 
with a range of public and private actors (Engel et al. forthcoming).
Since 2007, Fryshuset has run a project addressed at children of single mothers 
in Stockholm. Since then, this project has also been started in Malmö and in Go-
thenburg. The focus for this activity is the children, but indirectly the activity also 
affects the mothers. And, as a part of this activity, Fryshuset offers parent education 
and different kinds of lectures for the mothers. The aim is to support and strengthen 
children that are living with a single mother in economically vulnerable circum-
stances. Fryshuset describes the support as being provided from a health perspec-
tive with focus on the children’s and the mothers’ everyday situation and especially 
wellbeing. This concept is based on Aaron Antonovsky’s thinking of saluto gen-
esis and the importance for the individual of a sense of coherence (see Antonovsky 
1987).
238 M. Nordfeldt et al.
It can be argued that this activity has been developed in a clearing (see Seg-
nestam Larsson et al., Chap. 6) identified by Fryshuset in the social landscape, 
including support for single mothers and their children. The approach on health and 
empowerment offers a complementary activity to social services based on legisla-
tion and more acute problem-solving. The focus on both children and their mothers 
is also unique to this project.
17.2.1  Internal Characteristics
The goal of the project is to provide positive childhood memories to children living 
in vulnerable situations of different kinds—economically, socially or being victims 
of abuse. This is based on a belief in all children’s right to play, laugh and to be seen. 
A ground for this work is the Children’s Convention (UN 1989). Ultimately, the 
objective is to enhance the children’s sense of self-esteem and confidence.
In practice, three types of activities are offered to single mothers and their chil-
dren. The first is the monthly meetings. On normal occasions, the participation 
number in a meeting is around 100 persons. At the monthly meetings, mothers and 
children form separate groups. The group of mothers can, for example, participate 
in lectures concerning aspects of health, during which they will also have time to 
network and support one another. Meanwhile, the group of children is divided ac-
cording to age and take part in sports, arts or music workshops together with volun-
teers—so called “amigos”—in the project (interview).
The fundamental idea behind these monthly meetings is that children living in 
situations of vulnerability need to have somewhere where they can enjoy them-
selves and laugh without thinking about, and taking responsibility for, the family, 
which is not uncommon that they do. In the project, the children can try out different 
activities, for example, different kinds of sports. The project provides suggestions 
on creative activities that are not costly. The ultimate idea of the project is joy, says 
the project leader, “we are good at joy” (interview). She continues explaining that 
the project wants to give these children positive childhood memories. “The children 
can come here and know that they don’t have to look after their mothers while 
they’re here, which is something that the staff experience a lot”. According to her, 
children behave according to their mothers’ state of mind and do not allow them-
selves to feel happy. At the project, it works the other way around as well; single 
mothers with total responsibility for their children can take a “break” or time to just 
sit and relax for a while, knowing that the child is having a great time in the other 
room (interview).
The second activity offered by the project is called “activities”. The idea with 
these activities is to take the whole group, mothers and children together, to do 
something out of the ordinary. This can be visits to museums, a public swimming 
pool, a fun park or a zoo. An example in Stockholm is a visit in the summertime to 
a large zoo about 3 h away from the city. Six filled buses went from Fryshuset to 
the zoo at the same time. The visit took some effort to organise: “We have become 
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experts at arranging events” the project leader states. The main idea behind these 
activities is to build up and support the relationship between mother and child. The 
project leader argues that in the child’s view these activities are things their mothers 
take them to do, without having to think about the cost, and this is a way to build 
up the role of the mother in the eyes of the child. In these activities also, the chil-
dren can see their mothers laugh and have a good time. This part of the project is 
costly and the three people employed in the project have worked out a special way 
of fundraising. The staff offer lectures to companies and invite them to co-organise 
these events with them. In that way, the companies will experience how the funds 
have been used and it can create some added value for the companies (interview).
The third activity at Children of Single (Lone) Mothers is called the “boomerang 
meetings”. This is a part of the project that has been going through many changes 
and had, by the time of the study, reached a form that the project staff was very 
pleased with. At the beginning of the project, the staff received many calls from 
mothers having all kinds of problems. These could be related to legal issues of 
custody matters, or health, or questions about how the social services function and 
act, and often these were questions that the three project leaders did not have the 
competence to answer. This resulted in an idea to arrange a fair twice a year where 
they invited experts from different fields and institutions to come and give personal 
counselling to the mothers. For many of the mothers, this meeting can be a first step 
to establishing a relationship with the appropriate institution. During these and all 
meetings, the project invites volunteers. The project leader explains that she and her 
two colleagues could not possibly meet all the needs and answer all the questions of 
the participants. The volunteers are called “fellow human beings” in the project and 
they are there to support the mothers during meetings (interview). Different kinds 
of advice are also given on the Internet. Persons can pose questions on the project’s 
webpage.
Beside these activities, the staff does a lot of work “behind the scenes”. They 
give lectures and try to represent and make visible the group of children of single 
mothers. “There is much to be done to make people recognize the problems of 
these children”, the project leader states (interview). The special method of fund-
raising, mentioned above is also a way to make more actors recognise this group. 
The project has also recently initiated cooperation with a university college in the 
Stockholm area, where they give lectures to university students who are studying to 
become teachers. Here, the project leader sees a good opportunity for influencing 
the general view of this group of children (interview).
The mothers that participate in the activities become members (free of charge) 
of the activity. At the time of the case study, there were just over 1000 members 
in Stockholm. Only single mothers can attend. The reason for this is that there are 
mothers among the participants who live with a protected identity and risk feeling 
threatened if men participate in the activities.
At the time of the study, three persons were working in the project. This staff had 
developed skills as “event experts” and they organise most of the target group’s ac-
tivities. Beside a grant from the local government, the staff needs to raise funds and 
apply for allowances, from, for example, different kinds of foundations. Volunteers 
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were engaged in the project as so-called “amigos”, who attend to the children, and 
“fellow humans”, who support the mothers. Fundraising and advocacy are impor-
tant responsibilities taken on by the project staff, and both responsibilities seem to 
fertilise the other.
17.2.2  Dealing with Local Context
There are elements of advocacy in this project. There is an ambition to raise atten-
tion to the issue of child poverty and the situation for unemployed or low-income 
single mothers. The staff at Fryshuset implements this in different ways, for ex-
ample, by cooperation with a university college and by giving lectures and seminars 
to different stakeholders, including private companies and politicians.
When talking about these issues with politicians, the project staff is experienc-
ing a lack of knowledge of these families’ situations and, sometimes, prejudices, 
considering situations to be self-induced. By making this group visible, there is 
an ambition in the project to contribute to long-term changes for the target group, 
concerning both the children and the mothers.
The project also concerns the question of more flexible opening hours within the 
childcare, which is an issue on the local political agenda in Stockholm. The possi-
bility of working “uncomfortable hours” is stressed by several political parties and 
pointed out as important for single parents. This means childcare should be open in 
the evenings, at nights and even weekends (Segnestam Larsson and Carrigan 2013, 
WP4). Childcare in the evenings and at nights could be an important basis for single 
mothers to get a job, though many jobs in occupations that are still female dominat-
ed, within health and social care, for example, have uncomfortable working hours.
Another field of advocacy for the target group is the discussion about the na-
tional norm of social welfare benefits, which today includes neither leisure time 
activities for children (for example, fees for sport or music lessons) nor monthly 
internet costs. This latter could mean that some children cannot receive information 
sent out from their schools or from other organisations that communicate mostly 
through the Internet.
17.3  Concluding Remarks
Children of Single (Lone) Mothers is an example of an innovation initiated within 
the civil society by an organisation acknowledged for its entrepreneurial ways of 
working. Fryshuset is a Stockholm-based organisation but with networks and con-
tacts in municipalities in different parts of Sweden. As described above, the Swedish 
welfare system has been opened up to alternative producers of welfare services. A 
parallel development is that during the last few decades civil society organisations 
have attracted growing interest and have been granted greater legitimacy from both 
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state and local governments. However, this has only to a limited degree resulted in 
a growing rate of social services produced by CSOs. But there are political expecta-
tions on CSOs to deliver new solutions for unsolved social problems and help to 
strengthen the welfare system by filling gaps.
One might argue, though, that the project Children of Single (Lone) Mothers 
is in line with traditional roles and expectations of a CSO, which also have been 
strengthened during the latest decades, namely to focus on new needs and new 
groups with needs that are not covered in other ways. The foundation Fryshuset has 
taken on this role in relation to vulnerable youth since the mid-1980s. They have 
served as pioneers and offered services that are not covered by the public sector 
(Engel et al. forthcoming).
The working in the project is based on the methods developed in Fryshuset—ad-
vocacy for their target group, direct services and also with the aim of empowerment, 
which in this project is implemented by the advice given in boomerang meetings. 
The mix of funding for the project and the cooperation with different stakeholders 
are also in line with the overall ways in which Fryshuset works.
The project has been subject to some diffusion, which is also in line with the 
ambitions of Fryshuset. During the organisation’s nearly 30-year lifetime, the or-
ganisation has had the motivation to spread its know-how and methods to other 
municipalities. This has partly succeeded, but there have also been many obstacles 
to spreading locally initiated activities to other places and stakeholders. Fryshuset’s 
answer to the problem of diffusion has been to build networks with local entrepre-
neurial actors and initiatives (Engel forthcoming).
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Chapter 18
Nijmegen: Work Corporations—for the 
Unemployed, by the Unemployed
Joost Fledderus, Taco Brandsen and Francesca Broersma
18.1  Introduction
In 2011, the municipality of Nijmegen, located in the southeast of the Netherlands 
with approximately 165,000 inhabitants, decided to adjust its re-employment policy. 
This reform was necessary because national retrenchments severely cut the munici-
pal budget for re-employment services—from 30.3 million € in 2011 to 11.5 mil-
lion € in 2014 (Gemeente Nijmegen 2011). A large proportion (68 %) of this budget 
was being spent on created, subsidised jobs. Given that these jobs were proven to 
be expensive and unsuccessful instruments to get beneficiaries back to the regular 
labour market, these were put to an end (Gemeente Nijmegen 2011). The belief 
of most local political parties was that the resources must be spread more equally 
among all recipients of social assistance (i.e. benefit for long-term unemployed). 
Instead, the concept of work corporations (werkcorporaties) was introduced to 
modernise their current policy in an “innovative fashion” in order to “realise the 
ambitions” with respect to re-employment (Gemeente Nijmegen 2011).
Work corporations resemble social enterprises (Defourny and Nyssens 2012), 
which are run primarily by beneficiaries themselves, though with professional guid-
ance and possibilities of education, and which aim towards the re-employment of 
the participants within 2 years. This chapter describes how work corporations are 
organised, how users are addressed, the position of work corporations within the 
local welfare of Nijmegen, and ends with observing current developments. It is 
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primarily based on interviews with the Alderman of Work and Income, two policy 
advisors of the municipality of Nijmegen, and 17 participants, held during October 
2012 and July 2013.
It should be noted that Dutch municipalities have a fairly large degree of discre-
tionary space to determine their policies when it comes to providing services to so-
cial assistance beneficiaries. Social assistance benefits are distributed according to 
the Work and Social Assistance Act, which applies to those who receive little to no 
income from work. All municipalities receive a budget for granting benefits, which 
may complement one’s income up to 70 % of the minimum wage as well as a budget 
for re-employing beneficiaries. Because this latter budget was shrinking fast, the 
municipality had to think of new ways of organising their re-employment policy.
18.2  Work Corporations
The concept of work corporations was introduced to the city by the local Labour 
Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) in their party programme of 2010. In no more 
than two sentences, the party expressed the need for the development of work cor-
porations in order to preserve subsidised jobs. When the Labour Party formed a 
coalition with the Green Party (GroenLinks, GL) and the social-liberal party Demo-
crats ’66 (Democraten ’66, D66) in 2010, work corporations were included in their 
common manifesto. The municipality then involved existing organisations operat-
ing in the field of subsidised labour or re-employment services to develop a con-
crete plan for work corporations.
18.2.1  Internal Organisation
Work corporations intend to re-employ recipients of social assistance (i.e. income 
support which is regulated by the Work and Social Assistance Act, WWB) with a 
considerable distance from the labour market by offering a combination of work 
and education. Basically every entrepreneur can initiate a work corporation, as long 
as it complies with a few conditions: People should be offered an opportunity for 
personal development (mainly through education), the service or product delivered 
should have societal relevance (which may be interpreted very broadly), and a work 
corporation should be able to be self-sufficient by selling these services or products 
(though it should remain non-profit). After a maximum of 2 years, people should 
leave the organisation and are supposed to find a regular job or continue with an 
educational programme.
Although most of the first work corporations were part of non-profit welfare 
organisations or concepts, for-profit companies have also started up work corpora-
tions (for instance, to educate potential future employees). A key factor of these cor-
porations is that participants are responsible for generating revenues through unpaid 
work and that these revenues are invested in running the organisation.
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Work corporations in Nijmegen include a restaurant, a sewing workshop with its 
own fashion brand, maintenance companies for public spaces and public housing, 
and a bike service shop. By 2012, over 400 people had participated within more 
than 40 work corporations.
When needed, a starting grant will be given to a new work corporation. Instru-
ments that are used for the re-employment of participants (such as coaching and 
education) are also financed by the municipality. Structural overhead costs and non-
structural development costs must, however, be compensated by the income the 
organisation earns by selling the services or products it offers. In the first year and a 
half, this will be partially funded by the municipality, but after 2 years, this should 
all be covered by the work corporations.
Both the municipality and the work corporations have distinct responsibilities. 
The work corporation selects participants, creates a personal re-employment pro-
gramme/development plan for the participant, guides the participant during the de-
velopment process, and provides education/training, often in collaboration with an 
educational institute. The municipality has the primary role in the recruitment of 
participants, if possible in cooperation with the work corporation; provides required 
facilities for the re-employment programme; and monitors the output target. The 
municipality sets up a contractual arrangement with the work corporations, the con-
tent of which is adapted to the corporation. Some work corporations have to comply 
with a performance target in terms of outflow of participants towards work or other 
educational programmes. Others do not have to fulfil any targets at all, although it 
is unclear why. The municipality does expect higher rates of outflow for work cor-
porations with good labour market prospects.
18.2.2  Ways of Addressing Users
For the municipality, the most important aspect of the work corporations is that, af-
ter a year or two, users will gain sufficient skills to be able to find a job on the regu-
lar labour market. They attain these skills partly because they are required to work 
from the very start and partly because they are supervised and educated through-
out the programme. Hence, the policy combines elements of “Work First” (Bruttel 
and Sol 2006) and more capability enhancing or empowering approaches (Bonvin 
2008). Work corporations teach not only technical but also social skills. Participants 
learn the basic elements of being an employee, such as getting in on time, asking 
for a day off or planning holidays, calling in sick, etc. But it also means learning to 
work with other participants, taking responsibility, and being an active employee.
The municipality states that for every individual it must be assessed whether 
working in a work corporation is the most suitable re-employment strategy and, 
moreover, whether the available work suits the client since work corporations also 
differ from each other (Gemeente Nijmegen 2011). Thus, there is some level of 
personalisation involved: Not every person that receives social assistance benefits 
automatically qualifies to join a work corporation.
246 J. Fledderus et al.
Almost all users of the work corporations must have an intake interview or 
sometimes even a formal job application. For two important reasons, intrinsic mo-
tivation is a key criterion for selection: (1) It is almost impossible to complete the 
programme successfully without a certain passion or preference for the profession 
and (2) the performance target set for outflow to work cannot be reached with un-
motivated workers. Nevertheless, after a relatively successful start, the municipality 
found that it became more difficult to find voluntary applicants for the work corpo-
rations. Therefore, they began to organise compulsory job markets where eligible 
individuals were obliged to take a look at the work corporations and are very much 
stimulated to declare their interest in one of them.
People enter work corporations for different reasons. For some, this includes 
obtaining a diploma; for others, it is the first step towards a higher level of educa-
tion. Still others value the social contacts at work and the rhythm of a working life. 
There are also those who mention that a change in home life—for instance, arrang-
ing child care—already ensures that their world broadens. However, participants 
might also lack any form of motivation, especially when they feel that participation 
is mandatory. In this case, sanctions might be imposed. Users sign a contract with 
the municipality where basic rights and obligations are described. A sanction may 
include a (temporary) reduction of the received benefit—for example, if a user has 
repeatedly not shown up. Until now, this measure has been rarely used.
In general, the concept of work corporations stems from the idea that people who 
are in need of guidance in their search for a job are still able to be active and thus 
able to generate income. In this sense, the municipality looks at what recipients of 
social assistance are capable of doing rather than at what they cannot do.
18.2.3  Interaction with the Local Welfare System
In the beginning, the abolishment of subsidised labour and the introduction of work 
corporations were accompanied by some opposition, especially from the Socialist 
Party (SP) and obviously from those who occupied subsidised jobs. Subsidised jobs 
were related to values typical to the left-wing municipality such as solidarity and 
equality (because vulnerable individuals are appreciated for their valuable work). 
Some argued that work corporations did not incorporate such important values. 
However, in 2010, the Alderman of Work and Income1 (from the PvdA) stated that 
“participation remains the starting point”. Yet, work corporations do seem to break 
with traditional beliefs in the city of Nijmegen. All stakeholders are now given an 
active role in re-employment: civil society, the private sector, local government, and 
the beneficiaries. Hence, work corporations can be both regarded as a co-production 
between participants and professionals and as a co-management structure between 
the municipality and the private and third sector (Brandsen and Pestoff 2006).
1 Aldermen are part of the local Council of Mayor and Aldermen, which is responsible for imple-
menting and executing municipal policies.
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According to the Alderman, the ideal situation would be plenty of successful, 
self-sufficient work corporations for clients to choose from. This way, the munici-
pality will still be able to give everybody the chance to participate in society when 
resources are limited. Shifting the responsibility of the municipality of re-employ-
ing beneficiaries towards organisations in the field has probably been the largest 
implication of the innovative reform. In particular, organisations that were used to 
working with subsidised employees are now required to think differently about the 
future of the participants. Re-employment was never something these organisations 
had to worry about.
An important topic within the field of social enterprises is the concern for un-
fair competition with the private sector (Brandsen and Karré 2011). However, even 
though they do not have to pay the participants, the work corporations are unable to 
sell their products and services for a below-market value. This is because the rev-
enues should cover all overhead and development costs. Actually, many work cor-
porations recognise the importance of close collaboration, rather than competition, 
with the specific economic sector to be able to assure outflow to regular work. For 
example, a bike repair shop cooperates with a big bicycle company because they are 
in need of employees. This increases the chances of participants to find a job there.
18.3  Future Developments
The municipality of Nijmegen clearly states that it does not work on the basis of 
a blueprint. Rather, it has been trying to develop a flexible model, which suits the 
local welfare system of Nijmegen. The municipal coalition as well as the adminis-
tration would like to take enough time to see whether the concept can develop into a 
successful instrument. A first evaluation at the end of 2012 showed that 18 % of all 
participants (88 out of 484) have successfully found a new job or higher educational 
programme (Gemeente Nijmegen 2013). This is less than the desired target of 25 %. 
The most important point for improvement was to give more responsibility to the 
municipality during the final phase of activities, in realising the outflow to regu-
lar employment. Work corporations often do not have sufficient expertise to guide 
participants towards the labour market. Therefore, the evaluation suggests that the 
municipality will have to put more effort in finding a good match between the job 
seeker and the work corporation and make more use of its network. In short, there 
should be a more intensive relationship between the municipality and the work 
corporations than anticipated.
Also, as mentioned, it appeared to be more difficult to get people enthusiastic 
to join a corporation. The coercion used by the municipality to assure participation 
has led to the involvement of less motivated beneficiaries. Because the managers 
of the work corporation are dependent upon the cooperation with and between its 
participants, a lack of motivation can seriously obstruct the work process. A better 
understanding of the motives of participants to join such programmes might help to 
avoid such a tension.
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Meanwhile, opposition towards the new policy seems to remain relatively mild. 
This might be due to the fact that the policy has been developed together with the 
third sector (i.e. the non-profit organisations which started the first work corpora-
tions), that there remains space for work corporations to adapt to specific condi-
tions, and that the core ideas of the innovation are in accordance with the dominant 
values of the local welfare system.
Until now, Nijmegen appears to have been the only municipality that has imple-
mented work corporations as a core element of their re-employment policy. Yet the 
core idea behind this initiative can be relatively easily disseminated across other 
European cities. That is, trying to involve all parties that potentially contribute to 
the inclusion of disadvantaged jobseekers, such as welfare organisations and private 
businesses. Also, it points at the possibility of investing in the unemployed on the 
one hand and to require some contribution from citizens (in the form of work with-
out pay) on the other. Keeping in mind some of the difficult aspects of the policy, 
work corporations—or similar initiatives—may prove to be a fruitful co-production 
between citizens, local government, business, and the third sector.
18.4  Conclusion
Due to financial constraints, the municipality of Nijmegen has had to revise its 
re-employment policy. The result—work corporations—represents a sharp break 
with local traditions and therefore amounts to a social innovation. Moreover, as the 
work corporations all have freedom to determine their internal organisations, the 
policy also encourages innovative structures at the sub-organisational level. None-
theless, it remains to be seen whether work corporations will prove to be resistant 
to (local) political changes or whether they are merely a transitional structure in the 
shift towards another type of policy.
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Chapter 19
Birmingham: The Youth Employment and 
Enterprise Rehearsal Project
Nadia Brookes, Jeremy Kendall and Lavinia Mitton
19.1  Introduction
The Youth Employment and Enterprise Rehearsal (YEER) project provided busi-
ness support to black and minority ethnic individuals who were not in employment, 
education or training (NEET) in Birmingham, UK. The YEER project was designed 
to provide business-specific training and assist young people from developing an 
idea to starting their own business. The project was run by a social enterprise, The 
Future Melting Pot (TFMP). This chapter briefly describes the city context, how the 
YEER project was organised, how it interacted with beneficiaries of the project and 
some key context factors that influenced the innovation.
Birmingham is located in the West Midlands region of England and is the largest 
city in the UK outside London with a population of just over 1 million inhabitants. 
Local government for the city is the metropolitan authority of Birmingham City 
Council, the largest local authority in the UK made up of 40 wards (administrative/
electoral districts within council boundaries). It has the youngest population of any 
major European city; over half the population is under 35 years old. Birmingham’s 
population is significantly diverse in terms of ethnic composition. The city has un-
employment rates twice the national average, and in some areas over 50 % of the 
working-age population is not in employment.
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Labour market policy is largely a function of central government who are re-
sponsible for activation strategies in local areas. However, due to Birmingham con-
taining some of the most deprived areas with the highest levels of unemployment 
in England, various central government initiatives have been implemented locally 
through the city council since 2000. These initiatives have had addressing unem-
ployment as their sole objective or as part of wider neighbourhood or regeneration 
strategies. The Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF), which came from the na-
tional Department for Communities and Local Government and the Department for 
Work and Pensions of the previous Labour government, was a key programme for 
Birmingham. The city was allocated £118 million over 3 years from 2008, and al-
most half of the WNF resources specifically targeted worklessness (worklessness is 
a wider term than unemployment as it includes everyone of working age who does 
not work no matter what their circumstances). The funds were allocated as part of a 
general grant given directly to local authorities. This was not ring-fenced, and so lo-
cal authorities were able to use it as they saw fit to support the delivery of local, re-
gional and national priorities. Therefore, the remainder of the WNF was allocated to 
strategic partners to address barriers to worklessness and other key priorities such as 
supporting business, improving educational attainment and skills, addressing health 
inequalities, encouraging active involvement in sport and culture, improving energy 
efficiency, reducing the number of people living in temporary accommodation and 
making the city a safer place.
Significantly, the WNF enabled the development of a targeted approach at a 
local ward level to select and commission organisations to help people find work 
(described in the following chapter). It also led to the Worklessness Innovations 
Fund which provided small grants of up to £25,000 for feasibility studies, research 
and demonstration projects. In 2010, 44 organisations were awarded resources to 
try new and interesting ways of helping people gain employment, of which TFMP 
was one.
The organisation responsible for YEER, TFMP, is a social enterprise set up in 
2009 after identifying a gap in the market for an organisation to support the aims 
and aspirations of disadvantaged young people in the West Midlands. The organisa-
tion works primarily with women and young people, particularly those classed as 
NEET and from ethnic minority backgrounds. The philosophy of TFMP is to “en-
able and empower young people to achieve their potential through enterprise”. The 
concept is very much about developing individual ideas and talents, to “open new 
gateways to disadvantaged groups who find it hard to engage meaningfully with 
traditional business networks”. TFMP focuses on self-employment and enterprise 
creation and encourages the individuals they work with to develop new social en-
terprises to benefit local economies.
Underpinning their work is that services and opportunities should be those that 
young people have determined they want themselves, not just with them in mind.
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19.2  YEER Project
In 2010, TFMP successfully obtained funding from the Worklessness Innovations Fund 
to set up the flagship YEER pilot project. The aim of the project was to provide business 
support to black and minority ethnic individuals who were NEET with the main aim of 
participants being able to set up their own businesses or social enterprises. The project 
included training, support and access to accredited advisers. The approach could be 
characterised as intensive, personalised support to stimulate entrepreneurialism. Creat-
ing young entrepreneurs was seen as helping to address the breakdown of the traditional 
route usually taken where young people progressed to employment after school (or uni-
versity). There were already various agencies in existence to support businesses but only 
once the business was developed to a certain point; no support, however, was provided 
to explore options or with the set-up phase.
The project provided a structured yet flexible programme of support in a “safe 
and welcoming atmosphere”. Young people had to be over 18 years old and on 
welfare benefits for at least 3 months. There were a limited number of places, and 
young people had to complete an application form and take part in an interview. 
Participation therefore required a certain amount of motivation and commitment 
from the outset. The usual timeframe for young people to be engaged with the proj-
ect was 6 months or less.
Participants were offered the chance to improve personal development; nurture 
their entrepreneurial “mind”; start the business they had always wanted to start; 
create their own work and become their own boss; and make a difference for them-
selves, their family and their community. An action plan was drawn up with a mentor 
and participants received support in developing business ideas from initial design 
through to completion. Training covered confidence building, time management, 
personal goal planning, ideas generation, market research, business planning and 
the practical aspects of setting up a business. It provided the opportunity to explore 
the option of self-employment through a personalised approach led by the needs of 
the individual and where feedback was incorporated into the project. The project 
responded to the different learning paces of individuals, and more advanced learn-
ers could benefit from a “fast-track” approach to courses and additional sessions.
The project’s approach was innovative in that it offered excluded young people 
an alternative to unemployment or ad hoc paid employment. This differed from 
conventional employment support and the focus on “getting a job”. It used inno-
vative approaches to communication and retention using the preferred method of 
communication identified by participants, for example through Facebook and other 
social media.
The YEER project was delivered by TFMP staff and volunteers, along with ex-
pert mentors and advisers. The mentors were recruited specifically for the project so 
that they had existing networks that participants could tap into. Partnership develop-
ment was seen as a large part of the success of the YEER project giving participants 
the opportunity to network effectively from the start, both between the agencies 
involved and by giving the young people access to these networks and individu-
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als. The city council, Business Link (government advice and guidance service until 
2011), Advantage West Midlands (government regional development agency until 
2012), local entrepreneurs, the Creative Community Coalition, the Business Devel-
opment Service (group of professional business advisers), I-Social Entrepreneurs 
(social enterprise development organisation) and Young Enterprise (enterprise edu-
cation charity) were all counted as partners.
The project supported 20 young people in its pilot phase, of those some set up 
their own businesses, some gained employment, and some started volunteering or 
education and training courses. All developed business skills, improved their ca-
reers prospects and gained an awareness of the business world even if they did not 
take their ideas forward at this point. One young person, for example, received 
assistance with developing a business plan, researching their idea and mentoring 
from a local social entrepreneur. They subsequently set up a business running drama 
courses for children that they continued whilst taking up a teaching course to further 
develop their skills. Participants reported that as well as practical skills the project 
had given them confidence and a greater understanding of what they wanted to do.
The services TFMP provides are the product of a series of consultations and 
focus groups in which over 300 young people participated to give their views on 
what support they would like to see available for young entrepreneurs. The main 
request was for more personalised, innovative support particularly for people who 
have an idea for business but are unsure how to take it forward and turn it into a 
reality. YEER was an attempt to meet that identified need. TFMP see their positive, 
practical approach and individual focus, coupled with the promotion of innovation 
and creative thinking as allowing the delivery of a personalised service to all of 
those they help.
19.2.1  Context
There were a number of key contextual factors that enabled the existence of the 
YEER project in Birmingham. Birmingham has a much higher percentage of 
NEETs than other areas of the West Midlands, and this project directly addressed 
local authority concerns about this group and their future employment prospects. In 
addition, the target group focus on those from ethnic minority backgrounds tied in 
with local political discourse about community cohesion and social inclusion. The 
project also connected with the national and local neighbourhood and workless-
ness agendas by supporting young people into self-employment based in their local 
communities. As part of gaining WNF funding, projects had to demonstrate how 
they added value to the citywide employment and skills strategy. The funding op-
portunity combined with Birmingham’s willingness to use the resources to try some 
different and interesting things also provided the environment for the innovation to 
be supported. It also linked with the move to working in partnership and a desire to 
increase involvement of the third sector.
However, the YEER project was intended to be a time-limited, small-scale, pilot 
project; it received only £24,977 of funding and during the pilot supported 20 young 
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people. With the end of the WNF as a source of funding in 2011, the city council 
and the local strategic partnership did not make resources available to continue with 
the project, despite early successes. Be Birmingham (the local strategic partnership) 
who administered the Worklessness Innovations Fund focused on the provider’s 
strategy for sustainability rather than providing them with continued support when 
giving out grants and many projects closed. Funders and providers were all aware 
that the main feature of the fund was to accrue learning for future strategies and 
projects rather than sustaining and replicating the innovations supported; for ex-
ample, a best practice guide for setting up projects in the future was produced.
This kind of pilot funding will always result in limited impact on the local wel-
fare system as a whole and a struggle with issues of scaling up. TFMP as an organ-
isation is in a position where, should funding become available, they could run the 
project again in this format. TFMP still has an extensive volunteering programme 
aimed at providing work opportunities and improving the employability of young 
people in Birmingham, particularly for those from their target groups, and contin-
ues to work in partnership with existing business support providers as well as other 
organisations sharing a similar purpose in order to complement service delivery. 
This multi-agency approach of public sector partnerships, private sector alliances 
and community networks is seen as a way of ensuring clients receive the maximum 
benefit in achieving their goals and sustainability for the organisation.
19.3  Conclusion
The YEER project could be adapted for different age and client groups, and there 
is no reason to assume this could not be replicated in other cities and countries. It 
was a small-scale project and so low risk for the local authority and local strategic 
partnership to support, but therefore also the potential for impact on the local wel-
fare system was limited. The project did shift the focus away from getting people 
into work to supporting entrepreneurial activities, which had not often been central 
in policy discussion and even less so for this particular group considered difficult 
to engage with. It was an example of the increased involvement of the third sector 
in delivering services and the application of business practices to areas of social 
concern, integrating economic and social development through stimulating entre-
preneurialism, social enterprise and start-ups.
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Chapter 20
Birmingham: A “Locality Approach” to 
Combating Worklessness
Nadia Brookes, Jeremy Kendall and Lavinia Mitton
20.1  Introduction
The locality approach to worklessness in Birmingham, UK provided a framework 
for an area and individual-level focus for commissioning employment and skills 
services. Worklessness is usually defined as the unemployed and the economically 
inactive combined (ONS 2009). The approach involved a range of local welfare 
partners. This chapter briefly describes the city context, how the locality approach 
was organised, how it interacted with beneficiaries and some key context factors 
that influenced the innovative approach.
Birmingham is located within the West Midlands region of England and is the 
regional centre for business, retail and leisure. The city is disproportionately affect-
ed by worklessness, having many areas with high unemployment and deprivation 
which has persisted for many years. Birmingham has unemployment rates twice 
the national average, and in some areas over 50 % of the working age population 
are not employed. The city has the highest rate of youth unemployment in the UK. 
These entrenched problems of unemployment, a shortage of appropriate jobs and 
fragmentation of support had all been identified as issues locally.
Birmingham has had a wide range of regeneration and renewal programmes and 
initiatives over the years targeting both the city centre and neighbourhood areas. 
When the Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF) was allocated to Birmingham by 
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Fig. 20.1  Integrated employment and skills model. (Source: Birmingham City Council)
 
central government for 2008–2011 to help tackle worklessness and low levels of 
skills and enterprise, it was recognised that a more strategic approach was needed 
to the use of resources in tackling long-term unemployment, barriers to employment 
and other elements of deprivation in the city.
20.2  A Locality Approach to Unemployment
20.2.1  Internal Organisation
Birmingham developed an innovative approach to tackling unemployment for those 
living in the most deprived areas and with high levels of unemployment (25 % or 
more). The two key innovative features were a model to integrate employment and 
skills provision at an individual level and contracting of services at a local or ward 
level (these were electoral districts with an average of around 27,000 residents), the 
integrated employment and skills (IES) model and the Neighbourhood and Con-
stituency Employment and Skills Plans.
Integrated Employment and Skills (IES)
The IES was the primary means by which activity to tackle worklessness was deliv-
ered in the city. Figure 20.1 illustrates the IES model.
Neighbourhood and Constituency Employment and Skills Plans
The decision to use this approach was driven not only by a desire to include local 
priorities in the programme but also to use lessons from previous initiatives about 
involving local people in decision-making whilst ensuring that services remained 
strategically commissioned. As a result, Neighbourhood and Constituency Employ-
ment and Skills Plans were drawn up in the first year of the WNF programme. 
The neighbourhood plans covered seven Birmingham wards that had more than 11 
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priority areas for deprivation within them, and 9 constituencies were the subject of 
constituency plans (which also captured the needs of smaller clusters of priority 
areas lying outside key wards). These were put together by local welfare partners, 
local providers, community groups and local councillors.
The purpose of these plans was to set out key actions and targets for activities to 
support residents where worklessness was high to access sustainable employment 
opportunities. The goal was to create a framework to ensure that service delivery 
was more effective and better focused on the needs of residents. The aim was to 
achieve the following: analyse the need in local areas and calculate local targets 
to be achieved; gauge and record the impact of existing provision; identify service 
gaps and propose additional activity to be commissioned to address service gaps.
The employment and skills provision eventually contracted tended to provide 
a relatively standard set of options for support, but the local and IES-driven ap-
proach to delivery on a city-wide scale, the development of the employment and 
skills plans approach and the contracting process were innovative. This was a move 
away from the usual arrangement of a single contract for the whole city to one with 
tailored contracts to meet the needs of local people. The deliberate targeting of local 
areas, groups and individuals was a key innovative feature of the approach.
The IES model and the employment and skills plans provided a foundation for 
a focus at the client level and the provision of targeted action and support that each 
individual required (whether this was education, skills or employment) no matter 
what provider they accessed. The approach was designed to ensure that local needs 
were taken into account and overall contract values set at a level to allow third sec-
tor providers to tender for contracts. It also facilitated the development of a number 
of innovative projects to address unemployment such as the Youth Enterprise and 
Employment Rehearsal project supporting young people to explore setting up their 
own businesses (described in Chap. 19) and the job bus run by a third sector or-
ganisation, a mobile jobs bus equipped with employment and training experts and 
technology to provide information on jobs and services.
In terms of responsibilities for the management of the approach, Be Birmingham 
was responsible for the effective delivery of the WNF and as the Local Strategic 
Partnership played a key role in bringing partners together to coordinate action on 
unemployment through focusing on the most deprived neighbourhoods. The Bir-
mingham Economic Development Partnership was the thematic partnership respon-
sible for the management of elements of the fund. Responsibility for the develop-
ment and approval of projects was delegated to an Employment Sub Group of the 
partnership, which included the local authority, Jobcentre Plus and Skills Funding 
Agency representatives. The local authority was the accountable body for the fund-
ing, and so processes and governance needed to comply with both Be Birmingham 
and local authority requirements.
The approach was largely bottom–up in that priorities were identified through the 
employment and skills plan process, which were then fed into a delivery plan. The 
Employment Sub Group management team agreed upon the priorities and commis-
sioned projects and activities. An appraisal panel made recommendations on which 
projects should go ahead for approval and the group approved projects (except for 
260 N. Brookes et al.
those over £ 300,000, which went to Be Birmingham for approval). The thematic 
partnership made programme-level decisions and received project information. Be 
Birmingham received updates on performance and a local authority. Cabinet Mem-
ber approved projects in line with financial regulations.
Forty-three contracts were let to a variety of provider types at ward level through 
the Neighbourhood and Constituency Employment and Skills Plans process: private 
sector; third sector organisations and consortium; and social enterprises. Individual 
projects specifically targeted a range of groups: the disabled, lone parents, the over 
50s and those who are not in education employment or training, carers, women and 
vulnerable clients (alcohol users, offenders). The employment and skills support 
provided included making contact with clients, skills-assisted planning, mentoring, 
subsidisedwork placements, support into business start-ups and social enterprise, 
and English language and basic skills. There was also support to local businesses 
to provide job vacancies for local residents. In one constituency, the Skills and 
Job Match contract provided a range of services to assist people into employment. 
Clients were provided with support to develop curriculum vitae, get interview ex-
perience, to conduct job searches and access voluntary work. In another local area, 
the Intermediate Labour Market contract enabled good links to be established with 
local employers including a local medical practice, training centres, local shops and 
social enterprises (DC Research and Focus 2011).
20.2.2  Interaction with Users
The areas with the highest levels of unemployment are also usually the most de-
prived, and the aim was that by supporting people into sustained employment in 
those areas there would be benefits to the localities as a whole. This was a proac-
tive drive to pursue the development of community-led, neighbourhood-specific 
approaches, actively engaging those individuals most at risk of unemployment and 
furthest away from the labour market, including the long-term unemployed, ethnic 
minorities and people with disabilities.
The IES model underpinned the delivery of the unemployment approach and 
focused on making changes to the way the infrastructure works, including improved 
partnership working and more joined-up services. The support process included 
employability skills to overcome personal barriers; skills support linked to existing 
vacancies; and support to and through sustained employment. The key features of 
the IES model included:
• Improved local information to effectively target resources to the needs of a par-
ticular group or individual
• A wide range of outreach and contact strategies to effectively engage with groups 
or individuals
• A strong client-focused approach that addressed the needs of specific individuals
• A range of interventions to address the needs of individuals
• Client tracking to support individuals to access employment and post-employ-
ment support
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• Engaging with employers and providing bespoke training to match priority cli-
ents to vacancies
• Continuity to ensure a joined-up approach, assurance to clients and opportunities 
to build on learning
• Local unemployment champions
The service providers commissioned indicated that having provision available at a 
local level was essential for engaging with service users. Many people did not want 
to travel outside of their neighbourhood, and so it was important to have a visible 
presence in the community and to use organisations that potential users of the ser-
vice would be familiar with.
20.2.3  Context
IES is a policy that predates the current national Coalition government in the UK, 
and various models were developed trialled and delivered on a national, region-
al and local level. The thinking behind it came from the Leitch Review of Skills 
(Leitch 2006) which emphasised the need to improve the national skills base to 
facilitate growth in productivity, improve national economic competitiveness and 
increase individual social mobility. After participating in one of the IES trials, Bir-
mingham decided to continue with and develop the model. There was also an im-
petus from the previous national Labour administration to build responsive services 
at a local level to tackle unemployment and improve skills through initiatives such 
as the WNF.
There were a number of key contextual factors which enabled the development 
of the locality approach to worklessness in Birmingham. The approach linked into 
the local political agenda around localism or devolved decision-making which was 
seen as key to dealing with social problems. As a city, Birmingham was and is 
highly committed to tackling unemployment, and social inclusion is high on the 
political agenda. Commissioning at a city level was not seen as suitable for a city as 
diverse as Birmingham. The IES model was the principal means by which activity 
to tackle unemployment was informed and sat at the heart of the city strategy (the 
core strategy to provide a 20-year framework for sustainable growth in Birming-
ham, with proposals to provide 50,600 new homes and deliver 100,000 new jobs by 
2026) and the local area agreement (steps to deliver the city strategy).
The major players in the local welfare system all agreed and signed up to the 
IES model, including the local authority, Jobcentre Plus and the Skills Funding 
Agency. It provided a well-understood model against which to commission activity 
and assess performance. There was a significant amount of political scrutiny mostly 
related to the wards wanting to have greater independence over spending and to be 
able to hold providers to account. Political involvement in the process led to some 
delays (and the slow start resulted in criticism from national government within the 
local authority and local press) but having the engagement of local councillors also 
helped to embed and raise the profile of the delivery contracts of the employment 
and skills plans in their areas (DC Research and Focus 2011).
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Stakeholders and service delivery organisations believed that this approach pro-
vided local support and got many people into work, training and volunteering op-
portunities. The approach also supported partnership working which was a char-
acteristic of the local welfare system emphasised by local government. A number 
of organisational partnerships came together for the first time to deliver contracts, 
including those of different sizes and different sectors with a range of geographi-
cal and target group focus (DC Research and Focus 2011). For example, Prospects 
(an organisation providing education, employment and training services across the 
UK), the Jericho Foundation (a Birmingham charity providing support into em-
ployment) and Birmingham Enterprise (a local enterprise and employment support 
organisation) formed a partnership to support people into business start-ups, social 
enterprises or work and into further education or development of skills in one area 
of the city.
Many third sector providers came together solely for the purpose of delivering 
WNF contracts. Private sector providers also felt that their relationships with many 
community and third sector groups had improved during the delivery phase of the 
employment and skills plans. It also enabled projects to develop new relationships 
with employers, which increased opportunities for clients to access available jobs.
The locality approach has had issues of sustainability and currently does not 
operate in some of the original areas where it was implemented or not in the way 
originally intended. This was seen primarily as a knock-on effect of the loss of re-
sources for neighbourhood management which supported the process. The contracts 
with service providers set up through the locality approach were also linked to the 
Working Neighbourhoods funding which came to an end in 2011. The withdrawal 
of funding was as a result of cuts in budgets through the Coalition’s Spending Re-
view in 2010 as a response to the financial crisis. This innovative approach did have 
the potential for significant impact on the local welfare system with its approach to 
commissioning and delivering services, and there is still support for the approach. 
There are plans to refresh this strategy under the current council’s localism agenda.
20.3  Conclusion
The IES model and local delivery approach arose out of a particular set of cir-
cumstances in Birmingham and a willingness to undertake major change; however, 
elements of this approach could be replicated elsewhere. It enabled an in-depth 
understanding of issues for local residents where unemployment was high, which 
provided the opportunity for different provider organisations to work together for 
the first time and to develop small-scale innovative projects (such as the Youth 
Employment and Enterprise Rehearsal project described in Chap. 19) and capture 
learning, useful not only locally but also for the setting up of projects more widely.
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Chapter 21
Münster: How Prevention Visits Improve Local 
Child Protection
Andrea Walter and Danielle Gluns
21.1  Münster—City Context and the Field of Local 
Childcare Policy
Münster has around 300,000 inhabitants and is located in the biggest German state. 
It is a relatively wealthy city (compared to other cities in North Rhine-Westphalia) 
and can be characterised by a rather young (with around 50,000 students) and well-
educated population with low unemployment rates. Its economy is dominated by a 
strong tertiary sector with a large spectrum of both public and church administra-
tions, university and other higher education, science, healthcare, communication, 
insurances and financial institutions. Therefore, Münster has not been hit as hard by 
economic crises as other cities.
Social policy in Münster is influenced by a strong Catholic tradition, which leads 
to an emphasis on solidarity and subsidiarity and a connection to the concept of 
communitarianism (Vorländer 2001). Consequently, society has the duty to care for 
those who are not able to do so for themselves, whereas the smallest possible entity 
(the individual, the community etc.) should be responsible in order to avoid unnec-
essary collectivisation (Leuninger 2002, pp. 21–26). The foundation for this claim 
lies in the high value of personal autonomy in the Catholic tradition (Focke 1978, 
p. 192; Leuninger 2002, pp. 20f). Thus, the state should enable everyone to con-
tribute actively to the society which stresses the social political focus on prevention 
and investments in human capital as a basis for competitiveness and participation 
(Leuninger 2002, pp. 113–116, 121).
These traditions are mirrored in local childcare policy, of which the prevention 
visits (see below) form a part. In this field, German municipalities have been a 
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driving force for a long time. Making the reconciliation of work and family life pos-
sible for well-educated women has been the main objective in Münster. This aim is 
in line with the national legal requirement to increase the number of places in child-
care for the under 3-year-olds. To sum it up, adequate supply of childcare facilities 
and more flexibility as well as increasing quality standards are seen as important 
for the individual wellbeing of families as well as for improving the attractiveness 
of the whole city. All in all, a broad consensus among the relevant actors from lo-
cal politics and public administration as well as from organised civil society about 
promoting childcare policy can be identified. Concretely, the welfare associations 
and other stakeholders such as parents’ initiatives are strongly involved. The main 
cleavage in this field regards promoters of affordability and accessibility on the one 
hand and promoters of high-quality care on the other, while there is agreement on 
the overall need for a high amount of institutional childcare.
21.2  Internal Characteristics of the Prevention Visits1
21.2.1  Improving Local Child Protection by Assisting Every 
Family—Goals and Ways of Addressing Users
The prevention visits are a new kind of service in the field of childcare policy and 
were initiated by the Youth Office in 2008. The Youth Office in Germany is re-
sponsible for child protection (§ 1 Abs. 3 S.3 SGB VIII). For this aim, the office 
can intervene in families where the wellbeing of the children is threatened and can, 
as a last resort, decide to take children out of their families. Due to this, the Youth 
Office has a negative reputation in Germany, which is aggravated by the role of 
the Youth Office during the Third Reich and in the German Democratic Republic. 
With its staff of around 1,400 employees, the Youth Office in Münster is the largest 
administrative unit within the municipality (Youth Office Münster 2012, p. 163).
The general proceeding of the innovation is that all parents in Münster with a 
newborn child receive a visit from Youth Office employees.2 From a practical point 
of view, these prevention visits aim to assist parents with their children’s upbring-
ing. From a political point of view, these visits serve as an operative instrument to 
improve local child protection based on intensive and early family contact. Con-
cretely, the responsible local authorities hope to improve the relationship between 
families and the Youth Office (improving the office’s image) as well as to prevent 
worst-case scenarios like abuse or neglect of children or even infanticide. The local 
media coverage in June 2008 especially focused on the cases of 5-year-old Lea So-
phie from Schwerin and 2-year-old Kevin from Bremen. Both died a horrible death 
1 Methodically, this chapter is mainly based on two expert interviews with representatives from the 
youth office, annual reports of the office as well as local newspaper articles.
2 All facts about the family visits in the following subchapters without any designated sources are 
based on the newspaper article “Jugendamt will jedes Baby besuchen” (05/06/2008) as well as the 
website of the Youth Office.
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caused by child neglect (WN 05/06/2008). The implementation of the prevention 
visits was an initiative by the Youth Office itself. The concept of these visits is ori-
ented at the so-called Dormagener Modell3 of prevention visits that was developed 
in the city of Dormagen in 2006. The actors of the Youth Office adapted the con-
cept to the situation in Münster. A specific aspect of this Münster model is that the 
prevention team who is responsible for coordinating and realising these visits aims 
to visit every family in Münster, not only socially disadvantaged ones from poorer 
areas as it is done in other cities. The participation in the family visits is voluntary 
for the parents.
The innovation works in the following way: First of all, each family with a new-
born child (these are about 2,400 per year in Münster) gets a letter of inquiry by the 
Youth Office. If they do not object, they receive a second letter in which the pre-
vention team suggests an appointment. The concept offers different services: First 
of all, the prevention team informs the parents in an individual way about differ-
ent issues relevant to parents: parental benefits, childcare facilities and preventive 
healthcare offers. In this context, the families get information leaflets, which are 
in line with the respective nationality of their child and the district of the parents’ 
home. If desired by parents, a midwife accompanies the visits. Furthermore, the 
first parents’ letter ( Elternbriefe) is handed over to the families personally. These 
letters present, in total, 46 educational assistances (i.e. advice on breastfeeding or 
protective vaccination) and their dispatch to the families is staggered over the pe-
riod from the first month of life up to the eighth birthday of the child.4 The parents’ 
letters are conceptualised by the working group Neue Erziehung e.V. which is a 
nationally organised non-governmental organisation (NGO).5 They are available in 
many other municipalities, but not every Youth Office sends them to the families 
for such an extended period. As mentioned above, one of the main goals of these 
prevention visits is to ameliorate the negative image of the Youth Office which is 
amplified by the supra-regional media.6 To underline this aim, every child gets a 
welcome gift from the Youth Office. This toy symbolises that the prevention team 
does not want to take the children away from their parents, rather it wants to bring 
all families real benefit. The parents should get the impression that the Youth Of-
fice might be useful for every family member and in every (difficult) situation. The 
families should realise that they can rely on the Youth Office as a service provider. 
Ergo, these prevention visits are seen as a sort of door-opener7 by the employees of 
the Youth Office.
3 The so-called Dormagener Modell is the title of a local programme, which aimed to develop 
instruments for preventing child abuse and intra-family violence. This pilot project was developed 
in the German municipality Dormagen in 2006. Many other municipalities were convinced of this 
new concept and adapted this model. See source “Dormagener Modell”.
4 The description of the parents’ letters is based on the website of the Youth Office.
5 The working group Neue Erziehung e.V. was founded in 1946 by teachers in Berlin. After the pe-
riod of inhuman National Socialist and fascist tyranny, the members of this NGO aim to develop a 
new conversational understanding of education. Source: Website of Arbeitskreis Neue Erziehung.
6 Interview with a representative of the Family Office.
7 Interview with a representative of the Family Office.
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21.2.2  Internal Organisation and Modes of Working
The prevention team is composed of six qualified employees working part-time 
who coordinate and implement the appointments and visits. Every member is an 
employee of the Youth Office. This underlines the main purpose of the prevention 
team that its members should serve as ambassadors for the office. Volunteers, as 
in other German municipalities, would not have direct access to the services of the 
Youth Office.8 That is one of the reasons why the Youth Office decided to integrate 
the visits into the office itself. Each of the six employees should care for about 400 
newborn children per year. Actually in the year 2009, 2069 families were visited. 
The visits are financially sustainable since they are funded as part of the annual 
budget.
21.2.3  Context of the Innovation—Interaction with the Local 
Welfare System
The prevention visits were initiated by the head of the Youth Office itself, who is 
one of the key players within the elite network of the city. As head of the office, she 
is a member of different administrative and local political networks (round tables, 
working groups etc.). Despite her network position, at the beginning, she had dif-
ficulties in finding political majorities for this program. Many politicians did not 
want the prevention team to visit families living in wealthy social environments 
as well. But the head of the Youth Office refused to accept any compromise and 
underlined that child protection is a universal issue concerning every family.9 The 
office aimed to achieve public consensus by arguing to prevent worst-case scenarios 
which are built up by media, politics and society. At the same time, they emphasized 
the supportive function of the visits as opposed to controlling families. Finally, this 
strategy succeeded. The political factions agreed. Today, the Youth Office is very 
satisfied with this innovation. The head of the Youth Office highlights its success 
and importance for the strategy of the Youth Office.10 This is also acknowledged by 
the local media.11
The high number of prevention visits which have been carried out over the last 
years (2009: 2,069, 2010: 2,314, 2011: 2,080) shows the high demand as regards the 
prevention visits by families. In a quarter of those prevention visits in 2010 (497), 
the Youth Office identified a high need for advice, information as well as support. In 
more than 1000 cases, the prevention team informed parents about the offers of lo-
cal services focusing on childcare (Youth Office Münster 2012, p. 87). In this way, 
the prevention visits have contributed to the intended image change of the Youth 
Office: from a control instance to a kind of service provider.
8 Interview with the head of the Youth Office.
9 Interview with the head of the Youth Office.
10 Interview with the head of the Youth Office.
11 “Reicht ein Besuch?” a comment of the local journalist Karin Völker in WN 05/06/08.
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For evaluation, Münster takes part in an empirical study about German munici-
palities, which have introduced the instrument of prevention visits. With reference 
to the first results of the participating municipalities as well as the high demand of 
this instrument by municipalities in North-Rhine Westphalia, the empirical study 
evaluates the instrument of prevention visits positively and sees it on the path to-
wards a regular offer ( Regelangebot) (Frese and Günther 2012, p. 251). In addition 
to this, the evaluation of prevention visits in different cities underlines the positive 
effects of the specific Münster model: Parents participating in the study emphasise 
the positive effects of both working with employees of the Youth Office as well as 
visiting all parents in the city (Frese and Günther 2012).
21.3  Conclusion
The prevention visits can be seen as an important instrument in the process of im-
age changing and improving child protection in Münster. The deep impact of this 
social innovation for the local welfare system can be explained by the following 
three context factors:
Being Part of the Prevention Approach as well as of the Local City Strategy This 
innovation supports the core value of prevention and especially the prevention pro-
gram of the Youth Office. Furthermore, with their customer focus, these prevention 
visits help to improve the Youth Office’s image as well as to strengthen the field of 
local childcare policy identified by the local elites as an important factor for the city 
to become more attractive for young families. Thus, this social innovation became 
an important pillar for the urban local welfare policy strategy.
Being an Integrated Part of the Local Welfare System Since its implementation five 
years ago, the instrument of the prevention visits has become firmly institution-
alised within the field of local welfare politics in Münster. This is apparent in the 
merger of the prenatal advice and the prevention team in 2010. In June 2011, the unit 
“Prenatal advice, prevention services and family visits” was founded. This enables 
better networking between early services and the expansion of existing cooperative 
governance structures (Youth Office Münster 2012, p. 85). Furthermore, the visits 
are institutionalised in a financially sustainable way.
The Impact of the Local Network Governance for This Innovation A change in the 
welfare governance architecture can be identified. Local welfare policy in Münster 
seems to work more and more in networks as opposed to operating in a hierar-
chical process. This is underlined by the implementation process of the preven-
tion visits, which was led by the highly embedded and active head of the Youth 
Office. Because of its new understanding as a customer-oriented institution, the 
Youth Office increasingly acts as a partner for civil society (families), not as a hier-
archical instance. The negative reactions in the beginning have shown that local 
politics and civil society still perceived the Youth Office as an intervention authority 
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( Ordnungs-/Eingriffsinstanz). The new governance forms offer some advantages 
for the success of this innovation: Problems and challenges (like financial issues) 
can be directly discussed between the involved actors. Solutions can be developed 
together before disagreement results in unbridgeable differences.
The analysis of the prevention visits in Münster demonstrates the necessity of in-
novators to connect to locally prevalent norms and values. The local welfare system 
not only structurally, but also “culturally” determines opportunities and obstacles 
for social innovations. Furthermore, the successful implementation of prevention 
visits in a given local context will depend on an active “policy entrepreneur” who 
can mobilize supporters and resources.12
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Chapter 22
Barcelona: A Citizen’s Agreement 
for an Inclusive City
Teresa Montagut, Gemma Vilà and Sebastià Riutort
22.1  Barcelona’s Sociopolitical Structure
The administrative decentralisation of the political structure in Spain grants region-
al and local councils a set of legislative and executive competencies which, in the 
case of social welfare services, are very far-reaching. The social innovations that 
we find in Barcelona today are related to two basic factors: the continuity in city 
government and the dynamics of civil society.
From the first local elections (after the re-establishment of democracy) and until 
2011, a period of over 30 years, the city council of Barcelona was in the hands of the 
left (the Socialist Party won the elections and governed in coalition with two other left 
wing parties). The main characteristics of the social welfare system of the city, there-
fore, are (1) continuity in the government team over a long period of time, (2) starting 
from zero, that is, they had to build the system from scratch, and (3) citizens who—after 
the long period of dictatorship—wanted to be involved in political action, to participate. 
Municipal policymakers made the most of this potential when it came to setting up the 
local welfare system, as did other political actors (the opposition parties and civil soci-
ety) to some extent. The civil society in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia has 
traditionally been participative and enterprising, as demonstrated by the large number 
of cooperatives that existed in Barcelona at the end of the nineteenth century.
Another element that helps to understand the context is the fact that in Barcelona 
we find an objective that cuts across all areas of political action: the “modernisation” 
of the city. This is a manifestation of the desire to recover the spirit of enterprise that 
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the city once had, to recover its own brand of economic and cultural dynamism that 
was forbidden during the years of dictatorship. It finds its expression in the con-
struction of the “Barcelona model”, a model that can be seen clearly in the changes 
in urban development as a result of the 1992 Olympic Games, the success of which 
was to a large extent due to the involvement of civil society, although it also affected 
other areas of society. In this way, policymakers in the Social Welfare Department 
set themselves a basic goal of building a social services model that was participa-
tive. As no welfare services system yet existed, there was no widespread culture of 
commitment to, or participation in, the city’s social welfare. The structures used to 
encourage and enable people to commit themselves to collective responsibilities 
would also have to be created.
The search for a “Barcelona model” has meanwhile continued ever more serious-
ly in various political arenas, and collaboration with civil society in social welfare 
matters has also increased significantly, representing a force for social innovation 
in the city.
22.2  The Programme “Citizen’s Agreement for an 
Inclusive Barcelona”
22.2.1  The Programme
The programme Citizen’s Agreement for an Inclusive Barcelona (CA) is an example 
of social innovation that fits in with a new form of governance. It establishes both 
a new form of participation and policy-making. The CA is not only based on new 
practices but also introduces changes in social responsibilities (public and private) 
in the local welfare system. By bringing about a new culture in the management of 
the welfare system, it also affects attitudes and values within local government. It is 
an example of social innovation resulting from a two-way process: (1) A top-down 
process, in the sense that it was proposed by the municipal government, which (2) 
intersects with a bottom-up process based on the effort and interests of different 
organisations and social networks that work within the city’s social welfare system. 
We consider that this is a programme with great potential, and it could be imple-
mented in other cities with similar conditions.
The programme was established in April 2005. The ultimate goal of the pro-
gramme is to redistribute responsibilities in the social welfare sector in Barcelona 
through a broad agreement among representatives of the main social agents in the 
sector. The intention is to create a strategic framework shared by all participating 
entities. This is a new philosophy, which integrates the diversity of activities that 
are carried out in the local social welfare system into a single framework or joint 
strategy. It is based on a policy decision to coordinate the diverse activities of differ-
ent social actors. No one loses their space for action; rather, it is possible to improve 
results by combining efforts.
27522 Barcelona: A Citizen’s Agreement for an Inclusive City
At the moment of its creation, a total of 235 entities of diverse nature (organ-
isations, businesses and universities) signed the agreement. Since its public pre-
sentation, the number of institutions and organisations involved and attached to 
the agreement has grown each year. In December 2011, there were a total of 467 
participating organisations, institutions and businesses (doubling the number of par-
ticipants in 5 years), and in 2013 there were more than 500.
The agreement has been promoted and is coordinated by the municipal gov-
ernment. Currently, the more than 500 participating entities work in such distinct 
spheres as the economy, culture, education, social action, housing, health and labour. 
The values that the CA promotes are identified in the strategic framework that de-
fines the programme: coexistence, cooperation, social cohesion, creativity and com-
munity. From the perspective of the internal administration of the agreement, the aim 
is to encourage values like democratic governance, networking and quality of work.
To sign the agreement means joining a network that provides opportunities for 
access to and exchange of information, resources and knowledge. It also promotes 
projects in which cooperation between diverse entities and organisations in the city 
is key.
The CA is organised on different levels: (a) there is an annual meeting of all 
the signatories to the agreement, in which participants provide an account of the 
work they have carried out during the year and agree on the direction of the work 
for the following year; (b) there is a governing council, which is a deliberative and 
decision-making body that shapes the development of the agreement and its actions; 
(c) there are work commissions, formed by organisations that temporarily work on 
concrete issues, and (d) there are action networks formed by organisations, institu-
tions and other bodies that work in specific sectors, which establish common objec-
tives to improve the work they do.
The Action Networks
Direct action depends on the networks. The organisations and city institutions in 
these networks share concrete methodologies and goals; they cooperate and direct 
their shared work toward common strategic and operational objectives. The net-
works begin with a desire to work together on a particular issue or matter and to 
achieve improvements in the respective fields of the participants. Each network is 
independent and has, based on its objectives, its own dynamics and working plan. 
At the time of this study (2013), ten networks had been formed:
• Network for the Reception and Support of Migrants in Barcelona
• Network for Assistance to the Homeless
• Network of Businesses with Social Responsibility Projects
• Network for Social and Labour Market Integration (now: for “Social Economy”)
• Network of Centres for Children and Teens
• Support Network for Family Caregivers
• Inclusion Housing Network
• Cultural Network for Social Inclusion
• Network for Children’s Rights
• Network for Coexistence and Prevention
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Some of the networks have progressed more than others, and some have managed 
to agree on common citywide projects or programmes. In terms of the CA’s direct 
impact on social welfare policies, there have been two networks in particular that 
have achieved significant results: the first one is the Network of Centres for Chil-
dren and Teens, which has agreed on one model for all the city’s centres, both public 
and private, providing assistance for children and teens at risk. The other one is the 
Network for Assistance to the Homeless, which has created a solid network for the 
exchange of resources and information.
Network of Centres for Children and Teens
This network is formed by 17 organisations and was established in April 2006. Its 
aim is to improve the city’s responsiveness to children and adolescents in situations 
of social risk. It was an initiative of the organisations that manage or run centres 
for children and teens (outside school hours), the aim of which was to gain greater 
recognition for the work they were doing. Through the network, the member organ-
isations would work on developing a common model of care for young people for 
all the centres in the city, even though managed by different entities.
Today there is one model for the centres agreed upon by all. During the work car-
ried out, new centres have been established, and today there are centres that depend 
on the city and centres that depend on the social organisations, all of them with the 
same programme for teens and children.
Network for Assistance to the Homeless
This network was created in November 2005 and consists of 26 organisations and 
federations. The social organisations participating in the network are committed to 
working together to help homeless persons regain autonomy and social relations. 
Various working groups were established and together they have carried out diverse 
actions, such as the following: a count of the number of homeless persons in Bar-
celona; preparation of a document with proposals on how to improve healthcare for 
the mentally ill; coming to agreement on proposals for action; sharing information 
and data and creating an open online catalogue of all the resources and services 
available through government and other entities.
The network has representation and dialogue with officials of local and regional 
government. The administration, politicians and professionals with responsibility in 
this area have embraced this new way of working horizontally with third sector or-
ganisations. This network has made it possible to create a new form of governance 
in this area.
22.2.2  Impact of the Programme
The CA has had an interesting impact on social welfare policy in the city. Not only 
has it made it possible to share resources and information but it has also changed 
forms of governance. The groups involved see themselves as actors who can have 
an impact on social welfare. It has led to the participation of citizens and social 
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organisations in welfare policies through different forms of deliberation and ac-
tion. The programme has changed the social welfare system in the city in various 
ways. For example, the structures of the CA represent a new form of governance, in 
particular the dynamic in the Executive Commission, which allows and promotes 
proactiveness with a very high level of reflection and production of documents 
(I-6)1. There is participation in the overall welfare system, which also improves or 
facilitates the activities carried out by each of the participating entities.
The importance of the CA in the city’s social welfare system can also be mea-
sured with the change in the municipal government. The municipal elections in May 
2011 led to the election of a Convergència i Unió (CiU) centre-right nationalist co-
alition government. After 30 years of left-wing hegemony in the municipal govern-
ment, a centre-right party came into power. This change concerned the participating 
groups in the CA: “When the new council member entered, we all had concerns 
about what would happen with the CA because, of course, the CA is an uncomfort-
able space…. but at that time, we discovered that not only was the CA not cancelled, 
but it seems to have been strengthened” (I-12)2. Clearly, the new government in 
power has given its support to the programme. In the words of the member entities: 
“the new government has made it theirs”.
22.3  Conclusions
The balance of the work carried out and the challenges and difficulties involved—or 
that had to be overcome in the framework of the CA—are different if we take as a 
reference the CA programme in its entirety, or if we consider the action networks. It 
is necessary to separate these levels analytically to better understand the CA.
22.3.1  The CA Programme
The CA is an increasingly consolidated programme. The new administrative and 
governing structure of the municipal government considers it a flagship programme. 
It is not considered a programme designed and developed by its political rivals but 
rather as one the current government has chosen and wants to strengthen. The mem-
ber entities say that “come what may, and whoever is in the municipal government, 
it will continue and has to continue” (I-8)3. In fact, it can even be stated that in this 
period in which we have a centre-right municipal government, recognition of the 
CA on the part of the administrative structure (civil service) of the government has 
1 I-6 Interview Third Sector entity
2 I-12 Interview Technical Secretary of CA
3 I-8 Interview Third Sector entity
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advanced. In the process of the creation and subsequent development of participa-
tory programmes, it was difficult for part of the government structure to understand 
that the CA was a space for sharing equal responsibility between the government 
and civil society; “it was the professionals and not the administrative structure that 
understood it and implemented it” (I-12). This was the greatest obstacle to be over-
come; for example, there were difficulties ensuring that in the actions of the CA, 
the government and entities had the same visibility. However, it seems that relations 
with the administration are more fluid today and the consolidation of the CA is such 
(there are more than 500 entities involved in the programme) that it can be assumed 
that any attempt to eliminate or reduce its role would be too costly.
At this time (2013), a further step has been taken in the framework of the CA. 
This is the “shared strategy”. As the entities say: “… the CA was not formed and left 
as it was but is constantly being revised…” (I-8). The “shared strategy” proposal 
emerged when the municipal government presented its Plan for Inclusion 2012–
2015 in the CA plenary. The entities understood that although the Plan for Inclusion 
was a government plan, it was necessary that a distinct and complementary proposal 
emerge from the CA to establish a strategy for shared actions and policies between 
the government and the entities. The “shared strategy” covers a total of 936 projects 
and actions, channelling a total of around 500 million €.
22.3.2  The Action Networks
Regarding the balance of the work of the action networks, the results cannot be 
generalised, as each network functions independently and depends on the efforts of 
the entities comprising it. Each network depends on the dynamic that its component 
entities contribute. Thus, there are large and small entities, proactive and more pas-
sive entities, some which want—and have—greater roles and others that have less 
of a role. These characteristics, among others, such as the very goal of the work of 
the network, have an impact on the dynamic of each network. Although the two net-
works briefly discussed above seem to have found a dynamic of cooperative work 
and joint reflection that has allowed solid relations to develop to the satisfaction of 
their participants, we have also found that the political changes appear to have af-
fected certain other networks significantly.
This is the case of the Social Economy Network (earlier, the Network for Social 
and Labour Market Integration), which is headed by the municipal institution Bar-
celona Activa. It seems that the change in government, combined with the effects of 
the economic crisis (government budget cuts as well as a decrease in money from 
the European Union for insertion programmes), led to a shift in the focus of the net-
work that seems to have slowed the dynamic with which it had begun. Specifically, 
today there is more talk about self-employment than there is about social and labour 
market integration. The goal of the network is to “promote the social economy of 
the city”. The network has opened up to include companies (those with corporate 
social responsibility policies) which are more interested in self-employment than in 
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developing a programme with the city to create jobs or for the social and economic 
insertion of those groups with difficulties. In the very dynamic of how it operates, 
there is a lack of proactivity and its dynamism is much more dependent on Barcelo-
na Activa. It does not meet as often, and it needs to find a common stimulus, which 
can—in these times of serious economic crisis—stimulate its work. It is necessary 
to monitor the work of the various networks in order to make a comprehensive 
evaluation of their functioning. This is one of the issues that the entities leading the 
CA have on the table for upcoming discussion.
Finally, and by way of conclusion, we can say that the “Citizen’s Agreement for 
an Inclusive Barcelona” programme has had a strong impact, which is continuing to 
grow. It is proving to have a broad consensus, which is attracting other entities that 
have not yet become part of the agreement.
To a great extent, the programme’s success is a result of the relationships that 
are formed between the participants, who are essentially working in a network. But 
the participants also appreciate the fact that being focused on action, their impact 
is multiplied. They also value the influence the CA has at times had on municipal 
authorities.
It is possible to spread this innovation. In fact, it is a project that has been spark-
ing a lot of interest in other municipalities in Spain and in other countries as well. 
However, this is a project that requires a two-way social process. It would not have 
been possible without the interaction between clear leadership in charge of the proj-
ect and a dynamic civil society.
For an innovation in governance to become established, a broad consensus is 
required on the part of all the actors involved. And perhaps, not only a consensus 
on the idea but also regarding capacity, in other words: on the one hand, a clear idea 
and the real possibility of designing a new model by the government leaders respon-
sible and on the other hand, the existence of a network of entities that want to be 
involved and participate in designing and managing the social services of the city.
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Chapter 23
Bern: Integration Guidelines
Maxime Felder
23.1  Introduction
The innovation we seek to address in this chapter is one that consists mainly of a 
ten-page document defining the migrant integration policy of the Swiss capital, 
Bern. Our aim in this short chapter will be to outline how a document may be con-
sidered a social innovation, and how it might function as a tool for guiding local 
policy.
Since the 1970s, the integration of migrants has sparked heated political debates 
within Switzerland1. In 2008, a new Foreign Nationals Act introduced “integration” 
as a legal notion. As article 4 states: “the aim of integration is the coexistence of 
the resident Swiss and foreign population on the basis of the values of the Federal 
Constitution and mutual respect and tolerance.” Furthermore, it is established that 
“integration should enable foreign nationals who are lawfully resident in Switzer-
land for the longer term to participate in the economic, social and cultural life of 
the society”. It should be noted that integration is further defined as a bidirectional 
process, requiring “willingness on the part of the foreign nationals and openness on 
the part of the Swiss population”.
As often happens within a federal system, implementation has been left open 
to the interpretation of the various cantons. Yet, compared to rural and peri-urban 
populations, urban populations regularly show more openness towards migrants2. 
1 For a summary on the concept of integration in Switzerland, see Cattacin and Chimienti (2006), 
and the report La notion d’intégration dans la loi, Commission fédérale pour les questions de 
migration, 2008.
2 The results of the vote on the federal popular initiative to prevent the construction of Mosque 
minarets (2009), or the more recent vote on the initiative “against mass immigration” (2014) are 
meaningful examples.
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In the canton of Bern, the composition of the parliaments on the communal and 
cantonal levels reflects this political cleavage. The left wing coalition has held a 
majority in the city parliament since 1996, while on the cantonal level, the con-
servative party Schweizerische Volkspartei, Swiss Popular Party (SVP) is the most 
represented party, with right wing politicians representing two thirds of the parlia-
ment. Accordingly, as with other Swiss cities, Bern felt the need to develop its own 
integration policy.
A political majority does not prevent divergences, however. Civil servants who 
were interviewed reported a lack of coordination between the numerous actors 
involved in the field of migrant integration. The idea of working on “integration 
guidelines” was adopted, and the process of its development is at least as important 
as the result. We will first outline the context of Bern as a Swiss city before focusing 
on the integration guidelines as social innovation. This will commence with a short 
history of its development, before an analysis of its mode of working, the ways of 
addressing users and the interaction with the governance system.
23.2  The Context
Bern is the Swiss capital and home to the federal administration, government and 
parliament. It is the fourth largest city (130,000 inhabitants in 2014) and urban 
area (406,000) in Switzerland. Foreigners represent 24 % of the city’s population, 
which is slightly less than most other cities in Switzerland. The unemployment rate3 
reached 3.3 % of the active population in 2010 in Bern while the mean average for 
all Swiss cities was 4.4 %. Bern is the chef-lieu of the second largest canton, both 
in area and population.
Since Switzerland is a federal state, responsibility for welfare is shared across 
the national, cantonal (26 cantons) and communal levels (2495 communes). Fol-
lowing the two guiding principles of subsidiarity and federalism, a large part of the 
welfare system is steered by the commune. The commune of the city of Bern has 
a wide and supportive welfare system and is seen as constantly growing, since the 
left holds a majority in the city government. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
representatives from both the left and right agree with this vision. Even if there is 
some doubt regarding long-term viability, expansion of the city’s welfare system is 
not contested on a fundamental level. However, the two main coalitions regularly 
disagree on the extent of the state’s role regarding societal issues: a left wing coali-
tion, commonly called Rot-Grün-Mitte, red-green-centre (RGM), is opposed to a 
right wing coalition, named by interviewees “die Bürgerlichen” (“bourgeois”, in the 
“conservative” sense). Since the early 1990s, the former have been the most promi-
nent actors in the development of a kind of municipal socialism in the city. They 
are a good fit for Häußermann’s notion of an integration coalition (Häußermann 
2006). The second coalition advocates a more liberal state and could be seen as a 
3 It should be stated that this only counts people registered with regional unemployment offices.
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growth coalition. However, a convincing consensus can be found when it comes to 
the welfare system’s raison d’être. Along these lines, the dual coalitions function as 
what we might call an innovation regime4.
This consensus rests in a desire to enhance the location’s desirability for people 
and business. Although it is the capital, as previously mentioned, Bern is only the 
fourth largest city in Switzerland. The head trio is Zurich, often identified as the 
financial capital, Geneva known for its banks and its numerous international organ-
isations, and Basel, with its dynamic pharmaceutical industry. Each of these three 
has an international airport as well as close links with neighbouring countries. For 
its part, Bern is trying to identity itself as a social, open-minded and innovative city. 
Interviewees proudly recall how, in the 1990s, Bern was a pioneering city in the 
field of drug policy5. “Bern is a social city” or “Diversity is richness” are slogans 
promoted by the city government, so it comes as no surprise that Bern wants to be 
a city where no one is left behind.
Bern also invests in the promotion of a positive discourse concerning the issue of 
migrants, with voters’ support showing that this orientation is more than simple city 
branding6. Due to the system of direct democracy at the communal level, orientation 
of the welfare system can be attributed in part to voting citizens. A significant num-
ber of Bern’s citizens could be described as belonging to a “creative class” (Florida 
2013). Despite the critiques that can be levelled at this analytical category, a number 
of interviewees spoke of an “urban mind”, or an “urban minded population”. This 
state of mind is considered to include values like global mindedness, solidarity, 
creativity, ecology and growth. Referendums on migration issues regularly show 
how urbanites distinguish themselves from the rest of the population. For example, 
72.3 % of Bern city dwellers rejected the recent vote against “mass migration”7. 
Meanwhile, on the cantonal level, 51.1 % of the voters accepted restrictions on im-
migration. The values of openness and tolerance demonstrated by urban voters are 
consequently embraced by the city’s government, becoming a framework for their 
policies.
23.3  Integration Guidelines
We will now outline the history of integration guidelines. In the second half of the 
1990s, Swiss cities started to take control of the challenges surrounding the integra-
tion of migrants. Until then, right wing populist parties were alone in tackling the 
subject. Schönenberger and D’Amato (2009) attribute this change to the increasing 
4  Concept inspired by Häußermann, see Cattacin (2011).
5 Interview with a third sector worker in the field of addictions.
6 See for example the high scores of the government re-election of 2012 (almost 70 % for the city 
president).
7 Swiss popular initiative “Against mass immigration”, February 9th 2014. Accepted by a slight 
majority of 50.34%. Detailed results for Bern available on the Chancery website: http://www.sta.
be.ch/sta/de/index/wahlen-abstimmungen/wahlen-abstimmungen.html.
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heterogenization and fragmentation of the social and urban structure and to the 
arrival of new lifestyles (of nationals and migrants). The specific urban context 
allowed cities to take a lead in negotiating this theme that, up until this point, had 
been largely ignored by the Confederation and the cantons. Consequently, several 
debates arose, with one of the purported problems being the implementation of the 
ageing foreigners law (1931). It had become necessary to adapt the policies to the 
present context and more current concerns. However, authorities on various levels 
offered minimal cooperation due to their differing understandings of procedures.
For these reasons, in 1995, the executive council of the city of Bern decided to 
establish official guidelines. The idea was to develop and possess a better knowl-
edge regarding the integration of “people from foreign origin” and the fundamentals 
regarding potential alternative practices. A year later, the anthropologist Hans-Ru-
dolf Wicker (University of Bern) delivered a report that highlighted the necessity 
of a coordinated and needs-related integration policy. Many actors within the fields 
of administration and civil society transmitted their feedback and, in 1997, a work-
ing group dedicated to the redaction of the guidelines was established. It included 
representatives from the Foreigners Police of Bern, from diverse departments like 
welfare, education, equality between men and women, from the federal foreigner’s 
commission, together with an anthropologist. Some nongovernmental organisations 
were represented, among other Caritas (charities), the information service for for-
eigners and the Forum for Migrants. It is noteworthy that representatives of migrant 
populations themselves were not invited. In 1998, the executive council received a 
first draft, which underwent revision until 1999, when it was finally voted on and 
accepted by the council.
The guidelines are composed of ten principles, intended to pave the way for 
a renewed understanding of integration, specifically within the realm of political 
discourse. Furthermore, they were meant to “open the way” to the implementa-
tion of lasting integration measures8. As an introduction to the newly established 
guidelines, the executive councillor at the time9 underlined the importance of con-
tributions made by migrants to Switzerland. Indeed, some migrants are amongst the 
most professionally successful people in Switzerland; however, it is the case that a 
disproportionately high number work in the low-pay sector or are unemployed. This 
could be interpreted as a sign of an economic, social and cultural disintegration that 
threatens Bern’s prosperity. Schönenberger and D’Amato (2009) state that while 
there has never been an active integration policy in Switzerland, the “declining” 
economic situation has intensified the challenges faced by migrants.
Ten years later, the need for an adaptation of the guidelines was felt. It had to en-
compass the emerging consensus on the principle of encouraging and demanding10 
8 Claudia Omar-Amberg, preface to Leitbild zur Integrationspolitik der Stadt Bern, Stadt Bern, 
1999.
9 The social-democrat Claudia Omar-Amberg, in charge of the Department of Education, Health 
and Welfare.
10 Fordern und fördern in German. Encouraging refers to the welfare benefits whilst demanding 
refers to the conditions attached to the provision of these benefits.
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(impacting the whole urban welfare system) and the approach of integration as a bi-
lateral process. The scene had changed with a new law regarding foreigners coming 
into force in 2008. The Confederation had taken over the debate about integration, 
which had started at a city level, and for the first time integration became a legal no-
tion. Since 2001, the Confederation has offered a budget for integration measures; 
measures which migrants may be forced to follow (e.g. language classes). However, 
divergences remained when it came to the balance between encouraging and de-
manding and on the understandings of the respective roles of the migrant population 
and the “host” population. Meanwhile, a newly created “Competence Centre for In-
tegration” was tasked with leading the update of the 1999 guidelines, supported by 
an expert group (internal and external of administration). A new study was ordered 
by the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies. In 2009, the Competence 
Centre for Integration organised a “guidelines day” in which 60 participants took 
part. As a civil servant explained: “we invited a lot of people for a day of discussion. 
They could make proposals, ask questions. It would have been unimaginable to 
come up with these guidelines and say ‘here, now you have to implement them’”11. 
This time round, representatives of migrant populations were not forgotten.
Ratified by the city council in 2010, the most significant aspect of the new ver-
sion was a list of 37 concrete measures planned for implementation in 2011 and 
2012. The intention was that the Competence Centre would help to coordinate and 
inform, whilst the city would draw from the global city budget in order to finance 
them. Some measures address the migrant population directly (e.g. financial sup-
port for German courses) while others address workers in contact with migrants 
(e.g. diversity management training).
23.3.1  Internal Organization and Mode of Working
We will now describe the 2010 version of the guidelines. The document starts with 
an introduction to the integration policy of Bern, first highlighting the diversity of 
the city’s population: foreigners represent one fifth of the population and exist in 
a heterogeneous population. Following that, the document defines integration as a 
way of reaching equality of opportunity and participation for everyone, understood 
as the basis for social cohesion. Integration is meant as a dynamic process that 
requires, besides financial means and time, the commitment of both migrants and 
national citizens. The importance of the many actors involved (e.g. welfare institu-
tions, sport clubs, religious communities, associations, etc.) is also acknowledged.
The document details four guiding principles: “1. The city of Bern recognises 
diversity and difference as strengths of our society; 2. The city of Bern supports 
the potential of migrants; 3. The city of Bern commits itself to the fight against dis-
crimination; 4. The city of Bern supports equality of opportunities and participation 
of migrants”. These principles are detailed in three or four sub-points. Then, the 
11  Interview with a public administrator in the field of integration.
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specific aims are detailed in several fields of action such as training, language and 
education; labour market; hobbies, culture and sport; health; civic and social par-
ticipation; housing and environment; information and communication. Finally, the 
document names the actors involved and their specific roles in the implementation 
of the guidelines, namely the Competence Centre for Integration, the administrative 
services, external partners (associations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
etc.), the board for integration (group of experts) and the Forum for Migrants. The 
Competence Centre for Integration is meant to coordinate the work of a wide net-
work of public, private and third sector actors.
Integration policy is thus a “cross-cutting” policy involving all sectors of a mixed 
welfare system. The Competence Centre is also the link between the different ter-
ritorial levels: the Confederation, the cantons and the other communes.
Widely publicised by the Swiss administration, the document is available on 
paper as well as on the Internet, foremost addressing the administration and the 
civil servants of the city of Bern. The principles and aims presented in the docu-
ment should lead their everyday work and orientate the action of their services. 
However, it cannot be assimilated to a work duty since no enforcement is planned 
to ensure the implementation of the guiding principles. Moreover, the document 
also addresses private and third sector actors, highlighting their potential impact on 
integration and suggesting ways of considering and dealing with people of foreign 
origin. Finally, it is meant to inform the population about the integration policy of 
their city. In 2010, the updated version of the guidelines became more concretised, 
encompassing a catalogue of measures. In this respect, the guidelines function as 
a basis for the proposal to existing structures of how they could participate, in real 
terms, in the city’s integration policy.
23.3.2  Conception and Ways of Addressing Users
The guidelines have many goals and thus address different categories of users. We 
could identify three user-oriented roles and two governance-related roles. First, 
through the development of the guidelines and the consultation process, experts 
and stakeholders (that were sometimes not considered or did not consider them-
selves as stakeholders before) are involved and encouraged to take part in the city’s 
integration policy. The purpose is thus to redefine the extent of the policy field. 
Second, the guidelines have a coordination role. Users here are agencies and units 
providing services in the redefined field of migrant integration. At the street level, 
users are the workers providing these services, for whom the guidelines are a code 
of conduct. Third, the guidelines have an information role, with users here being 
the city’s inhabitants and even potential inhabitants the city wants to attract with its 
migrant-friendly image.
The first governance-related role is practice oriented since the guidelines serve 
as a basis for concrete measures. The idea is that action needs, first of all, a consen-
sus on the aims and definition of concepts. It states in black and white that the city 
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of Bern wants to promote integration and specifies what exactly is meant by inte-
gration, why it is important and who is responsible for it. Since reaching the aims 
relies on the coordinated work of many actors, clarifying all these aspects is crucial. 
By pointing out where integration is at stake, it opens the way for new measures 
and most importantly, new fields of action. The second governance role is politi-
cal and strategic. As a civil servant said, “The guidelines were a political project. 
The idea was to show that they [the city government] handled it [integration]”12. 
The guidelines are used as a political tool, to legitimise measures of integration. 
Indeed, integration is a hot topic for debate. As Vogel stated for another Swiss city, 
establishing guidelines on this topic puts an end to countless discussions in the city 
council (Vogel 2006). Thus, it can be seen as a way of imposing a political program. 
As everybody agreed on the principle of promoting integration, the left managed to 
establish a model that bound the principle to measures in order to make them harder 
to contest.
23.3.3  Interaction with the Governance System
Integration guidelines can be considered as an innovative change within the gover-
nance of Bern’s local welfare system. Starting with a formulation of the principles, 
it contributes to the reification of the city of Bern, establishing it as an important 
actor regarding urban social life. Every principle and its sub-points start with “The 
city of Bern [dedicates itself to/supports/acknowledges/etc.]”. Repeated 18 times 
in a row, this anaphora suggests that dedication to the integration of migrants is a 
special feature of the city of Bern. It also insists on the communal stranglehold on 
integration issues facing the cantonal and federal authorities.
The guidelines are also an innovative feature of governance in the way they go 
beyond the usual decision-making process, usually involving elected magistrates 
and occurring behind closed doors. The development of the guidelines is in this 
sense as important as the result. First, by involving many actors, the competence 
centre acknowledged the fact that integration cannot rely solely on the state and its 
administrative agencies. Neither can it be reached through big projects or campaigns 
or on quotas and compulsory measures aimed towards civil society. Examples of 
inclusion, equality of opportunities and non-discrimination can be seen everywhere 
and everyday. As a civil servant explained: “People often think that there is no will 
to implement these guidelines. What we see is a lot of motivation yet perhaps a lack 
of know-how. People expect big projects. But integration is also a matter of details 
we do not necessarily see”13.
Second, this manner of discussing, negotiating and finally writing down guide-
lines is an innovative way of building social policies. It supports participation and 
acceptance through the consultation and involvement of stakeholders. It acknowl-
12  Interview with a civil servant in the field of integration.
13  Ibid.
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edges the limits of enforceable rules in a field like integration. Definitions and re-
sponsibilities first have to be collectively defined and endorsed. The coordinating 
and informing role of the Competence Centre for Integration illustrates the innova-
tive (in this context) role of the state as an encouraging and enabling actor. How-
ever, herein lie the limits of this way of governing. The city can somehow enforce 
its guidelines within its own administration and institutions; however, there is no 
legal basis for doing so in associations and private companies. Since there is no 
intention to make them mandatory, their implementation remains highly dependent 
on cooperation from third parties.
Another limit is related to the competences attributed to the Confederation. As 
an example, a journalist put forward the case of a migrant with an academic degree 
that is not recognised by Swiss authorities (Einhaus 2011). In such a case, the city 
has no leeway to offer him better job opportunities. The same problem weighs upon 
the naturalisation process and requirements. If Bern—its government and its popu-
lation—predominantly think that naturalisation can be a tool to support integration, 
the city has no authority to lighten the requirements of the procedure. Those are 
defined by the canton and Confederation. At these upper levels, naturalisation is 
mostly seen as the reward for “completed” integration.
23.4  Conclusion
Two opposing interpretations can be made from this innovative feature of gover-
nance. On the one hand, this way of defining a policy and an agenda by consulting 
experts and stakeholders can be seen as a technocratic turn in Bern’s governance. 
Indeed, the clarity and univocality of the guidelines can mask the controversial 
aspects of the debate on what is integration and how we want to achieve it. Like 
Schönenberger and D’Amato (2009) argued, the guidelines managed to simplify 
a complex and controversial debate. This simplification and clarification allowed 
the city government to launch concrete measures on the basis of the collectively 
defined guidelines and thus, partly avoid the endless debates on integration. As 
MacLeod (2011:2632) argues, “This process of polic(y)ing and governing through a 
stage-managed consensus is serving to depoliticise 21st-century capitalism’s deeply 
antagonistic social relations”.
On the other hand, the guidelines can be seen as an acknowledgement of the emi-
nently political character of integration policy. Instead of pretending the concept of 
integration is technical and unequivocal, this policy building process is based on a 
political debate. Integration policy has first been disputed among stakeholders from 
civil society and has then been voted on by the city council. This process requires 
consensus and reaching a consensus requires a deliberation process. The consensus 
has to be renewed, as it has been done with an update of the guidelines after 10 
years. However, in the medium term, it allows for the building of coherent policy, 
where all stakeholders involved potentially work towards collectively defined aims. 
The guidelines could be a sign of an upcoming form of governance where the lo-
cal state aims at facilitating and coordinating the implementation of policies (refer 
Øverbye et al. 2010 for more on this topic).
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In either interpretation, such guidelines contribute to addressing the growing 
challenge of coordination. The multiplication of actors involved in the welfare sys-
tem (see Kazepov 2010) increases the need for coordination measures. Integration 
guidelines have proven to be effective as a horizontal coordination measure address-
ing actors of the same (urban) level. However, it is less helpful with regard to the 
challenges of multilevel governance and the need for vertical coordination. These 
challenges are accentuated by the difference in the political majorities between the 
city (left wing majority) and the cantonal level (right wing majority). Nevertheless, 
the innovative features of the integration guidelines are strongly related to their 
development and their implementation on a local level. It allows a significant con-
sultation process since the lower scale permits involving any interested actor. In that 
case, developing guidelines at the city level can increase inhabitants’ identification 
with the city. The integration policy is not only a welfare policy. In the case of Bern, 
it is an intrinsic part of the city’s image and attractiveness.
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Chapter 24
The Implicit Normative Assumptions of Social 
Innovation Research: Embracing the Dark Side
Ola Segnestam Larsson and Taco Brandsen
24.1  Introduction
Social innovation as a concept has moved into the political limelight of many wel-
fare societies in Europe. It has become one of the key buzzwords, beloved by poli-
cymakers and practitioners across the world (Borins 2001; Eshima et al. 2001) to a 
degree where the concept could even be labelled as “policy chic”. There are many 
reasons why social innovation is heralded as a solution, particularly in relation to 
societal changes in Europe related to welfare programmes that can no longer deal 
with an increase in social problems. The positive features attributed to the concept 
are supposed to counterbalance the further slimming down of welfare benefits and 
services (Evers et al. 2014). Indeed, normative features combined with underlying 
societal changes provide social innovation with an appeal that seems hard to resist. 
It combines a determination to reform and improve welfare services in the social 
arena with a sense of state-of-the-art entrepreneurial and organisational practice. 
Who could object to such a compelling approach?
Yet, the normative assumptions tend to obscure the dark sides of the phenom-
enon such as failure, political conflict and oppression. Rather than accepting social 
innovation at face value, this chapter explores its less palatable side. We believe that 
the generally optimistic tone in social innovation debates mask a set of problems, 
both in the concept and in practice, which we will illustrate with the research results 
from the Welfare Innovations at the Local Level in Favour of Cohesion (WILCO) 
project. One of the aims of this project was to identify lessons for social policies and 
ultimately improve social cohesion. Such an optimistic approach should not, how-
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ever, prevent us from discussing the more disturbing elements of social innovation 
that researchers have identified throughout the project.
As argued in the opening chapter of this publication, as well as in other publica-
tions emanating from the WILCO research project (e.g. Evers et al. 2014), the vast 
majority of the literature on innovation does not use the term social innovation. The 
small stream of research that does is largely unconnected to the rest. In other words, 
when we refer to social innovation research, it must always be kept in mind that 
we are referring to a specific subset and not necessarily the one that is academically 
best known or most influential.
Literature and policies that do conceptualize, define and use the term social inno-
vation, however, usually frame the concept in a highly positive fashion (e.g. Bureau 
of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) 2010; Mulgan 2006). Social innovations stand 
for “improvement” (Phillis 2008) and are linked to a better answer to basic needs 
as well as more satisfying social relations (Moulaert 2010). There is even talk of a 
“social innovation movement”, though there is no convincing evidence to suggest 
that there is more social innovation now than 50 or a 100 years ago, nor that it is part 
of a coherent movement. It appears to be ideology more than a serious assessment. 
Moreover, this optimistic strand of literature tends to ignore a number of existing 
and more critical conceptions of social innovations.
This chapter will discuss general criticism of this optimistic approach, highlight-
ing the dark side of social innovation concept and practice, referring to the implicit 
influence of market and government models, the denial of politics and inflated ex-
pectations of diffusion.
Although we will use material from the WILCO project to underpin the argu-
ment, we will maintain self-criticism (up to a point). As a project working within 
specific debates and within specific funding conditions, it too was influenced by 
some of the more rosy assumptions in the debate. The role of the constructively 
critical insider is necessarily an ambiguous one. We will try to indicate to what ex-
tent we too have been influenced by normative assumptions, to what extent we have 
managed to avoid them and why.
24.2  The Influence of Market and Government Models
Social innovation—though presented as an alternative to markets—is often infused 
with conceptual baggage from markets and government.
This is most evident in the emphasis on scaling and systemic change. Accord-
ing to this perspective, innovations must grow and be “rolled out”. Adaptations of 
the innovation cycle of social innovations show this as the logical final step for a 
mature innovation. As we already argued in the earlier chapter, evidence from the 
WILCO project challenges the idea of scaling in various ways. An overall conclu-
sion is that the life cycles of social innovations, including processes of emergence, 
stabilization and scaling up, were very conditional and not available at the press of 
a button.
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Furthermore, most social innovations studied in the WILCO project were not 
scaled. In addition, it seemed as if most social innovators were far from interested in 
scaling up their social innovations. One case study of employment social innovation 
in Zagreb can serve as a first example, as difficulties for scaling up of the project 
were explicitly discussed (Bezovan et al. 2014a). Main challenges included difficult 
working conditions of overburdened social workers, lack of financial resources to 
support clients and too high expectations regarding employment. Similar conclu-
sions were found in the case of employment-based projects in Birmingham as they 
were intended to be time-limited pilot projects and were small in scale, which meant 
the opportunity for scaling up was always going to be limited (see Chap. 21 in this 
book). In fact, our research revealed that many innovations died when their funding 
ended.
A cyclical perspective implies that innovations that are not scaled are failed inno-
vations, or at best unrealised potential—they get stuck somewhere down the cycle. 
But this cyclical perspective is adopted from a business context, and as such it car-
ries implicit normative assumptions. It is, paradoxically, a perspective that is similar 
to one of government: Solutions to problems are to be expanded through bureau-
cratic, standardised procedures, with an emphasis on equal access and treatment. 
This underlines that the major distinction in society must not always be between 
market and state but could also be between universal and contextualised perspec-
tives (Scott 1998). The universal perspectives of market and state deny alternative 
conceptions of systemic change that rely less on big breakthroughs and more on 
incremental groundswell delivery (Osborne 1998; Garcia and Calantone 2002). The 
former perspectives also consistently undervalue the role of alternative providers, 
such as voluntary organisations and informal initiatives, as they tend to produce the 
types of locally embedded social innovations that remain under the radar.
Also, the conceptual lens implicit in such perspectives tends to be based on prod-
ucts rather than service processes. Various researchers identified how innovations 
in services are not only profoundly different from products in terms of the degree 
of tangibility, separability, perishability and co-production (Sundbo 1997; Drejer 
2004; Pestoff and Brandsen 2006; Normann 2007; Osborne 2013). Between mar-
ket and government, they need an open system orientation that acknowledges the 
importance, for example, of organisational and institutional environments (Tether 
2003). Yet, these perspectives are notable by their absence in the discussion of so-
cial innovations in welfare services.
24.3  The Denial of Politics
Mainstream literature and policies are strongly in favour of social innovation (or 
any type of innovation, for that matter), preferably so-called “disruptive” ones. 
Contained within this conceptualization of social innovation seems to be the norma-
tive assumption that any particular innovation must be a good thing, not the least as 
a result of the emphasis of social in social innovations (Membretti 2007; Meeuwisse 
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2008; Miller and Rose 2008). Opposition—often described in terms of barriers—is 
often regarded as reactionary and somehow in conflict with public interest (com-
pare with Phillis 2008; Murray et al. 2010).
Of course, social innovation as a process may encourage the improvement of 
welfare services and society more generally, but that does not mean that any specific 
innovation is necessarily positive. For a start, it downplays the risks involved in any 
innovative process and the challenges this poses for support and management (Jo-
erges and Nowotny 2003). Risks are an essential part of innovation, but that implies 
that social innovations often fail (like start-up businesses), which may have all sorts 
of negative effects. In one Dutch case we examined, the failure of a neighbourhood 
watch initiative soured relations within the community (Fledderus et al. 2014). Al-
though policy experiments are applauded, these are generally seen as chances for 
success rather than as opportunities for learning from failure (Borins 2001).
More fundamentally, the normative endorsement of innovation ignores the fact 
that those who resist it may have a point. Social innovations concern changes in 
social relations, which means that there are also people who lose by it. Are they 
simply reactionary forces that need to be overcome? It is not that easy. The interpre-
tation of social innovations is not inherent to the nature of the innovation, and there 
are often different ways to “read” them. As noted in Chap. 9, “they acquire different 
senses, depending on the position given to them in the discursive context. This is 
testament to the open and risky nature of innovations”. Indeed, in diffusing innova-
tions, a certain level of ambiguity is often essential to success, because they may 
have to be reinterpreted and contextualised within a different political discourse. 
Whether one is for or against them is essentially a question of how one relates to 
the different discourses.
This points to a disturbing element in discussions on social innovation, which is 
the tendency to downplay the political context and conflicts of social innovations in 
welfare services (Pettigrew 1973; Hill and Hupe 2009). As discussed in the intro-
duction to this volume and this chapter, the mainstream literature argues that social 
innovations to a large degree are not the property of specific social and political 
orientations. Thus, social innovations stem from the necessity to improve existing 
welfare services and to devise better solutions (Harris and Aldbury 2009). In other 
words, social innovations could be considered a normative good (Membretti 2007; 
Meeuwisse 2008). However, social innovations’ values, actions and outcomes will 
always be contested issues, as discussed earlier. Not only are they prone to the 
inherent party political nature of welfare policy processes, they are also subject to 
internal political processes of welfare service organisations and the need of man-
agers to demonstrate their effectiveness in a field of allegedly contested outcomes 
(Feller 1981).
Social innovations can also be linked with a diversity of political goals. They 
might take different meanings over time, depending on the wider political con-
cept and institutional system wherein they become embedded (see e.g. Osborne 
and Brown 2011). In fact, the concept of social innovation was kept in high esteem 
when linked to the political context in some of the cities included in the project. This 
was especially the case in dispersed as compared to unified policy environments. 
One example was Pamplona in Spain (Hendrickson 2014). Although the concept of 
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social innovation was not an explicit priority in this city, it was met with sympathy 
even when it challenged dominant views in the political sphere. The concept was 
linked to actions of limited scope as offshoots of mainstream programmes, as a way 
to expand social action without expanding or containing direct public provision. 
Another example was the city of Malmö in Sweden (Carrigan and Nordfeldt 2014). 
Innovation was made a key discursive concept in the policy arena around local 
welfare in Malmö. Political actors considered the concept a cross-political one and 
used it in the hope of attracting people and organisations from various ideological 
backgrounds. In both these cities, the concept of social innovation was supported by 
varied political coalitions, albeit for different reasons.
At the same time, other social innovations among the case studies in the WILCO 
project were limited in their development because others downplayed the contested 
nature of their work or because they were bogged down by local political conflicts. 
It was sometimes impossible to distinguish successful from failed cases because 
there was no consensus on what their goals should have been. In the case of neigh-
bourhood revitalization innovation in Zagreb, for example, a lack of coordination 
between local government offices and local city companies affected the visibility 
of the innovation in a negative manner (Bezovan et al. 2014b). Public strategies or 
social marketing were consequently not on the agenda due to political conflicts, 
including an unstable political situation, resignation of a mayor and local elections. 
Another example of political conflicts disabling social innovations was found in the 
city of Varaždin (Bezovan et al. 2013).
The role and recognition of civil society in the development of social innovation 
has strengthened over time. However, as argued in the research, political turbulence 
and changes to power structures hindered the development of more systematic co-
operation from being established. There are examples of cities and local contexts, 
such as Lille, in which the local political arena for social innovation remains weak-
ened by attention paid to a limited number of other priorities due to economic crisis 
and budget cuts (Fraisse and Bia Zafinikamia 2013). There are also cities, such 
as Malmö, in which local political disagreements hindered the implementation of 
particular innovations (see Chap. 6 in this book). Even though there was political 
consensus about the need for new solutions in local welfare in general and the pro-
motion of social innovation as a concept in particular, different stakeholders and 
coalitions disagreed regarding the methods and instruments to be implemented, af-
fecting the emergence and development of social innovations.
If the practice of social innovations has more to do with changes in social rela-
tions than products or processes, they are necessarily also conflict-ridden and politi-
cal by nature. Those who claim to study the phenomenon with any seriousness must 
at least incorporate this much. Resistance and opposition, risks and dangers, as well 
as negative effects and misuse need to be taken seriously, regardless of the norma-
tive good of social innovations (Borins 2001).
Such conflicts are rarely discussed in the current mainstream of social innova-
tion literature. Ironically, in its denial of politics, social innovation literature is pro-
foundly political. Being aware of the local context and by implication of the local 
politics was one of the hallmarks of the WILCO project’s approach.
298 O. S. Larsson and T. Brandsen
24.4  Inflated Expectations of Diffusion
One of the main objectives of the WILCO project was expressed as identifying the 
“key factors for diffusion and upgrading of (social) innovations” (Evers et al. 2014, 
p. 9). At least three different positions on the possibility and desirability of diffu-
sion can be identified (see Lewis 2007; Segnestam Larsson 2013), two of which 
explicitly challenge the assumption that social innovations easily can be diffused to 
other cities and local contexts. The first is the view that suggests that the transfer of 
best practices among different kinds of local contexts and organisations is easy and 
desirable (Herman and Renz 1999; Roberts et al. 2005; Shoham et al. 2006).
This view has been disproven already (see the previous chapter), and the WILCO 
evidence only serves to underline this. Diffusion did not always occur where it 
was sensible, sometimes simply because of economic reasons. One example was 
the case of economic circumstances in relation to nonprofit housing in Varaždin 
(Bezovan et al. 2014b). Even though one of the analytical results of the case study 
revealed that this innovation showed the capacity to become a model for other cit-
ies with sufficient diffusion capacity, the economic crisis that influenced the fiscal 
capacities of cities across Croatia at the time of research hindered diffusion even 
within the city of Varaždin. Economic circumstances like too much dependence on 
public funding for stability were also mentioned as a limiting factor, for example, 
in the case study of neighbourhood revitalization in Geneva (Kapko and Cattacin 
2014).
In other cases, diffusion did not take place because innovations could not match 
the relevant bureaucratic criteria to be considered worthy of partnership (cf. Borins 
2001). Since its creation, a housing association in Nantes had regularly been invited 
by public actors to participate in activities aiming to create strategic priorities re-
garding care for elderly people (Coqblin and Fraisse 2014). However, public actors 
regarded the association as an experimental project still in the making, not as a 
regular partner in the development of social policies. Moreover, the case of housing 
revitalization in Geneva shows that what other parties considered a lack of relevant 
assessment also prevented diffusion (Kapko and Cattacin 2014).
Such limitations to the diffusion of social innovations are acknowledged in the 
more critical strand of social innovation research (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971; 
Loch and Huberman 1999; Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan 2001), in which two 
more critical views can be distinguished. One of these could be labelled the “adap-
tive” view. Researchers and practitioners who support this view argue that although 
social innovations from one context may have relevance for another context, they 
cannot be applied in a simple or straightforward manner (Åberg 2008; Maier and 
Meyer 2011; Sahlin and Wedlin 2008). Instead, the desired social innovation has to 
be adapted or translated into the local context.
Indeed, we found that—given this process of adaptation—a number of inno-
vations went through a process of translation and localization. Some of these in-
novations represented approaches that, even though they were new in the context 
where they appeared, represented international trends, having emerged in many 
sites and cities across Europe. This concerned three types of innovations in particu-
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lar. The first type of social innovations was social enterprises working in the field 
of occupational and social integration as so-called “work integration enterprises”, 
such as the employment social innovation of Filur in Stockholm (Nordfeldt and 
Carrigan 2014a). Additional examples of this type of social innovations that ap-
peared in many sites and cities across Europe were found in Barcelona, Plock and 
Varaždin (Montagut et al. 2014; Siemieńska et al. 2014; Bezovan et al. 2014c). 
The second type of social innovations representing international trends was par-
ticipative and community-oriented forms of revitalising housing estates and urban 
neighbourhoods (e.g. Bezovan et al. 2014b; Nordfeldt and Carrigan 2014b; Kapko 
and Cattacin 2014). Finally, the third type of social innovations to be mentioned 
here was family support services and centres of various kinds. Despite differences, 
their common innovative core was to direct offers of support to the whole family 
system instead of focusing solely on childcare services. This type of social innova-
tions was common in contexts as different as Italy, England or Germany (Costa and 
Sabatinelli 2014; Brookes et al. 2014; Ewert and Evers 2014). The combination of 
the three types of social innovation, including similarities and differences across 
sites and cities, suggests that diffusion did take place but with local translations and 
adaptations.
Yet, there is a third and more critical position towards the import of social in-
novations, suggesting that the process of mainstreaming leads to a standardization 
of solutions and the trimming of more critical elements of the original innovation 
(Boyd 2004; Galston 2005; Jensen and Miszlivetz 2006). This is not something the 
WILCO project examined systematically, and it is up to future research to apply this 
more critical position to the possibility and desirability of diffusion.
On the basis of the existing evidence, we can conclude that there is no direct 
relationship between the potential value of an innovation and its opportunities to be 
diffused. The picture of a swift and easy transfer is therefore misleading.
24.5  Conclusion
In order to provide some counterweight against the inevitable parade of success-
ful innovations that comes out of such a project as WILCO, we adopted a more 
critical perspective on social innovation research. As this chapter has shown, many 
perspectives on social innovations have explicit or hidden normative assumptions 
that obscure the dark side of the phenomenon: the failures, the conflicts and the op-
pression of universalistic approaches.
As argued in the previous sections, attention for detail and a diverse group can go 
some way in preventing such assumptions from stifling the debate. In the end, one 
should always have a few critical questions at hand. Who benefits from the intro-
duction of social innovations? Who loses? Did anything get worse? Common sense 
also helps. In the context of welfare, many of the problems are what policy science 
calls wicked problems, such as poverty, addictions and homelessness. These do not 
have easy or ultimate solutions. Eldorado is not around the corner.
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Academically, the added value of social innovation is less in its conceptual con-
tribution—this is very limited—than in its potential ability to bind several disciplin-
ary traditions together. It is a pity, then, that much of the social innovation research 
has been relatively weak in incorporating the more mature conceptual and theoreti-
cal insights from these traditions. In another function, as a concept bridging theory 
and practice (in the words of Jenson and Harrison, a “quasi-concept”), it has been 
more effective (European Commission 2013, p. 16). However, on both scores, its 
potential can only be fully realised when there is more honesty about covert as-
sumptions and the dark side of social innovations.
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Chapter 25
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in Social 
Innovation
Taco Brandsen, Adalbert Evers, Sandro Cattacin and Annette Zimmer
Social innovation is in several respects an ambiguous term. On the one hand, 
it purports to be a new development; on the other hand, it is as old as mankind. 
Arguably,  today’s innovations are less dramatic than those 100 or 200 years ago. It 
is a force potentially capable of changing social policy and society more generally. 
The hope of understanding social change as human progress, once focussing on 
technological and market-based innovations, is now pinned on social innovations 
that take shape in the realm of civil society. There is, however, no guarantee at all 
that innovations from the texture of civil society will have a happy end in the form 
of state powers adapting and strengthening them, since they rely on human relations 
and are therefore also prone to conflicts, failures and politics. Social innovation is 
at the same time a useful catch-all phrase for bridging theory and practice and a 
concept often despised as academically weak and politically ephemeral.
Researchers in the Welfare Innovations at the Local Level in Favour of Cohesion 
(WILCO) project have tried to balance the various demands on social innovation 
research, to be academically sound, while at the same time demonstrably relevant 
to practice. A key objective of the project was to contextualise social innovation: to 
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understand them in relation to the social, political and spatial context from where 
they originate and within the wider contexts that are so influential for their further 
development.
On the basis of the overall evidence, this concluding chapter discusses the im-
plications of our findings and identifies key issues for discussion. To recognise the 
often overtly or implicitly normative nature of social innovation literature and to 
do homage to one of the most famous “Spaghetti Westerns”, we have ordered our 
argument in terms of the “Good”, the “Bad” and the “Ugly”. “Good” signifies what 
innovations can contribute to a society’s ability to cope with change and, more pre-
cisely, to do it in a way that change can be thought of as progress in civility. “Bad” 
signifies the shortcomings of social innovations—especially their limited impacts 
in an overall averse social and policy context. “Ugly” stands for discourses that 
regard social innovations as something else—usually as market-based products and 
technologies.
25.1  The Good
The first reason why we think that social innovations stand for something “good” 
has to do with the fact that social innovations and much of the related debates 
underline the impact of democratic politics and active civil society—with implica-
tions on what innovation means and on what makes up the innovative capacity of 
societies.
Traditionally, innovation discourse was guided by a strong focus on market-
based developments, new ideas that get taken up by entrepreneurial capitalists who 
know how to turn a good idea into an innovative marketable product. In this per-
spective, societies based on market systems were considered dynamic societies, in 
contrast to traditional societies without market systems and to autocratic systems 
with centrally planned economies that failed to develop such dynamism.
However, markets have their own structural logic and so have political and so-
cietal systems. It was argued that the development and installation of guiding val-
ues, institutions and firm regulations need democratic politics and a guaranteed free 
space for society, with a double impact:
• The societal sphere, civil society in a more narrow sense and democratic institu-
tions with their modern political administrations, became a field of and for in-
novations, creating forms of living and organisation such as urban lifestyles, new 
organisational forms like associations, which co-shaped ideas about progress as 
human progress.
• Welfare states and civil societies created a framework of orientations and rules, 
which influence the types of innovative market-based products that could be 
successfully sold to consumers that were also citizens. The culture of modern 
democratic and welfare societies, their proceedings and regulations, had both 
selective and civilising impacts on market-based innovations, strengthening their 
social use values and restricting their negative side effects.
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The discourse on social innovations is different, since it expresses a different view 
of human progress. While acknowledging the importance of market systems in the 
generation of innovations, it also underlines the innovative potential of the civil 
sphere in society and of democratic state institutions. They have an impact by creat-
ing social innovations within their own domains and through their ability to civilise 
the social dimension of market-based innovations, products and technologies.
In our conceptualisation of social innovations, we expressed our sympathy with 
concepts of the social innovations that stem from neither the research and devel-
opment (R&D) centres of big business nor technocracies of central state admin-
istrations. The social innovations we focussed on express the vitality of open and 
pluralist systems, representing hopes and aspirations that escape or even confront 
dominating concepts of progress and innovation. They show that not one economic 
(often called neoliberal) or political concept and logic (often labelled as governmen-
tality) shape all spheres of society. They also show that market and state logics are 
not as per definition at odds with civil society initiatives, but that they are capable 
of producing links between agents and spheres in urban society.
The second aspect of the “good” in social innovations has to do with the fact that 
local social innovations can foster debates about new instruments, approaches and 
coping strategies dealing with challenges to inclusive social and urban develop-
ment.
They do so because they show that there are alternatives to prevailing orienta-
tions the path-dependent welfare states offer and to making public management 
similar to business management. The cases studied and presented in this book re-
sult in a kind of mosaic. They direct attention to a cultural turn in public services, 
regulations and governance, something illustrated by our case studies both of cities 
and of local innovations. The summary of major policy trends in the 20 cities in the 
introductory chapter of Part II, and the analysis of recurrent patterns found among 
the local social innovations in the introductory chapter of Part III point to the same 
key-issues:
1. Service innovations invest in capabilities; pave ways from mere protection to 
co-production; open approaches avoiding stigmatizing effects; bridge gaps, rec-
onciling professional services and people’s life worlds; create bundles of person-
alised support in order to meet users’ complex needs.
2. Innovations in regulations upgrade forms of ad hoc support by offering time-
limited loans; offer individually tailored combinations of services and benefits 
to curb new social risks; and work with “social” contracts that relate access 
to welfare support to people’s commitment—to work for themselves and the 
community.
3. Innovations in governance offer co-production and partnership by fostering units 
and types of organisation that operate in more socially embedded ways; promot-
ing recognition of new groups and themes; building issue-related inter-secto-
rial partnerships and platforms that work on “hot” items; favouring democratic 
decentralisation through participatory mechanisms in neighbourhoods.
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4. Innovations in modes of working and financing consolidate forms of multi-
professional teamwork including volunteers and civic commitment of support-
ers; produce new professionalism, combining formerly fragmented knowledge 
through dialogue with and involvement of users; operate on mixed funding, 
merging resources from stakeholders across sectors.
5. Innovations in how to conceive of (local) welfare systems focus on welfare 
mixes, reaching out to all sectors of local welfare systems and upgrading its 
community component; less standardised, more diverse and localised welfare 
arrangements; a welfare beyond established demarcation lines, that opens up to 
environmental and lifestyle politics, bridging economic and social policy con-
cerns, welfare and urban politics, focusing less on groups and more on situations 
and territories.
The key words and issues as they are recollected here can be viewed and taken up 
both as promising solutions to local problems and as messages to all those who are 
interested in changing the cultural orientations and policy frameworks of local wel-
fare, services and urban governance.
This leads to a third argument: social innovations offer good chances for promot-
ing change since they can be quite easily spilled over to similar milieus and settings 
in other spots and localities.
As argued above, it takes specific constellations of factors for local social inno-
vations to emerge—not only pressures and needs but also aspirations and openness 
of actors in the local context (see Chap. 2). In the academic debate on enabling con-
ditions for social innovations, it is common to point out factors that seem to be spe-
cifically local, such as social and cultural movements, traditions of solidarity within 
the local community, an urban texture where unconventional attitudes merge with 
entrepreneurial readiness and local elites that open up to new ideas and attempts.
This is however slightly misleading, as discussed in Chap. 3 of this book. None 
of these factors are exclusively local. Movements and projects in a city are usually 
related to social trends and strands of thinking, values and assumptions present at 
different points of society. Local experts taking part in innovative processes are 
usually members of networks that operate on (inter)national levels. Programmes 
with funding possibilities and their local nudges are often the result of initiatives by 
state experts at national level that encourage new approaches. Social innovation is 
multilevelled by nature.
Altogether, this points towards a process of social innovation that relies on inter-
play and contagion across domains, logics and multiple levels.
25.2  The Bad
What is the “bad” side of social innovations in the sense of short-lived and limited 
impact? In local welfare, we identified several negative aspects, of which we stress 
three: the short lifespan of most social innovations, the limited interest in transfer-
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ring them and the aspects of social innovation where the social dimensions appear 
more threatening than promising.
To begin with, most local social innovations are precarious. Like butterflies, 
they are pretty, but they lead a short life. There is a tendency in publicity on so-
cial innovation to discuss successful cases that become part of standard practice. 
Based on our evidence, we conclude that the reality of local social innovations is 
a different one. The majority remain local and last only a limited number of years. 
The emphasis on success stories and scaling up is an important one, with implica-
tions for the direction of future funding; but it is equally important to realise that 
the majority of local innovations (especially those not originating in professional 
organisations) do not fit such a pattern of growth and one should not disregard the 
cumulative effect of the many small, temporary initiatives that are of high value 
within their local context.
Of the innovations we studied, many were either discontinued after a few years 
or faced an uncertain future in the short term. Cutbacks in public sector funding no 
doubt play a part in this, but the underlying structural dynamics (such as project-
based funding, dependence on charismatic initiators, high mobility in cities that 
disengages people and shifting political fashions) suggest that the underlying condi-
tions are of a structural nature.
A second “bad” aspect of social innovations is that the innovators themselves of-
ten give little attention for diffusing them. In a market context, diffusion comes with 
profits and is the point of the initiative. The social innovation literature stresses the 
entrepreneurial and leadership side of the phenomena, and it goes without saying 
that innovators aim at popularizing widely what they are doing. This perspective 
suggests that social innovation comes with the inherent desire to spread the message 
and change the world. Looking at the usual examples of scaled social innovations, 
one could almost believe it. Our findings show, however, that this assumption can-
not be maintained for a considerable part of social innovations in local welfare. 
Many tend to be generated by projects, initiatives and actors from the third sector, 
who have no direct interest beyond their local context.
A detailed look at the cases shows that often groups of people or organisation 
took action in the face of a pressing local need: children went hungry, women were 
abused and young men wandered the streets aimlessly. They devoted great energy to 
get their initiative off the ground, scraping together resources and building on local 
knowledge. Their original interest was not selling their innovation in another city, 
let alone another country. This can be interpreted both as admirable commitment to 
local needs or as a lack of interest in problems beyond the borders of the commu-
nity. Either way, it limits the impact of social innovation to a far greater degree than 
its advocates usually admit.
A third element that we consider as “bad” is related to the fact that a significant 
part of social innovations represent cultural, economic and social aims and prac-
tices that are highly controversial or even seen by many as threatening rather than 
promising. For instance, there are consumer goods such as new technological de-
vices that generate personal information through apps and social media. They allow 
more (self-)control of health and performance, progress going hand in hand with the 
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risk that businesses or the state abuse data for their own purposes. Yet, such risks 
have not stopped such devices from spreading like wildfire. Likewise, businesses 
in the sharing economy like Uber are very ambivalent in their effects. Furthermore, 
new innovative instruments for the diagnosis of genetics, aiming at new forms of 
preventing health risks (including for the unborn), raise complicated ethical and 
social questions.
Socially threatening innovations like the ones mentioned tend to be ignored by 
the mainstream academic debate on “social” innovation, which prefers to focus on 
innovations with social dimensions largely considered as “good”. However, they 
have both a technical and a social dimension. Their social impact is high and their 
implicit aim is to encourage a certain style of living, working and consuming. Due 
to their controversial social impacts and aims, they neither fit in the pool of social 
innovations seen as basically good nor do they count as clearly unsocial innova-
tions.
Working with a broad notion of social innovations calls for research that system-
atically studies how to deal with controversies on social innovations with varying 
balance sheets of possibly good and bad social goals and impacts, depending on 
context and nature, and how this influences their development.
25.3  The Ugly
The “ugliness” in social innovation is to misrepresent them as something they are 
not. Probably the most common misrepresentation of social innovation is to im-
plicitly treat them as similar to business innovation and, as a result, ignore many 
of the special conditions needed to make them flourish. Sure enough, many so-
cial innovations originate from businesses, yet those in local welfare mostly origi-
nate in nonmarket contexts like the third sector or social movements (according to 
some definitions of social innovations, exclusively so). More importantly, there are 
fundamental differences compared to other types of innovations. For a start, they 
usually relate to services not products. This makes a difference in that it relates 
to ongoing relationships rather than discrete transactions and to outcomes rather 
than outputs. Furthermore, they are usually embedded in specific social relations. 
This, in turn, means that they are more contextually bound than their technological 
counterparts. An iPad will continue to function in the same way whether it is used 
in Stockholm, Dover or Belgrade. This is not the case for approaches or schemes 
working with people that rely on specific regulations and cultures to be effective. 
Finally, they tend to address social needs not sufficiently addressed by government 
programmes and markets. Indeed, local governments can even use such initiatives 
to justify their own inactivity or, through a symbolic financial gesture, construct 
political legitimacy by appearing to respond to social challenges.
As discussed in Chap. 3, all these have consequences for the emergence and 
development of social innovations. The implicit use of business models as a bench-
mark strengthens the already strong tendency to emphasise successful and scaled 
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examples. Though scaling is important , it concerns only a relatively small propor-
tion of social innovations and one that appears to be based primarily on a selective 
use of case studies. It also strongly underplays the significance of the vast majority 
of social innovations that are not or only partially diffused, remain restricted to a 
local area and last only for a relatively short period of time. Arguably, the cumula-
tive effect of such small initiatives is of far greater importance to society than the 
few star examples that achieve a wider impact. The emphasis on widely dispersed 
social innovations also tends to highlight the role of professional organisations and 
networks, given the importance of intermediaries for diffusing social innovations. 
By implication, it downplays the role of third sector organisations and citizens’ ini-
tiatives, whose roles are often confined to a local setting.
A second misrepresentation concerns the relationship between economic and so-
cial innovation. The underlying assumption of several studies and public statements 
is that prevailing politics of economic and urban growth and social innovation in 
cities go easily together and that they are complementary and part of a single strat-
egy to make cities more attractive, competitive and liveable. Even supporting this 
perspective, one would concede that the diffusion of innovations that challenge 
routines is problematic due to procedural and managerial difficulties, calling for 
effective strategies that strengthen acceptance. However, disregarding innovative 
attempts or picking up only certain parts and aspects points to a kind of selectivity 
of contexts related to controversial interests, priorities and strategies. Generally, 
local authorities tend to favour innovations complementary to their urban growth 
strategy, aimed at making the city more dynamic and attractive according to their 
terms. The fact that the most sustainable innovations in our sample were those either 
fully integrated into the local welfare administration or even initiated by the local 
authorities deserves closer examination. The case studies on Milan and Münster of-
fer good examples of the selective nature of such strategies, favouring innovations 
that were complementary to their growth strategy. Local social innovations fit to 
different degrees with the strategies of cities to become globally competitive places, 
attractive for urban elites. Urban gardening is one such example. However, innova-
tions focussing on people at the fringes of urban society are of minor relevance for 
such strategies. Such types of innovations have proven especially vulnerable to cut-
backs and shifts in political mood. The British examples of local social innovations 
are good illustrations of this.
The third “ugly” trait that makes it difficult to find appropriate ways of dealing 
with social innovations in public policies is the one-sided presentation of welfare 
state reform as a primarily top–down process, giving priority to regulating and 
standardising over securing open spaces for social innovation. This state-centred 
concept of change and reform is historically untrue, as many social innovations 
avant la lettre were incorporated into state-sponsored schemes and reality is more 
hybrid than often acknowledged. The focus on welfare regimes in academic debate 
has all but written bottom–up innovation out of a welfare state and presents the 
history of social reform history as top–down process of large-scale institutions and 
regulations. It ignores the basic role of experimentation and bottom–up innovation 
in nudging and realising successful reforms.
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25.4  Finally
Research on social innovation has progressed slowly in recent years, caught be-
tween many imperatives. In particular, it has hovered unsteadily between highly 
abstract (meta-)theories and conceptualisations, a flood of interesting illustrative 
examples and a barrage of practical guidelines with a largely intuitive basis. There 
are few signs that the social innovation literature has already got a firm place in 
academic debates in established disciplines. As a matter of fact, there is not much 
debate, the points of contention have not crystallised clearly. This, however, is a 
necessary precondition for the state of the art to move forward. We need scepticism 
and disagreement.
It would certainly help if research on social innovation more wholeheartedly 
embraced failure and thwarted ambition. The road to realising social innovations 
is a rocky one, and many are left behind. One reason is that they get embroiled 
in “legitimate controversies”. Social innovations are political in nature and not all 
political initiatives survive. But our evidence shows that the failure of social in-
novations is also due to widespread risk-averse attitudes when it comes to social 
experimentation. Despite paying lip service to innovation, authorities tend to prefer 
what is known and tested—be it in the tradition of state regulation and standard 
setting or through a swing towards approaches working well in the business sector. 
Innovations guided by other social values and assumptions than those prevailing 
traditionally in administrations and business have a harder job. They need support-
ers that show some readiness to take a risk and help to realise at least some kind of 
open space, some clearings within the otherwise rather dense jungle of regulations 
and standards.
In the face of innovations with the potential to revolutionise the economy and 
areas like labour market relations, it would be silly to argue that new common rules 
and large-scale regulations are not needed. The social innovations covered in this 
book, however, need another kind of state intervention. They are local, often dis-
persed and precarious. They call for enabling welfare policies that give room for 
experimentation, listen to the messages of innovators and find ways for using their 
expertise. For decades, welfare has been linked to universality, but it should be 
linked to diversity as well. Welfare policies must practise experimentation and think 
in terms of dilemmas to get the best of both worlds. May this book encourage re-
searchers, policymakers and professionals to take steps in that direction.
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